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INFORMACJE O AUTORACH Katarzyna Maniszewska Collegium Civitas, Warszawa, Polska Renee Stillings Study, Research, and Custom Programs Abroad (SRAS), USA Paulina Piasecka Collegium Civitas, Warszawa, Polska |
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Słowa kluczowe state |asymmetric threats |hybrid warfare |non-state actors |conventional warfare |cyber attacksStreszczenie In recent decades, the international stage has witnessed warfare’s evolution away from conventional tactics. Whereas historically rivaling nation-states dueled on rigid battlefields to declare a winning power, modern tactics have blurred the lines between war and peace while removing definite fronts, actors, and necessary capabilities. This is representative of modern-day asymmetric threats: used generally by weaker actors in conflict to exploit vulnerabilities in a more powerful opponent, these strategies circumvent direct confrontation while being unconventional, irregular, and difficult to combat. In unison with traditional war tactics, these characterize hybrid warfare which combines asymmetric and conventional aspects of conflict. This paper will examine asymmetric and hybrid threats, their status modeling conflict in the 21st century, and the actors, both state and non-state, that drive their use. Further, a variety of case studies will be examined from which recommendations to combat asymmetric and hybrid tactics will be made. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA
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Zoë Brammer
Active Cyber Defense and Operational Environment Preparation: An Opportunity for Progress
35 – 49
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Słowa kluczowe cybersecurity |Cyber Defense |active cyber defense |cyber situational awareness |operational environment preparationStreszczenie The prevalence of threats in the cyber domain have become increasingly evident, as signaled by the widespread adoption of military strategies aimed directly at information flows in a race to establish “cyber dominance”. These strategies tend to be offensive in orientation, inefficient, and event-specific, causing them to rapidly become outdated. Due to the ever-changing nature of the cyber domain and the inability of a single state to dominate cyberspace, states should begin to adopt stronger defensive orientations in their quest for cybersecurity. This paper highlights two areas of cybersecurity–active cyber defense (ACD) and operational environment preparation (OEP)–that provide ample opportunity for cyber defense improvement. I then make three actionable recommendations, all of which address gaps in both ACD and cyber OEP that together will result in improved cybersecurity. In this way, improving cyber defense capabilities can be resource-efficient, sustainable, and effective. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Clark University, USA
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Sarah Gossett
Shaping Future Internet Policy: Balancing Freedom and Security Through Globalization
50 – 71
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Słowa kluczowe internet |internet policy |WWW |World Wide WebStreszczenie Information Communication Technology (ICT) advancements have a significant effect on the balance of international security and freedom. This relationship has exposed a pattern of waves in the levels of social, economic, and political globalization over the last century. Nations have failed to adapt to rapid societal changes and to understand the pattern and its relationship to international security, freedom, and human rights, only delaying and increasing the risk of global instability. The internet is the most recent ICT advancement, but its unprecedented capabilities have made it difficult to anticipate social, economic, and political effects when left improperly regulated. Finding a solution at the international level requires finding a middle ground with potential to benefit all countries. Every country’s unique condition makes it impossible to find a strict one-size-fits-all approach to internet regulation. Factors such as development, location, history, culture (traditions and morals), and governance must be taken into account and used to establish boundaries for the minimum and maximum levels of internet regulation. The actions needed to combat internet threats to security (misinformation, calls for violence, hacking, and cyber attacks) and individual freedom (suppressed, private data collection, threats to journalists, and excessive censorship) will require sacrifices to both to find a suitable balance. Extreme internet freedom or censorship will continue to deteriorate global stability by pushing public opinion toward nationalism and isolationism. Failure to maintain and improve globalization through balanced international internet policies provoke single-stakeholder control to threats such as internet sovereignty, access monopolization, and the privatization of human rights. This article seeks to further explain these relationships and offer recommendations for a long-term, balanced approach with defined minimum and maximum levels of internet regulation through the comparison of biases and internet policies between the United States, the European Union, and China, as well as policies established by the United Nations and private sector. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, USA
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Steven Davic
The American Ape at the CIA: The Origin of Evolved and Learned Cognitive Mechanisms that Cloud Intelligence Analysts’ Reasoning
72 – 107
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Słowa kluczowe evolutionary psychology |structured analytic techniques |intelligence analysis |information analysis |Intelligence services |cheater-detectionStreszczenie All human behavior may be understood as an interaction between genes and the environment. The integration of innate cognitive mechanisms (from genes) and learned cultural mindsets (from the environment) profoundly affects our ability to perceive and interact with the world around us rationally. While we share innate cognitive mechanisms across the human population, cultural mindsets have substantial variation, even within the same country. Both the innate cognitive mechanisms and learned cultural mindsets have a substantial influence on intelligence and security analysts’ objective reasoning abilities. Challenges arise when analysts’ cultural mindsets do not align with their targeted group’s (or individual’s) cultural mindsets. Although the Intelligence Community (IC) has made significant strides to address these challenges, through structured analytical techniques (SATs), the professionalization of intelligence analysis, and uniform analytical standards, insights from other academic disciplines may offer additional/alternative solutions. In this paper, knowledge from Evolutionary Psychology, Cultural Anthropology, and Neuroscience is explored to gain insight into why humans view the world in diverse but shared ways, and its implications on the intelligence community. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
James Madison University (JMU), USA
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Jefferson T. Stamp
Yea or Nay on Huawei? Altering the Balance of the 5G Technology War in Europe
108 – 124
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Słowa kluczowe security |hegemony |NATO |telecommunications |Huawei |5G |technological disruption |strategic information warfare |surveillance |intelligence |export controls |geopoliticalStreszczenie Although the potential security threat posed by Huawei’s 5G technology has been under review for more than a year, Europe still lacks a unified response. The indecision is due in part to NATO’s inability to address technology-based security issues that arise from international trade. To combat European ambivalence, the U.S. strategy has been to render Huawei an unreliable vendor in 5G development through the enforcement of export controls. In effect, the U.S. is using its hegemonic power in the international trading system to coerce European countries into an emerging technology-based security regime in opposition to the Chinese surveillance state. The research presented herein explores Huawei’s technological disruption in the geopolitical context of strategic information warfare and examines how these factors color the current debate. The research demonstrates that, when making their ultimate decision on Huawei’s 5G technology, European countries should consider the impact of technological disruption and strategic information warfare on the integrity of the international system as well as the importance of retaining sovereignty over critical infrastructure in the maintenance of their democratic societies and values. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, USA
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Streszczenie The weaponization of chemicals and biological agents have higher mortality rates and demoralizing effects than conventional weapons, and thus considered weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since World War I, the use of chemical warfare has dominated the international stage. Multiple countries have conducted extensive biological R&D and acquired an advanced capability, however aside from toxins, there has been less actual deployment of biological weapons. Nevertheless, recent advances in biotechnology allow for more advanced weaponization of biological agents. After the proliferation and use of these unconventional weapons globally, the international community started to acknowledge the inhumane and demoralizing effects of them and as a result, security apparatuses to prevent proliferation and prohibit the use of them through international agreements, conventions and organizations. History shows that countries have violated international agreements. Countries with an extensive chemical and biological infrastructure, are considered potential actors to weaponize these materials, as many equipment, supplies, and facilities care considered dual-use in which they can be used for both peaceful and military purposes. Additionally, major difficulties arise in the verifying the use of these weapons and attributing blame as confirmation of allegations often takes time. Nevertheless, it is important to monitor countries who are likely to have capability and intentions to use these weapons such as Russia, Syria, North Korea, China and Iran. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
James Madison University (JMU), USA
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Słowa kluczowe EU counterterrorism |US counterterrorism |terrorism-as-crime |terrorismas- war |rhetoric |transatlantic divide |transatlantic relations |convergence |EU-US relationsStreszczenie This paper attempts to analyze the risks that lie in a military approach to counterterrorism and the development of European Union counterterrorism after 9/11. It describes the immediate responses of the US and the EU to 9/11 and attempts to explain, why they adopted different approaches in the aftermath. Furthermore, it analyzes the reactions to the Paris attacks in 2015 and argues that these attacks, together with the ones perpetrated in 2016, mark a shift in EU counterterrorism. It finally asks whether US and EU approaches to counterterrorism have converged in recent years and what chances and risks this eventual convergence entails. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Universität Tübingen, Niemcy
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Słowa kluczowe NATO |cybersecurity |Cyber Defense |Article 5 |Collective defense |Collective security |Attribution |ProportionalityStreszczenie As cyberspace expands to encompass all aspects of life, so too do the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure and information expand. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) historically has been a force for collective defense and has not shied away from meeting developing cyberthreats from state and non-state entities alike. The primary objective of this short paper is to highlight the unique nature of cyber defense and countering cyberattacks, particularly in the context of NATO’s Article 5. I will briefly discuss the language of Article 5, as well as a few of the major challenges that could arise if the article (or any sort of international legal action) were invoked in response to some serious cyberattack, particularly attribution and proportionality, using the infamous 2007 cyberattack against Estonia as a brief case study. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
University of Texas at Austin, USA
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McKenzie Kotara
How Gun Policies Between The United States of America and the European Union Affect Modes of Violence Used by Far-Right Groups
177 – 190
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Słowa kluczowe far-right |Guns |gun policies |US |EUStreszczenie The overall purpose of this paper is to explore the gun policies between the United States of America and the European Union in order to gain an understanding of how these policies might affect what modes of violence are used by far-right groups between the two regions. This research was conducted through extensive literature and data review from several different sources, such as the TESAT report and use of data from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. In this paper, we find that guns policies do not affect the modes of violence used by far-right groups between the United States and the European Union, even though the two have extremely different policies when it comes to the use and possession of firearms. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
University of Texas at Austin, USA
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Sami Shihadeh
The Relation Between the Refugee Crisis, Terrorism, and Far-right Extremism in Europe
191 – 202
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Słowa kluczowe European Union |terrorism |ISIS |Immigration |Refugees |ExtremismStreszczenie This paper examines how terrorist groups have capitalized on the immigration and refugee crisis. First the paper looks at the possible threat of European ISIS fighters returning back to Western European countries under the guise of asylum seekers. Then the paper looks at the rise of terrorism in Europe; evaluates possible outcomes of this crisis or any possible future one, and provides recommendations to mitigate immigration processes without compromising international security. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Middlebury Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California, USA
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Marianne Perkins
The Role of Disinformation in Migration: Case Studies of the United States and Sweden
203 – 221
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Słowa kluczowe migration |Disinformation |misinformation |fake news |Immigration |United States of America |SwedenStreszczenie Fake news, junk news, disinformation, and countermedia are distinct from similar terms like misinformation due to their intentionality to mislead. Disinformation has existed for centuries, but its forms today in the information age are especially dangerous with the possibility of high levels of amplification on social media. The characteristics of democratic elections – such as in the United States 2016 presidential election – may very well be changed by the increase in and specialization of echo chambers filled with like-minded individuals and often also disinformation. These echo chambers result in increased polarization with little resolve and many countries confused as to what is the solution to fighting disinformation. Mitigation strategies are possible and necessary for individuals and countries to win the so-called information war. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
East Tennessee State University, USA
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Słowa kluczowe pornography |human trafficking |sexual exploitation |Sexual offending |sexual violence |prostitution |rape |terrorism |evolutionary psychologyStreszczenie The following is intended as an introduction for students and professionals to consider sexual offending within the context of terrorism. Specifically, sexual offending is reviewed as a means of inducing terror (e.g., rape), and as advantageous for recruiting (e.g., access to sexual slaves) and funding (e.g., prostitution) for terrorist organizations. The present analysis is meant to provide a truncated overview rather than a comprehensive examination. Interested readers are directed to other sources for more detailed coverage of topics such as prostitution and terrorism, rape during warfare, terrorism, evolutionary psychology and evolutionary perspectives on terrorism. A report from the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate836 describes more examples of terrorist organizations recruiting and financing in relation to sexual offenses. The main intent of the present review is to encourage and stimulate future scientific research on sexual offenses and terrorist activities, with specific regard for improving counterterrorism policy and programs. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Oakland University in Rochester, USA
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Kathryn Weston
The Frequency and Influence of Far-Right Extremism in Current and Former American Military Personnel
238 – 246
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Słowa kluczowe far-right |white supremacy |Atomwaffen |Boogaloo |United States military |FBI |DHSStreszczenie This paper examines the role of current and former American military personnel within white supremacist groups in the United States. I draw upon three specific case studies and broader FBI data to establish the influence and role of military personnel within white supremacist organizations. As this paper highlights, military personnel influence includes the contribution of skills acquired through specialized training in weapons, tactics, and organizational skills. The parameters of my research include three case studies from the past three years that effectively illustrate the reason for renewed interest in the issue. I will then explain the purpose and scope of an assessment conducted by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the consequent public outrage after its leak; following this, I will summarize the findings in an FBI assessment on military recruits in white supremacist organizations in the United States. Finally, I will propose my own solutions, which include renewing the government’s research efforts to accommodate online participation in this movement. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
University of Missouri-Columbia, USA
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Yasmeen Jones
The Impact of Terrorism on Border Security in the EU: The Case of the Islamic State
247 – 269
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Słowa kluczowe terrorism |IS |Islamic StateStreszczenie The Islamic State (IS) has been around since the 1990’s under different leadership and commonly referred to as ISIS. It was not until 2013 when the group changed their name to the Islamic State. Since the 2000’s, the expansion of the Islamic State has grown significantly. IS has been in battle to overtake many regions within Syria and Iraq to acquire control of lands and assets. US-led invasions with joint forces from Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, and the UK have taken part of the coalition to deter and expel the rise of the Islamic State from gaining complete power in the Middle East. The economic advantages that IS receives from conquering different regions in Syria and Iraq comes with benefits such as oil, taxes, smuggling artifacts/art, and prospering from business deals with human trafficking dealers, which has given the terrorist organization the fundamental means to procure, govern, recruit, pay, and distribute their beliefs across the globe. The network of the terrorist organization has enlarged to a degree where there are individuals all over the world who pose a threat. Countries in the South/Southeast Asia (i.e. the Philippines) and in the EU (i.e. France, UK, Belgium, and Germany), have seen an increase in terrorist plots or attempted attacks within the past five years due to many Muslim citizens and non-Muslims citizens (i.e. young vulnerable males and criminals) being persuaded to convert into foreign fighters due to the progression of radicalization and digital recruiting methods used by IS. In response, the EU has enacted strict mandates formed for restrictions and more effect guidelines for border security, to deter any terrorist threat in the present and future times. Effective policies and border agencies such as FRONTEX and European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) to challenge and mitigate any threat possible from entering into the EU. This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism organized and/or inspired by IS to EU security with a focus on border security. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Syracuse University, New York, USA
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