BOOK OF ABSTRACTS

Roman Ingarden and Our Times. An International Philosophical Congress

12-15 April 2021
ONLINE
(Central European Time, UTC +1)

Jagiellonian University in Kraków
Poland
2021
KEYNOTE SPEAKERS PRESENTATIONS

1. Jeff Mitscherling (University of Guelph)

Lipps, Stein and Ingarden on Empathy and the Coexperiencing of Value in the Aesthetic Experience

Over the last few decades of the nineteenth century and the early decades of the twentieth, empathy became an increasingly important theme in studies of perception and aesthetic experience. In the work of Theodor Lipps (1851–1914) empathy became the foundational concept of an aesthetic theory, and also of a social and moral theory, that proved extremely influential in the early decades of the twentieth century. In her PhD dissertation, a large part of which was subsequently published as On the Problem of Empathy, Edith Stein subjected Lipps’s concept of empathy to lengthy critical analysis, in the course of which arose numerous insights into essential features of human nature, insights that she then employed in constructing her own view of empathy, focusing on intersubjectivity and our experience of community. The accounts offered by Lipps and Stein of the empathic character not only of our aesthetic experience but of our intersubjective experience of the social world supplied Ingarden with a good deal of material for his own critical analyses of the cognition of the literary work of art. And his analyses of the aesthetic experience have supplied us with directions of research for a “science of literary aesthetic objects” that we have still to explore.

2. Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp, University of Cambridge)

The role of mental imagery in our engagement with art

Mental imagery plays a crucial role in our engagement with art. And not just literature, where imagination is often highlighted, but also in the visual arts, music and conceptual art. And even in literature, I argue, it is mental imagery that plays an important role, not imagination, as traditionally construed. And in some works of conceptual art, the perceptual engagement with the work is deliberately replaced with the engagement by means of mental imagery. I compare this account of the role of mental imagery in our engagement with art with Roman Ingarden’s concept of the ‘places of indeterminacy’.

3. Peter Simons (Trinity College Dublin)

Works of Music: Ingarden and Beyond

In the relatively small field of ontology of music, no writer approaches the sophistication and descriptive adequacy of Roman Ingarden. His account of the nature of music works and their relationship to their creation, notation, performance, audition and reproduction takes account of features and complications to a far greater extent than alternative theories. This can be
illustrated by considering the most prominent alternative candidates, some of them of more recent provenance than Ingarden’s own. Platonism, as proposed at monograph length by Julian Dodd, apart from its ontological extravagance, makes excessive demands on the work and belittles the creator’s act. Meinongianism recognises the indeterminacy of works, but again undervalues the creator, and imposes additional constraints of its own, not to mention requiring that although there are infinitely many works, no work exists. Ingarden charts the multiple dependencies of work on creator, scores and performances, but underestimates the complexities and varieties of the relationships between work, performances and variants. Can we do better? Yes we can. A bottom-up approach rooted in actual, concrete performances takes account of all Ingarden’s subtleties and more, allows for a greater range of variation and exception, yet remains ontologically austere. While in a loose and popular sense there are works of music, in a strict and philosophical sense there are none; nevertheless our conception of works can be adequately explained and justified by judicious use of the notion of vagueness and the operation of abstraction.

4. Dagfinn Follesdal (University of Oslo, Stanford University)

Roman Ingarden and Wolfgang Kayser

The German literary theorist Wolfgang Kayser (1908-1960), whose lectures and publications became very influential on literary theory and analysis all over the world, particularly in Portugal and in Germany, was strongly influenced by Roman Ingarden, as reflected in the title of his main work, Das sprachliche Kunstwerk (1948), a takeoff on Ingarden's Das literarische Kunstwerk (1931). In this lecture I will discuss the influence of Ingarden on Kayser, and Kayser's application of Ingarden's ideas, particularly in Kayser's lectures in Göttingen in 1954-55 (which have not been published, but were attended by the speaker).

5. Jan Woleński (Jagiellonian University in Kraków)

Logical modalities and modes of being

Logical modalities are studied by modal logic. Although there exist many modal systems, the most elementary principles of modal logic are displayed by the logical square and its two generalizations, namely logical hexagon and logical octagon. Three logical laws, namely (a) if A is necessary, then A is actual (true), (b) if A is necessary, then A is possible, and (c) if A is necessary, then A is possible, and the distinction between possibility as not-impossibility, and possibility as accidentality (A is accidental if and only if A is possible and not-A is possible) are particularly relevant for Ingarden’s treatment of modes of being (modi entis) as a fragment of existential ontology. Ingarden’s analysis of such concepts as originality, dependence, etc. g uses modal terms. Hence, it is interesting to confront his ontological theorems with principles of modal logic. In particular, Ingarden’s conclusions that reality (actuality) is separated from necessity and possibility requires a modification. The same concerns the thesis that if the disjunction of originality and derivativeness is strong.
6. Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen, University of Oxford)

**Pure and applied phenomenology**

At its core, phenomenology is a philosophical endeavour. Given its distinctly philosophical nature, one might reasonably wonder whether it can offer anything of value to positive science. Can it at all inform empirical work? There can, however, be no doubt about the answer to these questions. For more than a century, phenomenology has provided crucial inputs to a variety of disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, including psychology, sociology, and anthropology. Within the last few decades, phenomenology has also been an important source of inspiration, not only for theoretical debates within qualitative research but also for ongoing research within the cognitive sciences. But what is the best way to practice, use and apply phenomenology in a non-philosophical context? How deeply rooted in phenomenological philosophy must the empirical research be in order to qualify as phenomenological? How many of the core commitments of phenomenology must it accept? In my talk, I will discuss and assess some different answers to these questions.

7. Semir Zeki (University College London)

**The measurement of subjective experiences - from colour to beauty**

Colour and beauty are often regarded as subjective experiences about which there can be no dispute [de gustibus et coloribus non est disputandum]. Yet psychophysical experiments show that when subjects belonging to different races and cultures are asked to categorize the colours of surfaces when these surfaces are viewed in lights of different wavelength composition, they invariably categorize them in the same way. Hence the categorization made by one person has universal validity and is therefore objective. Equally, when human subjects belonging to different races and cultures are asked to rate the beauty of faces (biological beauty), they invariably give the same high rating to very beautiful faces, regardless of the gender, race, or culture of the rated face. Hence, an individual rating a face as very beautiful can assume with reasonable confidence that their rating has near universal agreement. This is not true for building or other man-made artifacts (artifactual beauty), where aesthetic ratings vary considerably, not only between subjects belonging to different cultures and races but also between those belonging to the same race or culture. I will discuss the objective reality that turns the aesthetic experiences in the biological domains of colour and faces into objective ones that have universal assent rather than subjective ones, and consider why the experience of mathematical beauty may also be considered as belonging in the biological category. Finally, I will discuss brain imaging experiments which show that the brain activity correlating with aesthetic experiences can be both localised and measured and consider, in light of these experiments, why beauty matters.
1. **Sara Fernandes** (Centre of Philosophy, University of Lisbon) is a PhD researcher in the philosophy department of the University of Lisbon and a philosophy teacher at Colégio Militar (Military College). Her research project is a Critique of neuro-identity: anthropological, ethical and social dilemmas on brain Enhancement. Her main research interests are the relation between philosophy and neurosciences, in particular neuroenhancement and its impact on human nature, personal identity, and neuroethics. She holds a research degree from the doctoral program on Bioethics of the Portuguese Catholic University (2009) and a MPhil in Philosophy from the University of Lisbon (2006) with a dissertation on Paul Ricoeur and the problem of personal identity.

e-mail: sara-fernandes1@campus.ul.pt

Rethinking Personal Identity. From the cultural roots of neuroenhancement to Peter D. Kramer’s *Listening to Prozac*

New developments in neuroscience, especially since the Decade of the Brain, have made neuroenhancement an important domain of philosophical reflection. Neuroenhancement is usually understood as any intervention on the brain that aims to improve its capabilities beyond clinical therapy and good health (better intellectual performance, abler minds, and even happier persons). It is the ability to use certain resources (natural, social or technological), not for a clear therapeutic purpose, but to develop human capacities of healthy individuals, such as mood, cognitive, and moral functions.

Despite the recent scientific and biotechnological advances in human enhancement, I believe that the desire for human improvement is not new, as it characterizes human nature and it has its western cultural roots traced back to, at least, the Greek civilization. I will discuss selected works of fiction (Greek myths, literature and films), spanning different centuries, that show how this wish of human improvement is a constant over time, as well as the important anthropological dilemmas that it necessarily raises. Science and technology seek to realize the desire of improvement, of overcoming the biological limits that is very present in the western cultural imagination. “Life imitates art, more than art imitates life” is an inspirational O. Wilde’s quote.

In this presentation, it is firstly argued that science imitates certain forms of Art - narrative or fictional -, since Art has the capacity to create and innovate in time, to bring up new horizons for research and technology. In some ways, science seeks to accomplish the worlds of artistic creations. Secondly, it emphasizes how the impact of science in contemporary western societies, its emerging authority, explains the emergence of a new attempt to ground personal identity in two domains in increasing evolution, genetics and neurosciences. It mainly focuses on neurosciences, highlighting its tendency to form a neurobiology of personal identity and to create a neural ground of that philosophical concept by reducing it to brain functions. Thirdly, it criticizes this neuroreductionist attempt, and offers philosophical arguments for
acknowledging several dimensions of personal identity which are not subsumed in a neurobiological approach.

2. **Kamil Lemanek** (University of Warsaw) - I am an American currently working on a PhD in philosophy and a Preludium Grant at the University of Warsaw. Both are aimed at exploring language and the theoretical commitments made by theories of meaning, covering natural language processing, cognitive features, and theory construction. I am particularly interested in the positions defended by Fodor and Brandom, respectively.

    e-mail: K.Lemanek@uw.edu.pl

**The Language of Thought and Problematic Concepts**

Jerry Fodor’s Language of Thought (LOT) represents an interesting perspective in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Concepts play a central role in that framework. There are two essential conceptual structures—simple and complex concepts. I argue that there is theoretical space for a unique type of concept that problematizes that fundamental distinction following his more recent work (e.g., 1999, 2009). I refer to this type of concept as a correlate. It mirrors the content of a complex concept while maintaining the absence of structure unique to simple concepts.

The notion of a concept has of course undergone changes in Fodor’s account over the years, but the core idea is that a concept is a mental particular composed of a content together with a mode of presentation. Content is understood in referential and causal terms—the content of a concept is whatever it refers to, and it refers to whatever is causally responsible for eliciting it. Mode of presentation is something like the representational vehicle of the concept, and it includes syntactic features. Though that characterization has encountered issues, it generally holds. A given concept is simple insofar as it doesn’t admit of any internal structure or constituency. On Fodor’s story, most of our lexical concepts are simple. Those simple concepts can be put together in virtue of the syntactic features captured in their modes of presentation. That affords the compositionality that’s so central to LOT, allowing us to construct complex concepts out of our simple concepts.

That basic picture may be confronted with the theoretical possibility of the content of a constructed complex concept being acquired as a simple concept through causal means. Insofar as simple concepts are primitive, they may be systematically produced as possibilities paired with complexes, such that for every complex concept there is a simple concept with the same content. Though the two can be distinguished in terms of their possession conditions, the possibility of these correlated concepts massively inflates the primitive basis LOT is committed. It also serves to distance it from natural language, which has long served as a helpful model.

3. **Przemysław Zawadzki** (Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University) - I am PhD candidate in Philosophy and PhD student at Jagiellonian Interdisciplinary PhD Programme. I obtained my Masters degrees in Philosophy and Cognitive Science at Jagiellonian University. I am interested in neuroethics and philosophy of mind. Currently, I am working...

e-mail: przemyslaw.zawadzki@uj.edu.pl

**Personality and authenticity in light of the memory–modifying potential of optogenetics**

For almost 20 years philosophers have expressed concerns that memory modification technologies (MMTs)—techniques allowing us to intentionally and selectively alter memories—may endanger the very fabric of who we are, or even undermine our “humaneness”. The most promising currently studied MMTs such as propranolol or extinction training combined with memory update or glucocorticoids have the potential to alter memory in a safe and relevant manner, but their effectiveness is still limited and temporary. These memory-modifying interventions offer to alter only emotional components or expressions of excessively emotional (fear, phobic, or traumatic) memory; however, they cannot eradicate adversity of the memory in its entirety—that is, they cannot selectively “deactivate” declarative memory (e.g., belief phobic system) or episodic memory (e.g., conscious awareness of the experienced trauma). Since the persistence of phobic beliefs or episodic memories is highly relevant to phobias or posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), it may sometimes be necessary to render their total amnesia as this can be the only way to overcome PTSD or other psychological conditions. The findings of recent years show that this prospect may be actually realized in the not so distant future as new MMT, optogenetics—neurotechnology allowing for optical control at the millisecond resolution, with the precision of cell type–specificity—appeared on the scene. Animal studies show that optogenetics offers completely novel potential to alter memories, e.g., the reversible erasure of a disturbing memory. Thus, neuroethical considerations of these memory-modifying possibilities are important and timely, especially as optogenetic–systems are rapidly developing with potential use as therapeutic measures. In my presentation, I will tackle one of the most widely discussed neuroethical concerns previously expressed towards MMTs—threat to authenticity—in light of the novel memory-modifying possibilities offered by optogenetics. To realize this aim, I first establish a relationship between memory systems and personality (psychological constructs not usually considered by ethicists and philosophers) and authenticity (a strictly philosophical construct). On the basis of this theoretical synthesis, I analyze dangers of optogenetic memory modifications in light of the authenticity concept that is most consistent with the above-mentioned psychological constructs—Pugh, Maslen and Savulescu dual–basis model.

4. **Niccolò Aimone Pisano** (University of St. Andrews and University of Stirling (SASP)) is a second-year PhD student at the University of St. Andrews and University of Stirling (SASP). He completed his BA in Philosophy at the University of Pisa (2016). After completing his MA in piano at the musical Conservatory in Siena (2017), he undertook his MSc in Philosophy of Science at the LSE, writing a dissertation on Leibniz’s Principle and quantum mechanics (2018). After that, he completed his MLitt in Philosophy of Mind within the SASP
programme (2019), with a dissertation on the Mark of the Cognitive under the supervision of Prof. Michael Wheeler, his current PhD supervisor.

e-mail: nap6@st-andrews.ac.uk

On the necessity of the first-person perspective for cognition

In this talk, I will argue that the presence of a first-person perspective (1PP) on cognition is a necessary condition not only for our understanding of what cognition is, but also for the very existence of cognition as a genuine natural phenomenon. My presentation is divided into three parts. In the first part, I will briefly motivate the importance of establishing whether 1PP should be included as a necessary condition for cognition in the search for a Mark of the Cognitive (see e.g. Rowlands (2009), Rowlands (2010a), Adams (2010), Adams and Garrison (2013, 2014) for some views on the topic), motivated by the debate over the 4E’s, especially over Extended Cognition. In particular, I will point out that the meaningfulness of the notion of “cognitive subject”, depends on this. Secondly, I will highlight what is being had a 1PP on is not something distinct, if not just theoretically, from what entertains such perspective: differently from the third-person perspective, 1PP is the perspective cognizers (which are taken not to be something over and above their cognitive states) have on first-order cognitive states. I will suggest that a good way for the 1PP to be concretely conceived of is in the light of Tononi’s IIT (2004, 2008, 2012). Finally, I will outline my argument to the effect that the existence of a 1PP is necessary for cognition. I will start from two assumptions: cognition (uncontroversially) involves information processing; cognition is a real natural phenomenon, and as such it must have properties distinguishing it from other phenomena and magnitudes. Then, I will point out that, since without a 1PP there can be no cognitive subject, but, at best, cognitive systems, the boundaries of such systems would be arbitrary, and no further requirements on information processing mentioning the personal level (e.g. Rowlands’ (2010b)) could be added. This makes characterising cognition as something more than (Shannon) information processing impossible. Therefore, depicting cognition in a purely third-personal way contradicts the initial assumption that it is a genuine natural phenomenon in its own right; from this, I will conclude that there can be no cognition without 1PP.

5. Dirk Franken is Assistant Professor at the University of Heidelberg. He received his PhD from the University of Münster. He works on topics in Metaphysics, Philosophy of Language and the Philosophy of Mind.

e-mail: dirk.franken@uni-heidelberg.de

On Good and Bad Reasons for Endorsing Mereological Hylemorphism

Hylemorphism is the view that an object’s essence is – at least in part – determined by what is called the object’s form. According to the mereological version of hylemorphism, an object’s form is also a proper part of the object alongside its physical parts. Whether there are good reasons for this assumption depends not least on the background assumptions about forms and
their role in the composition of objects. In the case of contemporary mereological hylemorphismists, this background is provided by what I call vertical hylemorphism. I shall first argue that, as long as vertical hylemorphism is accepted, there are no good reasons for endorsing mereologism. Then, I shall point out that there is an attractive, alternative version of hylemorphism – horizontal hylemorphism – which provides good reasons to endorse mereologism.

6. Shamik Chakravarty (PhD Scholar, Lingnan University, Hong Kong) I recently finished my PhD at Lingnan University, Hong Kong on the metaphysics of fictional entities. My research interests are in aesthetics, naturalizing metaphysics through cognitive science and philosophy of language. I have taught Philosophy, English and Creative Writing to High School students and have written books for children. In the future, I would like to popularize academic philosophy, especially in my country, India.

e-mail: shamikchakravarty@ln.hk; philoshamik@gmail.com

Dependence and Fictional Characters

The artefactual theory of fiction holds that fictional characters are abstract and created artefacts like money and nations. One of its main proponents, Amie Thomasson (1999), holds that fictional characters are ontologically dependent on a particular author or authors (rigid historical dependence) for their origin and on literary works for continued existence (generic constant dependence). While there have been objections, both the dependencies are dogmas held among artefactualists, which have not been systematically undermined within the framework. In this paper, I hope to undermine both, using counterexamples, especially from No Man’s Sky, a computer game, where the algorithm creates a character through natural selection as well as by showing how the authorial process works. In doing so, I will set up a new criterion for continued existence of fictional characters.

7. Inger Bakken Pedersen is a doctoral researcher at the University of Vienna. She works on philosophy of mathematics and is part of the ERC Starting Grant Project “The Roots of Mathematical Structuralism”. In her dissertation she writes on epistemological and metaontological questions pertaining to mathematical structuralism. Pedersen completed her MA in 2018 at the University of Oslo with a master thesis on Kurt Gödel’s realism and mathematical intuition.

e-mail: inger.pedersen@univie.ac.at

Ontological Dependence in Mathematical Structuralism

Ontological dependence relations determine how objects and domains of objects depend on each other. While such relations are of continued importance to contemporary metaphysics, it is also an issue across local fields of philosophy, such as philosophy of mathematics. Mathematical objects can ontologically depend on other mathematical objects or domains of
such. Ontological dependence relations are especially salient to the debate about mathematical structuralism, which is the view that mathematical objects have no ‘inner nature’, and that a mathematical object is what it is due to its mathematical context, i.e. the mathematical structure in which it appears. This means that the natural number 2 simply is the second place in the natural number structure, and so depends on the elements belonging to the same structure (the other natural numbers) and on the structure as a whole (the natural number structure, N). Ontological dependence is therefore integral to the ongoing effort to characterize mathematical structuralist positions with a realist ontology, known as non-eliminative structuralism (see Parsons 2008 and Shapiro 1997). While there is general consensus that there are ontological dependence relations within mathematical structuralism, there have been surprisingly few attempts to characterize the relation itself. Notable exceptions are Linnebo (2008) and Wigglesworth (2018), who characterize the relation as one of individuation and as a grounding relation, respectively. Interestingly, due to the recent construals of Edmund Husserl as a proponent of early mathematical structuralism (see Centrone 2010 and Hartimo 2012, 2019), another dependence relation presents itself as a possible candidate, the relation of foundation. The relation of foundation is characterized in the third Logical Investigation (Husserl 2001) and aims at explaining how wholes and parts are connected to each other. In this paper I explain how the relation of foundation can be a suitable dependence relation for non-eliminative structuralism, as it allows for a more fine-grained analysis, due to its (i) unifying character, and (ii) for permitting dependence relations to be nested. This accounts for the constitutive character of a structure and its elements, and shows how some elements depend only on some of the other elements belonging to the same structure.

References:


Truthmaking and Levels of Reality

The term “truthmaking”, which is used by contemporary metaphysicians as referring to the Aristotelian classical notion of truth, describes the relation of gaining the property of being true by some truth bearer (e.g. proposition) in virtue of the existence of an entity called truthmaker (so states the truthmaker principle). Many researchers speak about truthmaking, but they employ various specific mechanisms explicating the relation like necessitation (D. M. Armstrong), supervenience (D. Lewis), entailment (H. Beebee & J. Dodd) or grounding (G. Rodriguez-Pereyra). Though the truthmaker principle in its general formulation does not commit philosophers to accept some specific kinds of being as the furniture of the world, there is a correlation between chosen mode of truthmaking and accepted kinds of being. For instance in Lewis’ theory he wants to make true propositions about some complex entities (e.g. possible worlds) by committing to the mere individuals. That is why he has to choose the mechanism of supervenience as the truthmaking operation. Roman Ingarden in the first volume of the Controversy Over the Existence of the World introduced the specific meaning of the distinction between ontology and metaphysics. Ontology concerns entities without committing to their factual existence in contrast to metaphysics, which is about facts. Adding the realm of language appears that there are three levels of reality: semantic, ontological and metaphysical. While moving from one to another realm of reality the level of the metaphysical weight of being increases. Therefore the truthmaker principle becomes an instrument of the survey of those three domains of reality and identification of the truthmaking entities. Referring to the aforementioned framework there occurs the issue of justification for the evaluation of the truthmaking mechanisms depending on whether they refer only to the language, possible entities or facts.

9. Stefano Marino (Università di Bologna) is Associate Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Bologna. His main research interests are focused on critical theory of society, hermeneutics, philosophical anthropology, neopragmatism and somaesthetics, the aesthetics of fashion, and the philosophy of music. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy at the University of Bologna in 2008, and before obtaining a permanent position at the University of Bologna as Associate Professor in 2019 he was granted postdoctoral fellowships at the University of Freiburg i.B. in 2009 and 2011 and at the University of Bologna from 2013 to 2015, and was fixed-term researcher at the University of Bologna from 2016 to 2019. He is the author of several monographs, including: Le verità del non-vero. Tre studi su Adorno, teoria critica ed estetica (2019), Aesthetics, Metaphysics, Language: Essays on Heidegger and Gadamer (2015), La filosofia di Frank Zappa. Un’interpretazione adorniana (2014), and Gadamer and the Limits of the Modern Techno-scientific Civilization (2011). He has translated from German into Italian the books by T.W.

e-mail: stefano.marino4@unibo.it

The Meaning of Living in the Present Tense: Aesthetics of Pop-Rock Music and the Primacy of Questioning in Pearl Jam

As has been noted by Richard Shusterman, “[p]opular art has not been popular with aestheticians and theorists of culture […] . When not altogether ignored as beneath contempt, it is typically vilified as mindless, tasteless trash”. Now, the domain of popular culture and popular art is very broad, complex and articulated, including a lot of different aesthetic practices and experience that range from photography and film to commercial fiction novels and comic books, from fashion and design to videogames and popular music. In turn, also this latter field is not narrow and simple but vice-versa broad, complex and articulated, as simply testified by the well-known existence of a great variety of different genres and subgenres that form the ‘constellation’ of contemporary popular music. These genres and subgenres are quite often connected also to so-called ‘oppositional’ or ‘subcultural’ styles, as clearly shown by the examples of the mod, teddy boy, hippy, punk, reggae, hip-hop or grunge styles in music and culture. Now, in the realm of contemporary popular music, what we may generally call ‘pop-rock music’ has surely represented since many decades one of the leading trends and traditions, and can be understood indeed as one of the most important and influential products of 20th-century culture and music. However, as the above mentioned quotation from Shusterman clearly shows, inasmuch as it is part of popular culture, also pop-rock music has been typically ignored or vilified by several aestheticians and philosophers of art, from Theodor W. Adorno to Roger Scruton up to Alva Noë nowadays. Notwithstanding all this, I believe that popular art, in general, deserves serious aesthetic attention, and I agree with Shusterman that pop-rock music, in particular, is often able to suggest “a radically revised aesthetic with a joyous return of the somatic dimension which philosophy has long repressed”. For this reason, following the invaluable suggestions and insights provided by authors such as Shusterman and Theodore Gracyk, and also relying on what I have defined an ‘unorthodox’ Adornian perspective in some of my previous contributions in this field, in the first part of my talk I will offer some observations on the significance of pop-rock music for a philosophical aesthetics that is not limited anymore to a mere philosophy of the fine arts only grounded on the paradigm of disinterested contemplation but is rather broad enough to also include aesthetic experiences belonging to popular culture and everyday life. Then, in the second part of my talk, I will try
to exemplify some of my general ideas on philosophy and pop-rock music by referring to the particular example of Pearl Jam, undoubtedly one of the greatest rock bands of the last 30 years, whose ‘philosophy’ of making sense of the present tense, according to my interpretation, is capable to disclose very interesting horizons and perspectives for what I would like to define a post-metaphysical reevaluation of the contingency and (in)significance of the ‘all-encompassing trip’ that, after all, the human existence consists of.

10. Arthur Cardoso de Andrade - Undergraduate Student at the Philosophy Department of the Federal University of Campina Grande and Undergraduate Student of Portuguese and English at Cruzeiro do Sul University. Studies focused in Contemporaneity, Aesthetics, Education and Decolonialism. Coordinator of the Philosophy Academic Center.

e-mail: andradearthur314@gmail.com; arthur.cardoso@estudante.ufcg.edu.br

Emancipation of the Body: The Creation of a New Fat Aesthetic in the Contemporaneity

In the 20th century, the world went through the greatest transformations in its history. The attempt to standardize society was clearly one of the fruits of the domination of industry and capitalism. This standardization reaches our bodies through the imposition of an ideal of beauty. The thin-ideal standard of beauty has imposed an aesthetic that excludes, disapproves, and shames the fat body, placing it in a lower position compared to the thin body. Analyzing high visibility media and prominent social places, it is possible to notice that there are no fat bodies included. Consequently, the fat body is imprisoned and limited, requiring an emancipation of standards and representativeness. In this presentation, we will reflect on the difficult emancipation process of fat bodies and what is the role of philosophy in it. The media, fashion, and art are questioned about the representation of fat bodies. We will also present some ideas on the creation of a new fat aesthetic as a result of this process and how revolutionary this new aesthetic is.

11. Swantje Martach - recently defended her PhD in Philosophy at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, in the frame of which she grew a “New Materialist Ontology of the Clothing” in collaboration with the University of the Arts London. Right now, she is organizing herself an institutional affiliation for her post-doctoral research project “Relational Realist Aesthetics” (working title), continues to contribute regularly to the Swiss Portal of Philosophy (www.philosophie.ch), just joined the theoretical team of the interdisciplinary artistic project New Dawn (www.newdawn.digital), and is looking forward to her research stay at the Aesthetics Institute, Presov University (Slovakia) next Spring.

e-mail: swantjemartach@gmx.de
From Look to Relation: Re-trending the Aesthetic

Up until recently, two trends in particular dominated the philosophical canon: 1) The prioritization of epistemology over ontology, and 2) a minimization and hence marginalization of the aesthetic. The simultaneity of both trends might appear as surprising, given that the aesthetic was conceptualized as a particular kind of epistemology, and hence considered part of the focused-on philosophical discipline.

However, since the start of 2000, speculative philosophy as a new philosophical movement is forming, which proclaims a change in both above-named trends. This school of thought 1) re-claims the possibility of ontology, even of a realist kind, which in the eye of its actors needs to be prioritized over epistemology, that can only be deduced therefrom (we need to ask: What is?, before we can ask: How do we perceive that what is?). And 2), remarkably, speculative philosophy highlights the fundamental role of the aesthetic within reality, which led several actors to call for a lifting of the aesthetic discipline to a “first philosophy“ (see Harman 2007a).

Yet how does a speculative aesthetics look like? As a matter of fact, such a reconsideration evokes the need to re-address a question already posed by Ingarden, namely the one of the ontology of the aesthetic (for Ingarden: of the artwork, see Ingarden 1989). But in contrast to e.g. phenomenology, speculative philosophers claim that the ontology of the aesthetic precisely is not a kind of epistemology. The aesthetic is not in the eye of the beholder, but it rather is in-between (also, but not only: recipient and artwork), viz. at the relation (see Harman 2007b, 30; Morton 2013, 22; Shaviro 2009, n.p.).

Crucially thus, as a primary philosophy, the aesthetic is to be “ontologized“, viz. it needs to be turned into a matter for ontological inquiry. And as its ontology is of a realist kind, there also are relations existent, and thinkable, that are aesthetic, yet in which the human is not involved. To fortify this “relational realist aesthetic“ trend, we now need a) to find out where else in-between the aesthetic materializes, that we so far were inhibited to access, and b) to assemble the speculative means by which we can witness the latter.

Bibliography:


e-mail: ekuzian@clemson.edu
Modernism in Dance. What kind of bodily art performance manifests aesthetic expressivity?

Dance has a very broad spectrum of styles and uses. In this paper, I consider dance as a kind of art performance, which uses the body as its distinctive medium. My focus is on determining what kind of dance can be modernist, that is, which dance genre best realizes the ambition of treating the body as its central medium.

My central claim is that contemporary dance radically breaks away from ritual, classical, and modern forms of dance and makes ordinary movements visible in an aesthetic way. Admittedly, the use of the body in contemporary performances draws on the embodied nature of the dancer in a modernist sense. If the artistic medium of dance—the body in movement—has inherent aesthetic qualities, then the job of embodied aesthetics is to provide a framework for clarifying the medium-specific elements and limits of dance.

My overall argument has two steps. I first clarify the notion of modernism, and how dance differs from other performance arts. Second, I justify the claim that the body is the distinctive medium of dance. I offer a reading of the history of dance, which shows that its developments and revolutions successively refine the appreciation of bodily movement alone as the focus of its practice to conclude that only contemporary dance is fully and self-consciously modernist, using the body as central to its aesthetic reflection.

Phenomenology and Aesthetics of Dance

My main focus of my paper is to clarify the philosophical framework for my study of dance, a study that attempts to provide some empirical evidence for Kant’s view that the beautiful is ‘purposive without purpose.’ Kant insists that the appreciation of beauty involves a distinctive, non-conceptual way of relating to the world. The purpose of my study is to test whether people judge goal-oriented vs. non goal-oriented movement differently, and to assess what kinds of movements they judge to be beautiful.

My starting point is what I regard as an oversight in the classical phenomenological tradition. In the first part of my talk, I clarify Merleau-Ponty’s view of the body and outline its limitations. When philosophers like Merleau-Ponty attempt to understand the meaning of embodiment, they tend to focus almost exclusively on goal-oriented bodily movements—those movements that accomplish some aim or task. I suggest we can gain a much fuller understanding of human embodiment by broadening Merleau-Ponty’s focus to include purposive but non-goal oriented movements—movements like dance, gestures, and children’s play. I present and defend a paradigm for understanding what it is to appreciate bodily movements as artful. My main claim is that in order to appreciate movements aesthetically, one must free one’s judgments about them from the goals they satisfy. In order to explain what is minimally required for an aesthetic attitude towards a moving body, in the second part of this presentation I draw on Immanuel Kant’s notion of judgments of taste, which he discusses in the “Analytic of the Beautiful.” Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment is useful in helping us appreciate the body in dance in an aesthetic way. The main idea behind the aesthetic model of bodily intentionality is to view bodily movement as capable of being artful in just this way—
as serving no instrumental purpose yet still being meaningful. In the third part, I present an example of contemporary choreography by Trisha Brown to show that dance movement often exhibits purposiveness without a definite purpose.


e-mail: tejutaur@student.jyu.fi

The Possibility of a Domain-free Pluralist Definition of Truth

I join the current movement towards truth pluralism by exploring the possibility of a domain-free pluralist definition of truth that is currently missing from the literature. The general claim of truth pluralism is that there are many ways of being true. The standard explanation is that there are various truth-grounding properties, such as coherence and correspondence, and that these properties vary by discourse domains. For example, ethical sentences are true if they cohere and physical sentences if they correspond. While the commitment to domains does help avoid certain issues with indeterminacy, it also introduces an array of definitional issues. In short, the now prominent domain-reliant pluralists bear the burden of defining discourse domains, in addition to defining truth in a way that utilizes the notion.

I argue that discourse domains are not a necessary commitment for truth pluralism by providing a model for a domain-free pluralist definition of truth. This model utilizes a general truth-property denoted by ‘is true’ and had by all true sentences. The possession of said property is determined by satisfaction of what I call the platitude-based criteria. These criteria are derived from common-sense conceptions of truth and translated into a form that is satisfiable by sentences. An example being ‘a sentence is true iff it is prima facie correct to believe’. The satisfaction of said criteria depends on two factors. First, one can distinguish between the types of objects and properties referred to by the singular terms and predicates composing a sentence. Second, a sentence satisfies the criteria by having the relevant truth-grounding property for the types of objects and properties that are referred to. For example, if a singular term refers to an extensional object and the property predicated is natural, then the criteria-satisfying truth-grounding property is correspondence. For abstract objects and non-natural properties, criteria-satisfaction is based on coherence. Thus, the possession of the general truth property is based on a sentence's ability to satisfy the platitude-based criteria by possessing the relevant truth-grounding property for the types of objects and properties referred to by the components of the sentence. No reference to discourse domains is required.

14. Tom Kaspers is a PhD student at the University of St Andrews and the University of Stirling who works on alethic pluralism under the supervision of Crispin Wright. Website: tomkaspers.com.

e-mail: tk70@st-andrews.ac.uk
A Sellarsian Account of Truth and Asserting

The questions “What is truth?” and “What are assertions?” often go hand in hand. I believe that it might be best to answer the latter question before answering the former. However, to do so is not an easy task. In this talk I will draw inspiration from Sellars in my attempt to give an account of what assertions are that does not rely on a preconceived understanding of what truth is. My views will in no way amount to an interpretation of the views Sellars held himself — I must confess that do not understand Sellars’s writings well enough to even hint at which views he might have held — but perhaps they could be called “Sellarsian” in spirit. I will make use of the example of a Sellarsian inscriber, who registers regularities in their experiences, labels them, and projects them onto the world. By doing so, the Sellarsian inscriber creates language-entry, intra-linguistic, and language-departure norms which dictate the correct application of a term. From this, I will show that to assert is to project and that this assertoric practice can be legitimized either by showing its social-institutional value or by showing how its projections can be explained and justified by entities that underlie them. For an assertion to be true, it has to be correctly assertible, i.e. assertible without violating the norms created by the Sellarsian inscriber. Sellars calls this semantic assertibility, or “S-assertibility” and argues that different domains of discourse will have different standards that determine which assertions are Sassertible. (Sellars 1968, IV §26) I will show that this view on truth is reminiscent of the view defended by Douglas Edwards, who argues that, for some domains of discourse, truth grounds being, while for other domains, being grounds truth, and who defends a moderate pluralism about truth which takes truth to be determinable by multiple different properties. (Edwards 2018)

15. Krystian Bogucki - he is a PhD student at University of Warsaw. He is interested in the history of early analytic philosophy and philosophy of language. He published in such journals as Filozofia Nauki, Analiza i Egzystencja, Kwartalnik Filozoficzny and Hybris.

e-mail: kbogucki12@gmail.com

Truth: the Tractatarian approach

Tractatus logico-philosophicus is a philosophical classic. However, it should be acknowledged that the full understanding of the work still needs a lot of apprehension and effort. In recent years, the special attention was devoted to the conception of truth that can be found in the works of the early Wittgenstein. Sullivan (2005) examines Tractatarian view in regards to identity theory of truth. Hanks (2014) explains the principle of bipolality by means of positive and negative state of affairs. Glock (2013) lays emphasis on the role of Wittgenstein’s account of intentionality. In my talk, I will contrast Tractatarian conception of truth with the standard Tarskian approach to truth. Firstly, I will argue that the semantic conception of truth neglects two crucial notions for the early Wittgenstein’s understanding of the concept of truth, namely the logical multiplicity of a proposition and the bipolarity of sense. Secondly, I will claim that from Wittgenstein’s point of view the fact of omitting these two notions results in abandoning the real problem of the relationship between the language and the world.
The Tractarian conception of logical multiplicity has engendered in contrast to the Russellian view of complexes. At first, Russell had held in opposition to Meinong that judgments consist of the relation of the mind to something simple and indivisible, a fact. Later on, he acknowledged the multiple relation theory of judgments. It means that he accepted the correspondence theory of truth and the complexity of facts. In Notes on Logic, Wittgenstein criticizes Russell’s theory for the lack of explanation of negative judgments and judgments with ordered relations (x is the father of y, y is the son of x). He proposed the concept of logical multiplicity as the key to correspondence theory of truth and the aforementioned problems. In Notebooks 1914-1916, Wittgenstein spoke of a proposition as a picture of a complex. The proposition must have something in common with the presented fact, namely logical multiplicity. The notion of logical multiplicity is based on theory of types and it constitutes elaboration of an idea of logical form (TLP: §4.04;§4.041). However, it turns out that the left side of the T-sentence always has logical multiplicity equal to 0 in the Tarskian theory of truth. Hence, the semantic conception of truth cannot explain how a sentence represents anything.

16. Paul Schilling - he recently completed his PhD at Yale, after studying philosophy and classics in Heidelberg, Oxford, and Munich. He works on topics at the intersection of the philosophy of language, logic, and metaphysics, especially topics connected to the concept of truth.

e-mail: paulschilling1@gmx.de

The Omnipresence of Truth

Frege noted that ‘we cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time finding the thought that this thing has this property to be true. So with every property of a thing is conjoined a property of thought, namely that of truth’ (‘The Thought’). I call this idea the thesis of the Omnipresence of Truth (OT). As it stands, OT is open to different interpretations and invites several questions: is truth—hence OT—primarily a feature of thoughts understood as acts (or states), or rather of thoughts understood as abstract contents? is the thought that p the same as or different from the thought that it is true that p? is the act of judging that p the same as or different from the act of judging that it is true that p? I present an explication of OT which is rather different from Frege’s take on the idea. My account is based on the idea that truth is primarily a property of acts of judgment and assertion, conceived as token-reflexive acts which affirm their own truth. According to this picture, truth is already ‘implicit’ in the assertion that p, and made ‘explicit’ by affirming that it is true that p.

17. Harri Mäcklin, PhD is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, Finland. His main fields include phenomenological aesthetics, the history of continental aesthetics, and the relationship between philosophy and art. He is currently working on the phenomenology and history of aesthetic immersion. Mäcklin also works as an art critic in the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat.

e-mail: harri.macklin@helsinki.fi

Roman Ingarden on Aesthetic Attention
The notion of aesthetic attention has in recent years become an important theme in debates concerning the nature of aesthetic experience. The central figure in these discussions is Bence Nanay, who argues that aesthetic attention is demarcated from other types of attention in that it is simultaneously focused on a single object but distributed to several of its properties. While there seems to be a growing consensus that aesthetic experiences involve a special type of attention, a lively debate has risen whether Nanay’s suggestion offers a valid or sufficient description of aesthetic attention.

This paper examines how Roman Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience can contribute to a more robust understanding of aesthetic attention. The main claim of the paper is that comparing Nanay’s theory to Ingarden’s phenomenology shows that while Nanay’s observations on aesthetic attention are phenomenologically valid, they still fall short of providing a sufficient account of its central structures. I argue that Ingarden’s thought – which is largely ignored in the current debate – in many ways prefigures, augments, and exceeds Nanay’s notion of aesthetic attention. This paper identifies six shortcomings in Nanay’s theory based on a comparison with Ingarden’s phenomenology. By doing so, it aims to give an example of how a closer understanding of Ingarden’s thought would benefit contemporary debates regarding the nature of aesthetic experience.

18. Charlene Elsby - Ph.D., was recently Assistant Professor of Philosophy and the Philosophy Program Director in the Department of English and Linguistics at Purdue University Fort Wayne and is currently working with the Government of Canada in the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council. She is the Vice President of the North American Society for Early Phenomenology and edited Essays on Aesthetic Genesis. She recently published “Gregor Samsa’s Spots of Indeterminacy: Kafka as Phenomenologist” in the Polish Journal of Aesthetics and "Time and its Indeterminacy in Roman Ingarden's Concept of the Literary Work of Art" in Horizon.

e-mail: celsby@gmail.com

Roman Ingarden on Fictional Times

Roman Ingarden’s treatments of time differ according to whether he is speaking of real time or time in the literary work of art. Whereas time can be divided into the past, present, and future (in such a way that each is essentially different from the others), the time of the literary work of art allows for a time that de-privileges the present and allows the author to represent time with more malleability. The author may choose to represent time all out of order, as Kurt Vonnegut does in Slaughterhouse Five. Even as Ingarden expounds on the atemporal “order of sequence” of a literary work, nevertheless temporality remains essential to the work of art’s represented objectivities as well as its concretization. In this paper I examine the metaphysics of time in relation to the literary work of art according to Ingarden’s conception and conclude that Ingarden’s analysis explains how it is possible to represent deviant views of time in literature.
19. Matthew E. Gladden’s research interests include phenomenological aesthetics and the philosophical dimensions of virtual reality and computer games. He is particularly interested in applying the frameworks developed by Roman Ingarden and Christian Norberg-Schulz to the analysis of digital gameworlds. He is the author of several books and journal articles on the philosophical, social, and organizational implications of social robotics, ubiquitous computing, neurocybernetic augmentation, virtual reality, and other phenomena contributing to ongoing processes of technological posthumanization. He has taught philosophical ethics at Purdue University and served as Associate Director of the Woodstock Theological Center at Georgetown University. Guest Lecturer, Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN, Warsaw, Poland.

e-mail: matthew.e.gladden@gmail.com

8-Bit Mystique: An Ingardenian Aesthetic Analysis of the Appeal of Retro Computer Games

Recent years have seen a revival of interest in 8-bit computer games developed in the 1980s, along with the rising popularity of “8-bit-style” or “retro” games that are created using current technologies but designed to imitate the look and feel of such historical games. Judged objectively, 8-bit games appear far more “primitive” than typical contemporary video games, which often include hyperrealistic 3D graphics, lush orchestral scores, and sophisticated literary plots. For this reason, some have suggested that 8-bit games are relatively deficient as works of art, with their resurgent popularity being understandable only as a form of nostalgia, as older gamers seek to revisit the experiences of their youth. Here, however, we draw on Ingarden’s thought to argue that 8-bit-style games’ supposed “crudeness” is not a weakness; rather, it is a form of indeterminacy that possesses rich artistic value and can give rise to singularly meaningful aesthetic experiences. First, we analyze Ingarden’s account of how the recipient of a work of art “concretizes” a schematic construct by filling in areas of indeterminacy through imagination and judgment. It is shown that the act of playing an 8-bit-style game both allows and requires players to perform a kind of concretization that is impossible with more “sophisticated” contemporary games and which can give rise to uniquely enjoyable aesthetic experiences. Second, we draw on Ingarden’s account of the “life cycle” of a work of art to show how the pattern of initial popularity, later neglect, and more recent revival of certain 8-bit games suggests that they possess an organic vitality that is absent in pieces of kitsch but possessed by the best works of art.

20. Małgorzata A. Szyszkowska is an adjunct at the Faculty of Composition and Music Theory, Collegium of Humanistic Sciences and Foreign Languages at the Fryderyk Chopin University of Music. She focuses on the aesthetic and philosophy of music, phenomenological aesthetics, everyday aesthetic and listening and community. She is currently head of the research project “Philosophy of Music. Metaphysical, Phenomenological and Deconstructive Paths to Researching Music its Theory and Practice” NCN 2016/23/B/HS1/02325 (2017-2022). She is the author of Listening to Music. Study in Phenomenology of Listening (Semper 2017).
Roman Ingarden: the Value in the Aesthetic Experience of Art

The goal of this presentation is to suggest a fuller understanding of Ingarden’s account of aesthetic experience presenting it in light of Ingarden’s axiology and his understanding of value in appreciating and evaluating art. Author’s claim is that Ingarden’s account of aesthetic experience is one of the most inspiring and well developed accounts. This has to do with the detailed and developed presentation of the experience as well as with explaining the role of value in the experience. As much as the account of aesthetic experience of Roman Ingarden has been appreciated, it seems fair to say that it hasn’t received enough attention. Ingarden’s account of aesthetics experience is complex and well developed. It presents the experience as containing various strata and developing gradually towards its final goal. Author offers her interpretation of Ingarden’s account of aesthetics experience in reference to values and evaluation of art. Using contemporary literature devoted to evaluation in aesthetic experience of artworks (Gracyk 1999, Walton 1993), the author aims at presenting Ingarden’s account as most valuable and inspiring still today.

21. José-Rafael Herrera-González - is a graduate student and is currently working on his doctoral thesis on the combination of temporal and epistemic logic based on so-called hybrid logics. He is also a professor of Philosophy in secondary education. He has participated as a speaker in various international conferences and has published several articles and book chapters on epistemic logic, temporal logic, hybrid logics and the problems related to the construction of modal temporal-epistemic logic systems. He is currently a member of the LEMA research group at the University of La Laguna (Spain).

e-mail: rafaelherrera.filosofia@gmail.com

How to undermine omniscient subjects. Some formal strategies to overcome the problem of logical omniscience

The problem of logical omniscience is one of the most important obstacles that modal epistemic and doxastic logic has to face, and the different attempts to overcome it have motivated some of the most interesting formal developments that we can find in this subfield of non-classical logics.

The problem is that epistemic logic systems based on modal logic formalize epistemic and doxastic notions that, due to their overly ideal character, would only be applicable to omniscient subjects.

However, if we wish to remain within the limits of the modal conception of epistemic and doxastic notions (which, on the other hand, is so fruitful for the philosophical analysis of these notions), it is not easy to overcome the challenge represented by the above-mentioned problem of logical omniscience, and this is because this problem has its deepest roots in two basic theses of epistemic modal logic, namely:

1) The semantic definition of knowledge and belief as modal concepts.
2) The definition itself of logical validity.

In this presentation we will show how to build formal temporal-epistemic systems based on hybrid languages, that is, systems of temporal and epistemic logic in which we resort to the so-called hybrid logics to refer to epistemic states located in specific moments of time, and also we will posit the hypothesis that this type of formal systems can offer us an interesting way to solve the problem of logical omniscience.

This possible solution consists in taking into consideration epistemic subjects who are potentially (or virtually) omniscient, but who, in fact, never become omniscient in the actual world, since the possibility of obtaining all the logical consequences of their beliefs or knowledge, or the possibility of knowing all logical truths, would be postponed to a moment in the future that, in fact, may never be reached.

In this way we can create formal temporal-epistemic systems keeping ourselves in the framework of modal logic, with the advantages that this implies, but formalizing more realistic and applicable epistemic and doxastic notions to real epistemic subjects, as, for instance, human beings.

22. Thomas Netland is currently working on his Ph. D. dissertation on the role of phenomenological philosophy in cognitive science, specifically within the enactive approach. Exploring the prospects of different forms of interaction between phenomenology and empirical sciences of life and mind (a “naturalized phenomenology”), two of his project’s guiding forces are Merleau-Ponty’s Gestalt ontology and the idea of enactivism as a philosophy of nature. Department of Philosophy and Religious studies, Faculty of Humanities Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway.

e-mail: thomas.netland@ntnu.no

Enaction: A Phenomenology-Science Integration

A productive dialogue between phenomenological philosophy and cognitive science has been ongoing for decades, but the nature of this exchange has yet to be properly comprehended. With the intention of highlighting some central features of this relationship, my talk will 1) survey some of the different instances and conceptions of phenomenology-science interaction in the current literature and 2) show how the concept of enaction (as understood in the “Varelian” enactivist program) is developed through a dialectical integration of phenomenological and scientific perspectives.

Regarding 1), I classify instances/conceptions of phenomenology-science interaction by what role they ascribe to phenomenology, as either a) a method for gathering first-personal data, b) generating hypotheses for empirical testing, c) providing explananda for scientific explanations, or d) engaging in a more integrative exchange with scientific perspectives. While this is compatible with Gallagher’s (2003) categorization of neurophenomenology, indirect phenomenology, and “front-loading phenomenology” as phenomenological ways to inform cognitive science, it is also a potential tool for resolving ambiguities in Gallagher’s
classification regarding what phenomenology is and how its relation to science is negotiated in each of the different cases.

While a-d all represent more or less legitimate and productive contributions to cognitive science, the meaning of “phenomenology” varies significantly between them. If we are interested in how full-fledged philosophical phenomenology interacts with cognitive science, the currently most promising example is enactivism’s display of d) in developing its ontological framework. Thus, part 2) of my talk outlines how the concept of enaction operates at an interdisciplinary intersection where perspectives from transcendental phenomenology play a central role. This, I hold, does not violate enactivism’s naturalistic commitments but on the contrary represents a precarious, ongoing project the legitimacy of which is contingent upon its continued success. Moreover, it represents an arena where transcendental thinking can be (non-reductively) informed, enriched, and extended by scientific findings.

If successful, enactivism’s phenomenology-science integration bears promise not only of a more coherent and articulated interdisciplinary framework for the mind sciences but suggests a shift to a new ontology – in the form of a phenomenological philosophy of nature.

23. Alexander A. Lvov acquired his PhD degree from St. Petersburg State University in 2015, and have obtained the positions of a lecturer, then a senior lecturer, and then an associate professor since that. He has published more than 40 papers in both Russian and English on the issues of history of philosophy, philosophical anthropology and history of science; he has also participated in a number of international philosophical events (including Third International Congress of Greek Philosophy, Lisbon, 2016, and First International Conference of Hellenic Studies, Herceg Novi, 2019). He is a participant of DAAD (August 2017, 2018, 2019) and Erasmus+ (February 2019) staff exchange programs with Friedrich Schiller University (Jena, Germany), conducted by Prof Dr Uwe Hossfeld. His current fields of interest are: history of philosophy (classical and modern as well as its methodological aspects) and philosophical anthropology (its history, epistemology and the problem of worldview).

e-mail: a.lvov@spbu.ru

Will the Trespassers be Prosecuted? Anthropological and Worldview Approaches to the Phenomenon of Cultural Solipsism

It has become a commonplace statement that solipsism is a modern problem; they argue that it developed from Cartesian cogito and was reconsidered and eventually reestablished by the phenomenological movement. Indeed, there is even a consensus that solipsism may have never been defeated completely But there is a perspective to avoid solipsism at least in its cultural manifestation on anthropological grounds. It draws us back to the classical practice of the ancient Delphi divination, namely an illustrious “I—Thou” recognition: the asker was only allowed to enter the communicative sphere with God, recognizing God’s presence hic et nunc. Plutarch put that explication of the inscriptions on the gates of the Delphi temple “gnothi seauton — E (ei)” as a dialogue. To this a contribution by B. Groethuysen in his project of philosophical anthropology as a discipline of a secondary reflection it very instrumental: the
“I” participates in the “I—Thou” communication to understand the Other, and implies the distinction within the “I” as the “I” and “I-as-the-language-user”.

Here I see a bridge from philosophical anthropology as a phenomenological project of the “more primordial” reflection to the technique of translation, which adjoins the issue of Weltanschauung. It brings us closer to the hermeneutical approach (a Dilthey—Groethuysen—V. Ivanov perspective) to analyze the Weltanschauung as a communicative, or practical sphere of human being in the world as a whole. The wholeness of being should be realized as the understanding of values of the Other(s), not only in ethical, but also in metaphysical perspective. Translation here means the task to overcome one’s cultural and traditional conditionality and to make the Other means and ends of one’s understanding (das Verstehen) and, consequently, one’s speech. By doing this I become the “I” and “I-reflective” instances as well as the Other becomes the “I” and “I-reflective” instances respectively; although one could know nothing about the “I” instance of the Other, one may realize the Other’s “I-reflective” instance, which pragmatically (but not purely ethically!) coincides with the one’s own reflective experience. Hence, the Cartesian motto: I think, therefore I am, we could reconsider as: I reflect, therefore you are.

24. **Hans Herlof Grelland** - Professor emeritus in quantum chemistry and lecturer of philosophy at University of Agder, Norway. His research includes theoretical quantum mechanics, the philosophy of physics, phenomenology, existentialism, the philosophy of art, and Chinese philosophy. In quantum mechanics he has tried to formulate mathematically the interplay between heavy and light particles, giving rise to molecular structure and to classical mechanics, and a relativistic form of quantum mechanics. His philosophical research projects include the influence of Søren Kierkegaard on Henrik Ibsen’s writing and Edvard Munch’s visual art, Hermann Weyl’s phenomenological philosophy of physics, the philosophical interpretation of quantum mechanics, the concept of space in Einstein and Sartre, empathy, human nature and the philosophies of Edith stein and Mengzi, the concept of nothingness in Daoism, Heidegger, and Sartre, and the concept of “angst” in Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Sartre.

e-mail: [Hans.grelland@uia.no](mailto:Hans.grelland@uia.no)

**The Concept of Nothingness in Daoism and in Heidegger**

Heidegger’s interest in Chinese and Japanese philosophy is well known (Parkes 1987, May 1996, Denker 2013) and it has also been suggested that he has been influenced by eastern thinking (May 1996). A comparison may throw some light on Heidegger’s thinking and may also be a fruitful case for bringing cultural traditions together and stimulate the development of new philosophical perspectives.

I want to discuss the Chinese concept of Wu (non-being or nothingness) as it can be found in classical Daoist sources, in particular in the Dao De Jing of Lao Zi (Moss 2001) and compare it to Heidegger's concept of das Nichts and related notions in Being and Time (Heidegger 1998) and What is Metaphysics (Heidegger 2010). This is related to the concept of being in Chinese tradition, which can be compared to notions of being in Greek tradition and
in Heidegger. My lecture will include a critical re-evaluation of May’s (1996, pp. 21-34) treatment of this question. I will also consider the role of the phenomenological approach in such a study, including Jen-Paul Sartre’s (Sartre 2018, pp. 50-57) criticism of Heidegger on the concept of nothingness.

References:

25. Çağlar Çömez - is a doctoral student on a cotutelle program at Boğaziçi University and Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg. His research is currently funded by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD). His doctoral thesis concerns the relation between morality and law, in general, and an assessment of how Immanuel Kant characterized this relation within the context of contemporary legal philosophy, in particular. His research interests include moral philosophy, legal philosophy, ethics and German philosophy. He wrote his master’s thesis and published on Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time. An article he wrote on Kantian and Humean ethics is forthcoming.

e-mail: caglar.comez@boun.edu.tr

Unjust Laws and the Ethics of Law

In its various versions, natural law theory endorses the idea that the concept of law cannot be understood independently of our ethical ideals. Thomas Aquinas and other classical natural law theorists characterized these ideals in substantive ethical terms such as justice. However, legal positivists objected to classical natural law theory by pointing to the obvious fact that, in actual legal systems, substantially unjust rules have been enacted and executed as laws. In response to the positivist objection, some commentators argued that Aquinas actually did not believe that justice is a condition for a rule to be regarded as law. Brian Bix, for instance, argued that, according to Aquinas, the fact that a legal rule is unjust only entails that it does not create any moral obligation to obey it, not that it is not law. The problem with this reading is that, in various points in his work, Aquinas explicitly accepts Augustine’s thesis that “unjust laws do not seem to be laws”. My main aim is to show that, with its central emphasis on ethical notions including social justice, classical natural law theory can still be a viable alternative in current ethical disputes about the nature of law. To this end, I offer a reading of Aquinas’ legal philosophy that both avoids the positivist objection and takes Aquinas’ endorsement of Augustine’s thesis seriously. Two key points in this regard in Aquinas’ legal philosophy are first that legally relevant normative notions such as the common good and justice are of
different kinds and second that the concept of law itself admits different degrees. Laws might be said to serve the common good and justice in different senses of these terms. Consequently, legal rules might have the character of law to varying degrees. According to this interpretation, Aquinas thinks that in order for a rule to gain the character of law to a minimum degree, it needs to meet only the content-independent requirements of justice. This does not mean, however, that the concept of law can be understood independently of content-related substantive demands of justice.

26. Matilde Liberti - Graduated in BA Philosophy at the University of Stirling, UK (2017) and in MA Philosophical Methodologies at the University of Genoa, Italy (2020), with a period of research on Chinese Jurisprudence and Buddhism philosophy conducted at Lingnan University, Hong Kong (2016). Her broad philosophical interests merge on current accounts of phronesis and on the relevant moral psychology that is needed to support them. Academic affiliation: University of Genoa, Italy.

e-mail: libertimatilde@yahoo.it

A humane account of virtue

In defining virtue McDowell draws a sharp distinction between the virtuous and the continent, arguing that they ultimately differ in cognition. What marks this difference is the silencing effect of virtue, according to which in the virtuous person all the non-salient features of the situation lose their motivational power (1998a). This position raised a number of interesting challenges in the current virtue ethicist debate: to begin with, McDowell defines the virtuous person in terms of the ‘no genuine loss theory’ (1998b; Baxley, 2007), according to which she does not feel pained by what she has to forsake in order to do the virtuous thing. This sounds like saying that the virtuous is actually a stoic, who feels more pleasure in doing the right thing than in forsaking something as valuable as, say, her own survival. So, is the virtuous just a brave continent in the end? Secondly, how is it cognitively possible to have non-salient reasons silenced unless one devotes one’s entire self to virtue? It seems that non-moral values such as family, relations, career or survival are valuable only insofar as they do not collide with the requirement of virtue. This paper aims at drawing a plausibly humane picture of the virtuous person starting from a defence of McDowell’s silencing effect of virtue. After presenting the problems raised by his sharp distinction between the continent and the virtuous (section 1), we explore its cognitive plausibility through Vigani’s (2019) recent account of situation-construal that explains how the virtuous and the cognitive see two different situations when presented with the same context (section 2). We will notice that the silencing effect of virtue does not imply that the virtuous person cannot feel pained by the situation she has to confront, because even though what is valuable to her does lose in motivational force, it is still present at her awareness; this is plausible if we endorse Dancy’s (2004) holism of reasons and values (section 3). Finally, we will wear the virtuous shoes and make sense of what it means for the virtuous person to be automatically motivated by what she sees, as opposed to the continent who needs to deliberate over what reason she is more motivated to act on (section 4).
References:

27. Pujarini Das (Philosophy, Dept. of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur) - is currently pursuing her PhD (Topic: A Reflective Analysis of Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Self-Control) at the Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur, India. Das has participated at national and international events and awarded overseas travel grants from the University of Padova, Italy; National Taiwan University, Taiwan; Van Leer Jerusalem Institute, Israel; Peking University, China; International Academy of Philosophy, Liechtenstein; Nicolaus Copernicus University, Poland; and the University of Cologne, Germany. Her published works are, “Freedom of the Will and No-Self in Buddhism,” and “A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy.”

e-mail: pujarini.hcu@gmail.com; pujarini@iitk.ac.in

Free Will, Human-Agent, and Nonhuman-Agent

28. Maciej Glowacki - is a master student of philosophy and mathematics at University of Warsaw. He is interested in philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and logic. Currently, his main areas of interest are metaphysics of linguistic entities, self reference and epistemic contextualism.

e-mail: m.glowacki6@student.uw.edu.pl

Epistemic contextualism and moral stakes. Moral standard as parameter of context

Standard arguments in favor of epistemic contextualism are usually based on the dependency of truth conditions of knowledge claims on pragmatic standards that are relevant in the given context (Rysiew 2016). In my talk I would like to take another approach in motivating epistemic contextualism. Following the suggestion of Rima Basu (2019), I argue that truth conditions of justification claims (and a fortiori knowledge claims) can as well depend on relevant moral standards. In the talk, I discuss some examples in which historical patterns of discrimination may raise the level of required confirmation of justification claims. One such example is a case of claims about social status of members of discriminated groups. Consider the following case. You are invited to a banquet of university professors in Vienna in 1922.
There are hundreds of male professors with their wives and only one female professor Elisen Richter – the first female professor in Austria. Seeing the woman at the party you may form a belief “This woman is not a professor”. This belief seems to be justified by the very low proportion of professors in the group of women at the party. But on the other hand, such a belief about Elise Richter would not only be false, but also unjust, since it would be formed solely on the basis of her gender (cf. Gendler 2011). I claim (following e.g. Basu 2018, Schroeder 2018), that such a claim cannot be justified by mere statistical reasoning because of its high moral stakes. I argue that these stakes stem from risk of hurting another person and conservation of patterns of discrimination. Moreover, I argue that such encroachment of moral standards is not merely an extension of standard pragmatic encroachment. The difference lies in the impossibility of constructing minimal contrasting cases for low and high moral stakes and in the lack of continuity of levels of required justification in such cases. Finally, in analogy of models of paradigmatically context dependent entities like indexicals (cf. Kaplan 1989), I propose a basic model of context dependency of knowledge claims in which moral standard is a parameter of context.

References:

29. Cristina Sagrafena is a second year Ph.D student in philosophy at FINO consortium. She is based in Turin, and supervised by Professor Jan Sprenger. Before starting her Ph.D, she obtained her Bachelor and Master degrees in Philosophy at Pisa University both with honors. Her main interests concern General Philosophy of Science, Formal epistemology, especially Bayesian Philosophy of Science, Social Choice theory and Decision Theory. Currently, she is working on the relationship between scientific theory choice and Social choice. After having investigated the social choice framework applied to theory choice in light of the idea of scientific objectivity, she is focusing on possible links between subjective Bayesianism and Social choice.
Scientific rationality is and can be silent

Samir Okasha (2011), applying Arrow's impossibility theorem (1951) for social choice to scientific theory choice on the basis of the Kuhnian epistemic criteria (Kuhn, 1977), argues that there is no acceptable theory choice rule, namely no rule that satisfies the Arrovian desiderata for social choice rephrased for theory choice.

He sees the only promising escape route in imposing on the rule conditions that demand it to take as input more-than-ordinal and interpersonally comparable information, following Amartya Sen's work for social choice (1970). Sen showed in fact that the Arrovian impossibility is mostly due to the only ordinal and non-interpersonally comparable information the social choice rule considers.

Regarding Okasha’s argument, Seamus Bradley (2017) points out that he relies on an objective reading of rational theory choice according to which the choice is determined by agent-independent principles of rationality. Such a reading however makes the Sen’s escape route look puzzling because it requires conditions that can be found in narrow domains of scientific inference.

Conversely, he proposes to use it following a subjective idea of rational theory choice: Sen’s escape route conditions become then silent principles of rationality that constrain but do not determine theory choice, because it requires subjective trade-offs among the criteria. In this talk I ask what happens to the social choice framework applied to theory choice if we impose on the latter the only desideratum of objectivity, arguably the most important desideratum for theory choice. To this end, I take into consideration two ideas of objectivity: objectivity as transformative criticism (Longino, 1990), and objectivity as value-free-ideal (Reiss, Sprenger, 2017).

While the former states that scientific method is objective in the extent in which it yields changes in its procedures and results, the latter says that scientific hypotheses acceptance is objective if free from contextual criteria, i.e. criteria that, differently from the universally applicable epistemic ones, appear as such in the context of their use. I will show that since in both cases, subjective trade-offs of the criteria are recognized (and encouraged), Sen's escape route can be used in light of a subjective reading of rational theory choice.

References:
Unconscious perception and epistemic luck

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), 'episodes of the same fundamental kind as episodes of conscious perception can occur unconsciously' (Block & Phillips, 2017, p. 165). UP has sparked a couple of heated debates in philosophy of perception and epistemology. To name a few, it is disputed whether the putative examples of unconscious perception really deserve the label ‘perception’ (Block & Phillips, 2017), whether UP favours any of the competing views in metaphysics of perception (Anaya & Clarke, 2017; Berger & Nanay, 2016), and whether UP constitutes a good reason to believe that perceptual consciousness is epistemically idle (Berger, 2020; Smithies, 2019).

This talk extends that list with yet another controversy. It argues that environmental and reflective luck, two types of epistemic luck that are widely regarded as knowledge-destroying (Pritchard, 2005, 2010), are compatible with knowledge if UP is true. The plan for the talk is as follows. I start by presenting a simple argument:

(P1) if unconscious perception exists, it must have epistemic import;
(P2) the epistemic import of unconscious perception is environmentally and reflectively lucky;
(P3) the epistemic import of unconscious perception suffices for knowledge;
(C4) if unconscious perception exists, environmental and reflective luck are compatible with knowledge.

Then I consider and reply to possible objections against each part of the argument. Since none of the objections turns out successful, I conclude that the simple argument is sound. The talk ends with some remarks about the ramifications of this result for the debate about epistemic luck.

References:


31. Rachel Dichter is a Ph.D. student at the University of Notre Dame with interests in epistemology, ethics, and social and political philosophy. In 2019, she obtained her B.A. in philosophy from Columbia University in the City of New York.

e-mail: rdichter@nd.edu

“Trans World” Identity: Naming and Necessity on Transition

An ongoing debate in social philosophy probes whether sex properties such as “male” and “female” are essential properties of those individuals who possess them. This paper explores Saul Kripke’s hypothetical take on the same via a critical reading of his influential work on the philosophy of language, Naming and Necessity. I first argue on the basis of Kripke’s metaphysical commitments that he would take sex to be an essential property of individuals. I further claim that this metaphysical view commits him to one of two positions on the physical transition of transgender individuals. In particular, he must hold either (1) that transgender individuals can never actually physically transition in any real sense or (2) that transgender individuals literally become new individuals when they physically transition. Along the way, I suggest that the picture of necessity that commits Kripke to one of these theses comprises an independently compelling rationale to abandon his theory.

32. Brett Blitch - having recently graduated with a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy from East Tennessee State University, he is currently working to further his academic endeavors via the graduate school applications process. His primary research interests have been and will continue to be focused on matters of epistemology and the philosophy of mind. He had the privilege of presenting his abridged senior thesis, “(Un)Reformed: A Response to DeRose and Pritchard’s Objection to Properly Basic Religious Belief”, at the 21st Annual Southern Appalachian Undergraduate Philosophy Conference earlier this year, and his current work continues to examine the viability of the reformed epistemological account.

e-mail: blitch@etsu.edu

The Nature of Analogy and Issues of Dissimilarity in Plantinga’s Reformed Epistemology

There has long persisted a point of contention within the reformed epistemological discourse concerning the sustainability of an analogy between religious and other sorts of basic belief. This is in large part due to the work of Alvin Plantinga, who stands as perhaps the most influential of the reformed epistemologists. His emphasis on a potential commonality in the formation of religious belief and that of other beliefs he considers to be ‘properly basic’ (and therefore rational) seems to hold two implications. The first is that there exists an analogous
nature in the belief-forming processes considered, and the second is that the presence of disanalogies may prove problematic for the account. As such, objections have been raised against Plantinga’s model on the basis of perceived dissimilarities between the sorts of belief in question. While I find it counterproductive to deny dissimilarities in the experience of religious and other sorts of basic belief, it is my aim to counter notable objections by disanalogy to Plantinga’s account through a differentiation of problematic and non-problematic dissimilarities. I suggest this may be accomplished by considering the evolution of Plantinga’s criterial standard of proper basicity since his introductory work on the matter. Moreover, I seek to provide an analysis of certain dissimilarities that are to be expected in the experience of varied sorts of basic belief given the nature of the relevant formative processes involved. For it is, I think, of benefit to the discussion that we recognize clearly the relationship between belief formation and proper basicity – and, of course, proper basicity and rationality – on Plantinga’s most developed reformed epistemological account. That is, since the sustainability of the relevant analogy in Plantinga’s epistemology will pertain primarily to matters of meeting the necessary criteria standard. I maintain that should the objection by disanalogy be successfully dispelled, there can be a constructive shift in discourse surrounding the viability of Plantinga’s model.

33. **Piotr Janik** - PhD, Autor of the book “Koncepcja przekonania w ujęciu semiotyczno-pragmatycznym. C.S. Peirce (1839-1914)”. Translator of E. Stein’s “Beittraege zur philosophischen Begrundung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften”. Member of Polish Phenomenological Association (PTFen) and „The Stein Circle”, The International Association for the Study of the Philosophy of Edith Stein (IASPES). A few important papers include: “Transcendent Action in the Light of C.S. Peirce's Architectonic System”, “«Czynności i wytwory» w perspektywie fenomenologicznej” and “Hermeneutyckno-fenomenologiczne ujęcie (wy)czucia duchowego”.

e-mail: piotr.janik@ignatianum.edu.pl

**Responsibility and its ontologic foundations. Ingarden’s Legacy**

Following Ingarden's thoughts on the meaning of responsibility, I place the analysis in the domain of values, without limiting it to ethics. I also refer to the E. Stein's research outcome, which coincides with Ingarden's thought. Stein, in his polemics with M. Scheler, postulates access to values through feelings, namely through the "living body". This thought will later be taken up by M. Merleau-Ponty and recently, by R. Barbaras. Barbaras' analysis will give an ontological basis of it. In the proposed approach, "responsibility" is the other side of the value perception. Responsibility is crucial for the individual, for his or her development and life, which I will try to outline.

34. **Giuditta Corbella** is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (Milano). She delivered a MA thesis about Possibility and Necessity in the works of Martin Heidegger, after spending several months at the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg. Her PhD project focuses on the employment of modal concepts and relations in
the realism-idealism controversy and in the Ingardenian ontology. It is conducted under the supervision of Prof. Giuseppe D’Anna, who works on issues in realism and ontology with a focus on Nicolai Hartmann. She is currently working on the multi-directional use of modalities among phenomenologists, with a particular focus on Heidegger and Ingarden.

e-mail: giuditta.corbella@unicatt.it

“Questions Knock at Reality”. Ingarden’s Erotetical Path Towards Realism

What is a question? Of what do we ask questions? What do our questions say about reality? And, ultimately, can erotetics, the theory of questions, be a useful tool for a realist philosopher? This paper will investigate Ingarden’s theory of questions as a means by which to tackle the controversy over the existence of an independent reality in Essentiale Fragen. This paper aims to consider Ingarden’s erotetical legacy and connect it to the realism-antirealism problem addressed by the philosopher throughout his entire academic life. The first section will introduce the text and the history of its reception. The second section will outline Ingarden’s theory of questions. The subsequent section will quantify the degree of ontological commitment present in the text and, consequently, its anti-psychologistic potential.

35. Kentaro Ozeki is currently a Ph.D. candidate at Keio University and a research fellow of Japan Society for the Promotion of Science. His specialization is logic and ontology (philosophical and applied), in connection with the legacy of the Brentano school. He obtained his BA in Letters at the University of Tokyo, and both MA in Philosophy (thesis title: “Meinongian and Husserlian Theories of Abstract Objects and their Logics”) and MS in Engineering (thesis title: “Ontology Integration Based on Upper Ontology and Its Application to Question Answering System”) at Keio University.

e-mail: kentaro.ozeki@gmail.com

Ingarden’s Dual-Bearer Theory of Fictional Objects

Largely in Literary Work of Art and Controversy over the Existence of the World, Ingarden gives a detailed ontological account on fictional objects in terms of the theory of purely intentional objects. Ingarden’s theory is defended and developed in some recent realist positions on the ontology of fiction, in particular, the so-called abstract artifact theory.

The significant features of the purely intentional objects are, in Ingarden’s terminology, their specific existential moments, such as existential derivativeness and existential heteronomy, and their double-sidedness (Doppelseitigkeit). According to the contemporary reconstructions of Ingarden’s theory, the double-sidedness of purely intentional objects is interpreted as a kind of distinction in the relationship between purely intentional objects and their properties, that is something like a distinction between property exemplification and property ascription.

However, while that kind of interpretation of double-sidedness captures an indispensable part of the double-sidedness, I argue that it does not fully explicate Ingarden’s
theory, in the sense that it misses the fact that these “two sides” are exclusively treated as two distinct “bearers” (Träger) of properties in his discussion (cf. Literary Work of Art, §20).

In my presentation, in connection with the ontology of fiction, I argue that the two-bearers interpretation of purely intentional objects is differentiated from the two-modes-of-predication interpretation of it, though the former is compatible with the latter. To conclude, the view developed by Ingarden is best understood as the dual-bearer theory of purely intentional or fictional objects. According to the Ingardenian dual-bearer theory, a fictional object is not an object such that a single bearer has properties in two different ways, but a structured object which consists of two bearers. The bearers, (a) the structure or the object as a whole, and (b) the content (Gehalt), which is a non-independent part of it, have properties in respective ways, and are in an ontological dependence relation. The dual-bearer theory of fictional objects manages some problems raised against the contemporary artifact theory and is comparable to some recent theories of fictional objects (the syncretistic theory and the modal Meinongian theory).

36. Paweł Rojek (Jagiellonian University) teaches metaphysics at Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He works on the problem of universals, ontology of relations and Russian philosophy. Recently he published Tropy i uniwersalia. Badania ontologiczne (in Polish), where he discussed Ingarden’s theory of tropes and universals.

e-mail: pawel.rojek@uj.edu.pl

Ingarden’s Hidden Nominalism

Roman Ingarden formulated an ontology according to which there are both particular properties and universal ideas. His theory, therefore, might be prima facie called realistic trope theory. It is realistic, because it accepts the existence of universals, and it is trope theory, since it also accepts particular properties. Ingarden aimed to be a realist of a special kind. He supposed that universals have independent beings and are not constituents of their particulars. His theory was, therefore, a fusion of transcendent realism with particularism. David Armstrong saw a possibility of such a position. “Particularism could be combined with realism” (Armstrong 1978: 85). “However – he added – I know of no Particularist, who has appealed to transcendent Forms”. Some authors suggested that it was Plato himself, but actually it was Ingarden who with no doubts occupied a position postulated by Armstrong. Ingarden’s specific position among trope theories was clearly seen by Ingvar Johansson. He noticed that Ingarden, along with Donald Mertz or Jonathan Lowe, accepted both the existence of tropes and universals, but – in contrast to them – regarded universals “as ideal and extratemporal” (Johansson 2009: 76). In my paper I am going to formulate a fundamental objection against Ingarden’s realistic theory of tropes. The problem is that he regarded universals as transcendent forms, and transcendent forms, arguably, cannot be true universals. I will argue that Ingarden’s theory of universals is in fact, along with Plato’s or Frege’s views, a kind of “hidden nominalism” (Bergmann 1960: 205-224; 1964: 246). My argument against Ingarden’s theory of universals develops a charge raised by Edward Swiderski (Swiderski 2001: 125), who first adopted Bergmann’s idea to Ingarden. Then I will try to show that although Ingarden’s ontology cannot be reinterpreted in
a true realistic way, some of its elements might be used to formulate a more appropriate theory. One possible modification of Ingarden’s theory has been already noticed by Andrzej Poltawski (Poltawski 1964). It needs, however, to change the status of the world of ideas from ideal to intentional. Ingarden definitely would never accept it.

References:
Bergmann G. (1960), Meaning and Existence, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.
Bergmann G. (1964), Logic and Reality, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press.

37. Jacob Bell (Independent Scholar) – Jacob has a BA in philosophy from American Public University and he spent a semester studying with the University of Edinburgh. He has presented and published on the topic of relational metaphysics which is his primary research focus.

e-mail: jacobabell91@gmail.com

Reality Holism: Ontological & Epistemic Pluralism Grounded by an Essence of Relation

Ontological and epistemic pluralism does not necessitate a difference in the fundamentality of being. Manifestations (things in the world) can differ both epistemically and ontologically. I.e., a phenomenal experience exists and is known subjectively. Physical facts exist and are known objectively. The historical method for making sense of this bifurcation is to make explicit a realm of mind and a realm of matter. This is a confusion. There is no separate realm of mind and matter, or subjective and objective – rather, one vast realm of relations from which everything emerges. The unique manifestation of something or the other depends on its specific relation to the rest of the world.

The fundamental nature of being is the relation of the world and everything that the world contains. Everything that exists in the cosmos shares a metaphysical essence that relates all of being, resulting in the sublime unity of all that exists and will exist, but which admits a plurality of modes of being at the level of manifestation. When merged with ontological and epistemic pluralism, this fundamental necessity of relation bridges the mind-body gap while also avoiding the idea that everything can be reduced to science-based physical fact-finding.

The multitudinous forms of manifestation allow for some things to be known objectively, others subjectively. It allows for some things to exist subjectively, others objectively. A science based physical fact-finding approach and a phenomenal experiential approach are both necessary endeavors for understanding the world. Each method reveals
unique phenomena of a unified reality which share a necessary and fundamental metaphysical relation but diverge in their specific position in the web of relations and as a result they occupy a unique place both epistemically and ontologically at the level of manifestation. Without one or the other, our picture of reality is incomplete.

38. **Kyley Ewing** (University of Regina) - has recently received her PhD in philosophy from the University of Maryland. Her dissertation is titled *The Existence of Time and Its Relationship to the Reality of Temporal Passage*. The abstract she has submitted is based on a paper that comes from her dissertation. She has just started a one-year contract as an Assistant Professor in philosophy at the University of Regina. Her areas of interest in philosophy are the philosophy of science, metaphysics, the philosophy of time, and free will.

e-mail: kyley.ewing@uregina.ca; kyley.ewing@gmail.com

**Temporal Passage in a Fragmented World**

First introduced by Fine (2005 and 2006) in “Tense and Reality”, fragmentalism is a relatively recent and striking addition to the debate between tensed and tenseless theories of time. Taking its place in the corner of tensed theories, the metaphysics of fragmentalism divides a world that is on the whole incurably incoherent into internally coherent fragments of tensed facts. One of the professed strengths of tensed A-theoretic accounts, such as presentism, is that they are able to account for the intuitive, everyday feeling that time really passes. B-theoretic tenseless accounts, on the other hand, are usually thought to accord better with the science of our world and are typically paired with the much less intuitive view that the passage of time is an illusion.

My aim is to consider if and in what sense fragmentalism can join its tensed compatriots in accounting for genuine temporal passage. There are three parts to my analysis of temporal passage in fragmentalism’s fragmented world. I begin by defending fragmentalism against claims that it presents a hopelessly muddled conception of reality. With a coherent conceptual picture of the basics of fragmentalism in place, I turn to the passage of time and argue that fragmentalism provides an ill-suited environment for the mind-independent passage of time. My defense of this thesis will be twofold. First, I provide a general argument that fragmentalism is neither able to accommodate the genuine global or local passage of time. Second, I respond to a proposal for a fragmentalist account of mind-independent temporal passage presented by Lipman (2018). I conclude that, although fragmentalism is not necessarily in itself an incoherent view, it lacks the advantages of orthodox A-theoretic tensed accounts.

**References:**

39. **Tatiana Denisova** (Surgut State University) holds a PhD in Philosophy from the Novosibirsk State Technical University. Since 2007 she is Associate Professor at the Surgut State University; she served as Dean of the Faculty of Social Technologies (2009-2011). Member of the Russian Philosophical Society and the International Society for the Interdisciplinary Study of Symmetry. Served as an editor to the journal North region: science, education, art. Her research interests fall under special areas of phenomenological ontology and metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, social philosophy, Greek philosophy, semiotics and theory of culture, art, and science. Author of the monographs Loneliness: metaphysics and dialectics (Moscow 2013, 2019); Avatars of Time: Images and concepts of time in the history of human thought (Moscow, 2019, 2020). Author of over 100 publications on issues of loneliness as an existential phenomenon, ontological aspects of time, the concept of the boundary as an ontological principle, among which “Metaphysics of the Human Situation in the Myth of the Labyrinth,” “Ontology of topos according to Aristotle,” “Existential Time: Metaphysics of Status and Pragmatic of Everyday Perception,” “The Loneliness of Minotaur,” “The Boundary in Cosmos and the two Images of Homo Definiens ad Terminus in the Myth of Daedalus and Icarus,” “On the intellectual prerequisites of Greek creativity,” and others.

e-mail: tatiana.denisova.1209@gmail.com

**Boundary as a constitutive principle of the Being: existential aspects**

The boundary prescribes the internal integrity and separateness of a thing, defines its “what-it-is”, assigns its place in the whole, that is it determines its “where-it-is”, connects it with other things by determining its “for-which-it-is”. The concept of boundary combines what the Greeks called πέρας (extremity), i.e. the external outline, the σχήμα, the boundary of a thing), and the substance (οὐσία) they bound.

The boundary allows anything to be something and at the same time delineates the horizon for a thing, it is a condition of its interrelations, change, and development. In other words, the boundary combines two major qualities of the Being: presence and becoming. Concerning human existence, the boundaries generally perform a similar function. However, they have certain important peculiarities, such as the following:

1. Humans are not only surrounded by boundaries, like anything; they are aware of them, need them, and project themselves based on them.
2. Humans not only recognize the need for boundaries but also push them by their activity. Humans do not occupy the objectively assigned place among other things in the whole but themselves create this place by defining both the external boundaries that separate him from the transcendental and the internal boundaries that structure the sphere of the immanent.
3. Humans do not exist simply in a world surrounded and delineated by boundaries, “inside boundaries”, or “beyond boundaries”. Concerning humans, the boundary reveals a paradoxical property: it marks the sphere of the immanent but does not closure humans in it; it passes through him. Human is the only creature for which the boundary is the place of his habitancy, the condition of his existence.
4. The specifics of human existence within boundaries lies not only in his striving to establish them, but also to cross them. No existential boundaries are ultimate for him.

5. Anything that lies beyond the boundaries does not fully belong to the otherness since it is compliant with the immanent and can be understood through the immanent.

40. Giulio Sciacca (University of Genoa)

e-mail: giulio.sciacca@gmail.com

Boundaries and Tropes

Jeroen Smid (2015) presented the following puzzle concerning boundaries, parthood, and dependency relations: (i) wholes depend on their parts, (ii) boundaries depend on their wholes, (iii) boundaries are parts of their wholes. Each of these sentences is individually plausible, yet their conjunction is contradictory. From (i) and (iii), it turns out that wholes partially depend on their boundaries. Hence, there is a tension with (ii), at least given some principle of asymmetry of dependency. Calosi (2018) proposed to replace (ii) with the close (ii*): boundaries depend on the interior of their wholes. While this proposal solves the puzzle, there are two reasons for scepticism. First, it is at odds with the Humean banishment of necessary relations between (concrete and contingently existing) distinct objects, given a ground-theoretic definition of dependence, such as Schneider’s (2020). In a nutshell, two existentially dependent objects are such that the depender cannot exist without the dependee: hence, necessarily, boundaries cannot exist without their interiors. However, since they are both mereologically and spatially distinct, Hume’s dictum establishes that their independent recombination is possible. Thus, worlds in which there is an open sphere without its boundary are genuine possibilities. Second, Calosi’s proposal does not carry over to an analogous puzzle concerning tropes. Consider: (i) wholes depend on their parts, (iv) tropes depend on their objects, (v) tropes are parts of their wholes. Calosi’s solution should rephrase (iv) as (iv*): tropes depend on the interior of their objects. However, by leveraging on the idempotency of the relation being the interior of, I show a couple of scenarios to which this strategy simply does not work. Lastly, I propose to replace (iii) with the weaker (iii*): boundaries are contained in their whole. I suggest this relation is similar to that between tropes and their objects. The comparison can then be pushed and motivated forward. First, the Chisholm-Brentano theory of boundaries precisely conceives boundaries as non-mereological constituents of objects. Second, some trope theorists, such as Mulligan, Simon & Smith (1984) but apparently also Aristotle, already pointed out boundaries as essentially dependent particulars, that is, tropes.

References:

E-mail: dalius.jonkus@vdu.lt; phenolt@yahoo.com

**Formalism and Phenomenology in V. Seseman’s Aesthetics**

The purpose of this article is to analyze the connection between formalism and phenomenology in Vasily Seseman’s aesthetics. In the articles “Aesthetic Evaluation in the History of Art” (1922), “The Nature of Poetic Image” (1925), “Art and Culture” (1927), Seseman discusses the formalist concept of art. However, the most complete critique of the formalist conception of art is revealed in Aesthetics (1970). In this book, he presented the most comprehensive conception of aesthetic structure. In this paper, I firstly analyze the most important features of the formalist history of art, and then I explore how Seseman transforms the concept of artistic form into a conception of aesthetic structure. I argue that formalistic analysis of art transforms the concept of artistic form into a style. This style is nothing less than the experience of being in the world. Seseman abandons the dualistic separation of sensory material and intelligible form, and instead offers the concept of aesthetic structure. He reveals the relationship between the sensory structure of an aesthetic object and the perceiving subject. Aesthetic value can be revealed as meaningful only with the participation of a subject and with the necessary contemplative attitude. Analysis of art must cover not only individual structures of the object, but also the phenomenological analysis of perception. The combination of formalism and phenomenology is a peculiar characteristic of Seseman’s aesthetics. The structural analysis reveals the systematic coherence among the artistic creator, work of art, and its perceiver.

**42. Fabio Tononi** is the editor-in-chief of The Edgar Wind Journal. He is also a member of the committee of the Centre for the Study of Cultural Memory, Institute of Modern Languages Research, School of Advanced Study, University of London. His research interests include the work of Aby Warburg, the aesthetics of Sigmund Freud, and the relationship between art and cognitive neuroscience – specifically as it relates to memory, imagination, empathy, the unfinished, motion, and emotion. Previous to this, Tononi was convenor of the Aby Warburg Reading Group and Seminar at the Italian Cultural Institute, London (2020), and convenor of the Seminar on Freedom and Free Will at the Warburg Institute (2018–2020). Tononi received a Ph.D. in Aesthetics and History of Art (without corrections) from the Warburg Institute, School of advanced Study, University of London; an M.A. in Art History, Curatorship and Renaissance Culture from the Warburg Institute, in collaboration with the National Gallery of London; an M.A. in Art History from the University of
Florence; and a B.A. in Art History from the University of Parma. He also held an internship at Villa I Tatti, the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies, in Florence.

e-mail: tononifabio@gmail.com

The Aesthetics of Freud: Movement, Embodied Simulation and Motor Imagery

This paper employs a neuroaesthetic perspective to address the problem of the representation and perception of movement in static sculptures. I begin my presentation with the aesthetics of Sigmund Freud (1856–1939), who, in dealing with sculpture, emphasises the importance of the beholder’s imagination in the contemplation of human figures, particularly when their posture suggests movement to the viewer. Under examination are two of Freud’s texts: Delusions and Dreams in Jensen’s “Gradiva” (1907) and The Moses of Michelangelo (1914), which deal with a Roman bas-relief and a Renaissance statue, respectively. These writings engage with artworks that represent meaningful moments in time: depictions of people and their gestures, mid-movement. These moments, conveyed by the artists through the gestures of their figures, activate the beholder’s imagination, which, in turn, enables a mental reconstruction of the action and a visceral understanding of the image. This essay proposes that, in static works of art such as marble statues, the representation of entire scenes (in a temporal sense) can only happen internally, in the beholder’s brain-body system. It is in this sense that achievements in cognitive neurosciences—mainly in topics related to the mechanisms of embodied simulation and motor imagery—can cast new light on Freud’s aesthetics, offering a new appreciation of his insights. The embodied simulation is based on the activity of mirror neurons, which are activated during the execution, observation and imagination of goal-directed actions, enabling a simulation, in the brain-body system of the viewer, of the gesture or movement observed or imagined. The imagination of the entire movement, suggested by figures performing specific gestures—such as those analysed by Freud—can also be explained in terms of motor imagery, that is, the mental process by which an individual rehearses or simulates a given action. It is in this sense, I posit, that an aesthetic experience may take place, as viewers observe works of art that depict figures in movement.

43. Kamil Lipiński is an assistant professor at the Institute of Cultural Studies (UWB). He holds his PhD in Philosophy (Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań) with additional background in Cultural Studies and Social Communication. Lipiński edited the theme issue of the journal “Sensus Historiae“ under the name „French Cultural Theory: Contexts and Applications“. He is a Runner-up in 2019 Postgraduate Essay Prize awarded by Postcolonial Studies Association/Journal of Postcolonial Writing. Lipiński co-runs and organizes workshops as a Co-Chair of the Film-Philosophy NECS working group.

e-mail: lipinski_kamil@yahoo.com
The Fragmentary Condition at the turn of 20th century

The fragmentary condition relates to Jena Romanticism as the point of departure to discuss how the idea of the fragment moves from the classical, literary studies to contemporary art and become part of broader interpretation of the fin de siècle’s aesthetics. The article builds on Jean-Luc Nancy’s and Philippe Lacoue Labarthe’s theoretical insights into Jena Romanticism, to examine the unification of all genres separated from poetry to touch poetry, philosophy, rhetoric through the anecdotal and witty articulation, as well as ars combinatoria. For Romantics, their basic imperative was to educate, for their existence that is, in Hegelian terms, Bildung, cultural education, formation, development. This literary foundation Jean-Luc Nancy defines as a fragmentary existence which he identifies with the fraction, fractal essence, inherent separation, disengaging. Nancy was intent on examining the emergence of various contemporary works expressing its essence in terms of breaks, incompleteness and autonomous role of the fragment. This conceptual, classical foundation explores these key conceptual and methodological perspectives and discusses the implications of the critical fin de siècle’s aesthetics for practices of fraction, ex-peau-sition, spacing and division of contemporary research in art.

44. Monika Mazur-Bubak, Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.), 2018, she has a master’s degree in political science and philosophy. Till 2019 she was employed as an assistant at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Pedagogical University of Kraków. Main fields of interests: Political Philosophy, International Relations, capability lists, global justice, Philosophy of War, Political Psychology, Social and Political Identities. She is preparing to publish a book on the Modern paradigm of War, based on modern theories of War and its anomalies. ORCID: 0000-0002-0342-2941

e-mail: monikadanutamazur@gmail.com

Dysfunction of disgust and indignation in political communities on the example of aporophobia

Disgust is a feeling or emotion that directly appears in the legal system. This is evident, above all, in the legal record concerning obscene behaviour. Arguments regarding "obscene" behaviour often appear in trials of people accused of murder and it happened that disgust was a mitigating factor. As Patric Devlin indicates, feeling disgust is an important premise for the functioning of society and is a direct response to a given event or character (Devlin, 1968). However, the same disgust was often considered a sufficient reason to justify aggressive behaviour (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 75). Social psychologists say that the main cause of outrage is perceptible disgust (Bilewicz et al. 2017. In turn, indignation, by definition, is associated with some kind of damage to dignity (indignation comes from dignity and indicates some denial of dignity). Therefore, disgust is associated with the feeling of having a certain status taken away. Outrage, like anger, is therefore associated with some noticeable loss in terms of dignity. But contempt differs from anger at the level of social services in that it is caused by violent and non-normative forms of action (Tausch et al. 2011), while anger results in normative forms of
protest (Bilewicz et al. 2015). A the same time disgust is significantly different from indignation because the first refers to magical thinking about "moral" or some unspecified contamination whereas indignation concerns a specific event that is classified as an attack on both bodily integrity and, one might say, emotional one. "First of all, indignation concerns harm or damage, a basis for legal regulation that is generally accepted by all. Disgust concerns contamination, which is far more controversial as a source of law" (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 102). Although Nussbaum definitely distinguishes the way these two emotions interact with relationships and social order, one can point out situations when they appear equally. This combination of these two emotions or feelings towards certain selected social groups seems to be extremely alarming and is an extremely strong challenge for contemporary political relations. An example of linking indignation with disgust is the phenomenon of aporophobia which is expressed not only in fear of poverty or homelessness but also in fear of people who are in a state of poverty and homelessness. In contrast to the voices indicating the social legitimacy of both of these emotions and taking into account these emotions in legislation, court judgments as well as public discourse, there are several basic examples in which the recognition of acts supported by these emotions as justified should be considered not only socially dysfunctional but it should be pointed out that arguments based on them are often one of the strongest barriers in the search for real and effective solutions to emerging social problems. In my presentation, several social phenomena, around which arose discourses that dangerously combine two emotion, i.e. indignation and disgust, will be analyzed. Aporophobia will be considered a key example. As a result, the consequences of these emotions at the functional level of political communities, which constitute a significant obstacle to solving problems reported by social minorities, will be indicated.

45. Chiara Müller - My name is Chiara Mueller and I’m philosopher in the field of Critical Theory and Political Theory. I did my Bachelors Degree at the University of Bayreuth studying Philosophy & Economics. In autumn I will proceed my studies at the Freie Universität Berlin in Philosophy. As an activist and philosopher, I mainly focus on the conversion of Critical Theory into Pragmatism which I find academic discourse often lacks. In autumn this year I will participate in the Radical Philosophy Association Conference in San Jose, California to pursue my dream of becoming a philosopher.

e-mail: chiara.e.mueller@stmail.uni-bayreuth.de

Power as a collective practice – The establishment of a new political polity

My paper aims to explore the possibilities of establishing a new political polity – one that aims at a more radical democratic notion of politics which understands power as a collective practice of every citizen of a society and recognizes public freedom as the ultimate goal of social and public institutions.

Proceeding from a paradigmatic understanding of society – one that on the one hand moves towards a more just and social egalitarian citizen hood and increasing possibilities of participation but also faces the rising trend of individualization and capitalist hegemony on the other, I build my arguments on the theory of Hannah Arendt’s notion of acting and speaking
politically to further develop a conception of institutional duties – one aspect that is often criticised by Hannah Arendt scholars for being void. In the course of this, the underlying ideal and one central aspect of Hannah Arendt’s work namely plurality as the condition per quam of political life will be elaborated and regarded as the key feature for the analysis of the political sphere and its quality.

I will then proceed investigating her notion of power which in her understanding exists as a potential which is actualized when actors gather together for political action or public deliberation. For the context of my paper specifically look at the concepts of power as an ontological ability and constitutional power which she developed in On Revolution (1963). The main point I want to raise here is that power should not be controlled and actualized by political and governmental institutions but rather build the structure of legitimacy which lies on the basis of every political community – the citizens. The notion of power developed in the course of this opens up a new approach to Political Theory which is based on reciprocity and solidarity and therefore manages to include “the quiet voices” of society. The last and main part of the paper focuses on the actual act of establishing a constitution of freedom – one that Arendt understands as an entirely new system of power. Although Arendt mainly describes this act by reference to the American Revolution, the paper aims to work out a general model of constitution-making which is supposed to be seen as a general guideline - also for European societies. The focus here lies in the possibilities of multiplying and diversifying power instead of limiting it.


e-mail: mumtazmuratkok@gmail.com

Cosmic Pessimism vs. Ecofascism

The climate change denial is becoming increasingly untenable. The COVID19 Pandemic demonstrates that the effects of climate change as the direct result of centuries long capitalist plundering of the planet are becoming more and more a daily experience for all including the ordinary citizens of the Global North. In such a situation, ecofascism, as an attempt to register such reality and come up with solutions to it, is terrifyingly regaining popularity as a “subculture” and especially in the Global North with the inevitable rise of the fascist right. Huddled around the slogan of “Bees, not Refugees”, ecofascism is a motley of ecology, nazi romanticism, white-nationalism, Nordic mythology and so on. Regardless of the fact that it is an abomination of a thought, ecofascism poses a threat because as many activists fear, once the deniers of today like the Republican Party in the USA abandon their denial, they may turn to
ecofascism. Acknowledging this threat, in this presentation, I would like to propose my notion of cosmic pessimism as a contribution to the ongoing struggle against ecofascism.

In the reality of “the Capitalocene” the questions regarding life and the living once again stare right back at us. Whenever these questions have been posed, answers or the search for the answer inevitably leads to the valuation of one form of life over another and it was almost always the human life (with its own internal hierarchies) over all the others. I propose that cosmic pessimism which operates through the acknowledgement of the primordial fact of the vulnerability and the insignificance of our planet in vast cosmos can be an affirmative and political answer. As it is informed by the ontology of life of posthumanism and increasingly popular planetary thinking like geophilosophy, biocommunism and planetary social thought, I will argue that such acknowledgement does not necessarily lead to paralysis, but instead, to an affirmation of all terrestrial life. Cosmic pessimism’s refusal of any internal and external hierarchy also makes it political and thus it can be put forward against ecofascism.

47. Piotr Sawczyński (Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Department of International and Political Studies) - I am a doctoral candidate at the Chair of Political Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Krakow, and a member of the Jagiellonian Interdisciplinary PhD Programme. I am the author of Polityczność podmiotu [Subject and the Political] (Universitas: Kraków 2016) and several articles published e.g. in JCR-indexed “Religions” and “Etica e Politica”. I am also a laureate of Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund and the Scholarship of the Minister of Science and Higher Education. I have been a visiting scholar at Princeton University, the University of Chicago, University College London and the University of Heidelberg. My doctoral thesis is on messianism and subjectivity in Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben.

e-mail: piotr.sawczynski@gmail.com

How to Redeem the Subject? Philosophy and the Messianic Turn

Among the most influential trends in today’s critical theory there is the messianic turn: a phenomenon which marks the re-emerging relation between philosophy and religion. Rather than follow the inglorious path of secular messianisms, it seeks to deconstruct the very opposition of the secular and the messianic in modern philosophical thinking, and—consequently—think the idiom of redemption anew in a disenchanted context of finite life. While the messianic turn mostly aims at the revision of well-established philosophical concepts, it also reformulates the very idea of messianism so that it is freed from particular connotations and associated with “salvation” (i.e. radical social and political change) for everyone, not just the chosen ones.

In my paper I demonstrate how the messianic turn of critical theory works to reconceptualize the problematic category of the subject. To do this, I analyze Giorgio Agamben’s project of “profane” messianism (although with “continual reference” to Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida), being one of the most extensive applications of messianic discourse to present-day continental philosophy. As argued by Agamben, modern human subjectivity has primarily been the domain of sovereign power over life, which must be
deactivated if subjectivity is not to end up as total subjection. The perspective used to confront the sovereign appropriation of the subject is antinomical Jewish messianism, tested by Agamben as a theory of subjectivity whose ontological indeterminacy makes it escape the oppressive mechanisms of sovereignty. In the paper I mostly focus on his Jewish-inspired notion of “whatever being,” supposed to conceptualize the subject beyond the sovereign opposition of individual and collective, and thus lay foundations for a new political ontology. While critically analyzing the idea, I especially highlight the moments of tension and ambiguity inscribed in it, and seek to answer if the messianic turn is cunning enough to “redeem” the subject after it has been mortified by the anti-subjective discourse of contemporary critical theory.

48. Thomas Byrne - specializes in Husserl's phenomenology. In particular, Dr. Byrne works on Husserl's semiotics, semantics, and axiology. Dr. Byrne received his PhD in December 2018 from the Husserl Archives, KU Leuven. Subsequently, Dr. Byrne assumed the post of Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Husserl Archives in Leuven. Currently, Dr. Byrne is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Macau via their "Talent Project". He has published in Husserl Studies, Axiomathes, Studia Phaenomenologica, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, amongst others. He has given invited talks at Universities across Europe, the United States, Asia, and Oceania.

e-mail: T.byrne3@gmail.com

Ingarden’s Husserl: A Critical Assessment of the 1915 Review of the Logical Investigations

This essay critically assesses Roman Ingarden’s 1915 review of the second edition of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations. I elucidate and critique Ingarden’s analysis of the differences between the 1901 first edition and the 1913 second edition. I specifically examine three tenets of Ingarden’s interpretation. First, I demonstrate that Ingarden correctly denounces Husserl’s claim that he only engages in an eidetic study of consciousness in 1913, as Husserl was already performing eidetic analyses in 1901. Second, I show that Ingarden is misguided, when he asserts that Husserl had fully transformed his philosophy into a transcendental idealism in 1913. While Husserl does appear to adopt a transcendentental phenomenology by asserting – in his programmatic claims – that the intentional content and object are now included in his domain of research, he does not alter his actual descriptions of the intentional relationship in any pertinent manner. Third, I show Ingarden correctly predicts many of the insights Husserl would arrive at about logic in his late philosophy. This analysis augments current readings of the evolution of Ingarden’s philosophy, by more closely examining the development of his largely neglected early thought. I execute this critical assessment by drawing both from Husserl’s later writings and from recent literature on Husserl’s Investigations. By doing so, I hope to additionally demonstrate how research on the Investigations has matured in the one hundred years since the release of that text, while also presenting my own views concerning these difficult interpretative issues.
49. Aleksandra Gomulczak (Department of Philosophy, Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań) - she is a third-year doctoral student. Her current research is devoted to studying the problem of the analytic-continental divide. Her doctoral dissertation concerns the interrelations between phenomenology and analytic philosophy from the perspective of the Lvov-Warsaw School.

e-mail: gomulczak.a@gmail.com

Izydora Dąmbska’s study on Ingarden’s and Frege’s philosophy of language in view of the contemporary discussion about the relationship between phenomenology and analytic philosophy

The aim of this talk is to elaborate on Izydora Dąmbska’s comparative study of the philosophy of language of Ingarden and Frege. This elaboration is placed within the context of the studies about the so-called analytic-continental divide. First, I'll give an account of Dąmbska’s analysis of the similarities between Inragen and Frege. Second, I'll examine Ingarden’s relationship to the analytic philosophy of language. This part delivers more detailed comments on some essential connections between Ingarden and Frege, and Ingarden and Ajdukiewicz respectively. I conclude by the statement that Dąmbska’s work (and philosophy of the Lvov-Warsaw School in general) plays a significant role on the map of the studies about the analytic-continental divide.

50. Rafał Lewandowski, Ph.D. student of philosophy at the Doctoral School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of Gdańsk. His current main interest is phenomenology, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. Particularly, he is focused on the issue of the possibility of naturalizing epistemology from the perspective of Roman Ingarden's philosophy. The title of his doctoral thesis is “Roman Ingarden’s critique of the psychophysiological theory of knowledge and the contemporary naturalized epistemology”. In his spare time he likes jogging, cycling, and snowboarding in winter.

e-mail: rafal.lewandowski@phdstud.ug.edu.pl

Roman Ingarden and George Bealer on the classification of concepts. The conclusions of the comparison relevant to the possibility of naturalized epistemology

My presentation aims to compare classifications of concepts according to Roman Ingarden and George Bealer, and to draw conclusions from this comparison. Both Ingarden and Bealer are advocates of epistemological intuitionism and critics of naturalism in epistemology. Both claim that naturalized epistemology does not provide satisfactory solutions to the problem of the generation of knowledge. However each criticizes naturalism in epistemology in a different way, the comparison of their standpoints regarding the classification of concepts allows one to notice the one common core. This core is the thesis that there are two main classes of concepts and that one class is necessary for the possibility of the second one. This dependence of one class on another has an essential consequence for the possibility of naturalized epistemology
because it is linked to the problem of causal underdetermination of perceptual knowledge. Therefore it poses a serious problem to all causal and more broadly externalist explanations of the generation of knowledge.

In the first part of my paper, I will present Ingarden’s principle of classification of concepts. This principle divides concepts into two classes: non-fluid and fluid concepts. I will explain this division by referring to Ingarden’s distinction between immanent perception and transcendent perception. In the second part, I will present the classification of concepts according to Bealer. This division rests on the distinction between semantically stable and semantically unstable concepts. Bealer explains it by reference to the Kripkean idea of identity of meaning of a given expression for any language group that is in a qualitatively/phenomenally identical epistemic situation. In the third part, I will compare both classifications of concepts. In the last part, I will draw my conclusion from this comparison by showing that both classifications assume dependence of fluid/semantically unstable naturalistic concepts on non-fluid/semantically stable category and content concepts. This dependence poses serious problems to the attempts to naturalize epistemology because it shows that naturalized epistemology does not provide a sound solution to the problem of causal underdetermination of perception by sensory stimuli.

51. Friedrich von Petersdorff (Independent scholar) studied philosophy, history and media. He obtained his M.A. in Marburg, Germany, and is now an independent scholar. His research is mainly focused on the epistemological and theoretical questions regarding historiography. His aim is to achieve a better understanding of the procedures involved in historical research and historical writing. He, therefore, analyses not only the methodological requirements of historiography but foremost the epistemological and temporal aspects involved. He has presented various papers on these topics and has published on Paul Rieß (2004), Theodor Lessing (2006), Nietzsche and Hitchcock (2009), Karl Popper (2017) and Mental Time Travel (2018).

e-mail: petersdorff@gmail.com

Aspects of ‘Time and mode of being’ within historiography

It is a characteristic feature of historiography that any historical narrative could be rewritten at any time in the future, thereby leading to reinterpetations of the respective events. Such reinterpretations take place, for instance, when 1) a revaluation of previous findings leads to new results, 2) new documents become available, 3) additional questions provide new insights, or 4) later generations ask different questions. However, an additional reason for the rewriting of history should be considered as well, namely the change in meaning given to the course of history or to specific historical events or developments. Arthur Danto analysed in his 1962 article “Narrative Sentences” in detail this significant aspect of any historian’s research and writing. Such sentences (as used by historians) “refer to at least two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event to which they refer” (e.g. it is only possible to speak of 1618 as the year the Thirty Years War started [= time A] by having the peace treaties of 1648 [= time B] in mind). Any event at time A is, therefore, analysed in view
of some later event at time B, which of course was unknown to the contemporaries experiencing the events at time A. Accordingly, Danto underlines in his discussion of narrative sentences as used by historians [at time C] the significant aspect that historians view the gone-by events and developments by referring at the same time to additional occurrences of historical significance without being immediately related to the analysed topic. – In my paper I shall review this specific temporal structure of historiography in terms as developed by Ingarden in “Controversy over the Existence of the World”, namely in his analysis of the “mode of being” regarding “events”, “processes” and “objects persisting in time” (§§ 27-30), as in my view carefully applying an analysis based upon these terms would lead to a better understanding of both epistemological and ontological status of historiography. I shall, therefore, present such a rewording and, furthermore, analyse the scope as well as the limits hereof.

52. Edward M. Świderski (University of Fribourg) is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of Fribourg (CH). His areas of competence include philosophy in the former Soviet Union and Russia today, philosophy in Poland with particular emphasis on phenomenology (Ingarden, et al.) and Polish Marxism, contemporary analytic aesthetics as well as social ontology. He was editor of Studies in East European Thought (formerly Studies in Soviet Thought) from 1988 to 2018. His publications range across all the stated areas of competence. Currently, he is preparing an English translation of Ingarden’s 1967 Oslo lectures - An Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology.

e-mail: edward.swiderski@unifr.ch

Sound and/or tones? Levinson – Scruton – Ingarden on musical aesthetics and ontology

Does musical aesthetics require an account of the ‘objects’ of musical experience, that is, does it include a musical ontology? The matter has been controversial, especially if, on a broadly phenomenological account of musical experience, what we attend to in our experience of music are tones, not sounds. The former appear to have properties ‘mere’ sounds do not have and access to them supposes a specific intentionality unlike that of ‘ordinary’ sense perception. I present and contrast three positions on this question, those of Roger Scruton, Roman Ingarden, and Jerrold Levinson. Scruton championed the distinction between tones and sounds and, on that basis, discounted musical ontology; Ingarden admitted the distinction de facto if not expressis verbis but held fast to musical ontology producing a unique variant thereof; Levinson seconds Scruton in abjuring the kind of ontology Ingarden proposed for musical works but is no friend of Scruton’s tones/sounds distinction, taxing him with having fallen prey to “phenomenological idealism.” A critical issue here concerns the nature of tones: Ingarden fell back on his conception of ‘pure ideal qualities’, Scruton deferred to Wittgenstein’s ‘aspect perception’, and for Levinson the issue is moot. Of course, in view of such differences one may well wonder whether there is a single correct point of departure in answering the question, does a musical aesthetics require a musical ontology? At least one thing seems clear: any attempt to settle issues like these is either incomplete or simply wrong if the ‘public’ character of musical experience is left out of account by adverting to musical culture, musical practice, or to a concept of ‘objective’ musical works. Each of the writers canvassed takes a stab at answering
that question, but Ingarden, in his essay on the musical work, is most ill at ease with it. I suggest in ending that, with some pruning of his views on musical ontology, he could be read in light of Levinson’s historical ontology of musical works.

53. **Michael Raubach** (School of Culture and Society, Aarhus University) is a final year PhD Student (2020) in the History of Ideas in the School of Culture and Society at Aarhus University. His work focuses on Reception Theory, and in particular the philosophical backdrop to the work of Hans Robert Jauss and Roman Ingarden, as well as possibilities for the overlap of their hermeneutic methodology with the contemporary approaches of Network Theory. His work is supported by a Marie Sklodowska-Curie ITN Fellowship from the History of Human Freedom and Dignity Project.

e-mail: raubachm@cas.au.dk

The Enduring Importance of Roman Ingarden’s Ontological Realism for Literary Theory

There have been few philosophers in the 20th century more creative and profound and yet more obscure than Roman Ingarden. He anticipated many of the major philosophical questions that would dominate literary theory in the 1960’s and 70’s in Germany, France, and the United States. In this paper I argue that his primary contribution to literary theory is an ontology that arcs deftly between the poles of idealism and realism with a nuanced way of upholding both the formal reality of the literary work of art and the subjective assessment of aesthetic value, all while preserving the fundamental meaning-making function of language. It was this philosophical foundation that proved to be the fertile ground for later philosophers like Hans Robert Jauss and Wolfgang Iser who wanted to push back on what they saw as analogous forces to idealism and realism in the rigidity of formalism and marxist materialism and the ostensible epistemological nihilism of the psychological hermeneutics.

54. **Julián Millán** (PhD student at the University of Murcia) a PhD student at the University of Murcia, Spain, as well as a professional musician. He is currently working on a Thesis on Ontology of Vocal Music, he has published several papers in the past on musical performance and philosophy of music, and recently he became interested in Roman Ingarden’s work as a part of his research on the ontology of musical work.

e-mail: juliansmillan@gmail.com

Roman Ingarden’s Ontology of the Musical Work: An Argument Against Musical Platonism

In his work Ontology of the work of art, Roman Ingarden tries to give a satisfactory answer to the main question in the ontology of music: what sort of entity is a musical work? Ingarden insists on the idea that a musical work is neither something identifiable with the score nor a mental entity. A musical work is, he claims, a purely intentional object, that has been created
by the composer’s creative acts. This claim has been disputed in recent decades by musical platonists (such as Peter Kivy and Julian Dodd), that consider musical works as eternal types of which the composer is the discoverer, but not the creator. The so-called ‘discovery model’ entails that musical works have always existed and will never cease to exist. For both Kivy and Dodd, what is essential to a musical work is creativity, not the creation of an entity. As platonists, both believe that musical works are pure sound structures that exist independently from any mental activity. Others, like Jerrold Levinson, insist in a requirement of creatability, in virtue of which musical works would not exist prior to the composer’s creational activity. Ingarden’s phenomenological approach leaves musical works in a somewhat uncertain position between an ideal object and a real object. But unlike platonists, that sustain the idea of musical works as autonomous, eternal types, in Ingarden’s view musical works, considered to be purely intentional objects, are dependent on the intentional act of the composer (seen as a creator) to exist, what entails a more intuitive position than the platonist view regarding the mode of existence of a musical work. I believe that the quest for a theory that does not conflict with common intuitions on what musical works are, is the ultimate challenge of the ontology of art. And Ingarden’s view comes closer to that respect than the platonist approach does.

References:

55. Martina Stratilková (Department of Musicology, Faculty of Arts, Palacký University Olomouc) is assistant professor at the Faculty of Arts at Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. Besides musicology, she also has a degree in psychology. She teaches courses on music analysis, music psychology, aesthetics, and music aesthetics. She is mainly engaged in music aesthetics and the philosophy of music, where her favourite issues follow phenomenological impulses in musicology, developed mainly in music aesthetics and music theory. In addition to various articles, she is the author of a book entitled Vývoj fenomenologického myšlení o hudbě [The Development of Phenomenological Thinking about Music].

e-mail: martina.stratilkova@upol.cz

Roman Ingarden’s Thoughts on Emotional Qualities of Music and Contemporary Theories of Music Expression

Roman Ingarden introduced his view of musical emotions in the seminal treatise The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity (1928-1933). He refused to admit that music disposes of distinctive layers of musical meaning, saying instead that there can be distinguished sounding and nonsounding elements within the structure of the musical work of art. However, what is
unique for music among the arts, is a close connection between sound-constructs and emotional qualities, so that these qualities are modified by the medium of music. While this position suggests a strong affinity to Eduard Hanslick’s (1825-1904) nihilism regarding music’s ability to convey extramusical meaning and expression as well, emphasizing specific musical ideas, we can see that Ingarden does not posit musical emotional qualities as something extramusical. On the contrary, he describes musical emotions as belonging to the work itself, or I will explain the issue of which emotions connected to music can be regarded as belonging to the work itself according to Ingarden and I will elucidate the relevance of this issue within Ingarden’s aesthetics. The main aim of the paper is to reconstruct Roman Ingarden’s intellectual position regarding musical emotions and in doing so it takes contemporary theories of musical expression as the point of comparison. I will mainly show Ingarden’s approach in view of resemblance and persona theories of expression and posit arguments in favour of one or the other. It will also be shown how the concept of a musical work of art as a purely intentional object enters Ingarden’s reasoning of this topic.

56. Alex R Gillham (Assistant Professor of Philosophy, St. Bonaventure University) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at St. Bonaventure University. He did his graduate work at Purdue University, where he wrote a dissertation on Epicurus’ ethics under the supervision of Patricia Curd. His recent research focuses on Epicurean ethics and the Problem of Hell.

e-mail: argillham@icloud.com

Deprivationism, Value Predication, and Harm by Omission

One way to rebut Epicurus’ argument for the claim that death is not bad for the person who dies is to be a deprivationist. All deprivationists think that death can be good or bad for the person who dies depending on the circumstances in which death occurs. One popular version of deprivationism claims that death is bad for the person who dies to the extent that it deprives her of goods that she probably would have experienced if she would have continued to live. This view has gained considerable popularity in the last few decades. In this paper I argue against this form of deprivationism. First, I develop what I call the Value Predication Objection (VPO), which claims that deprivationism is false because something cannot be predicated to have value for what no longer exists. After posing VPO, I consider and respond to replies. Only one such reply provides a satisfactory rebuttal of VPO. This response presupposes that the dead can have less well-being than their counterparts and that omissions are harms, so an adequate response to VPO requires these two presuppositions. Finally, I explore some entailments of these presuppositions to pump the intuition that it would be better to abandon deprivationism than to concede that the dead can have less well-being than their counterparts and that omissions harm. First, if death can be good or bad for the deceased, then the well-being of the deceased can change with time, unless being good or bad for a subject does not require variation in the well-being of that subject. Although counterintuitive, one could make this view work with the Counterfactual Comparative Account of harm (CCA). CCA says that someone is harmed when made worse off than she otherwise would have been. I develop a case called Near
Breakthrough to pump the intuition that CCA is false. Researchers who come close to discovering cures for prominent and very bad illnesses but ultimately fail do not thereby harm us. CCA, however, entails that they do harm us insofar as they make us worse off than our closest counterparts.

57. Maximilian Kiener (University of Oxford) is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Oxford and specialises in moral and legal philosophy, especially on questions of consent and moral responsibility. Maximilian holds a master’s degree (BPhil) and doctorate (DPhil) in philosophy from the University of Oxford. More information can be found on his personal website: https://maximilian-kiener.weebly.com

e-mail: maximilian.kiener@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

Taking Responsibility as a Normative Power

In this presentation, I discuss Bernard Williams’s case of a “lorry driver who, through no fault of his, runs over a child” (1981: 28). In a first step, I argue that that our currently best analysis of Williams’s case supports the following three independently plausible, yet jointly inconsistent propositions:
(1) The faultless driver is not morally responsible for the child’s death.
(2) One ought to apologise for something only if one is morally responsible for it.
(3) The driver ought to apologise for the child’s death.

In a second step, I then reconstruct a potential solution to this inconsistency from the work of David Enoch: Enoch accepts (1): the driver, he says, is “ex hypothesis, not [morally] responsible” (2012: 102). Enoch also accepts (2): the obligation to apologise requires moral responsibility. Yet, Enoch can still also hold on to (3), i.e. that the lorry driver ought to apologise. This is because Enoch claims that, although the driver is not automatically morally responsible, he is “morally required to take responsibility” (2012: 100), where taking responsibility is a normative power, like consenting or promising. But if so, morality requires that the driver not only take responsibility but also, as a consequence, apologise once responsible. Thus, (3): if the driver follows through what morality requires of him, he ought to apologise in the end. In the third and last step of my presentation, I then criticise Enoch’s solution. I argue that Enoch’s major argument for ‘taking responsibility’ as a normative power fails, i.e. his argument from the value of possessing this normative power: I claim that neither on the grounds of individual autonomy nor on grounds of promoting valuable relationships can we defend ‘taking responsibility’ as a normative power. I here contrast ‘taking responsibility’ with normative powers such as consenting and promising to substantiate my point. I finally conclude on a more positive note: although Enoch’s own view fails in the end, such failure holds an important cue for a better solution to the inconsistency at hand, namely the disambiguation of moral responsibility into answerability and liability.
58. **Ryan Kulesa** (University of Missouri) is a PhD student in Philosophy at the University of Missouri, Columbia, and received his MA in Philosophy for the State University of New York at Buffalo. His interests center around philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and bioethics. He has recently publication in the International Journal of Philosophy of Religion and is currently working on projects pertaining to causation, counterfactuals, and debates concerning conscientious objection.

e-mail: rkccz@missouri.edu

**Conscientious Objection: Against the “Legal, Expected, Standard, and Patient Interest” Conditions**

Schuklenk and Smalling and Savulescu put forth four conditions that are meant to delineate when conscientious objection is impermissible. In this essay, I will make the contention that their proposed conditions to determine when refusing to perform a medical procedure is impermissible – that a practice must be legal, expected, standard care within the patient’s interests – are insufficient. Specifically, these conditions are insufficient as they would not allow doctors to conscientiously object to practices which one would rightfully expect them to refuse to perform. In other words, these suggested, supposedly sufficient conditions could allow for repulsive practices to perpetuate and to which medical professionals would have no right to refuse to perform. I argue that the failure of these conditions to allow medical professionals to refuse to perform pathology inducing practices proves them insufficient. This essay, then, will: (1) define the conditions and recreate a common argument against conscientious objection and (2) produce a case in which the conditions of the conditions are insufficient and in which it seems the doctor should be able to object to the procedure, specifically the practice of female genital cutting. To conclude, I suggest that the addition of a pathocentric condition to Schuklenk and Smalling and Savulescu’s criteria is the best way to allow doctors to refuse to perform harmful practices such as female genital cutting.

59. **Se Yong Bae** (University of Missouri) is a PhD student in the Department of Philosophy at University of Missouri, Columbia. He earned a MA degree in Bioethics at New York University. He is currently working on ethics, especially on the moral status of animals, and on the philosophy of science, especially on the nature of evolutionary biology.

e-mail: rbrwd@missouri.edu

**Moral Enhancement as a Justifiable Way to Enhance Individual Moral Capability**

Moral enhancement aims at enhancing an individual's moral capability by means of neurotechnology. However, because of its transformative novelty, there are various skeptical views of moral enhancement. In this paper, I critically discuss two sources of skepticism toward moral enhancement and show that they fail to challenge the legitimacy of moral enhancement as a way of enhancing moral capability. First, some philosophers argue that the absence of consensus on what morality is and what it requires makes it difficult to define and pursue a
coherent form of moral enhancement. Instead of this requirement for objective morality, I provide an alternative view that what justifies a specific aim or form of moral enhancement is the entitlement to pursue personal morality. Second, another source of skepticism is the idea that moral enhancement undermines moral agency, i.e., autonomy. Against this argument, I closely examine the states of an individual before and after they are enhanced through moral enhancement and show that the close examination provides a plausible reason to see that in a sense moral enhancement extends moral autonomy.

60. Max Johannes Kippersund (University of Oslo) PhD Research Fellow
https://www.hf.uio.no/ifikk/english/people/aca/philosophy/temporary/maxjk/

e-mail: m.j.kippersund@ifikk.uio.no

**Binding and Illusion, A New Argument Against Naïve Realism**

Does visual perception fundamentally consist in representation? Representationalism says Yes, Naïve Realism says No. In this presentation I present a novel argument for the conclusion that perception is representational. It builds on the idea that visual experience involves an important kind of binding between perceived objects and their properties, which I will argue that Naïve Realism cannot adequately capture. The relevant binding structure is brought out by considering cases of binding failure, or “illusory conjunctions” as they are called in the psychology literature. In these cases, a mishap in visual processing results in an experience where features of one object are wrongfully experienced as belonging to a different object. Any theory of experience should be able to explain what the difference between experiences involving binding success and those involving binding failure consists in. Representationalism accounts for it naturally in terms of accurate attribution and misattribution. I argue that it poses a direct challenge to Naïve Realism. I consider several strategies the Naïve Realist might pursue in trying to escape this challenge but find them all wanting. Importantly, I will argue that strategies they have developed in order to deal with other types of illusions do not apply to the case of illusory conjunctions. They cannot be explained in terms of the perceiver’s point of view, or in terms of a partial hallucination. This argument is novel in two important ways. First it brings underexplored empirical considerations to bear on the debate between Naïve Realism and Representationalism. Secondly, it advances our understanding of what really separates these two positions as my argument offers a way of getting at the heart of the debate – the question of whether perception is fundamentally representational or not – without relying on some of the controversial commitments that typically have been used to argue against Naïve Realism, such as a common factor view of experience.
Are Semantic Externalism and Privileged Self-Knowledge Compatible? – Selected Critical Arguments

My presentation will be devoted to two different kinds of arguments against content compatibilism: reductio argument and the slow switching argument. Content compatibilism, whose most prominent proponent is Ted Warfield (1999), is the claim that it is possible to accept both principle of privileged a priori access to the content of one’s own mental states and the thesis that content of some of these mental states are wide. Content compatibilism, formulated in that way, is found by some philosophers (most notably Michael McKinsey, Paul Boghossian and Peter Ludlow) unacceptable. Reductio argument shows that content compatibilism makes us accept on purely apriorical grounds existential claims concerning external objects, what stays in opposition to the most naturally held view that knowledge of that sort may be gained only a posteriori (McKinsey 2002). The conclusion of reductio argument could be avoided on condition that the compatibilist would offer semantics of empty concepts, which is in accordance with semantic externalism. However, such an endeavour seems doomed to failure, as Boghossian’s argument shows (1998). The defence which counts McKinsey’s argument as transcendental argument, thus reversing its conclusion, is, as I would like to argue, also not crowned with success. The second type of argument against content compatibilism is slow switching argument, which has as a starting point modified scenario of Twin Earth described by Burge (1988). It is argued that Oscar, who undergoes a series of slow switches between Earth and Twin Earth is not in a position to know which concept of water he uses at a given time. Thus, the principle of privileged self-knowledge defended by compatibilists gets undermined.

References:
McKinsey M. (2002), Forms of Externalism and Privileged Access, „Philosophical Perspectives” 16, 199-224
Epistemological Significance of Conceptual Content of Perception

One of the most crucial notions in the theory of knowledge is perception. The main reason for this is that our interaction with the world is possible thanks to our senses. Although, since Descartes, discussion concerning perception has been focused on the fact that sometimes our senses deceive us. For this reason, it is often assumed that perception is an unreliable source of knowledge. In extreme cases the role of perception in justification of our beliefs is completely rejected. But if so, then how can we explain our ability to know the world around us? Of course, it can be said that perception offers us only a picture of the world and it is up to us whether we decide to endorse that picture. But then, experience is no longer the source of justification. I believe that this account is problematic since it is difficult to see how our senses can open us to the world if they do not play a role in justifying our empirical beliefs.

In my presentation I would like to show that we can avoid this problem by assuming that perception has conceptual content. If we consider experience a cognitive process, that is imbued with our knowledge of the world, then we can say that it is reliable, at least to the extent that our knowledge of the world is. I believe that the content of most of our experiences is veridical because we have relevant knowledge about our environment which partially constitutes our experience. Such experience can justify our knowledge about the external world. Obviously, this thesis has to be supported by concrete arguments which I shall try to present during my presentation.

Since I am using the idea of conceptual content of perception, my presentation will be based on the works of philosophers such as John McDowell and Wilfrid Sellars. The presentation will also focus on the problem of perceptual justification, which has its roots in the philosophy of Rene Descartes.
On the layers of the narrative structure of mathematical proofs

According to Roman Ingarden, what distinguishes the literary from a scientific work is its peculiar structure: every work of literature presents itself to the reader as a series of layers (linguistic sound formations, meaning units, schematized aspects, and represented objects) that, though organically bound together in the reader’s experience, are distinguishable upon analysis. In our paper, we show that the structure of proofs in mathematics is a specific kind of narrative structure organized by provers in a complex hierarchical order. Expressions, such as “definition,” “assumption,” “theorem,” “property,” “conclusion,” etc., are used to introduce objects, i.e. the contents (intentions) of a prover’s mathematical thinking that direct the reader’s (interpreter’s) mind toward certain objects and express the provers’ (tacit) epistemic values and belief in the degree of existence of these objects (their “ontological status”). Further, “assertions” (positive statements) in mathematical texts represent states of affairs that possess a “truth status”, in contradistinction to the ontological status of the objects introduced. Mathematical discourse also includes expressions that do not refer to objects or states of affairs, but to linguistic entities used within this discourse and have “mediated truth status”, since they refer to assertions that in turn refer to states of affair. The combination of propositions into a proof step is made by using logical connectives. Furthermore, proof steps are combined to build up a proof that can be represented in various styles that perform certain communicational functions. Consequently, formal processes of mathematical proofs that are exposed by a prover in ordinary language, are deeply affected by the communicational conventions of ordinary discourse, which presume concrete objects as referents of the linguistic units and nuanced assignments of values to objects that are related to their ontological or truth status.

64. Anupam Yadav (Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani) is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Department of Humanities & Social Sciences, Birla Institute of Technology and Science, Pilani, Rajasthan, India. She is a co-author of the book Human Values and Professional Ethics, Cengage (2018). She has published her research papers in various national and international journals.

e-mail: anupam.yadav@pilani.bits-pilani.ac.in

“We-identity” and the Questions of Knowledge

Western epistemology has been critiqued from various quarters for its coercive language of meta-narrative, demarcation of discourses into serious and non-serious ones, and knowledge being limited to the few elitist knowers. One question that has gained prominence in the post-philosophical, post-epistemological culture is to restore the social fabric weakened by the power-nexused western epistemology. In the context of philosophical hermeneutics that claims
the universality of the praxis of hermeneutics the effective-history and cultivation of common sense, the sense of the community (Gemeinsinn) responds to the dominant cogito-centric epistemology. Rorty’ anti-foundationalism, anti-representationalism relates philosophy with social hope and seeks solidarity in trust and cooperation. The Platonic-Aristotelian paradigm that humankind’s most praiseworthy ability to penetrate behind appearance into reality, he claims, is divisive of the society into the seekers and the deniers of truth. To him, the democratic utopia envisaged by the social democrats is edifying and futuristic, and must be collaborative. The feminist discourse is highly critical of the western epistemology and science. Against the ‘invisible conspiracy of the masculinist scientists and philosophers’, Haraway retorts that they threaten our budding sense of collective historical subjectivity, agency and our “embodied” accounts of truth. Her idea of critical positioning, knowing how the meanings and bodies are created, unveils the politics of elusive God’s eye view. The historical, embodied, agential, partial and stitched ‘vision’ of collective identity offers a better, accountable and livable objectivity. The concept of feminist identity or solidarity, in the transnational agenda, however, insists on the heterogeneity, contestations, differences as opposed to the vacuous sisterhood and considers them as the site of knowledge. It is the ‘common differences’ that provide the analytic space to theorize the politics of solidarity in decolonizing knowledge and education. At the same time, the idea of intersubjectivity has been used as an analytic tool to combat the existential and epistemic erasure of the third-world women in the homogenizing politics of the Eurocentric feminist scholarship. The paper examines the agency of ‘we-identity’ in the post-epistemological culture of the democratization of knowledge.

65. Kamil Cyprian Aftyka (Stanford University) In his last, fourth year of undergraduate studies in the United States. In spe, Polish philosopher. He conducted work on philosophy of nature, origins of American philosophy, as well as on the relation between philosophical and aesthetic cognition. Three major areas of his current interest are: hermeneutical approaches to the study of empirical history (following philosophy of Gadamer), philosophy of education and upbringing, and the history of relativism in analytic tradition.

e-mail: aftykakc@stanford.edu

The Ends of Science and the Humanities in the Post-Humanist and Post-Materialist Times

C. S. Peirce as a young philosopher claimed the necessity of dominance of materialism and science in his age. (I base this summary on his 1863 oration “The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization.”) But he also thought that in the end, science will stop progressing. By that point we will have turned the external world into a thoroughly intelligible one. For every thing—a fly, a machine, wind-blow—will impose itself on us in this new age as a sign of the divine. (Cf. J. Słowacki’s concept of what I translate as “trans-angelification of humanity.”) Our imagination has been occupied in the past century with a similarly peaceful utopian image. Marxist position (v. for instance Mao’s text translated into English as “On Contradiction”) claims that once class-struggle ends, the purpose of any political activity is simply the management of nature, of those things that are not resolvable by the dissolution of class-
difference. Human activity would consist in the end in merely scientific activity. Scientific experts become the only rulers according to this ideal. Peirce’s vision treats science as a mean but not as an end; in fact, science ends when the humanity progresses to a new age. Marxist vision, of course limited by my definition of it, ends with the age of science as final. This latter vision is, however, anachronistic from the post-humanist perspective. It states a firm division between human and nature, thereby inevitably antagonizing them. In my talk I would like to argue for three theses that develop this introductory exposition: (1) Peircean vision, in light of the entire corpus of his works, is properly post-humanist. (2) Peirce’s belief in the necessity of materialism in his age enables us in hindsight to understand the significance of movements such as phenomenological and logical-positivist realism, on top of aforementioned Marxist approach to materialism. (3) Post-humanism developed in the Peircean fashion marginalizes also the humanities. If science dealt with nature, human-ities dealt with human. The implausibility of the distinction between nature and human yields the rationales for science and humanities no longer viable.

66. Alexandru Dragomir (University of Bucharest) is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Bucharest. Currently he is a post-doctoral researcher on a project entitled “Modal Epistemology and the Problem of Post-personhood”, his work being supported by a grant of the Romanian Ministry of Education and Research, CNCS – UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-PD-2019-0004, within PNCDI III.

e-mail: alexdragomirs@gmail.com; alexandru.dragomir@filosofie.unibuc.ro

On conceivability evidence for the physical or technological possibility of post-persons

According to the shared view in the literature (Buchanan 2009, Douglas 2013, Agar 2014), post-personhood is a category of moral status that entails a broader set of basic rights and stronger moral protection than personhood. As such, a post-person might rightfully claim a set of basic rights that would conflict with a mere person’s basic rights. For example, a possible consequence of creating post-persons might be that a mere person’s life could be sacrificed in order to protect a post-person’s life.

Creating post-persons is conceivable given a background knowledge of (a) the technologies aimed at cognitive enhancement (pharmaceutics, genetic engineering, robotics etc.), (b) our accounts of moral status, and (c) the observed dynamics of our practice of assigning moral status. I will argue that the conceivability acts that are supposed to offer us evidence for the technological or physical possibility of post-personhood are unreliable. I will propose three lines of argumentation for this:

(1) It is usually taken that acts of conceiving involving only sensorial imagery are reliable guides to possibility (Kung 2010). However, since post-persons are highly theoretical entities, imagining them necessarily involves non-sensorial information, and, as such, they belong to a type of (moral) theory-laden acts of conceiving that are considered to be unreliable guides to possibility.

(2) Conceiving post-persons involves joining in a single imaginary act instances of concepts between which there are no a priori ties: (a) instances of concepts of cognitive endowment and
(b) instances of concepts of moral status, and such acts are unreliable guides to possibility (Hill 1997).

References:


e-mail: rafal.solewski@gmail.com

The Concept of Stratification of the Work of Art in the Aesthetic Thought of Roman Ingarden and Władysław Stróżewski in Relation to Contemporary Art. On the Example of an Analysis and Interpretation of an Installation by Arthur Jafa

The text begins with an indication of the influence Roman Ingarden's philosophy exerted on Władysław Stróżewski's aesthetic thought. A particular emphasis is applied to the belief in the intentional nature of the work of art, as well as its multi-layered structure and the location of the ‘aesthetically valuable qualities’ and ‘qualities of aesthetic values’ within such a structure.

Next, selected topics discussed by Stróżewski in Dialectics of Creativity are presented. Finally, the considerations regarding the relationship ‘was – is’, ‘beginning – end’, ‘top (content, idea) – bottom (material, technique), necessity and freedom, as well as necessity and possibility are
applied to the contemporary ‘installation art’. Arthur Jaffa’s work The White Album (awarded the main trophy at the 2019 Biennial in Venice) is analyzed. Although the installation is constructed with the use of various media and materials, it has been shown that the reception of the whole gives the installation the character of an intentional work. The analysis also demonstrates the presence of a multi-layered structure and dialectical juxtapositions mentioned above. For installations using various materials and media, the multiplication of layers and the surprising transformation (through a peculiar "installation") of the material-meaning-sense relationship is especially characteristic. The multiplication of layers and the transformation of material-meaning-sense relationship also highlight the issues raised in Dialectics of Creativity, yet it does so in an artistic way. The specific ‘aesthetically valuable’ qualities such as immersiveness, intensity, and poeticality are eventually described as used to reveal the values of beauty and truth.

68. Aref Ali Nayed (Kalam Research and Media) is Chairman of Kalam Research and Media. He was former Ambassador of Libya to the UAE and has taught at the Uthman Pasha Madrasa in Tripoli, Libya, and was Professor at the Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies (Rome) and the International Institute for Islamic Thought and Civilization (Malaysia). He received his BSc in Engineering, MA in the Philosophy of Science, and a PhD in Hermeneutics from the University of Guelph (Canada), and also studied at the University of Toronto and the Pontifical Gregorian University. He has published widely on Theology, Philosophy, Inter-Faith, and Politics.

e-mail: aref@kalamresearch.com

The Work of Art as Operational Artifact: A Return to Ingarden’s Controversy

Web of Science ID: AAT-2655-2020
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6071-4131

e-mail: Ineta.kivle@lu.lv; inetakivle21@gmail.com

61
Roman Ingarden’s Composition of Strata and Don Ihde’s Listening to Voices

The study interprets polyphony as a unifying concept in discovering overlapping horizons of different phenomenological approaches and shows polyphony as an investigative tool for developing new philosophical interpretations of complicated phenomena, in this case: (a) polyphonic composition of work of art in Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology, and (b) polyphony of listening in Ihde’s existential phenomenology. Phenomenology gives a possibility to view various modes of polyphony: ontological and acting, perceptual and thinkable, imaginative and real. In the current study Roman Ingarden’s polyphony of acting strata of the works of art and Don Ihde’s polyphony of “listening to” are viewed as two different kinds of the phenomenological approach to polyphony. Ingarden considers that the functions of the individual strata participate in making not a monotonic but a polyphonic work of art (music, literature, architecture, film) where strata differ from each other by their individual formation and, acting together, form natural polyphonic unity of the work. In Don Ihde’s philosophy polyphony comprises a full range of inner and outer experience uniting voices of languages, imagination, emotions and performative actions. The current study shows how these two phenomenological approaches constitute the different elements of polyphonic unities – in Ingarden’s case, elements of polyphony are composed by various strata that form unity of work of art; in Ihde’s philosophy a polyphonic unity with the centre of listening is formed by existential and intersubjective qualities of experience.


70. Mauricio F. Collao Quevedo (York University) is a second-year PhD student in the program of Social & Political Thought at York University, Ontario, Canada. His research interests include globalization, democracy, the Anthropocene, and the history of social and political thought. His current research explores the ‘posthuman turn in critical theory’ and posthumanist critiques of Marxian theory, as well as Marxism’s role in twenty-first century politics and its ability to meet the challenges of the Anthropocene.

e-mail: mcollao23@gmail.com

Regimes of Embodiment and the Phenomenological Anatomy of the ASMR Body

Since it was identified as a distinct sensory experience in 2009, the internet phenomenon Autonomous Sensory Meridian Response (ASMR) has inspired varying responses from scientific, social, public, and corporate sectors. Scientific researchers, in particular, have attempted to make sense of the ASMR experience by either comparing it to existing cognitive and experiential models or by linking it to specific physiological and psychological conditions. Their results, however, have been largely inconclusive, followed by calls for further research. In this paper I argue that most accounts of ASMR and of the ASMR body fail to provide satisfactory explanations of the experience because these are often grounded in a limited,
modernist conception of the sensing body – one with a specific constitution and with fixed roles, capacities, times, and spaces to which the ASMR body simply does not adhere. As such, what is commonly describe by popular accounts of the ASMR phenomenon is never the ASMR body itself but a reified modernist body for whom the ASMR experience is either an illusion or an anomaly (the two conclusions commonly drawn from scientifically oriented research). What is missing from these accounts is a socio-historical contextualization and phenomenological examination of the ASMR body under which its novelty and foreignness can be understood in relation to specific logics of embodiment and of bodily practice. To demonstrate the inadequacies of existing accounts (and critiques) of the ASMR experience, I highlight the modernist logics of embodiment and of bodily practice that inform these accounts through an original reformulation of Jacques Rancière’s aesthetic theory in tandem with an exploration of some strands of posthumanist thought. Three things I do in this paper are: first, provide some basis for a much needed theorization of the ASMR experience and the ASMR body; second, show that the ASMR body highlights previously unacknowledged sensory and relational capacities that challenge modernist perceptual and interpretative schemas as well as their corresponding normative specifications; third, demonstrate that ASMR opens the experiencing self to alternative sensory, subjective, and relational configurations. As such, the ASMR body can be said to be a truly posthuman body.

71. Maciej Piwowarski (Jagiellonian University in Kraków) - he holds a bachelor’s degree in philosophy, which he acquired in the Institute of Philosophy of Jagiellonian University, where he currently continues his studies to get a master’s degree. His main fields of interest have been husserlian phenomenology, ontology and analytical philosophy, although recently his interests have shifted more towards ethics, mainly bioethics and the subject of human death. The main goal of his bachelor’s thesis was to compare Roman Ingarden’s existential pluralism with contemporary pluralistic theories, and he continues studying Roman’s Ingarden ontological thought working on his master’s thesis, which provided a basis for his presentation for this congress.

e-mail: m.piwowarski@student.uj.edu.pl

Roman Ingarden’s Ontology of Relations

The main goal of my talk is to present the ontology of relations of Roman Ingarden in a broader context of both modern analytical philosophy, and some ancient and medieval approaches to the subject of relations. My motivation for this presentation is the fact that although Ingarden is rightly classified as a continental thinker, many of his ontological views can provide an interesting insight to the problems analytical philosophers are struggling with today. Some of Ingarden’s ideas were noticed and appreciated in a world of modern analytic metaphysics, the most notable example being his existential ontology (which was the source of inspiration for the works of Amie Thomasson, for instance). But his work on relations has gone largely unnoticed in ontological circles, both domestically and internationally. That is why comparison of Ingarden’s view of relations with modern themes in analytical thought seems to be a worthwhile project.
I will present the structure of a relation which was proposed by Ingarden, and by analyzing different components of relations I aim to show that Ingarden’s theory is a comprehensive view, where one can find many themes similar to those present in the other philosophical traditions. For example, Ingarden’s so-called core (or bond) of the relation is reminiscent of visions of relations such as one popularized and endorsed by Bertrand Russell, where relation is thought of as a poliadic property, ‘located’ between objects. But, on the other hand, the presence of the relational exponents in Ingarden’s framework points more towards theories popular in the Middle Ages (like, for example, Aquinas’ view), where relation is firmly anchored in one object, while being directed towards another. I would also like to show some more original aspects of Ingarden’s view, such as the fact that Ingarden’s conceives of relation as a state of affairs with more than one subject, where objects, being terms of a relation, are considered to be parts of it (unlike as in almost all other views, where a relation itself doesn’t consist of objects that are ‘participating’ in it, being located either solely between objects or in one of them).

72. Anastasiia Zinevych - MS in psychology, PhD in philosophy, received PhD degree at the H.S. Skovoroda Institute of philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (PhD topic: “The human being and the world in existential philosophy of G. Marcel and E. Minkowski), independent researcher and lecturer on phenomenological and existential topics, practising existential therapist, lecturer and co-moderator of Free school of philosophy and culture (Odessa, Ukraine), member of the Organizing Committee of the Summer School for Process Thought (Katowice, 2021), associate member of the Federation of Existential Therapy in Europe (FETE), full member of the Ukrainian Association of Existential Consultancy and Therapy (UAEKT), member of the Association «Présence de Gabriel Marcel». Scientific interests: phenomenology, existential philosophy, philosophy of life, philosophical anthropology, practical philosophy, process thought.

e-mail: nio Kazin@yahoo.com

The phenomenological approaches of R. Ingarden and E. Minkowski to the lived time

The report proposes a first comparative analysis of the phenomenological approaches of Roman Ingarden and Eugene Minkowski to the time. Their phenomenologies have never been compared before, despite the fact of their friendship. In the first part of the report, the origins of their approaches are shown: Husserl's phenomenology in the case of Ingarden and Bergson’s phenomenology in the case of Minkowski. The similarity of those sources in the conception of “lived” time, as opposed to “external” time, is proved. The second part of the report is devoted to the analysis of Ingarden’s and Minkowski’s concept of lived time, namely of its three stages: the past, present, and future. Reflecting on the pathological time experience, Ingarden and Minkowski made an independent conclusion that people could live only in one of these stages and that there are various ways of experiencing them: active and passive. Their main discovery was that the “present” is not reducible to the actual “now” as a momentary instant. The “present” is always a continuum, uniting three times into single unity. The report compares their descriptions of expectation and hope as passive modes of experiencing the future, and of
action and ethical act as active modes. The third part of the report is devoted to their conceptions of subject, experiencing time: “existential subject” (Minkowski) or “internal force” (Ingarden) and their difference from “transcendental subject” (Husserl).

Conclusions; for both thinkers “real self” is an essence that can’t be reduced neither to consciousness nor to the flow of experience as its expressions. They both considered the “self” as transcendent to the actual “now.” Both thinkers regarded an “act” or an “ethical act” as the highest expression and embodiment of one’s essence and as the main way of affirming the “self” not as “natural creature” (Ingarden), but as a “spiritual self” according to the chosen value (Ingarden), or ideal (Minkowski). The main difference in their views is that Minkowski placed the “self” in the future, as an ideal that must be achieved. While Ingarden regarded it as a force, accumulating in my “self” in committed actions that should be preserved.

73. Alexander Michael Witkamp (KU Leuven) - he is a PhD student in philosophy at KU Leuven with a background in philosophy and history and philosophy of science (HPS). He is particularly interested in views on ontological categories that draw inspiration from Aristotle to argue for metaphysical realism. In his PhD, he is investigating the possibility of constructing a realistic theory of categories that analyses the importance of ontological categories for human understanding along Aristotelian lines.

e-mail: alexander.witkamp@kuleuven.be

On the Relevance of Ontological Categories

Philosophising about categories is a sophisticated enterprise with a long pedigree, though there are presumably as many views about categories as there are philosophers who have reflected on them. (Some notables being Aristotle, Kant, Husserl, and not to mention Ingarden.) While the prominence of categories in philosophical thought points to their importance, it simultaneously renders theories about categories vulnerable to the objection that theorising about them is in a sense irrelevant. Although we can recognise the importance of categories in our experience and thought, in light of the plurality and lack of consensus of views on them, it seems tempting to draw the conclusion that we ought to be pessimistic about the chances of developing a realistic theory of categories. Is there simply no such theory to be found? As some, like Quine, Goodman, and Putnam argue; because categories are relative to categorial frameworks, constructing a realistic theory of categories is a fool’s errand to begin with. We can explain the variety among categorial theories by the claim that each theory of categories is relative to the categorial framework or context in which they are used. And contexts are all that can be productively philosophised on. My purpose is to resist pessimism about the chances of developing a realistic theory of categories. Is there simply no such theory to be found? As some, like Quine, Goodman, and Putnam argue; because categories are relative to categorial frameworks, constructing a realistic theory of categories is a fool’s errand to begin with. We can explain the variety among categorial theories by the claim that each theory of categories is relative to the categorial framework or context in which they are used. And contexts are all that can be productively philosophised on. My purpose is to resist pessimism about the chances of developing a non-relativistic theory of categories by targeting views that claim that realistic, or non-relative, categories are impossible. Specifically, I will argue that a realistic theory of categories that maintains that some categories are context independent is defensible. (To be clear, I do not aim to show that all categories are independent and realistic.) Put shortly, I will argue that ontology is metaphysically possible insofar as it is logically necessary that some categories are framework or context independent. I will support this view by arguing that ontology is the metaphysical study of the various categories of being. And I will further argue
that it is logically necessary that some categories are independent because it would be otherwise impossible to study categories at all.