Numer 49 (2/2018)
Editors of the Volume: Monika Murawska, Piotr Schollenberger


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Monika Murawska,
Piotr Schollenberger
Introduction
9 – 10
PDF (11)

Affiliation

Matthew E. Gladden
A Phenomenological “Aesthetics of Isolation” as Environmental Aesthetics for an Era of Ubiquitous Art
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.1
11 – 25
PDF (11)

Keywords

aesthetic overload, isolation, environmental aesthetics, Ingarden, Berleant

Abstract

Here the concept of the human being as a “relatively isolated system” developed in Ingarden’s later phenomenology is adapted into an “aesthetics of isolation” that complements conventional environmental aesthetics. Such an aesthetics of isolation is especially relevant, given the growing “aesthetic overload” brought about by ubiquitous computing and new forms of art and aesthetic experience such as those involving virtual reality, interactive online performance art, and artificial creativity.

Affiliation

Polish Academy of Sciences / Institute of Computer Science
Anglia Ruskin University / Lord Ashcroft International Business School
Magdalena Krasińska
The Convergence of Phenomenology and Semiotics in Georges Didi-Huberman’s Aesthetics of the Symptom
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.2
27 – 40
PDF (9)

Keywords

phenomenology, symptom, aesthetics of the symptom, semiotics, history of art, Georges Didi-Huberman, Erwin Panofsky, Immanuel Kant

Abstract

The goal of this article is to present the aesthetics of the symptom proposed by Georges Didi-Huberman, which in the context of the theory of the image attempts to integrate a phenomenological and semiological description. The article starts with his critique of the discipline of art history as dominated by an effort to make it a science and to widen the range of knowledge about images, whose most striking manifestation the French author finds in Erwin Panofsky’s iconological method, which is modelled on the “neo-Kantian” key, i.e., the philosophy of symbolic forms. Didi-Huberman proposes going back to the conclusions drawn from Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where we find, for example, the concept of the aesthetic idea. The impreciseness of experience and impossibility of reducing experience to a concept should, as Didi-Huberman contends, be given due recognition in the history of art, which he justifies with the application of the term “symptom” adapted from Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis. The symptom undermines the central position of the art historian as a subject of knowledge and opens the theory of the image to lack-of-knowledge. In turn, the aesthetics of the symptom is supposed to encompass both the meaningful and the phenomenal.

Affiliation

University of Warsaw / Institute of Philosophy
Edyta Kuzian
Aesthetic Bodily Intentionality in Dance: Developing the Classical Notion of Intentionality
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.3
41 – 58
PDF (10)

Keywords

Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, bodily intentionality, dance, aesthetic bodily intentionality

Abstract

In this article, my main strategy is to analyze Merleau-Ponty’s use of intentionality in order to do three things: first, I delineate Merleau-Ponty’s departures from Husserl’s semantic conception of intentionality. Second, I clarify and develop Merleau-Ponty own positive and distinctive account of perception in terms of bodily intentionality. Thirdly, I suggest that Merleau-Pontian account of the bodily intentionality is incomplete because it cannot describe the bodily movement in dance.

Affiliation

Clemson University, South Carolina, USA
Regina-Nino Mion
Husserl’s Theory of the Image Applied to Conceptual Art
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.4
59 – 70
PDF (11)

Keywords

Husserl, image object, image word, perceptual figment, conceptual art

Abstract

Edmund Husserl has famously declared that “Without an image, there is no fine art.” The aim of the article is to find out whether conceptual art can be experienced as image as well. It will be shown that Joseph Kosuth’s conceptual artwork One and Three Chairs (1965) perfectly illustrates Husserl’s theory of image consciousness and the concept of “image.” Thus, Husserl’s theory makes a valuable contribution in understanding conceptual (and contemporary) art.

Affiliation

Estonian Academy of Arts / Faculty of Art and Culture
Błażej Mzyk
Moritz Geiger’s Postulate of Aesthetics as an Autonomous Science
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.5
71 – 84
PDF (8)

Keywords

phenomenology, Moritz Geiger, aesthetics’ autonomy, aesthetic values, methodology

Abstract

Moritz Geiger (1880–1937) in Phänomenologische Ästhetik paper postulates aesthetics to become an autonomous science. The new science is intended to analyze aesthetic values and to discover the rules of their regulations. It tends to be separated from aesthetics as the sub-discipline of philosophy (especially under the influence of metaphysics) and aesthetics as a field of applying other sciences (mainly psychology). It may be achieved by the usage of a phenomenological method.

Affiliation

Jagiellonian University in Kraków / Faculty of Philosophy
Dena Shottenkirk
Global Grammar
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.6
85 – 100
PDF (9)

Keywords

philosophy, contemporary art, aesthetics, relativism, art theory

Abstract

I argue that art is a kind of epistemology. It is a way we know the world. But it is not knowing the world in the way that old correspondence theory of empiricism claimed, nor what the rationalists wanted to believe: we cannot simply look at the world or have it conceptually come to us, unbidden, unedited, clear and distinct. There is no a priori “given.” Instead, the “world” comes at us with a plethora of data: massive bits of information, some of which is attentional and noticed consciously, some unconsciously, and much not noticed at all. We edit, we select. We do both as a result of being previously told what to notice (e.g., the usual designation of public objects), and as a result of selecting what pragmatically matters to each of us as individuals.

My view gives credence to the epistemic role played by art; I argue that the act of understanding art is an act that allows the viewer to enter the phenomenal experience of the individual artist—through the phenomenal experience’s symbolism encapsulated in the artwork—and allows that phenomenal experience to enter the domain of social facts. It is a transfer of knowledge, from a first-person account of being in the world to a third-person account. In this, individually experienced qualia (e.g., the artist’ experience) become socially constructed concepts (in the process of audience viewing and acceptance), and the non-linguistic experience of the artist is converted into the linguistic practice of the group. We are at a point in history where that is evident. That art is a kind of epistemic experience is evident in contemporary art because we have not only traveled past modernism, with its epistemic notions of progress and objective truth, but past postmodernism and its notions of relativism, and have arrived at a moment in history where the meaning in an artwork is not derived from the movement with which the art has aligned itself, but from the point of the individual artist. It is an experience that has at its fingertips the general rules, the general grammar, of post-modernism’s theories and modernism’s styles.

It is a view of art that argues that art is not merely a pleasant leisure activity, not merely a search for beauty, but one of the important ways that we construct and understand our world. Art tells us what to see, how to parse the selected data into useful entities, and thus how to chunk, so to speak, the ontological world. Thus, art doesn’t only make a sub-set of the data legible and meaningful, it also tells how to value that ontology: what to care about, and how to relate that to other things that we care about. It gives us the world we value.

Affiliation

Brooklyn College, New York, USA
Gina Zavota
Rethinking Space in Telepresence Art through Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind”
DOI: 10.19205/49.18.7
101 – 113
PDF (7)

Keywords

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Eduardo Kac, telepresence art, space, embodiment

Abstract

Eduardo Kac, an important contemporary telepresence artist, has maintained that tele-presence art contributes to the breakdown of our sense of space. His argument rests in part on a reading of Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind.” Contrary to Kac on this matter, I argue that an interpretation of telepresence art through Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that such art diminishes our experience of space; in fact, such a reading can reveal telepresence art to be a means of expanding that experience.

Affiliation

Kent State University, Ohio, United States
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1 – 116
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