Theoretical aspects in multi-level security management of the European Union in the framework of Security Sector Reform (SSR)

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Abstract
Governance is a way for society to get organised, take and implement decisions by means of mutual understanding, reaching agreements and taking actions. It works at every level and is visible in social, political and economic dimensions. It includes a range of instruments, principles, institutions and practical action. States, governmental and non-governmental entities with some competences in governance aim to boost development level and provide security to their citizens. The concept of multi-level governance (MLG) is a characteristic of the European Union (EU) and its areas, where it is capable of exercising its governance at many levels using sectorial internal and external policies. This article focuses on multi-level security management by the European Union within the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), dedicated to two sectorial external policies, i.e. the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). In this article, the author will attempt to explain what Security Sector Reform actually means for the European Union. For better understanding this analysis author adopted the multi-level governance theory to demonstrate how the SSR concept can be combined with MLG. The author put forward a thesis that, due to many similarities, i.e. in the EU approach to security management in external relations.

Keywords: European Union, the concept of multi-level governance (MLG), security, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Teoretyczne aspekty wielopoziomowego zarządzania bezpieczeństwem Unii Europejskiej w ramach reformy sektora bezpieczeństwa

Streszczenie
Zarządzanie jest sposobem na zorganizowanie się społeczeństwa, podejmowanie i wdrażanie decyzji poprzez wzajemne zrozumienie, zawieranie porozumień i podejmowanie działań. Działa to na każdym poziomie, i widoczne jest w wymiarze społecznym, politycznym i ekonomicznym. Obejmuje szereg instrumentów, zasad, instytucji i praktycznych działań. Państwa, jednostki rządowe i pozarzą-
dowe posiadające pewne kompetencje w zakresie zarządzania mają na celu zwiększenie poziomu rozwoju i zapewnienie bezpieczeństwa obywatelom. Koncepcja wielopoziomowego zarządzania (MLG) jest charakterystyczna dla Unii Europejskiej (UE) i tych obszarów, w których jest ona zdolna do sprawowania władzy na wielu poziomach przy użyciu sektorowych polityk wewnętrznych i zewnętrznych. Niniejszy artykuł koncentruje się na wielopoziomowym zarządzaniu bezpieczeństwem przez Unię Europejską w ramach reformy sektora bezpieczeństwa, dedykowanej zewnętrznej polityce, tj. Wspólnej Polityce Zagranicznej i Bezpieczeństwa oraz Wspólnej Polityce Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony. W artykule autorka spróbuje wyjaśnić, co tak naprawdę oznacza reforma sektora bezpieczeństwa dla Unii Europejskiej. Aby lepiej zrozumieć tę analizę, autorka przyjęła teorię wielopoziomowego zarządzania, żeby pokazać, w jaki sposób można połączyć koncepcję reformy sektora bezpieczeństwa z wielopoziomowym zarządzaniem. Autorka wysunęła tezę, że koncepcja SSR jest realizowana w ramach wielopoziomowego zarządzania bezpieczeństwem, z uwagi na wiele podobieństw, np. w podejściu do zarządzania bezpieczeństwem przez UE w jej relacjach zewnętrznych.

Słowa kluczowe: Unia Europejska, koncepcja wielopoziomowego zarządzania (MLG), bezpieczeństwo, Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa, Wspólna Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony, reforma sektora bezpieczeństwa (SSR)

Conflicts, uncertainty and instability are among the most serious problems the world is facing. Both local and international conflicts lead to deaths and devastation. They also have both a direct and indirect impact on development. In many cases, conflicts and instability are linked to security problems in non-European Union (EU) countries. Failure to respect law and order and fundamental rights exacerbates the issue. Unfortunately, this often happens when entities from the security sector are not subject to civilian oversight or they intervene in political life participating in abuses and violation of human rights, or when they are unable to provide security services to the population and prevent threats such as terrorism and organised crime (European Commission 2015).

These are precisely the above-mentioned international threats and the complexity of the processes taking place in the international arena that make it impossible for a state, who is simultaneously a subject and a player, to individually face all the challenges and threats it is facing. The state does not have sufficient financial and logistic instruments, including human resources, to effectively prevent and fight global threats, especially beyond its own territory. Thus, it depends on multilateral systems, based on international institutions and international law. Having understood this, we notice that without cooperation with other countries and entities, the state is not able to function properly. This is where joint governance processes, involving different levels of decision-making and actions, enter the scene. Governance is a way for society to get organised, take and implement decisions by means of mutual understanding, reaching agreements and taking actions. It works at every level and is visible in social, political as well as economic dimensions. It includes a range of instruments, principles, institutions and practical actions. States, government and non-government entities with some competences in governance aim to boost development level and provide security to their citizens (Van Langenhove et. al.
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2009: p. 22-23). Note that governance is most often identified with state-internal activities. Next, it can be associated with an organisation (Justaert, Keukeleire 2010: p. 9). What is increasingly used for organisation-related governance is the concept of multi-level governance (MLG), which is characteristic of the European Union and its areas, where it is capable of exercising its governance at many levels using sectorial internal and external policies. Janusz Ruszkowski believes that classical multi-level governance in the European Union is based on three conventional crisp levels: the supra-national, the national and the regional. This means that the multi-level governance system in the EU is based on a combination of supranational and intergovernmental institutions with a certain degree of both centralisation and decentralisation (Ruszkowski 2013: p. 23). The MLG theory can be applied in any field that requires cooperation between multiple actors at different levels.

This paper focuses on multi-level security governance by the European Union within the concept of Security Sector Reform (SSR), dedicated Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (TEU 2012: art. 42.1). Special CSDP is about projecting security outside of the EU area in order to contribute to the stabilisation of states or regions that may potentially be the source of further destabilisation or more directly threaten EU societies. Such a security culture has been developed by design as much as by default: it results both from the difficulty to embrace a broader spectrum and from the desire to act at a particular level and through EU-specific tools or methods (Sperling, Webber 2019: p. 237; see also: Lucarelli et al. 2019).

The author attempts to explain what Security Sector Reform actually means for the European Union. Then, the author will examine how the SSR concept can be combined with MLG. The research question is actually about understanding why the development of SSR is not possible without MLG and what consequences it has for the EU security management in its external dimension.

The author put forward a thesis that, due to many similarities between the SSR concept and the application of the MLG in practice, i.e. in the EU approach to security management in external relations, the SSR concept seems to be implemented within the framework of multi-level security management.

For analysis of the Security Sector Reform concept, the author adopted the multi-level governance theory. Due to its inherent features such as its detachment from a specific territory, taking into account formal and informal mechanisms, its comprehensive nature, or long-term actions, supported by the shared responsibility of all EU actors, this theory should be an excellent tool for exploring the SSR concept dedicated to the EU external

1 CSDP is the part of the CFSP. According to the Lisbon Treaty CSDP shall provide the Union with an “operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets” that can be used on “missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.” CSDP operations are further defined in Article 43.1 of the TEU (2012), which proposes a list of tasks to be carried out that includes “joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation.” The article adds that all these tasks “may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories.”
actions. This theory will work well within the framework of the SSR concept developed by the EU, as it requires coherent policies, integrated cooperation and comprehensive actions at many levels and, thus, fits perfectly into the multi-level governance model and comprehensive approach to security in the European Union. The author used the MLG theory in a comparative perspective, indicating the relationship between the developed SSR concept and the EU multi-level security governance.

**Security Sector Reform in the European Union**

The process of European integration has led to the creation of a polycentric political configuration characterised by a decentralised political structure, in which several actors are involved in different areas. Security governance allows multiple types of actors, but the EU is a complex and unique one. The actoriness of the EU is also bound up with the relationship it enjoys with its Member States, all of which are security actors in their own right (Sperling, Webber 2019: p. 8; see also: Bergmann 2019). Area of foreign policy, security and defence being no exception to this rule. The evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), demonstrate increasing synergies between the national, international and supranational levels, where a wide range of actors cooperate. Based on the analyses of social networks, empirical studies in CFSP and CSDP confirm that whereas security management has actually been transferred to the EU level, it still remains controlled by the state actors. Two complementary trends have been observed over the last decade. On the one hand, these included continuous shaping of both sectorial policies (CFSP and CSDP) and the externalisation of these tasks through the intermediary of state representatives, European officials and the Brussels-based political-military structures. On the other hand, we observed a never-ending emphasis on ubiquitous EU discourse on a comprehensive approach to security, civil and military aspects, and on combining both internal and external dimensions of security (Giumelli, Lavallée 2013: p. 366). Such an approach is clearly visible in the concept of Security Sector Reform (Justaert, Keukeleire 2010: p. 3). Furthermore, empirical security governance engages in extended analyses of particular policies, with measurable consequences, both in the general (the incidence of peace, political stability, and economic and social well-being) and in the particular (the outcome of sector-specific action, for instance, an arms control treaty, a peace agreement and so on) (Sperling, Webber 2019: p. 8).

While there is no agreed definition of Security Sector Reform, for policy-makers and practitioners, SSR typically refers to the reform, construction or reconstruction of security and justice sector institutions, including oversight and management bodies. Underpinning SSR is the importance of improving Security Sector Governance (SSG), ensuring security responsive to the needs of the people. Disarmament, demobilisation

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2 With the establishment of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the toolbox of instruments available for peacebuilding activities has expanded considerably, turning the EU into a veritable comprehensive peacebuilding actor. (Ejdis. Juncos 2017: p. 4).
and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants is often interrelated with Security Sector Reform.\(^3\)

According to the annex to the conclusions of the European Council of 14 November 2016, *Elements of an EU-wide strategic framework for the support of Security Sector Reform* (European Commission 2016), the SSR is the basis to enable the European Union to implement effective democratic control measures and increase the accountability level of this sector. Therefore, it remains relevant in all the contexts, including the stable ones, in order to improve governance and security for the whole duration of a conflict. Because it addresses potential crisis triggers, reform of the security sector remains one of the key elements of conflict prevention. It is also one of the most important elements of crisis management and conflict resolution, post-conflict stabilisation, peace-building and building statehood, as it restores accountable security institutions and effective security services to the society and, thus, creates pre-conditions for sustainable development and peace. The support offered under the SSR must be tailored to security-related needs of the partner countries, which can be identified with an effective and inclusive political dialogue and must be based on clear and sustainable national responsibility. EU support under SSR can contribute to this effort with its proposal of an integrated and systematic approach applicable to all EU instruments, including the CSDP, and this aiming at effectively linking and coordinating short, medium and long-term SSR activities. Such activities may include institutional support, training, providing equipment, support of community supervision and security mechanisms. They may also draw on the expertise of Freedom, Security and Justice (FSJ) actors if only can they add any more value (Council of the European Union 2016: p. 1–4). For all these instruments to work efficiently, it is not only necessary to understand the very specific character of security in non-EU countries, but also to engage in multi-level cooperation at EU level, the results of which would allow the implementation of effective mechanisms in the third countries.

A pan-European approach to Security Sector Reform emerged in numerous debates on security and development just after the end of the Cold War. The trend to combine security with development was so strong that it led to the so-called "securitisation of development", where developmental insufficiency was rather seen as the cause of insecurity than problems of inequality and justice. Security Sector Reform at first was implemented as an instrument of development policy by the British government, as part of the British involvement in Sierra Leone and Uganda. Subsequently, the SSR concept emerged in the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and was subsequently developed within the framework of mul-

\(^3\) DDR is fundamentally a process through which armaments are removed from former combatants, who are also removed from military structures and assisted in reintegration into civilian life, and sometimes into state security institutions. Both DDR and SSR are highly political exercises with normative implications, involving the redistribution of power and generally aiming to re-establish the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of force. DDR and SSR can also be mutually reinforcing with, for instance, former non-state armed actors being integrated into state security institutions, which can help rebuild trust between formerly warring parties as well as disincentivise potential spoilers by providing a stake in the state security structures and the prospects of long-term employment. Conversely, where DDR falters, due to resistance, distrust or non-compliance, the prospects for successful SSR are inevitably compromised (see: Ansorg, Gordon 2019: p. 2).
tilateral cooperation between the European Union and the United Nations (UN) (Albrecht et al. 2010: p. 74). Thus, the Security Sector Reform has quite rapidly become not only an important concept covering numerous development-related slogans in frame of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and Partnership for Peace (PfP), Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe (COE), and also, as already mentioned, the EU and UN (Vidalis 2006: p. 2; see also: Kirchner 2006).

Security Sector Reform constitutes a broad concept that goes far beyond classical military actors and traditional actions. The SSR concept is often associated with capacity-building measures and knowledge transfer, enabling domestic actors to assume responsibilities for reform processes (Eickhoff 2020: p. 43). It is a multidimensional policy that involves various actors, including civil society and non-state actors. Implementation of the Security Sector Reform in the European Union centres around two cooperation levels: the intergovernmental level and the community level (Justaert, Keukeleire 2010: p. 3). As Quentin Weiler notes, the SSR is a pillar structure (taking into account the former EU pillars), characterised by varied decision-making procedures. The goal of SSR is to transform the security system, encompassing all the possible actors, their tasks and responsibilities, into a well-functioning governance system following the principles of democracy. He stresses that the European Union strongly emphasises the need to promote conflict prevention and, thus, construed its identity on this very premise. However, a cultural revolution in the EU is necessary for the SSR concept to be enforced. It must cover the *radicalisation of development* and *securitisation of underdevelopment* (Weiler 2009: p. 810). Therefore, in order for the SSR to be fully operational, it is necessary to engage in multi-pillar, multi-level cooperation that would take into account the different trajectories of such cooperation, starting from situation analysis and political dialogue, through democratic and multi-level security management combined with theoretical and practical support (operational back-up), especially in conflict prevention. Combining EU instruments dealing with freedom, security and justice with sectorial CFSP and CSDP policies constitutes an excellent example of multi-level security governance within the Security Sector Reform.

**Multi-level governance and Security Sector Reform**

It is worth stressing that multi-level management has become very trendy over the recent years. Research based on MLG allows examining the complexity of decision-making processes within the European Union, focusing on the relationships between multiple European actions at various levels, i.e. supranational, national and sub-national. Together with the evolution of the CFSP and the CSDP, and broad formulation and implementation ranges for both policies, MLG approach was also extended to emphasise the role of the actors involved in the EU foreign policy, security and defence, and the way these actors cooperate (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p.1; 2010b: p. 9). Multi-level governance primarily relates to the decision-making processes between institutions and states. Therefore, the multi-level governmental approach to security and defence
policies focuses predominantly on the formulation stage. MLG involves a wide range of institutional actors with relevant programmes and objectives, both at the EU and national level (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p. 1–2; 2010b: p. 9). James Sperling and Mark Webber notice that the normative perspective, first, considers policy as framed by shared normative frameworks that reside at three levels: system (agreement on the rules of the game), state (an acceptance that those rules constrain state behaviour) and domestic society (expectations of political reciprocity, democratic governance and the rule of law). Substantive governance, second, is concerned with governance-as-getting-things-done. This line of enquiry treats security governance as a mechanism for generating solutions to specific problems and for ‘providing coherent direction’ to national or international society. Third, empirical security governance engages in extended analyses of particular policies, with measurable consequences, both in the general (the incidence of peace, political stability, and economic and social well-being) and in the particular (the outcome of sector-specific action – for instance, an arms control treaty, a peace agreement and so on) (Sperling, Webber 2019: p. 8).

Security Sector Reform constitutes a good example of multi-level governance, as it allows examining processes that cover administrative procedures and legal standards (formal arrangements), as well as the dynamics of informal processes (social bonds, ideas), all of which affect the process in question from the moment it is formulated to its implementation (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p. 1–2; 2010b: p. 9). The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003, called the Solana Strategy, started promoting this type of approach. It promotes a holistic approach to EU foreign policy with security, economic development and democracy being seen as important contributions to political stability in the EU’s international environment (European Council 2003; see also: Kirchner 2007; Quille 2004). The European approach to the SSR constitutes one of the most operational applications of the multifunctional approach promoted at the strategic level (Bagayoko-Penone 2010b: p. 20). Apart from counter-terrorism actions and disarmament missions, the ESS identified support for the security sector reform in partner countries as a new area for EU intervention. This, in turn, contributes to increasing the scope of the Petersberg Tasks, integrating missions in security sector reform into Community policies.

There are three key documents evidencing the fact that the European Union is indeed pursuing an approach concept to support SSR. They define the EU’s role in the field of SSR and at the same time provide a political framework for EU’s commitment to security sector reforms. The first one includes the 2005 EU Concept on support for Common Security and Defence Policy to the SSR (Council of the European Union 2005) and the second one, includes the concept of European Community support to SSR, which defines the framework for Community support (European Commission 2006). The third one is the Policy Framework for Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Council of the European Union 2006). The Council document focuses on the role of CSDP and it recognises its policy to provide advice, monitoring, support to third-country authorities in building democratic institutions in the field of security that would not only be based on their internal laws but would also stay in accordance with international law. The document prioritises security
management over human security. From the point of view of the CFSP/CSDP policies, the stability of state structures is more important than citizen’s feeling of security. This does not mean that human rights and democracy issues are not addressed and it can be inferred from the document that these are the guiding principles of SSR support. Here, the approach to the SSR is just more functional, directly focusing on stabilisation and state security by helping to reorganise the security forces. To the contrary, the European Commission’s document presents an opposite approach to the Security Sector Reform. Human security is the key to this approach. Security management only comes second (Council of the European Union 2006; see also: Weiler 2009: p. 15). Therefore, the very approach to the SSR concept and its development reveals differences between the two EU institutions. The European Commission emphasises a far-reaching approach, focused on good governance, human rights and democracy. Due to its supranational nature, the European Commission has experience in promoting democracy and human rights, where this would be impossible for other actors. In a way the European Union’s global reach empowers the Commission to act in almost every region of the world. Due to the long-term presence of its agencies, the EU is able to provide long-term support both for national dialogue within the SSR and for other aspects of the security sector reform process. Moreover, the EU’s cohesion policy is an important element of a coherent approach within the SSR. The wide range of instruments for SSR is part of the EU’s regular external aid and promotes political dialogue. When reforming the security system, the potential of the political and financial instruments is a key asset (European Commission 2006). Please note that the Commission’s approach to the SSR derives from traditional Community experience in different political areas, i.e. development, enlargement, neighbourhood policy, conflict prevention, democracy, human rights, security and justice (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p. 6; 2010b: p. 20; compare: Babaud, Kets 2008). This demonstrates that its approach to security sector reforms exhibits a much broader scope than that of the Council of the European Union. Although both institutions focus on security issues, each of them prioritises a different aspect. Note that CSDP civilian missions and military operations are mostly based on a very narrow mandate, they are often implemented only for a short period, which stands in a kind of contrast with the European Commission’s long-term approach. Despite the difficulties, the two institutions experience with their relations, and the efforts of the Council of the European Union to create a holistic and coherent approach to SSR, both institutions do cooperate, involving in this cooperation both EU Member States and other international actors (Bloching 2011: p. 3). What is certainly not without significance, it is the position presented in the European Commission’s document, where it points out that Community actions in the area of CSDP SSR missions can complement each other, especially in countries affected by crises (European Commission 2006; see also: Britz 2013).

As noted earlier, the Security Sector Reform goes well beyond the narrow, more traditional aid in the areas of security, defence, intelligence and order (i.e. it goes beyond this classical model dedicated to internal security). This is because the security sector reform takes adapts a broader perspective taking into account global objectives reflecting
The challenges that the European Union has always been facing. Today, the EU’s objectives are more comprehensive, integrated and responsive to global challenges. It does not matter what approach to security issues do individual institutions present, as multi-level solutions are aimed at facilitating security management, coordinating decision making and indicating the best methods for solving problems and achieving objectives.

Thus, the following should be listed as common to two approaches to the SSR concept:

- security enforcement, including human security (depending on whether it is a Council or Commission approach),
- promoting democratic principles in the security sector, based on accountability, transparency and respect for human rights,
- improvement in the efficiency of the armed forces and strengthening their position,
- supporting institutions responsible for supervising security bodies (parliaments, non-government institutions, ombudsman, media),
- developing a holistic and comprehensive approach to security sector reform, both at the national and international level (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p. 34; 2010b; see also: Riddervold 2016).

It seems logical that the Security Sector Reform under the CSDP is more oriented towards crisis management, whereas the Community SSR programmes provide a broader approach as they focus on a long-term strategy to improve good governance and sustainable development mechanisms. Actually, despite these differences, specific areas of intervention at both intergovernmental and Community level are very similar.

In line with the global concept for crisis prevention and management, EU CSDP missions within the SSR frameworks can be of military, civilian or mixed character. Despite their diversity, if only they are Security Sector Reform missions, they have specific goals determined by SSR concept. In such a perspective, these missions take into account support for the defence sector reform, i.e. assistance in determining defence policy, armed forces training with respect for human rights, reorganisation of security structures, including the promotion of civilian supervision structures, assistance in implementing new staff policies based on pluri-ethnicism. Support for civilian institutions involved in providing protection and surveillance services for the security sector, i.e. police, justice and customs, is of utmost importance for missions based on the SSR concept. Training and police reorganisation are organised to support reforms in the police sector. Support for the judiciary includes a review of the existing legislation, identification of the needs of the criminal and penitentiary systems, support for the judiciary institutions and employee training. Support for the reform of customs service includes actions in training and definition of customs policy. The Security Sector Reform concept also includes support for supervision over institutions, such as parliamentary control, supervision of budgeting processes and others (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p. 4; 2010b). EU assistance for the SSR focuses especially on concentrating efforts in the area of democratic armed forces management, budgeting processes (transparency and accountability), judiciary institutions, and institutions responsible for law enforcement. In general, we can state that the mandate of the two teams of actors (CSDP and EU) overlap to a large extent. Both the CSDP
and the EU are entitled to engage in similar missions. As the division of work between the Council of the European Union and the European Commission remains unclear (although there are some differences in their approach to the security issue itself), SSR missions operate under the dual auspices of the Council of the European Union and the European Commission. As foreign policy, including security and defence, is identified with the former second pillar, this dual institutional framework provides a sense of a great role that the European Union plays in external politics with the Council of the European Union also having a key influence (Bagayoko-Penone 2010a: p. 5; see also: Hill 2001).

In further analysis of Security Sector Reform governance at two levels (EU and CSDP), stakeholders other than the Council of the European Union and the European Commission should also be considered. At the level of the Council of the European Union, it is primarily the European External Action Service (EEAS) with its policy instruments and institutional system responsible for crisis management. The following entities also play key roles: General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), and COREPER (Committee of Permanent Representatives). For CSDP and military missions these are national actors, relevant for military crisis management, i.e. primarily ministries of defence and other military structures of the Member States. At EU level these are High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR), Political and Security Committee (PSC), The European Union Military Committee (EUMC), The European Union Military Staff (EUMS). Moreover, for CSDP, the MLG approach should not focus solely on the structures established to coordinate these policies. The MLG approach for seeing a wide range of actors, civilian and military, who participate in the implementation of this policy, but who not always are part of, or are visible within the main structures established for the CSDP (Justaert, Keukeleire, 2010: p. 6). Those entities less visible in the whole process of planning and preparing missions include CFSP working groups: The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), Politico-Military Group (PMG), specific directorates of the General Secretariat of the Council Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Crisis Management Concept (CMC) defines general strategic goals from the civilian and military perspectives. Strategic objectives for typically civilian missions are defined by the CPCC, with the so-called Concept of Operation (CONOPS). CPCC also supports Heads of Mission (HoM) in developing an operation plan (OPLAN). CPCC can be said to act as operational headquarters for civilian missions. When it comes to the military, the EUMS is involved in early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning activities for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. It also deals with crisis management for all military operations (Bloching 2011: p. 4; see also: Juncos, Pomorska 2007; Diedrichs, Jopp 2003).

Actors involved in civil aspects of crisis management are more complex and dispersed. At the national level, these are primarily ministries of the interior, finance, development, police structures, customs and border guards. Each of these structures is required to be involved in the decision-making process, both at domestic and at EU level. This applies in particular to the persons from different operational institutions who are able to prepare, implement and ensure the continuation of security and defence policy. This applies to
qualified police officers, judges and other professionals who transfer their authority from national level to EU/Community level to manage operations in different regions of the world (Justaert, Keukeleire 2010: p. 6).

At Community level, the European Commission and its delegations are involved in the development and implementation of the SSR concept. Moreover, the Directorates-General also remain active: e. DG External Relation (RELEX), which has an important role in coordinating the European Commission’s overall policy on conflict prevention and peace-building, the Directorate General for Development and Cooperation (DEVCO), EuropeAid, which defines EU development priorities, and the Directorate General for Enlargement (DGENL), which can be involved in supporting reforms in candidate countries, e.g. in security and justice reform.

Moreover, the EU presidency also plays an important role. It was exactly thanks to the UK presidency, in the second half of 2005, that the already mentioned concept of SSR support by the CSDP was adopted. Further, a document on Community support to the SSR concept was adopted in the first half of 2006 by the Austrian presidency. The Finnish presidency, in the second half of 2006, proposed an operational approach within the SSR. The presidencies actively participate in raising SSR awareness by organising seminars and training sessions (Spence, Fluri 2005: p. 12).

Key actors for both the CSDP and the EU include numerous international organisations and fora, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and many sub-regional organisations. This is because most security challenges require the involvement and cooperation of multiple actors. This translates into different or more diverse methods of operation and using complementary measures. The EU policies focus on various locations and, therefore, require political coordination with other organisations and third countries, both at the general level (objectives and strategies) and at the so-called nitty-gritty, i.e. detailed level. Note that the civil crisis management sector, including SSR and know-how, is largely addressed to non-governmental entities, including research centres, think tanks, counselling in private and multinational corporations that provide technical knowledge and workforce. When implementing security sector reforms, these are not only international actors, such as the European Commission, that benefit from the advice of NGOs, but also states also do. Security Sector Reform is a policy, in which two levels of cooperation meet, the intergovernmental and the community level. Therefore, in foreign policy, security and defence there are three major terms that can be used to describe them: multi-level, multi-pillar and multi-location governance system, requiring the use of informal negotiation practices, cooperation and coordination (Justaert, Keukeleire 2010: p. 8–9; see also: Born et al. 2003).

Moreover, the security sector reform is supported by numerous financial instruments of the European Union focusing on external aid. These instruments include:

- The Instrument for Stability (IfS), which can be used in crisis situations as part of an intervention. Financial support can be both short-term and long-term. The IfS flexibility allows for supporting CSDP missions in early warning and reforms of the judiciary. In the Horn of Africa, IfS funding was used to support justice, police and
penitentiary services (transfer of captured pirates within the framework of the ATALANTA military anti-piracy operation);

- The European Development Fund (FED), is the main instrument for the distribution of developmental aid in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and EU overseas countries and territories (OCT);

- The Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), which includes programmes covering a wide range of developmental activities, some of which being relevant to the SSR, e.g. governance, democracy, human rights and support for institutional reforms;

- The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) supports democracy and human rights activities in non-EU countries, and contributes to strengthening international standards of justice, democracy, law and order, human rights, thus fitting into the canon of SSR support;

- The CSDP budget covers a range of SSR-related activities i.e. crisis management operations, conflict prevention and resolution, stabilisation and monitoring activities, peace implementation. The costs of civilian and military missions are covered by the participating Member States;

- The Athena mechanism is responsible for managing the common costs of military operations. These may include transport, infrastructure, medical services. The participating states shall assume responsibility for their contributions according to the “costs lie where they fall” (European Parliament 2013: p. 9; also: Derks, More 2009: p. 11–13; compare: Spence, Fluri 2008: p. 12–14) principle;

- Pre-Accession Instrument (PAI) is intended to support EU candidates in the transition period. With this instrument, support is directed towards institutional development and cross-border cooperation. The instrument can be adapted to the needs of the SSR (European Parliament 2013: p. 1214; Derks, More 2009: p. 10);

- European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) is used for supporting countries from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area (Saferworld 2006: p. 8; compare: Middlebrook, Peake 2008).

Security Sector Reform has been defined as a new concept overlapping of security, development and civil-military relations. Extensive character and application of SSR are both its asset and a disadvantage. On one hand, they extend the reform prospects, but on the one hand, they make the definition of strategic plans and resource sharing more complex due to two different approaches. The SSR concept has become one of the priorities of EU external policy, which indeed provides a major advantage in its implementation, as the political instruments at the EU’s disposal cover the whole spectrum of opportunities corresponding to the needs of the SSR (Weiler 2009: p. 24).

The EU actions for the support of Security Sector Reforms correspond to the so-called framework of soft power, which still remains an effective EU tool. However, it should be noted that the EU’s soft power is increasingly at odds with security issues, and above all, it contrasts strongly with the recently emerging threats, which are difficult to fight with soft measures. On the other hand, the EU treats the SSR as innovative support for civil-military activities that combines security and development. Support for the SSR
concept takes place on two levels: community and intergovernmental. Thus, within the framework of SSR EU offers a number of instruments, in the form of legal acts, structures as well as financial and operational resources, shaping the approach to the SSR, which can be deemed multifunctional and pillar-based at the same time, i.e. multi-pillar because of the two levels from which support for the SSR is implemented. In this rich palette of instruments and mechanisms, we should not omit the shortcomings in the SSR approach. First of all, this approach is often different, presented from the Community level by the European Commission and from the intergovernmental level, which is rarely noticed and valued as it should be, as the SSR is usually identified as an internal domain of EU policies, in which Community methods dominate. In the Community approach, the EU supports the SSR through a number of thematic and geographical projects and programmes using various instruments and policies (neighbourhood policy, development of cooperation, democracy, human rights or stabilisation processes). However, it should be noted that this approach is very much imbued with cultural discourse and the development of cooperation (Babaud 2009: p. 4). On the other hand, the intergovernmental level is characterised by a far too narrow approach to the SSR concept. CSDP missions usually focus on a specific issue, e.g. police reform, judiciary reform, etc. In the civilian domain, EU crisis management focuses on the rule of law, good governance, and security sector reform; it proceeds through capacity-building and advisory tasks, often in cooperation with other crisis management actors (Sperling, Webber 2019: p. 235). Mary Martin and Stefanie Moser has pointed out that the problem is also an aggregation of what different EU Member States interests are in order to arrive at the international priorities for their intervention (Martin, Moser 2012: p. 22). Therefore, the Council activities, including in the framework of CSDP missions, should take a broader, more comprehensive perspective, which is actually what the Council of the European Union is aiming at. It is worth noting that the number of CSDP missions for SSR is gradually increasing. Until 2010, there were thirteen such missions, including those in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia, Iraq or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Sixteen missions are currently being carried out within the framework of CSDP and managed CSDP structures, including five military and eleven civilian missions. It seems that there is one institution missing from that this pillar approach to the SSR concept i.e. a major institution that would coordinate activities at various levels and create a more multifunctional and harmonious support system for the SSR. For the time being, this cooperation seems to be non-uniform, still not very consistent, despite the fact that both the European Commission and the Council of the European Union declare that they cooperate and complement one another in security sector reform. Another disadvantage includes the lack of a consolidated budget and a large number of financial instruments. It would be enough to create a single common mechanism, which would only support the SSR. However, this still remains impossible in the multi-pillar configuration, thus a single common concept would have to be established first.

4 As of January 2020.
Conclusions

This paper focused on multi-level security governance by the European Union within the concept of Security Sector Reform, dedicated to Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Common Security and Defence Policy. The author attempted to explain what Security Sector Reform actually means for the European Union and then the author demonstrated the validity of placing the SSR concept within the framework of multi-level governance. For analysis of the SSR concept, the author adopted the multi-level governance theory. As the performed analysis has shown, due to its inherent features that the author mentioned in the paper, such as its detachment from a specific territory, taking into account formal and informal mechanisms, its comprehensive nature, or long-term actions, supported by the shared responsibility of all EU actors, this theory proved to be an excellent tool for exploring the SRR concept dedicated to the EU external actions. The theory of multi-level governance proved well useful within the framework of the SSR concept developed by the EU, as the involvement of the EU actors at many levels results in coherent policies, integrated cooperation, and comprehensive actions. Thus, the thesis the author stated in the introduction constitutes both a confirmation and, at the same time, a justification for developing the SSR concept within the framework of multi-level security governance in the EU external relations.

One of the research questions was: why the development of SSR is not possible without MLG and how does it translate into security governance in the EU’s external dimension? Security Sector Reform constitutes a mirror image of the integrated EU’s approach used in both its internal policies and external actions. The integrated approach in external policy translates into using EU instruments and resources, but it also results in shared responsibility for the actors at the EU and Member State level. This, in turn, translates into cooperation between a wide range of actors, from EU Delegations, through diplomatic activities within the framework of the European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union Special Representatives, to operational capacities within the framework of ESDP civilian missions and military operations. We are, thus, dealing with a situation where decisions and actions are taken at many levels. These are strategic actions, as they pool all the EU resources regardless of their nature (strictly internal or strictly external). By means of an answer to the second part of the question, a simplified conclusion can be drawn that in its external dimension multi-level security management contributes to more effective conflict prevention, peace building and sustainable development in non-EU countries. Multi-level governance provides an opportunity to develop coherent policies, based on understanding the root causes of conflicts, assessment of a given situation and taking appropriate action involving actors at all EU levels.

Despite its drawbacks, support for the Security Sector Reforms remains invaluable for building a system for security management, crisis management, conflict resolution, good governance and human security throughout the conflict. Active involvement of actors in the security sector reform through decision-making, managing missions and finance...
also proves the continuous development of multi-level cooperation for the SSR. For the European Union, it is also a question of its image at the international arena and willingness to prove the effectiveness of its soft power. For example, the implementation of Security Sector Reforms is among the EU’s priorities in Africa. The EU assumed responsibility for transforming the security and judiciary systems in these unstable countries. The programmes that the EU addresses to the third countries are comprehensive in that they contribute to the formulation of an integrated security and justice policy by establishing national coordination mechanisms, but also in that they provide training and funding. This has become one of the major EU priorities for external activities. Coordination between EU actors (including cooperation with the third countries) in strengthening the Security Sector Reform can contribute to conflict prevention, thereby, minimising threats in the EU’s close neighbourhood.

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