

Eva M. Dadlez*

What Bullshit, Kitsch, and Moral Grandstanding Have in Common

Abstract

Moral grandstanding contravenes the aims of ethics in the same way that kitch contravenes the aims of art and bullshit violates the aims of justifiable assertion. Using the work of Harry Frankfurt on bullshit, Tomas Kulka on kitsch, and Justin Tosi and Brandon Warke on grandstanding, this paper will explore the parallels among these transgressions.

Keywords

Bullshit, Kitsch, Grandstanding, Virtue Signalling

I have previously claimed that bullshit is to epistemology as kitsch is to aesthetics, insofar as bullshit transgresses the conventions of justifiable assertion in much the same way that kitsch contravenes the aims of art (Dadlez, 2018). In this paper, I will extend the analogy and maintain that moral grandstanding (sometimes referred to as virtue signaling) similarly contravenes the aims of ethics. In what follows, I deploy Harry Frankfurt's account of bullshit (Frankfurt 2005) and Tomas Kulka's account of kitsch (Kulka 1996), adopt provisional definitions, and survey examples. I then explore reasons for considering the parallel, and draw some conclusions on their basis. Finally, Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke's account of grandstanding (Tosi and Warmke 2020) will be investigated to expand the initial comparison. To clarify matters at the outset, the claim being made here is not that some works which present themselves as art (or indeed some moral assertions) can *be* bullshit, even though it is indisputable that they sometimes can.

* University of Central Oklahoma
Email: edadlez@uco.edu

I happily leave any exploration of precisely when this might be the case to other philosophers. Instead, this paper focuses on the family resemblances and the surprisingly similar transgressions at the heart of bullshit, kitsch, and grandstanding.

I

Let us begin with bullshit. According to Harry Frankfurt, bullshitters have no concern with how the things about which they bullshit really are: “He is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose” (Frankfurt 2005, 17). That purpose is typically not to make a garden variety assertion but only to utter something that sounds like one. Unlike liars, bullshitters misrepresent neither the matter about which they bullshit nor their beliefs about it. Bullshitters merely (and invariably) misrepresent what they are up to. In this, bullshitters misrepresent themselves to those who are the targets of their bullshit. In apparently making assertions, they present themselves as having some investment in the truth or falsity of what they assert (an investment that even liars have), whereas this is not the case. In noting the aptness of the phrase “hot air,” Frankfurt contends that the bullshitter’s “use of language, accordingly, does not contribute to the purpose it purports to serve. No more information is communicated than if the speaker had merely exhaled. There are similarities between hot air and excrement, incidentally, which make hot air seem an especially suitable equivalent for bullshit” (Frankfurt 2005, 13). Their aim has less to do with the content of their utterance than it does with having a certain impact on their audience or with creating a certain impression. The essence of bullshit is not that it is false, but that it is phony (Frankfurt 2005, 14).

Frankfurt also notes that “the production of bullshit is stimulated whenever a person’s obligations or opportunities to speak about some topic are more excessive than his knowledge of the facts that are relevant to that topic. This discrepancy is common in public life, where people are frequently impelled—whether by their own propensities or by the demands of others—to speak extensively about matters of which they are to some degree ignorant” (Frankfurt 2005, 18).

So the purpose of a bullshitter in the kind of situation Frankfurt describes is to diminish the impression of ignorance or create an impression of expertise rather than to convey information. The bullshitter makes a statement purporting to give an informative description, and the auditor construes the bullshitter's utterance as one to which truth-value and the speaker's investment in truth-value are relevant when this is not at all the case. Consider, for example, Donald Trump's various pronouncements, many of which Harry Frankfurt himself has acknowledged constitute a clear example of bullshit (Frankfurt 2016). In particular, consider Trump's initial statements about the coronavirus, statements which cannot correctly be characterized as lies, since Trump pretty clearly was not aware whether they were true or false:

- January 22, 2020. "We have it totally under control. It's one person coming in from China. We have it under control. It's going to be just fine." CNBC interview in Davos, Switzerland.
- February 24, 2020. "The Coronavirus is very much under control in the USA. We are in contact with everyone and all relevant countries. CDC & World Health have been working hard and very smart. Stock Market starting to look very good to me!" the president tweeted.
- February 27, 2020. "It's going to disappear. One day it's like a miracle, it will disappear," the president said during a White House meeting with African-American leaders.
- March 6, 2020. "Anybody that wants a test can get a test. [...] The tests are all perfect, like the letter was perfect, the transcription was perfect, right?"—CDC headquarters in Atlanta.
- March 9, 2020. "So last year 37,000 Americans died from the common flu. It averages between 27,000 and 70,000 per year. Nothing is shut down, life & the economy go on. At this moment, there are 546 confirmed cases of CoronaVirus, with 22 deaths. Think about that!" the president tweeted.
- March 24, 2020. "I think Easter Sunday—you'll have packed churches all over our country"—Fox News town hall.
- March 29, 2020. "The better you do, the faster this whole nightmare will end. Therefore, we will be extending our guidelines to April 30 to slow the spread. [...] We can expect that, by June 1, we will be well on our way to recovery. We think, by June 1, a lot of great things will be happening"—White House Rose Garden press conference.
- April 3, 2020. "I said it was going away—and it is going away"—White House Coronavirus Task Force Briefing (Watson 2021).

Although most of the statements above are indisputably untrue, or at least invite people to draw conclusions that are indisputably untrue, they are better examples of bullshit than they are of lies. Indeed, the wishful thinking in the predictions is classic bullshit with no basis in reality—Trump’s beliefs did not guide his thinking about how things were, as would the pronouncements of both a liar and a truth-teller. These things were, instead, something Trump wanted people to believe for the sake of the stock market and his popularity.

One is irresistibly reminded of Trump’s wholesale adoption, from a very early age, of the pseudo-religious psychology of Norman Vincent Peale. Called a precursor to the prosperity gospel, Peale’s *Power of Positive Thinking* exhorted the reader to build self-confidence at all costs. Believing in one’s success and superiority would bring such things to pass:

“Believe in yourself!” Peale’s book begins. “Have faith in your abilities!” He then outlines 10 rules to overcome “inadequacy attitudes” and “build up confidence in your powers.” Rule one: “formulate and staple indelibly on your mind a mental picture of yourself as succeeding,” “hold this picture tenaciously,” and always refer to it “no matter how badly things seem to be going at the moment.” [Subsequent rules tell the reader to]... “make a true estimate of your own ability, then raise it 10 percent” (Blair 2015).

Since Peale’s recommendations run to constant repetition of verbal affirmations, it may explain a lot about Trump’s pronouncements, for instance: that he is a genius, that he has excellent medical and scientific acumen, that “nobody knows more about technology, ISIS, taxes, the environment, the courts, steel workers, golf, banks, trade, nuclear weapons (keep filling in the blank) better than me!”¹ It may also account for his repeated claims that COVID would disappear like a miracle. The strategy apparently makes things more likely to be true by announcing that they are and makes things more likely to happen by announcing that they will. Attitude is all. The entire doctrine seems admirably suited to provide examples of Frankfurian bullshit. One’s bullshit has nothing to do with what one believes about the facts, but only with what one wants and how one wants to be perceived.

In terms of the approach taken here, bullshitting violates an epistemic norm. It seems perfectly plausible to suggest that there are epistemic norms that can be transgressed or violated. Any university professor would attach blame to the work of a student who ignored strong counterevidence or made

¹ “Nobody Knows More Than Trump About Anything: A Supercut” (2020), NowThis, [online] <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sR3f95BGliA> [accessed: 26.07.2021].

completely unsupported assertions in a paper.² I will maintain that bullshitters transgress epistemic norms in much the same way kitsch-producers violate aesthetic norms.

II

Just as I am relying upon Harry Frankfurt's account of bullshit, I will rely on Tomas Kulka's discussion of kitsch. Kulka relies on three criteria in defining kitsch. First, he indicates that "kitsch depicts objects or themes that are highly charged with stock emotions." Denis Dutton, while reviewing Kulka, asks us to imagine "A little girl, holding a puppy, with big tears rolling from her eyes (and aren't those eyes the size of grapefruits!). Sad clowns, mothers with infants, cute, baby animals (mainly mammals), cheerful hobos, Swiss Alpine scenes with lovely, blond Swiss girls in folk dress, dolphins sporting in the water, and so on." A further stipulation of Kulka's: kitsch must be "instantly and effortlessly identifiable." Ambiguity can never be the calling card of kitsch—depicta must never be in doubt. Third, and probably most important, kitsch is unlikely to and not intended to "enrich our associations relating to the depicted objects or themes" (Dutton 1997). As Dutton points out, this failure to enrich is not an entirely straightforward condition, but Kulka's approach gives us much food for thought and a lot to get on with.

Transparency is, says Dutton, a hallmark of kitsch in Kulka's account. A viewer's concern is invariably fixed on content rather than form in the case of kitsch, often sentimental or moralizing content at that. Dutton notes that

The self-consciousness of the appeal of the kitsch subject is also important, Kulka indicates, echoing Milan Kundera's notion of the second tear. "Kitsch causes two tears to flow in quick succession," Kundera has written. "The first tear says: How nice to see children running on the grass. The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all mankind, by children running on the grass! The second tear makes kitsch kitsch." There is a sense of self-congratulation in that second tear, but also an enjoyment of the fact of universality. So when Bambi appears on screen, and everyone sighs, "Awwaah," part of the appeal of the event is the recognition that everybody's awaahing at the same time. "Since the purpose of kitsch," Kulka says, "is to please the greatest possible number of people, it always plays on the most common denominators" (Dutton 1997).

² Internalists might subscribe to a conception of justification in which evidence was considered more or less substantiating. Both internalists and externalists might regard belief-forming processes as more or less appropriate or warranted. So there is a kind of obligation even in the case of externalism not to jettison one's truth-seeking apparatus or to regard it as irrelevant to one's assertions.

In the same way that bullshit ignores and sidesteps epistemic norms, kitsch ignores aesthetic norms. Just as truth is irrelevant to bullshit, aesthetic qualities are irrelevant to kitsch. As Dutton has it, “Franklin Mint ad copy normally tries harder to persuade customers of how a purchase will enable them to enjoy elevated status, refinement, and opulence than it tries to exalt the peculiar aesthetic qualities of the objects on offer. In this sense, the kitsch game, while it intends to look like the art game, is played by quite different rules: it is more about the consumer than about the artifacts” (Dutton 1997). In other words, the aims of kitsch-producers are not the aims of art any more than the aims of bullshitters are those of justifiable assertion. Kitsch and bullshit pose as art and justifiable assertion, respectively, without adhering to any of their norms.

The work of painters like Thomas Kinkade appears to bear the same relation to art that Trump’s pronouncements bear to a concern with truth. Popular during the 1980s and 1990s, Kinkade galleries (at one point, 350 galleries and franchises in the United States alone) sold prints, embellished prints, and partially augmented original paintings for startlingly large sums. These offerings were invariably pastel-hued and sentimental, leading Kinkade critic Joan Didion to write that

A Kinkade painting was typically rendered in slightly surreal pastels. It typically featured a cottage or a house of such insistent coziness as to seem actually sinister, suggestive of a trap designed to attract Hansel and Gretel. Every window was lit, to lurid effect, as if the interior of the structure might be on fire (Didion 2003, 73).

Kinkade paintings meet all of Kulka’s criteria for kitsch. Their themes are invariably charged with stock emotions: sentimental, patriotic, or religious. There is no ambiguity whatsoever concerning their content. Indeed, titles often hammer a theme home as if to avert any confusion regarding depicta: “Gazebo of Prayer,” “Homecoming Hero,” “Symbols of Freedom” (the national Christmas tree *and* the Washington monument in one go), “America’s Pride.”³ They typically do not enrich the viewer’s associations, at least not on purpose, in the sense that they offer no novel interpretations or insights regarding the depicted subjects. I would venture to guess that a Kinkade print has challenged not a single preconception since such prints began to be mass-produced. (As an aside, I want to stress that imitation Kinkade paint-

³ See the Kinkade website, [online] <https://thomaskinkade.com/art-genre/patriotic/> [accessed: 27.07.2021].

ings featuring cottages invaded and set on fire by Starship Troopers count as satire, not kitsch. Irony and mockery both have a powerful effect on our powers of association.)⁴

I have maintained that, just as bullshit presents itself as invested in epistemic norms, kitsch presents itself as having an investment in aesthetic norms. However, neither is, in fact, the case. This is the misrepresentation at the heart of bullshit and kitsch, and it is at least part of the reason why Kulka maintains that kitsch is a pseudo-art that poses as art. Yet how can kitsch *appear to* comply with the kind of associational enrichment norm toward which Kulka gestures and do so in the very act of violating it? We could argue that kitsch poses as art because it employs the painterly, sculptural, and other art techniques. Nothing says that a kitsch producer must be technically incompetent with respect to standard methods of art production. Just as the bullshitter may say something true without intending to convey the truth, so a kitsch producer may employ painterly techniques without intending to convey insights or enrich associations. The resemblance lies in the fact that the production of compelling form or the expression of truth, respectively, is the aim of neither.⁵ Kitsch might also be understood to pose as art insofar as it exploits the standard venues employed by artists for the display, sale, and promotion of their products. However, the most significant point is that kitsch presents itself as having private contemplation and appreciation as a primary purpose, whereas this is not the aim of the kitsch producer.

The idea that art is intended for private contemplation and appreciation is related to the associational enrichment condition that Kulka would maintain is violated by kitsch. We can agree that kitsch describes itself as providing a species of emotional and imaginative engagement and that it presents itself as facilitating aesthetic experience and appreciation. I will concede that kitsch usually does promote emotional reactions (as with the response to Bambi or sentimental responses to the coziness of Kinkade cottages). I will deny, however, that kitsch provides the contemplative, deeply aesthetic experiences that it represents itself as inspiring. It is easy to conflate an emotional response to kitsch with an aesthetic response in circumstances where aesthetics are not widely understood and where anti-elitist sentiments pro-

⁴ For instance, see the following: <https://mymodernmet.com/thomas-kinkade-paintings-star-wars-mashup/> [accessed: 27.07.2021].

⁵ What if a kitsch producer were, by accident, to produce a work which stimulated insight and reflection? Would it count as art rather than kitsch? That would depend whether producer intention was a criterion for what counted as art, and establishing such definitions is not part of my brief.

mote a leveling of criteria for what can be taken to constitute insight or contemplation. Responses to Bambi and cozy cottages are emotional, but they are sentimental rather than aesthetic or insightful.

Yet that need not prevent their appreciators from *believing* that they have an aesthetic or profound experience, even if they merely have a sentimental or mawkish one. So kitsch-appreciators are led to believe that they have genuine insights and aesthetic experiences when they do not, just as bullshit consumers believe that confidence in the bullshitter's concern is warranted when it is not. Very similar misrepresentations appear to rest at the heart of each.

Such epistemic and aesthetic transgressions have ethical implications as well. First, each involves the appearance of commitments to and investments in accuracy and artistry, respectively, which are nothing of the sort. So the general sorts of ethical strictures that are brought to bear on misleading others and deceitfulness have some application here. Further ethical concerns involve the upshot of not being able to count on another's pronouncements as having any basis in what they believe. Kant's consistency-in-conception test certainly indicts the bullshitter as well as the liar, in that the universalization of each undermines the possibility of doing either. I am not talking about a failure of confidence in the veracity of such pronouncements, but a failure of confidence in the speaker's concern with their truth or falsity, i.e., a failure of confidence in speakers' beliefs that their utterances have anything to do with the way things really are. Moreover, any consequentialist could point to the profoundly destabilizing and injurious effects that could be produced by such a failure of confidence in speakers' assertions, let alone the assertions of speakers in leadership roles. Either effective communication becomes virtually impossible or, when the appearance of a sincere concern with accuracy is taken for reality, false beliefs abound, and reasonable standards regarding evidence and justification are called into question.

Taking experiences of kitsch as aesthetic when they do not raises different issues for a consequentialist, though the case of kitsch also involves the matter of deception and could be regarded as ethically transgressive for that reason alone. If people consider their maudlin, sentimental reactions to be profound insights, they are not just mistaken. They are pretty likely, by elevating their reactions as they are, to give them a directive influence over their lives that could prove pernicious. So, for instance, cozy sentimental reactions to mother-in-the-kitchen-while-father-works 1950s style work, when those feelings take on the patina of profundity, are pretty likely to be taken as validation of specific roles for women. Apart from this, regarding

easy, sentimental reactions and experiences as wholly aesthetic can make people lazy. Why bother trying to understand Shakespeare or Modigliani or Mozart when so many more accessible and easy enjoyments are ready at hand (Ayn Rand, Kinkade, or The Cowsills)? Here the difficulty might not (though, of course, it could) involve harmful influences. Even if it did not, however, it would still involve the omission of experiences that could be more rewarding and beneficial overall than the ones that are easier to choose.

III

However, ethics is most relevant to my arguments in an entirely different way. I will extend my analogy between kitsch and bullshit to encompass moral grandstanding, as Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke conceive grandstanding. In other words, as indicated previously, I maintain that grandstanding transgresses moral norms in much the same way that bullshitting and kitsch-producing transgress epistemic and aesthetic norms. So, to begin, Tosi and Warmke, while granting that the designations “grandstanding” and “virtue signaling” tend to be used interchangeably to refer to the same phenomena, prefer the term “grandstanding.” They contend that “virtue signaling” is most frequently used in attacks on the political left by the political right, even though the phenomenon referred to is no respecter of political boundaries and afflicts the right just as often (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 37-40). They also believe that the word “signaling” may convey misleading suggestions about lack of intention or suggest that one possesses the trait concerning which some signal is transmitted. Neither of these is an invariable characteristic of the phenomenon they wish to describe (or indeed that I wish to describe here), so the term ‘grandstanding’ will be used henceforth.

As with bullshitting, one can grandstand whether one believes that what one is saying is true or whether one does not. Grandstanding is the use of one’s moral talk *principally* for self-promotion (to convey ethical respectability or win admiration for one’s ethical stance), though that talk may, in addition, have other aims, such as conveying a stance one holds. Similarly, kitsch producers may competently employ acknowledged techniques of art production. Their principal aim will not be to produce insight or aesthetic awe, however, but rather to appeal to the lowest common denominator to boost sales and profits. So in each case, there is a misrepresentation of the agent’s aims and intentions.

Tosi and Warmke provide the following basic account of grandstanding:

1. Grandstanders want to impress others with their moral qualities. We call this the **Recognition Desire**.
2. Grandstanders try to satisfy that desire by saying something in public moral discourse. We call this public display the **Grandstanding Expression**.

You can therefore think of grandstanding in terms of a simple formula:

Grandstanding = Recognition Desire + Grandstanding Expression (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 15)

So, for instance (to demonstrate that the right has its virtue signalers or grandstanders too), here is Florida Governor Ron DeSantis upping his game for the next Presidential election by claiming that requiring schoolchildren to put on a mask during a pandemic is a blow against parental rights:

7/28/21. "Forcing kids to wear masks is bad policy. Parents are best equipped to decide whether they want their kids to wear a mask in school. Neither bureaucrats in Washington nor local authorities should be able to override the decision of the parents," DeSantis tweeted.⁶

In a more florid case of grandstanding, Marjorie Taylor Greene compared House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's extension of the requirement to wear masks on the House floor to Nazi oppression of the Jewish population during the holocaust:

"You know, we can look back at a time in history where people were told to wear a gold star, and they were definitely treated like second class citizens, so much so that they were put in trains and taken to gas chambers in Nazi Germany," Greene said. "And this is exactly the type of abuse that Nancy Pelosi is talking about" (Nobles 2021).

Both claims are expressions of moral disapprobation (DeSantis) or outrage (Taylor Greene), where the clear intention is to establish one's (right-wing) moral credentials in the eyes of a very precisely targeted segment of the voting public. The moral stances expressed are those assumed to appeal to a target demographic for fundraising. The kind of "virtue" signaled in such cases depends on the intended audience's values. So grandstanding can involve far more than political correctness.

The Recognition Desire of which the authors speak is a desire to be recognized as ethical to one degree or another, sometimes in terms of a particular political stance. This desire is something that usually involves being recognized as outperforming others morally: the moral grandstander "typi-

⁶ Ron DeSantis on Twitter, [online] <https://t.co/1TyFBYAAWf> [accessed: 28.07.2021].

cally wants to be seen as better than someone or some group” (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 15). This idea of comparing oneself to others warrants a brief digression. Tosi and Warmke’s principal focus is on public discourse. But much of what they say applies to less public or smaller venue moral talk as well. It may be essential to notice that the sort of grandstanding which involves moral contempt or blame can prove especially problematic, even if we acknowledge (as I certainly do) that contempt and condemnation can often be called for. Contempt, in general, can buttress pride and self-worth by showing us that someone has less stellar qualities or has fewer possessions or is in some other way worse off than we are, making us seem better off in comparison. As David Hume once pointed out, it is easier to judge objects by comparison than to attempt to ascertain their intrinsic worth (Hume 1978, 372). The kind of contempt and disapproval that pervade racism and sexism (and sometimes the less justifiable forms of virtue signaling and grandstanding) can benefit the contemptuous and disapproving. They allow one to condemn others for things one identifies as deficiencies, thereby establishing one’s superiority without putting one to the trouble of having to excel in any respect at all. In having established the other as worse, one has established oneself as better. A morally charged emotion like contempt can involve an implicit comparison that can be found gratifying, even though contempt is not positively valenced. There is a built-in payoff in the effortless buttressing of one’s sense of superiority by ascribing flaws and deficiencies to others. So when Tosi and Warmke quite rightly warn the reader about the use of public platforms to enhance one’s moral prestige and of the pall of distrust and cynicism that this may cast over all moral talk, we should not forget that such things can prove a problem even on a smaller scale.

Of course, as Tosi and Warmke conclude, “grandstanding does significant damage to politics in a democracy. When people treat political discourse as a forum for self-aggrandizement, their interests frequently conflict with the goal of resolving social problems.” (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 166). In all three cases that have been discussed, the agent’s aims are misrepresented to that agent’s audience in such a way as to transgress epistemic, aesthetic, and ethical norms and in such a way as to impinge on boundaries established by those norms. Just as grandstanding takes the focus off of the proper business of ethics in the aid of self-aggrandizement, so kitsch takes the focus off of the genuine insights that art can elicit from the intellectually and aesthetically engaged in favor of less strenuous and less rewarding reactions that foster less fulfilling habits of appreciation. Similarly, bullshitters diminish concern with veracity and encourage blind acceptance, thereby sidelining critical evaluation.

Bibliography

1. Dadlez Eva M. (2018), "Kitsch and Bullshit as Aesthetic and Epistemic Transgressions", *Southwest Philosophy Review*, 34:1, pp. 59-67.
2. Blair Gwenda (2016), "How Norman Vincent Peale Taught Donald Trump to Worship Himself", *Politico*, [online] <https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/10/donald-trump-2016-norman-vincent-peale-213220> [accessed: 28.07.2021].
3. Dutton Denis (1997), "Thomas Kulka on Kitsch", *Philosophy and Literature*, 21, pp. 208-211, [online] http://www.denisdutton.com/kulka_review.htm [accessed: 27.07.2021].
4. Ehrenreich Barbara (2009), *Bright-Sided: How Positive Thinking Is Undermining America*, New York: Metropolitan Books, Henry Holt and Company.
5. Frankfurt Harry G. (2005), *On Bullshit*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, [online] http://www2.csudh.edu/ccauthen/576f12/frankfurt_harry_-_on_bullshit.pdf [accessed: 25.07.2021].
6. Frankfurt Harry G. (2016), "Donald Trump Is BS Says Expert in BS", *TIME Magazine*, 3/12, [online] <https://time.com/4321036/donald-trump-bs/> [accessed: 26.07.2021].
7. Hume David (1978), *The Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L.A. Selby-Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 372.
8. Kulka Tomas (1996), *Kitsch and Art*, Pennsylvania: Penn State Press.
9. Nobles Ryan (2021), "Marjorie Taylor Greene compares house mask mandates to the Holocaust", CNN 5/22, [online] <https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/21/politics/marjorie-taylor-greene-mask-mandates-holocaust/index.html> [accessed: 28.07.2021].
10. Tosi Justin and Warmke Brandon (2020), *Grandstanding: The Use and Abuse of Moral Talk*, New York: Oxford University Press.
11. Watson Kathryn (2021) "A Timeline of What Trump has Said on Coronavirus," CBS News, [online] <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/timeline-president-donald-trump-changing-statements-on-coronavirus/> [accessed: 26.07.2021].