Numer 11 (2/2021)
Subjectivity in relation to values and norms
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Maria Gołębiewska,
Anna Michalska Introduction to the issue: Subjectivity in relation to values and norms
341 – 345
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INFORMACJE O AUTORACH Maria Gołębiewska Polska Akademia Nauk Anna Michalska Polska Akademia Nauk |
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Anna Drabarek
A revitalisation of virtue ethics in contemporary education
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.1
349 – 361
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Słowa kluczowe virtue |self-improvement |virtue ethics in educationStreszczenie In this article I will discuss employing the classical prescripts of Aristotle’s virtue ethics in education as a guide for youth education. For Aristotle, the practice of virtues was not a goal in itself, since virtues are dispositions which may be revealed in various acts reflecting human perfection. Virtues tell us how to act to achieve a particular goal. The ethics of virtue highlights the love of good and perfection. The attitude of a justly proud man consists, among other things, in approving of what is good; at the same time, however, he strives towards selfsufficiency. Self-improvement, which emphasises self-sufficiency, often becomes behaviour that can, unfortunately, generate standoffishness, arrogance, and egotism. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Akademia Pedagogiki Specjalnej im. Marii Grzegorzewskiej, Warszawa
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Sebastian Hüsch
Geistlosigkeit. Reflexionen zur Aktualität von Søren Kierkegaards Konstruktion des Selbst im Spannungsfeld von Immanenz und Transzendenz
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.2
363 – 381
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Słowa kluczowe Søren Kierkegaard |spiritlessness |self |immanence |transcendenceStreszczenie One of the most suggestive and provocative concepts developed by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard is the concept of “spiritlessness”. Spiritlessness is conceived of as a state of mind which cuts out transcendent possibilities at the benefice of reduced immanent probabilities and thus hinders the individual to become a true Self. The present paper asks for the topicality of Kierkegaard’s dialectics of “spirit” and “spiritlessness” for the constitution of the Self in the 21st cntury. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Université d'Aix-Marseille, Francja
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Jaromir Brejdak
Genealogy of collective intentionality. Max Scheler and Michael Tomasello
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.3
383 – 402
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Słowa kluczowe Max Scheler |values |collective intentionality |emotional intentionality |phenomenology of community |evolutionary psychology |Michael TomasselloStreszczenie The present paper attempts to look at on the genealogy of both shared intentionality and collective intentionality, comparing Michael Tomasello’s concept with Max Scheler’s threedimensional concept of intentionality: ens amans, ens volens, ens cogitans, as affective, conative, and cognitive intentionality. I focus on various forms of affective collective intentionality — Schelerian forms of sympathy — to show collective subjectivity from the whole spectrum of emotional intentionality, presented by Scheler’s example of parents standing over the corpse of a child. Even though Tomasello’s works seem to empirically corroborate Scheler’s intuitions about the emotional genealogy of collective intentionality, they will differ in the horizons within they locate intentionality. In the case of the evolutionary psychology of Tomasello, we can talk about the horizon of cooperation, in the case of Scheler’s Scheler’s phenomenology of acts about the horizon of responsibility or co-responsibility, which gives intentionality its unique character. The similarities of both concepts concern the following pillars: 1) genealogy of intentionality covering the dimension of affective intentionality, conative intentionality, and the level of cognitive intentionality; 2) Imitation or, as Scheler would say, following someone. Because a person is recognized by the author of Formalism as an act, or a bundle of acts, the way to understanding and communication with another person is the maieutic coperformance of their acts — i.e., imitation. The maieutic co-execution of acts of others triggers the constitution process of a person, both on an individual and community level. We can speak, in the case of Tomasello, about the ontho- and sociogenetic function of co-executing acts or imitating; however, in the case of Scheler, we are dealing with the clearly axiological nature of such a constitution of both the individual and collective subjectivity (axiological ego, axiological communio); 3) collaborative engagement as a driving force behind collective intentionality in one case in form of co-responsibility, a nature of a collective person (Scheler); in the other case in form of collaboration developing intentionality to various units of community life (Tomasello). INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Uniwersytet Szczeciński
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Anna Alichniewicz
Monstrous body: between alienness and ownness
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.4
403 – 414
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Słowa kluczowe monstrosity |the monstrous |pairing |flesh |chiasmStreszczenie Monstrosity has its recognized place in cultural narratives but in philosophical discourse it remains mostly untouched. In my paper I make an attempt at phenomenological inquiry into the experience of the Other’s monstrous body. I am beginning with some remarks concerning Georges Canguilhem and Michel Foucault, the philosophers who devoted some attention to the problem of monstrosity and the monstrous, but my analysis is mainly based on the works of Bernhard Waldenfels, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Waldenfels emphasizes that the corporeal self is somehow perceived as alien, always somewhat distanced and not totally graspable. He also argues that the closer the Other, the stronger activation of the boundary between the spheres of the ownness and the alienness is caused. A promising framework for the analysis of the ambivalent reaction brought about by the encounter with a monstrous human body can be provided by Husserl’s phenomenological inquiry into the process of pairing, developed in his Cartesian meditations. It seems that in this experience the pairing process is frustrating and deranged because the process of apperception is disturbed by a cluster of untypical or quite unique characteristics of the monstrous body. In result, its sense remains unclear, puzzling and challenging. Interesting light on the experience of the Other’s monstrous body could shed Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, especially the ideas of flesh and chiasm outlined in his last work. The radical character of the monster, while does not render it something totally different from the own, elucidates, however, the contingency of the order under which the human corporeality is subsumed. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Uniwersytet Medyczny w Łodzi
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Maria Gołębiewska
Legal interpretation in Paul Amselek’s phenomenology of law — between subjectivism and objectivism
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.5
415 – 433
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Słowa kluczowe hermeneutics |meaning |understanding |intersubjectivity |sense |intentionStreszczenie The aim of the article is to characterise and analyse Paul Amselek’s research approach to legal hermeneutics. The text provides an outline of Amselek’s assumptions and theses about legal interpretation, considered in the broad context of hermeneutics, and in the narrower context of legal logic and argument (including rhetoric and speech act theory). In point of fact, one of the methodological aims of Amselek’s philosophical reflection is to harmonise the two indicated contexts for framing interpretation — the wide context of hermeneutics, and the more narrow context of legal logic and argument. Amselek refers to issues in communication theory, reaching beyond the hermeneutic concept of text interpretation and evocation of the original authorial intention. He analyses the legal text-message in its content and argument layers, he also endeavours to specify the methodological possibilities of interpreting the attitudes and motivations of subjects — participants in communication situation (the sender and receiver of the message). He also inquires about the ethical attitudes of jurisdiction authorities, performing the interpretation of a body of law — the subjects responsible for lawmaking and the execution of law. Adopting post-Enlightenment anthropological assumptions, Amselek accepts the primacy of rationality in cognition, decision making, and activity of the human individual. However, in his considerations on interpretation he concurrently underscores the role of affective factors, motivating many choices and actions made by legal subjects. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Polska Akademia Nauk
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Agnieszka Doda-Wyszyńska,
Monika Obrębska The political subject and hero in culture in the light of Juri Lotman’s theory. The case of Lech Wałęsa
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.6
435 – 446
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Słowa kluczowe Juri Lotman |Lech Wałęsa |subject |hero |explosionStreszczenie Politics appears to have a direct impact on the quality of our lives as citizens of states. We outline here the dependence between culture and its inherent mechanism of forgetting, and between a hero and a political subject. We employ the theory of Juri Lotman, who underlines the role of individuals and of single events in culture. The primary illustration given is the figure of Lech Wałęsa, politician, legendary co-founder of the Solidarity trade union, and Nobel Peace Prize winner. He exemplifies Lotman’s notion of a mobile hero, one who powered the course of history, but whose present-day political and social activity is of an empty and querulous nature, lacking a goal and deeper meaning, while the actions he performs take place within a closed semantic field. He is an example of a paradoxical hero, whose actions no longer generate tensions or build a new semiotic quality. Wałęsa’s problem is the ossification of his discourse and failure to perceive that transformation has already taken place. INFORMACJE O AUTORACH Agnieszka Doda-Wyszyńska Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu Monika Obrębska Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu |
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Anna Michalska
Transcendentalism, social embeddeddness, and the problem of individuality
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.7
447 – 463
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Słowa kluczowe Transcendentalism |normativity |social embeddedness |social development |psychological development |imitation learningStreszczenie It would not be much of an exaggeration to say that the notion of ecological and social embeddedness is one of the most exploited philosophical ideas these days, both in the academia and beyond. The most troublesome about the overall trend is that many proponents of the idea of social embeddedness simplistically consider selfhood as a form of aberration which merely provides vindication for inequality and violence. In this paper, instead of attacking the problem of the individual versus the collective head-on, I approach it by way of a critique of Stephen Turner’s repudiation of transcendental collectivism (Turner, 1994; Turner, 2010). According to Turner, transcendental entities, such as tacit knowledge, presuppositions, or traditions, should be altogether removed from explanatory schemata in the social sciences. I believe that Turner’s razor cuts too deep and the rejection of implicit framing is at best premature. Against the background of the identified shortcomings of Turner’s model of interactive learning, I track the interrelations between social development and the development of the self with an eye to showing that the relationship between individual selves and social reality is an extremely complex and multifactorial matter which we cannot hope to navigate without a proper transcendental frame. The frame is what mediates the relationship between the individual and the collective. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Polska Akademia Nauk
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Przemysław Szczurek
Dharmarāja and Dhammarāja (II). Yudhiṣṭhira’s moral dilemmas before the great battle (Mahābhārata 5,70)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.8
465 – 495
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Słowa kluczowe war |Yudhiṣṭhira |Mahābhārata |Pāli Canon |Buddhist ethics |kṣatriyadharma |peaceStreszczenie The paper offers a close examination of the Mahābhārata’s adhyāya 5,70, one of the more interesting and representative chapters to analyse Yudhiṣṭhira’s attitude on the dharma of the king and warfare. In this long chapter addressing Kṛṣṇa (before the latter’s diplomatic mission to Kauravas), the king deprived of his kingdom presents two different attitudes. On one hand, he states that even though peaceful conflict resolution would be the best to regain the kingdom, the war must be accepted if it is inevitable. On the other hand, he expresses his disapproval of war as evil in any form (MBh 5,70.44–66). Yudhiṣṭhira’s ambivalent utterance is analysed against the background of early Buddhist ethics (as represented in the Pāli Canon), totally condemning war, and other passages from the Mahābhārata, especially those glorifying the dharma of kṣatriyas. INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Uniwersytet Wrocławski
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Nina Budziszewska
Synkretyczne pouczenie jogiczne w Ćarakasanhicie (Śarirasthana 1.137–155)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.9
497 – 508
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Anna Maria Laskowska
Euklidesowy traktat Podział kanonu i pitagorejska harmonika
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.10
509 – 524
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Słowa kluczowe muzyka |Euklides |harmonika |Pitagoras |teoria proporcji |matematykaINFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Polska Akademia Nauk
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Słowa kluczowe kanon |Euklides |proporcja |starożytna teoria muzykiStreszczenie Przekład: Anna Maria Laskowska Źródło przekładu: Janus, C. (Ed.). (1895). Euclidis sectio canonis. (pp. 113–166). In: C. Janus (Ed.). Musici scriptores graeci. Lipsiae: B.G. Teubner. |
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Paweł Sznajder
Recenzja: Dominika Czakon, Zagubienie w interpretacji. Hans-Georg Gadamer wobec kultury i sztuki współczesnej. Jan Pomorski, Rzecz o wyobraźni historycznej. Ćwiczenia z hermeneutyki
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.12
545 – 548
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INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie
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Magdalena Reuter
Recenzja: Anil Seth, Being you. A new science of consciousness
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24917/20841043.11.2.13
549 – 553
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INFORMACJE O AUTORZE
Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny im. KEN w Krakowie
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