

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW
UNIwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

RADA NAUKOWA

Przewodniczący Rady Naukowej

Prof. dr hab. Wojciech Nowak | Rektor Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego

Dr Denys Azarov | Uniwersytet Narodowy „Akademia Kijowsko-Mohylańska”

Prof. Martin Bier | East California University

Prof. dr hab. Andriy Boyko | Lwowski Uniwersytet Narodowy im. Iwana Franki

Prof. Hugh J. Byrne | FOCAS Research Institute, Dublin Institute of Technology

Dr hab. Adrián Fábíán | University of Pécs

Prof. dr hab. Maria Flis | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. dr hab. Tadeusz Gadacz | Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny w Krakowie

Dr Herbert Jacobson | Linköping Universitet

Prof. dr hab. Katarzyna Kieć-Kononowicz | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Dr Miklós Kiss | University of Groningen

Dr Erdenhuluu Khohchahar | Kyoto University

Prof. dr hab. Andrzej Kotarba | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Dr Oleksiy Kresin | Narodowa Akademia Nauk Ukrainy

Prof. dr hab. Marta Kudelska | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. dr hab. Tomasz Mach | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. dr hab. Andrzej Mania | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Dr Kristin McGee | University of Groningen

Prof. dr hab. Karol Musioł | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. Biderakere E. Rangaswamy | Bapuji Institute of Engineering and Technology

Dr Melanie Schiller | University of Groningen

Prof. dr hab. Jacek Składzień | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. dr hab. Leszek Sosnowski | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. dr hab. Bogdan Szlachta | Uniwersytet Jagielloński

Prof. Luigia di Terlizzi | Università degli Studi di Bari Aldo Moro

Prof. Matthias Theodor Vogt | Institut für kulturelle Infrastruktur Sachsen

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW
UNIwersYTETU JAGIELLOŃSKIEGO

NAUKI SPOŁECZNE
~ NUMER 24 (1/2019) ~

TURKISH YOKE OR PAX OTTOMANA

The Reception of Ottoman Heritage
in the Balkan History and Culture

Edited by

Krzysztof Popek & Monika Skrzyszewska



KRAKÓW 2019

Zeszyty Naukowe Towarzystwa Doktorantów UJ
ul. Czapskich 4/14, 31-110 Kraków
www.doktoranci.uj.edu.pl/zeszyty

Redaktor naczelna:
Joanna Świt

Zastępczyni redaktor naczelnej:
Agnieszka Ścibior

Sekretarz redakcji:
Stanisław Szufa

Redaktor prowadzący serii:
Krzysztof Popek

Redaktorzy tomu:
Krzysztof Popek, Monika Skrzyszewska

Recenzenci:

dr hab. Karolina Bielenin-Lenczowska, Uniwersytet Warszawski
dr Kamil Bieniek, Uniwersytet Pedagogiczny w Krakowie
prof. dr hab. Ilona Czamańska, Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
dr Rigels Halili, Uniwersytet Warszawski
dr Kiril Marinow, Uniwersytet Łódzki
dr Tomasz Jacek Lis, Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu
prof. Krystyna Pieniążek-Marković, Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu
dr Tomasz Rawski, Uniwersytet Warszawski
prof. dr hab. Jolanta Sujecka, Uniwersytet Warszawski
dr Paweł Wierzbicki, Muzeum Miasta Krakowa
prof. dr hab. Sławomira Żerańska-Kominek, Uniwersytet Warszawski

Publikacja finansowana ze środków Towarzystwa Doktorantów UJ

Ilustracja na okładce:

A. Bozhilov, *Na tursko-balgarska granica*, „Balgaran” 1909, god. V, br. 13 (17 yanuari), p. 1.

Współpraca wydawnicza:

WYDAWNICTWO
n o w a s t r o n a

www.wydawnictwonowastrona.pl
e-mail: biuro@nowastrona.net.pl

Portal naukowy ACADEMIC JOURNALS
www.academic-journals.eu

© Copyright by Towarzystwo Doktorantów UJ

© Copyright by Wydawnictwo Nowa Strona

All rights reserved

Wydanie I, Kraków 2019

Nakład: 60 egz.

e-ISSN 2082-9213 | p-ISSN 2299-2383

Contents

INTRODUCTION	7
NEVYAN MITEV	9
The One Hundred Year Struggle of the Bulgarian People against the Turkish Invasion (from Momchil Yunak to the Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik)	
KRZYSZTOF DOBOSZ	29
Rumeli in the Period of Dynastic Instability. Why Were the Ottoman Balkans So Important for the Dynasty in the First Half of the 15 th Century?	
ALEKSANDAR ZLATANOV	45
Czajkowski's Christian Army of the Sultan, 1853–1870	
MATEUSZ SEROKA	59
Searching for “New Muslims.” Croatian Elite' Stance Towards Bosnian Muslims Elites in Croatian Travelogues in the Second Half of 19 th Century	
KRZYSZTOF POPEK	85
De-Ottomanisation of Land. Muslim Migrations and Ownership in the Bulgarian Countryside after 1878	
MONIKA SKRZESZEWSKA	111
Poturica gori od Turčina or...? The Influence of Islam on “Our Muslims” in Serbian Nationalistic Discourse (Review from the Second Half of the 19 th Century to the 1920s)	
AGATA PAWLINA	131
Traces of the Ottoman Musical Tradition in Early 20 th -Century Western-Style Turkish Art Music	

PAWEŁ MICHALAK	143
The Image of Turkey in the Public Discourse of Interwar Yugoslavia During the Reign of King Aleksandar Karađorđević (1921–1934) According to the Newspaper “Politika”	
PIOTR MIROCHA	167
Semiotics of the Ottoman Bridge: Between Its Origins and Ivo Andrić	
ANGELIKA KOSIERADZKA	181
The Memory of Architecture, the Architecture of Contentious Memory. Post-Ottoman Edifices of Worship and the Contemporary Spaces of Bulgarian Cities— the Case of Dzhumaya Mosque and the Tomb of Bali Efendi	
ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS	199

Introduction

The Ottoman Empire influenced the policy of the Balkan Peninsula for almost six ages. Since the 14th century, the Turkish rules were the source of the Balkan social models, lifestyle, and culture—the Ottomans are the reason why the South-East is different than the rest of the Old Continent. It is obligatory to combine the history, policy, and culture of the Balkans with the Ottoman heritage because it helps us analyse the most crucial processes took place in the past. What more, we notice the effects of those processes even nowadays.

There were two general visions of the Ottoman rule in South-Eastern Europe. The Balkan researchers usually talk about the “Turkish yoke”—the alien and oppressive occupation linked with the discrimination of Christians, even the physical destruction. On the other side, there are Turkish researches, who presented this period as the idyllic commonwealth of people of different faiths and cultures, lived side by side in peace by centuries under the tolerant sultans’ rule. The visions of the “Turkish yoke” and “Ottoman commonwealth” contain as much truth about the Ottoman Balkans as the false and distortions, arising from the simplifications or ideological motivations. As the American researcher of Balkan origin, Ali Eminov said: “The Ottoman rule in Bulgaria was not a golden age of tolerance and equality. However, it was not a centuries-long dark age of unrelieved cruelty toward Bulgarians either.”¹ These words can be applied to the whole region, not only Bulgaria. The vision of the “commonwealth” fits the general description of the ethnic relations in the Ottoman Balkan during the peace and stabilization, however, the “yoke” can be related to the crises, wars, uprising, and times of anxiety, which was dramatic to the Christian subjects of sultan (but Muslims as well). In that way, in the Balkan cultures and mentalities, there is a place for the contradictory stereotypes of the Turks and Muslims. On the one hand, they are “cruel tormentors”, on the other—“good neighbor”, which—with a wider historical perspective—can be translated into the historiographical visions of the “Turkish yoke” and “Ottoman commonwealth.”

The articles collected in the volume present the history and culture of the Ottoman Balkans from the arrival of the Turks to the Peninsula through the 19th until 20th century and the present reception of the Ottoman heritage in the region. Nevyan Mitev writes about the Bulgarian resistance against the

¹ A. Eminov, *Islam and Muslims in Bulgaria: A Brief History*, “Islamic Studies” 1997, Vol. 36, No. 2–3, p. 221.

Turkish invasion in the 14th and 15th century. The same period is the topic of the next article written by Krzysztof Dobosz, who tried to answer the question “Why were the Balkans so important for the Ottomans in the first half of the 15th century?” We moved to the 19th century, which is opened by text by Aleksandar Zlatanov, who presents the project of the Christian army of Sultan led by a Polish writer, political agent, and renegade Michał Czajkowski—Sadık Paşa. Mateusz Seroka analyses the relation between Croatian and Bosnian Muslim elites in the 19th century. We move ones again to the Eastern Balkans to see the effects of the collapse of the Ottoman rules and Muslim mass migrations on the Bulgarian countryside after 1878, which is analyzed by Krzysztof Poppek. In the next article, Monika Skrzyszewska presents the stereotypes of *poturice* in the Serbian nationalistic discourse from the 19th to the 1920s. Agata Pawlina takes us in a little different reality of the “Turkish Five”—a group of composers whose works set out the direction for modern Western-style Turkish art music at the beginning of the 20th century. Paweł Michalak focuses on the image of Turkey in the public discourse of interwar Yugoslavia. Piotr Mirocha analysis the semiotics of the Ottoman bridge, focusing on the works of the Yugoslavian Nobel laureate—Ivo Andrić. The last but not least article by Angelika Kosieradzka is a reflection about the place of the Post-Ottoman architecture in the contemporary spaces of Bulgarian cities.

We would like to thank reviewers for the titanic work and valuable remarks without which the book could not come into being. Special thanks go to Tomasz Jacek Lis Ph.D. and Agnieszka Aysen Kaim Ph.D.—without their help the book would not be published.

Krzysztof Poppek, Monika Skrzyszewska

NEVYAN MITEV

UNIVERSITY OF VELIKO TARNOVO, BULGARIA
ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL HISTORY DEPARTMENT
E-MAIL: NEVYAN_1986@ABV.BG

SUBMISSION: 3.01.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 31.01.2019

The One Hundred Year Struggle of the Bulgarian People against the Turkish Invasion (from Momchil Yunak to the Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik)

ABSTRACT

In the 12th–14th century the Bulgarian Tsardom was one of the largest and most prosperous states in the European Southeast. The Bulgarian culture reached its climax and a showing example, that could be seen even today, is the image of sebastocrator Kaloyan and his wife Desislava in the Boyana church near Sofia. The Ottoman invasion ended the existence of the Medieval Bulgarian state—the famous Bulgarian historian Ivan Tyutyundzhiev defined it as follows: “The Ottoman invasion cut off the hand of the Boyana painter.” The article explores the struggle of the Bulgarians against the Turkish invasion from the middle of the 14th century to the middle of the 15th century. The main points related to these crucial times are marked. Different hypotheses and theories about the stages of the conquering of the Bulgarian lands are dealt upon.

KEYWORDS

Bulgaria, Turkish Invasion, Medieval Ages, 14th Century, 15th Century, Ottoman Empire

The Ottoman invasion in Europe during the 14th century turned out to be fateful to the whole Balkan Peninsula. For almost five centuries, the Balkan people lost their independence and lived in one foreign world, under foreign rule. However, they resisted against the conquerors. Bulgarians did not give up so easy in front of the new menace and fought by about one hundred years for their survival. As a beginning of the phenomenon could be considered the

burning of the Aydan ships in the Aegean Sea from the Bulgarian Yunak Momchil in the 1340s. In the end, the Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik (1434–1444) of 1443–1444 and the death of the young king on November 10th, 1444 put an end to the Bulgarian hopes. These events marked the end of the first period of the anti-Ottoman resistance of the Bulgarian people.

After the Liberation in 1878, one of the basic topics in the Bulgarian historiography became exactly the anti-Ottoman resistance. It has been an object of many researchers. There are different hypothesis, theories, and suggestions about the processes and stages for the conquest of the Bulgarian lands by the Turks. The aim of this study is to deal with all sources and historiographic opinions about the matter. The author of the paper is sharing his point of view about this problem basing on all the data.

The development of the Bulgarian historical research after the Liberation contributed considerably to the study of the early Ottoman period. The opinion that the life of the Bulgarian people improved during the first years of the Ottoman domination was refuted with strong evidence by the Bulgarian historiography.¹ The fall of Bulgaria under the Ottoman rule revealed a new period of development of the Bulgarian people and nation, which left long-lasting, irreconcilable memories in the minds of the Bulgarians.

After the reign of Ivan Assen II (1218–1241), when the Bulgarian state reached its greatest power, followed a half-century crisis that covered all aspects of domestic and foreign policy. Focused on the northeastern lands threatened by the Tatar raids, the Bulgarians were not aware of another danger coming from the southeast—the Ottoman Turks.

However, the initial clash of the Bulgarians with Asian people was with the Aydin Turks. Umur, the emir of Aydin, was an ally of Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos in his war against Andronicus III for the Byzantine throne. In 1343 it was his hordes that cause great damage to his opponents. Initially, the Bulgarian voivode Momchil Yunak joined as an ally of John Kantakouzenos and Umur. In 1344, by taking advantage of the absence of the Aydin Emir, Momchil seceded from the alliance with the Byzantine emperor and settled in the Rhodopes and the Western Thrace. Next year Umur returned to the Balkan Peninsula, aiming at regaining the control over these territories. As a result, his

¹ Й. Митев, *Има ли временно подобрене на положението на българския народ след падането му под турско иго*, "Исторически студии" 1955, pp. 156–233; И. Снегаров, *Турското владичество пречка за културното развитие на българския народ и другите балкански народи*, София 1958; Д. Ангелов, *Борбите на българския народ против османската власт през първата половина на XV в. и походите на Владислав Варненчик*, [in:] *Варна 1444. Сборник от изследвания и документи в чест на 525 – та годишнина от битката край гр. Варна*, съст. М. Михов et al., София 1969, pp. 10–11.

ships were set on fire by Momchil at the port of Abdera. In June, in the battle of Peritheorion, the united Byzantine and Turkish forces managed to defeat the Bulgarians. Momchil Yunak was killed.²

In 1280, Osman I (1280–1324) became an independent ruler of the smallest beylik in Asia Minor. The waning Byzantine Empire had no opportunity to oppose the gathering momentum emirate. During the reign of the next ruler, Orhan (1324–1359), the Ottoman Turks succeeded in stepping on the European coast. In 1352, they helped the Byzantine emperor John V Palaiologos (1341–1391) in his confrontation with the Bulgarian and Serbian detachments. In the Battle of Didymoteichon the Ottomans succeeded in defeating the united Slavic forces. So they settled in the fortress of Çimpe, on the Gallipoli Peninsula. This was their first conquest in the Balkans. Two years later, on the March 2nd, 1354, taking advantage of the circumstances (namely the destructive earthquake), the Ottomans managed to take over the entire Gallipoli Peninsula.³ This was how their march to the conquest of the Balkans started.

The situation on the Peninsula was favourable to further military action. Bulgaria was divided into three major parts: the Vidin Tsardom, Tarnovo Tsardom and Despotate of Dobruja. In the 1360s, the fragmentation of the Bulgarian lands reached its climax. At that time Northeastern Bulgaria seceded from the central government and became autonomous despotate. Even before his death, the Bulgarian Tsar Ivan Alexander (1331–1371) divided his territories between his two sons. The older one Ivan Sratsimir (1371–1396) got the Vidin Tsardom, located between the rivers Timok and Iskar, and the younger one Ivan Shishman (1371–1393) got the central part of the territory with the capital Tarnovo. After the death of Ivan Alexander in 1371, the Bulgarian state was finally divided into three parts. At that time a number of independent possessions were formed in the Southwestern Bulgarian lands. The situation in the rest of the Balkan countries was quite similar. Their territories were fragmented into separate small possessions.⁴ Serbia was divided after the death of Stefan Dušan in 1355. The abovementioned weakening of the Byzantine Empire further complicated the situation for the Balkan people. The lack of coor-

² И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ XV–XVII в.*, Велико Търново 2017, pp. 50–51.

³ X. Матанов, *Средновековните Балкани. Исторически очерци*, София 2002, pp. 352–353, 392.

⁴ This partition wasn't the first one of the Bulgarian and other Balkan lands in the period of 12th–14th centuries. About the question see: Г. Н. Николов, *Самостоятелни и полусамостоятелни владения във възобновеното Българско царство (края на XII – средата на XIII в.)*, София 2011; R. Radić, *Oblasni gospodari u Vizantiji krajem XII i u prvim decenjama XIII veka*, „Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta“ 1986, 24–25, pp. 151–289.

dination in the actions of the Balkan states, as well as their intolerance towards each other, led to their collapse.⁵

In 1369,⁶ Adrianopolis (Edirne) was conquered by the Turks. Then the cities of Plovdiv and Boruy (Stara Zagora) suffered the same fate, which turned out to be the first important conquests of the Ottomans in the Bulgarian lands. Adrianopolis became a capital of the Ottoman state till the capture of Constantinople in 1453.⁷

The initial victories of the Ottomans were also due to their well-organized military system, which based on the janissary corps, sipahi and timariot cavalry, Azabs, and Akindjis. The core of the Ottoman army consisted of the janissary corps. Janissaries were kidnapped as young boys from Christian families by the Ottomans, next they were educated in religious fanaticism and iron discipline. Their equipment consisted of chain mails, helmets, shields, yatagans, and bows. They were the Sultan's personal guards and the strongest unit in the Ottoman army. The sipahi and the timariot cavalry made their own living by the feudal revenue of the timars (lands granted by the Ottoman sultans), however, they committed themselves to take part in military campaigns. They were armed with spears and swords, carried small round shields, but did not use chain mails and armors. The Azabs were irregular infantrymen called in only during campaigns, armed with bows and curved swords. The Akindjis were members of the light cavalry, mercenaries, who were only recruited during military campaigns and then dismissed from service. They served as a rear-guard of the Ottoman army.⁸ The Ottoman military system was well organized and the recruitment of the army was extremely fast. The permanent inflow of settlers from the Asian areas also stimulated the invasion. All these elements led to inevitable successes.

In 1337, the 100-year war between France and England broke out in Western Europe. In the middle of the century, the plague epidemic which took mil-

⁵ About the question see also: M. Salamon, *Bizancjum i Bułgaria wobec ekspansji tureckiej w dobie bitwy na Kosowym Polu*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne” 1992, 102 (Studia Polono-Danubiana et Balcanica V), pp. 29–43.

⁶ On the base of critical analysis of the sources I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr establishes that Adrianopol fell under Ottoman rule in 1369 see: I. Beldiceanu-Steinherr, *La conquête d'Adrianopole par les Turcs: la pénétration turque en Thrace et la valeur des chroniques ottomanes*, “Travaux et mémoires” 1965, 1, pp. 439–461.

⁷ J. Hauziński, *Początki penetracji politycznej i etnicznej Turków Osmańskich na Bałkanach*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et Studia” 1985, 2, pp. 199–210.

⁸ About the military organisation in the Ottoman state in details see: Б. Цветкова, Ц. Георгиева, *Държавна организация, военна и административна уредба*, [in:] *История на България*, Т. 4, ed. X. Гандев et al., София 1983, pp. 45–49; Д. Ангелов, Б. Чолпанов, *Българска военна история през Средновековието (X–XV век)*, София 1994, pp. 213–214.

lions of lives was spreading.⁹ The Balkan Peninsula was not spared by the Black Death either.¹⁰ Western Europe had its own problems and did not pay attention to the southeastern part of the Continent. The invader, who would bother the whole Europe, at that time seemed insignificant. In this way, the Balkans were left alone to face the new power that had come from Anatolia.

The problem of the periodization and the stages of the Ottoman conquest is complicated. There are different opinions on the subject. In the Bulgarian historiography, this question was described by Plamen Pavlov and Ivan Tyutyundzhiev. The authors analyzed all opinions and sources on the subject and compiled a complete chronology of the events. According to the researchers, the beginning was linked to the conquest of Adrianopolis and the subsequent offensive in the Balkans, and the end—the death of the Bulgarian emperor Constantine II in 1422.¹¹

Hristo Matanov points out three periods of the establishment of the Ottoman state considering political, military, and social factors. The first period is from the capture of the Gallipoli Peninsula to the early 1370s. In 1359, Emir Orhan (1324–1359) died, succeeded by his son Murad I (1359–1389). During this period, the Ottoman state was characterized as something between a nomadic unification and a ghazis' community. The second period begins in the early 1370s and continues until the end of the 1380s. The third period of the development of the early Ottoman state, according to Matanov, begins with the decisive battle at the Kosovo Field in 1389, aiming at the final expulsion of the Turkish invaders from the Balkan Peninsula.¹²

Which are the main forms of resistance to the Ottoman invasion at that time? The first anti-Ottoman Balkan coalition was established as a protection against the invaders. It was under the leadership of King Valkashin and his brother Despot Uglesha. Their armies were defeated in 1371 in the Battle of Chernomen. This gave an additional incentive to the Murad troops to enter further inland the Balkan Peninsula.¹³

⁹ H. Matanov, op. cit., pp. 340–341.

¹⁰ About the question see: И. Иванов, *Чумата в Европа и българските земи в края на Средновековието*, [in:] *Черно море между Изтока и Запада: Река Дунав – мост между народи и култури. Девети Понтийски четения*, Варна, 16–17 май 2003, съст. С. К. Панова et al., София 2005, pp. 267–277.

¹¹ П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Българите и османското завоевание (краят на XIII – средата на XV в.)*, Велико Търново 1995, pp. 55–118; П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Османските завоевания и „Държавата на духа“*, Велико Търново 2017, pp. 59–156; И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ...*, op. cit., pp. 419–430.

¹² H. Matanov, op. cit., pp. 394–402.

¹³ On the Ottoman method of conquest see e.g.: H. Inalcik, *Ottoman Methods of Conquest*, "Studia Islamica" 1954, 2, pp. 103–129; K. Moutafova, *On the Problem of the Ottoman Methods*

The second major battle in the struggle against the Ottoman conquerors was the battle of Plochnik in 1387. The united forces of the Serbian Prince Lazar and Bosnian King Tvrtko I (1377–1391) managed to defeat the troops of Murad I. The Bulgarian army of Tsar Ivan Shishman did not support the Ottoman troops, although he was their ally. As a punishment for the Bulgarian absence in the Battle of Plochnik, in 1388, Murad sent a huge army led by Ali Pasha. The Ottoman troops succeeded in gradually conquering the strong Bulgarian fortresses Provadia, Venchan, Madara, and Shumen.¹⁴ Most of North-eastern Bulgaria fell under Ottoman rule.

In 1389, the third major battle, aiming at the expulsion of the Ottomans from Southeast Europe, took place in Kosovo. The core of the Christian army consisted of the army of the Serbian prince Lazar and the Bosnian units of Vlatko Vukovic. In this battle, Murad himself was killed and King Lazar was later executed. The son of Murad—Bayazid I (1389–1402), called the Lightning, ascended the Ottoman throne. He turned out to be far more ferocious than his father, and with great cruelty managed to defeat the allied Christian troops. Until recently it was believed that in this battle the Ottomans defeated their adversaries. Recent studies showed that the legendary Kosovo Field battle ended without a winner.¹⁵

In 1393, the Tarnovo Tsardom of Ivan Shishman was conquered by the Ottomans. Due to the absence of the king, the defense of the fortress was headed by Patriarch Evtimiy. Soon Nikopolis was captured, where the Bulgarian ruler resided. He was taken captive and later died in prison. The historical data about the exact year of his death is not accurate. Most likely this happened not in Tarnovo and after the Battle of Rovine on May 17th, 1395 when the Ottomans defeated Wallahian ruler Mircea the Elder (1386–1418) and forced him to return to his lands to the north of the Danube.¹⁶

of Conquest (According to Neşri and Sultan Murad's Gazavatname), "Études Balkaniques" 1995, 31, 2, pp. 64–81.

¹⁴ All of these settlements are located in Eastern direction from Varna: Provadia about 45 km, Venchan about 55 km, Madara about 75 km, Shumen about 90 km. About their conquering by the Ottomans see: Мехмед Нешри, *Огледало на света. История на османския двор*, прев. М. Калицин, София 1984, pp. 93–94. Special research about the conquest of Ovech see: В. Игнатов, *Завладяването на средновековна Провадия от турците*, „Военноисторически сборник“ 1998, 67, кн. 6, pp. 7–13.

¹⁵ A critical analysis about the Battle of Kosovo see: Х. Матанов, Р. Михнева, *От Галиполи до Лепанто*, София 1998, pp. 86–90.

¹⁶ И. Божилков, В. Гюзелев, *История на средновековна България VII–XIV в.*, София 1999, p. 666.

At that time the invaders reached the Hungarian border. King Sigismund of Luxemburg (1387–1437) was increasingly threatening by that fact. In response, he organized a crusade against the new conquerors. The knights from France, Poland, Hungary, Germany, England, and other countries fought under his banner. The Crusader Army managed to take hold of the fortresses of Vidin and Oryahovo. The sources are sure that the Bulgarians played an important role in the capture of the two fortresses.¹⁷ The decisive battle took place in Nikopolis on September 25th, 1396. The Ottomans defeated the allied troops and most of the knights were either killed on the battlefield, found their deaths in the Danube or were taken captives. In the battle, one of Europe's most famous knights Jean de Viein was killed, while the constable D'o and the Duke of Burgundy Jean de Never were taken captives.¹⁸ The last Bulgarian state—the Vidin Tsardom fell after the Battle of Nikopolis. Ivan Sratsimir was taken captive and sent to Bursa where he found his death.¹⁹

During the reign of Bayazid I, the Ottomans managed to take hold of almost the whole Balkan Peninsula. In 1394, the ruler officially received the title “sultan” from the caliph of Cairo. However, in 1402 the Ottomans suffered a crushing defeat by the Mongols of Timur in the Battle of Ankara on July 20th.²⁰ These were the two most powerful armies in the world at that time. Bayazid was taken captive and later died.²¹ This battle led to a crisis in the Ottoman state. There were years of disturbances and civil wars. The four heirs of Bayazid: Suleyman, Musa, Mehmed, and Isa were the key players. Initially, Suleyman settled in Rumelia, its center was Edirne. In Asia Minor, Mehmed defeated his brother Isa in several battles and became the ruler of these lands. In 1411, Musa managed to kill his brother Suleyman and remained the only ruler in Rumelia. The participation of the Bulgarians in these events was marked in a Bulgarian anonymous chronicle: “Musa came out to the Danube region and gathered a large number of Wallachians, Serbs, and Bulgarians.”²² Based on the localization of the Musa Çelebi coins from the Bulgarian lands mainly in

¹⁷ See: Д. Ангелов, *op. cit.*, pp. 14–15.

¹⁸ About the popular knights, took part in this battle, see: М. Биелски, *Владислав III Варненчик на Балканите (1443–1444)*, Велико Търново 2006, p. 11; А. Атиа, *The Crusade of Nicopolis*, London 1934, p. 98–112. A significant contribution to the issue is the book published after the symposium with the same topic: *1396. Никополската битка в съдбата на България, Балканите и Европа*, съст. В. Гюзелев, София 1999.

¹⁹ И. Божилов, В. Гюзелев, *op. cit.*, p. 668.

²⁰ Timur was known in Europe as Tamerlan.

²¹ Bayazid, most probably was ashamed to pass through the whole Asia Minor in a cage.

²² И. Тютюнджиев, *Българската анонимна хроника от XV век*, Велико Търново 1992, p. 93.

Provadia region, the author of the present study has suggested that the Ovech Fortress²³ was one of the important possessions of the Ottoman ruler and probably his central city in Northeastern Bulgaria. It could be assumed that during these events some of the biggest battles took place in this geographical area.²⁴ In the decisive battle at the village of Chamurli, nearby Sofia, on July 5th, 1413, Mehmed succeeded in defeating Musa and killed him. In the 11-year civil war, Mehmed came out as a winner and was proclaimed an Ottoman sultan under the name Mehmed I (1413–1421).²⁵ The Balkan peoples benefited from the period of unrest in the Ottoman state by revolting in great numbers. First, the Byzantines took back control over the city of Thessaloniki and other towns along the coast of the Sea of Marmara.²⁶ In 1404, the Wallachian Voivode Mircea the Elder and the Bulgarian Emperor Constantine invaded Podunavije. Mircho managed to take hold of the fortress of Drastar, Constantin focused on Northwestern Bulgaria. This military campaign was mentioned in King Sigismund's letter to Prince of Burgundy Philip the Good in 1404:

And the famous Constantine himself, the glorified Emperor of Bulgaria, and Mircho, the voivode of Wallachia Transalpine, who have also returned to the bosom of our Majesty, have repeatedly boldly attacked the Greek districts and other areas there ruled by the Turks, winning triumph and a victory against our opponents and glorious feats of the same.²⁷

In 1404–1408, Stephan Lazarevich established himself as the master of the Serbian lands. He was also a participant in the anti-Ottoman Christian coalition. One of the rebellions of the Balkan peoples at that time was organized by Con-

²³ The contemporary town of Provadia is located 45 km westwards of the city of Varna. During the Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages was called Ovech. See: Л. Лазаров, *Данни за монетната циркулация на Провадийската крепост (по материали от Дългополския музей)*, Велико Търново 2001.

²⁴ Н. Митев, *Монетната циркулация в средновековния български град в края на XIV–XV век (по данни от Велико Търново, Ряховец, Шумен, Червен и Овеч)*, [in:] *Градът по българските земи (по археологически данни)*, ред. П. Георгиев, Шумен 2014, pp. 515–526.

²⁵ *История на Османската империя*, ред. Р. Мантран, прев. Г. Меламед, София 2011, pp. 64–74. About the civil war in the Ottoman state see also: А. Садулов, *История на Османската империя*, Велико Търново 2000, pp. 16–18.

²⁶ G. Ostrogorski, *Istorija Vizantije*, Beograd 1969, p. 516.

²⁷ М. Dinić, *Pismo ugarskog kralja Zigmunda Burgundskom vojvodi Filipu*, „Zbornik za društvene nauke Matitse srpske” 1956, br. 13–14, pp. 96–97. The above-mentioned English translation is given after Б. Цветкова, *Паметна битка на народите (Европейският югоизток и османското завоевание – края на XIV и първата половина на XV век)*, Варна 1979, p. 67.

stantine, the son of Ivan Sratsimir, and Fruzhin, the son of John Shishman. In the scholar literature, there are many disputes about the exact date of the rebellion's outbreak. One opinion is that it happened in 1408.²⁸ According to other researches, however, the rebellion outbroke in 1404 in the region of Pirot.²⁹ Despite the disputes, there is no doubt that at the beginning of the 15th century a mass Bulgarian rebellion outbroke in the Northwest Bulgarian lands, led by the two Bulgarian princes, causing difficulties to the Ottoman authorities. In the book about the life of Stephan Lazarevich, written by Constantine of Kostenets, the wish of the Bulgarians to be free from the oppressors is very clearly conveyed: "And the Bulgarian towns rose in arms with the sons of the Bulgarian tsars."³⁰ Eventually, the rebels were defeated by Emir Suleyman at the Temska river.³¹ From a Serbian letter, we learn that on April 23rd, 1413: "[...] Musa defeated the Bulgarians and moved them to other places."³² This information was also associated with the end of the Constantine and Fruzhin rebellion. That's how one of the largest resistance movements in the Balkans at that time was put to an end.

Plamen Pavlov and Ivan Tyutyundzhiev have a different opinion about the events after the Ottoman conquest of the Vidin Tsardom. The authors have analyzed the primary and secondary sources and concluded that the name "Bulgaria" continued to exist as a state-political concept. According to them, at that time, this geographical area was free and the ruler of Bulgaria was Emperor Constantine.³³

²⁸ Б. Цветкова, *op. cit.*, pp. 68–69; X. Гандев, Б. Цветкова, Г. Нешев, *Участие на българите в общите противоосмански действия и походи*, [in:] *История на България...*, Т. 4, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–106; Д. Ангелов, Б. Чолпанов, *op. cit.*, p. 255; X. Матанов, *op. cit.*, p. 486.

²⁹ П. Петров, *Въстанието на Константин и Грузин*, „Известия на Института за история“ 1960, бр. 9, p. 208; Д. Ангелов, *op. cit.*, p. 16. About all hypothesis see: П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Българите и османското завоевание...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–156; И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 419–430.

³⁰ V. Jarić, *Konstantin Filozof i njegov Život Stefana Lazarevića, despota srpskoga*, „Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva“ 1875, бр. XLII, pp. 270–271; П. Петров, *Въстанието на Константин...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 187 and after.

³¹ About the uprising of Constantin and Fruzhin in details see also: А. Кузев, *Восстание Константины и Фружина*, „Bulgarian Historical Review“ 1974, No. 3, pp. 55–67; M. J. Leszka, *Kwestia tzw. Powstania Konstancy i Frużyna w bułgarskiej literaturze naukowej*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et Studia“ 2014, 21, pp. 5–12.

³² L. Stojanović, *Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi*, Sremski Karlovitsi 1927, p. 223.

³³ П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Българите и османското завоевание...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 114–119; П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Османските завоевания...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 142–156; И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 420–428.

In 1412, the inhabitants of Vidin rebelled again. At the same time, there was a turmoil among the population in Northeastern Bulgaria and more precisely in the once-great Bulgarian fortresses Provadia and Madara. Another region, where the Bulgarians rebelled was the Shtip and Veles region, i.e. Southwestern Bulgarian lands. According to Dimitar Angelov, these were not single riots, but mass uprisings of the Bulgarian people against the foreign conquerors.³⁴ However, the efforts of the Bulgarians remained unsuccessful. Mehmed Çelebi showed a different attitude towards the Balkan rulers. He maintained friendly ties with Byzantium and Serbia, who supported him in the war against his brother Musa. However, his attitude towards the Wallachian Voivode Mircea was the opposite. Even after the death of Musa, Mircho remained an opponent, and therefore Mehmed organized a new campaign against him. He succeeded in defeating him and forced to pay an annual tax.

The concept of equality between Muslims and Christians was gradually gaining in popularity among the ordinary population in the Ottoman state. This teaching of Mustafa Buriuklige emerged in Asia Minor. His close associate, Bedreddin Simavi (a former kadiasker of Musa), was active in the Northeastern Bulgarian lands with the centre of Deliorman,³⁵ as well as in Zagora.³⁶ He started the uprising against the Ottomans with support of Mircea the Elder. Despite its threatening proportions, the rebellion was suppressed. In the Battle of Edirne Mehmed's troops succeeded in defeating the rebels of Bedreddin. After the defeat, the teacher fell into the hands of the Sultan and was hanged. According to some sources these events happened on December 19th, 1416, according to the other—in 1417.³⁷

As a result of Mircea's support, in 1417, the Ottoman ruler carried out a new military campaign against the Wallachian voivode. Large territories were taken away for the benefit of the Ottomans, and Mircea again was obliged to pay an

³⁴ About this uprising see: Д. Ангелов, *op. cit.*, pp. 20–22; Д. Ангелов, В. Чолпанов, *op. cit.*, pp. 256–257.

³⁵ The Deliorman is a geographical area in northeast Bulgaria with its center—the present day town of Razgrad.

³⁶ Zagora is a geographical area in Central South Bulgaria, which center is today's city of Stara Zagora.

³⁷ See: Д. Ангелов, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–29; see also: А. Д. Новичев, *К истории народного восстания в Турции под руководством Шейха Бедреддина Симави*, [in:] *Общество и государство на Балканах в средние века*, ред. М. М. Фрейденберг, Калининград 1980, pp. 21–44. About the unrests during this time and the uprisings of Mustafa Buriuklige Bedredin Simavi see also: А. Садулов, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–18; Б. Цветкова, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–75. For the life and doctrine of sheikh Bedreddin see: *Трима радетели за мюсюлмано-християнско единение през XV век. Шейх Бедредин. Николай Кузански. Георги Трапезундски*, съст. В. Гюзелев, София 2012.

annual tax to the conquerors. Shortly afterwards, he died on January 31st, 1418. Mircea's name was remembered by his constant struggles against the invaders. In 1419 and 1420, as a result of the renewed hostilities of the Ottomans, the whole territory of Dobrudja was probably conquered by the Ottomans. Thus, the Ottoman rule was established in Northeastern Bulgaria.

Mehmed I managed to stabilize the Ottoman state. He coped with the political crisis and began a new stage of conquest in the Balkans. His successor, Murad II (1421–1451), finally succeeded in overcoming the crisis in the state and consolidated his position on the peninsula. However, the beginning of his rule was difficult because he had to cope with the rebellion of the Ottoman throne contenders: Düzme Mustafa and Junayd of Aydın. The ruler managed to deal with the situation. In 1421, an Ottoman army devastated Transylvania, and in 1422 Constantinople itself was besieged. In the same year, the Bulgarian Emperor Constantine died. According to Plamen Pavlov and Ivan Tyutyundzhiev, the death marks the end of the Bulgarian rule in Vidin and, in general, the existence of the medieval Bulgarian state.³⁸ The Peloponnese was ruined in 1423. After the initial successes of Murad during the early years of his rule, he suffered several defeats by the united forces of the Hungarians and Wallachians. In 1425, the Wallachian voivode Dan and the Hungarian captain Pippo Spano headed a new military campaign against the Ottomans. From an anonymous Italian report, we learn that next to them was the “ruler of Zagora.”³⁹ This was the son of Ivan Shishman—Fruzhin, who settled in Hungary after the unsuccessful uprising of 1404–1408.⁴⁰ Initially, the allied forces were quite successful thanks to the support of the Danubian Bulgarian population. Eventually, however, they suffered defeat and were forced to retreat. Gradually, Murad's troops managed to conquer much of Serbia. In May 1428, the Ottomans defeated the troops of the Hungarian King Sigismund in the Battle of Golubac.

³⁸ П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Българите и османското завоевание...*, op. cit., p. 125; П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Османските завоевания...*, op. cit., p. 156; И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ...*, op. cit., p. 429. According to the authors, exactly the death of Constantine marks the end of the Medieval Bulgarian State. That statement is still not entirely accepted by the historians, despite the very convincing proves, shown by the researchers.

³⁹ И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ...*, op. cit., p. 433.

⁴⁰ Д. Ангелов, op. cit., pp. 31–32. About Fruzhin see: П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Българите и османското завоевание...*, op. cit., p. 126–131; П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Османските завоевания...*, op. cit., pp. 158–159; И. Тютюнджиев, *История на българския народ...*, op. cit., pp. 429–430.

The 1420s were marked by the numerous battles between the Ottomans and the Hungarian-Wallachian troops, which ended with the peace treaties' conclusion. In 1428 an agreement was signed with Wallachia, and in 1429 with Hungary. By virtue of these treaties, the Ottoman state kept the territories that were captured as a result of the military campaigns in the 1420s. This situation was extremely unfavorable for the Bulgarian lands, which remained under the control of Murad. The date March 29th, 1430 was disastrous for the Byzantine Empire, when Thessaloniki was conquered by the Ottomans. At that time it was in the possession of the Venetians, but the city had always been considered second in importance after Constantinople. Thus, in fact, the city of Constantine remained the only one which had not been captured by the Ottomans yet.

In the 1430s, another part of the Balkan population—the Albanians—became active. The uprising in Albania began in 1432 when the rebels succeeded in defeating the Ottomans under the leadership of Andrei Topia. The movement reached its peak in 1434 when Depa Zenavis was proclaimed king of Albania. In 1435, the envoy of the Hungarian King and the Bulgarian ruler Fruzhin arrived in Ragusa and from there he moved to Albania. Most likely, his aim was to ensure the Albanians that they would not be alone in their struggle against the Ottomans and would be supported by the other Balkan peoples, headed by the Bulgarians.⁴¹ King Sigismund did his best to support the Albanian military endeavor. Eventually, he failed to do so because he died in December 1437.⁴²

The Serbian lands were systematically devastated by the Ottoman troops. It forced Serbian despot George Brankovic to send his daughter Mara to the Murad's harem. Despite this sacrifice, the Sultan was merciless and the outrage continued. In 1437, the Hungarians managed to defeat the Ottoman troops at Golubac. In response, the retreating Turkish troops devastated the Serbian regions. The Despot was forced to give the strong fortress of Branichevo to the Ottomans. In 1439, the Serbian capital Smederevo was conquered by the Ottomans.

The death of Emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg in 1437 put an end to the Hungarian offensive in the Balkans for several years. The military campaigns of the Magyars against the invaders would be renewed with new strength by

⁴¹ А. Буда, *Борьба албанского народа под водительством Скандербега против турецких завоевателей*, [in:] *Повествы о Скандербеге*, ред. Н. Н. Розов, Н. А. Христякова, Москва-Ленинград 1957, p. 76.

⁴² Detailed information about the Ottoman invasion from 20–30s years of 15th century see: X. Матанов, *op. cit.*, pp. 495–503; П. Павлов, И. Тютюнджиев, *Българите и османското завоевание...*, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–156.

the young Polish-Hungarian King Vladislav III and the Transylvanian voivode John Hunyadi. The Bulgarians were actively involved in the anti-Ottoman military campaigns of 1443–1444. The Polish and Hungarian sources about the “long” campaign were sure that Bulgarians and Poles got on well because they had a common background. King Vladislav was welcomed as a liberator. In a number of letters written by John Hunyadi, Enea Silvio Piccolini, and others, it was said that the Bulgarians were part of the Crusade and supported the Christian Coalition as they could. After the truce in Edirne on June 12th, 1444, and its subsequent ratification on August 1st in Szeged, Bulgaria remained under Ottoman rule. Only a few days later, on August 4th, King Vladislav announced that a new campaign was being organized, he promised to John Hunyadi that he would become the King of Bulgaria. The European chroniclers, as Jan Długosz, Callimachus, Beheim, gave us two important pieces of information about the participation of the Bulgarians in these events. On the one hand, they wrote about the joining of Bulgarians into the coalition army and on the other hand, they mentioned about violence committed by the Christian army upon the local population. Similar information was available in the Ottoman sources. Still, however, most of the sources are unconditional that the Bulgarians also took part in the second crusade of King Vladislav. The defeat at Varna and the death of the young Polish-Hungarian king put an end to the hopes of liberation. The Bulgarians, like the other Balkan peoples, remained under foreign rule for centuries. The Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik also marked the end of the first period of anti-Ottoman resistance of the Bulgarian people.⁴³

The Nikopolis Treasure

Traces of these stormy events are the archaeological artifacts. The author would like to present one of the most significant treasures from the late Middle Ages, discovered in the Bulgarian lands in the region of Nikopolis.⁴⁴ It was

⁴³ About the participation of the Bulgarians in the Crusades of king Vladislav Varnenchik in details see: N. Mitev, *The Last Crusades in the Balkans from 1443–1444 or the Union between Central and Southeastern Europe against the Ottoman Invasion* (forthcoming). General researches about the Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik: W. Swoboda, *Warna 1444*, Kraków 1994; *Świat chrześcijański i Turcy Osmańscy w dobie bitwy pod Warną*, red. D. Quirini-Popławska, Kraków 1995; J. Dąbrowski, *Władysław I Jagiellończyk na Węgrzech (1440–1444)*, Warszawa 1922.

⁴⁴ В. Гюзелев, *Никопол през XI–XIV в. – вжодат на града в историята*, [in:] *История на Никопол*, ред. В. Гюзелев, Плевен 2004, pp. 59–68; А. Кузев, *Никопол и Холавник*, [in:] *Български средновековни градове и крепости*, Т. I: *Градове и крепости по Дунав и Черно*

found in several parts and gave rise to a number of different assumptions about its belonging and the reason for its hiding.

The First Nikopolis treasure was found in a metal pot in the area of the state vine nursery near Nikopol in 1915. It consists two silver plates, pieces of silver vessel, three silver spoons, pieces of belt appliqués, an earring and pieces of earrings, bracelet and coins of Ivan Alexander with Michael (1337–1371), Ivan Sratsimir (1356–1396), Bayazid I (1389–1402), and Mircea I (1386–1418).

The Second Nikopolis Treasure was found in 1971 when the Harmanlaka plot was ploughed (in the same area where the first one was found). It is considerably richer and more varied. The objects are made of gold—0.320 kg and silver—3.5 kg. The find consists of ten golden ear-tabs with a biconical, two-pyramidal, and spherical shape of the pendants; two gold bracelets—open, made of several ovals with plates at the ends—one with elongated trapezoidal shape and the other with a heart shape; one hundred and fifty seven buttons—silver or silver with gilt, a piece of glass, a necklace—gold with pendants; a silver cup; two silver bowls with bottoms bulging inwards; two silver spoons; five oval silver bars, two rod-shaped and two amorphous; a silver pendentive with pendants; four silver torcs; a silver ellipsoidal bowl; four gold and three silver coins of Isaac I Komnin (1057–1059), John III Doukas Vatatzes (1222–1254), a Venetian ducat from the fourteenth century, Manuel II Paleologus (1391–1423), Murad I (1362–1389), and a copper metal pot in which the treasure was discovered. The first researcher who wrote about the find Milko Asparuhov makes a number of parallels with artifacts found in Bulgaria and abroad. As for silver spoons, he mentions that such can be found both in Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The author considers that the production place of the bowls should be sought somewhere in the metal workshops in Quitaine and Montpellier in the 13th–14th centuries. But it is also possible to be a product of Sienna, Bergamo, Venice, or workshops located on the Western Balkan Coast. The presence of spoons on the Bulgarian lands, whose similar specimens originate from Man and Gotland, is explained by the author with the stronger trade relations between Central and Southeastern Europe along the Danube in the 13th and 14th centuries. Quite interesting are the inscriptions on two of the spoons and the two bowls from the second treasure where the name

море, съст. В. Гюзелев, А. Кузев, Варна 1981, pp. 125–148; Е. Манова, *Крайдунавският град Никопол в миналото*, „Военноисторически сборник“ 1980, бр. 49, pp. 69–81; М. Аспарухов, *Археологически приноси към историята на средновековния Никопол*, ч. 1, Враца 1997, pp. 87–137; idem, *Никополското съкровище*, „Известия на музеите от Северозападна България“ 1995, бр. 25, pp. 87–125; Г. Димов, *Никополското съкровище – опит за интерпретация*, „Mediaevalia“ 2012, бр. 5, pp. 33–41.

BALIN can be seen. This surname is popular in Northern Bulgaria and its most famous representative is a merchant from Nikopolis in the 17th century. The name is also a nickname for a healer.⁴⁵

Recently a find of 261 silver coins (among them 205 of Wallachian emissions), also from the area of Nikopolis, was published. The author Vladimir Penchev considers it as a part of the First Treasure.⁴⁶ Georgi Dimov calls it “The Third Nikopolis Treasure.” He finds a connection between the silver bars from the Second Nikopolis Treasure with the find from 1917. Based on the vaulted pieces of the treasure, Dimov summarizes that this is one of the greatest discoveries of jewelry, vessels, and coins from the early 15th century in the Balkans.⁴⁷



Image 1: The Nikopolis Treasure,
[online] rim-pleven.com/археология/ [accessed: 1.04.2019].

⁴⁵ М. Аспарухов, *Никополското съкровище...*, ор. cit.

⁴⁶ В. Пенчев, *Колективна находка със сребърни средновековни монети (XIV–XV в.) от района на град Никопол*, „Нумизматика, Сфрагистика и Епиграфика” 2010, бр. 6, pp. 153–165.

⁴⁷ Г. Димов, ор. cit.

There are different opinions about the concealment of the find in the literature. This fact is easily explained in view of the vicissitudes of the Bulgarian lands at the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 15th century. Naturally, the main reason for the hiding of the treasure is the coin findings. These are the emissions of Mirces I and Manuel Palaiologos, which are the most recent ones. Milko Asparuhov points out three reasons for the concealment of the find: the conquest of Nikopolis by the Turks, the Battle of Nikopolis in 1396, when the troops of the Hungarian King Sigismund I were defeated, and the Crusade of Vladislav Varnenchik in the autumn of 1444. The researcher trusts to Callimachus's chronicle, who wrote that during the siege of the Nikopolis fortress in 1444 the crusaders began to plunder everything around. The author concludes that it is most likely this event to be the reason for the hiding of the Third Nikopolis treasure.⁴⁸

Georgi Dimov offers the following versions on the treasure's belonging. First, the treasure may have been the property of a healer associated with the rock complex at St. Stephen Church, or that the treasure belonged to the beg of the Nikopolis Sandjak, who had made his pile during the Ottoman military campaigns in Wallachia and some of the objects were the spoils after the Battle of Nikopolis on September 25th, 1396. Another suggestion of the author, based on the coin finds, the largest number of which are ones of Mircea I, is that the coins were sent to Cüneyt, who supported Mustafa in his struggle for the throne and was an ally of Mircea the Elder.⁴⁹ Vladimir Penchev believes that the specimens were divided into two purses and each of them was put in the respective copper vessel. In one of the vessels were put only the more functional coins, whereas the "more elite" ones were put in the second vessel.⁵⁰

According to Georgi Dimov, the most likely reasons for hiding the treasure are the following. First, Mustafa's march to the south and Cüneyt's participation in it. Second, the capture of Nikopolis in the autumn of 1426 by the Wallachian voivode Dan II (1420–1431), comitadji of Temesvár Pippo Spano from Florentia, and the ruler of Zagora Fruzhin. A third hypothesis is that the concealment may have taken place in the early 17th century and the reason, for example, akıncı's loot, acquired by means of robbery.

From the review of the research and the description of the find, the following assumptions could be made. The Nikopolis Treasure is perhaps the largest find from the late Middle Ages found in the Balkans. It is so significant due to the combination of different stylish objects, most of which made in a variety of

⁴⁸ М. Аспарухов, *Никополското съкровище...*, op. cit., pp. 110–111.

⁴⁹ Г. Димов, op. cit., pp. 38–41.

⁵⁰ В. Пенчев, op. cit.

European workshops. At the same time, there are inscriptions that undoubtedly prove that the most probable owner of the find was a man with a surname Balin, a Bulgarian of origin. As far as the hiding of this invaluable treasure is concerned, as it has been already noted, there are quite a few contradictions. The monetary findings suggest that all this happened in the first half of the 15th century. Each event from these turbulent times on the Bulgarian lands could be a well-grounded reason for that—the turmoil in the Ottoman state after the death of Bayazid, the uprising of Constantine and Fruzhin, the campaign of Dan II, Pippo Spano and Fruzhin, the Crusade of Vladislav Varnenchik in northeastern Bulgaria.

...

From the above-mentioned events, it is evident that the Bulgarians had not waited relentlessly for their conquest by the Ottomans. The Bulgarians had been at war with the invaders for hundred years. First, against the Aydan and Ottoman expansion, and then the struggle for their freedom. The Bulgarians organized uprisings and took part in various anti-Ottoman European coalitions. Most of the military action took place on the Bulgarian territory. The Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik and John Hunyadi from 1443–1444 turned out to be a crucial moment. After these events, the Ottomans remained constantly in the Balkans, establishing their institutions here and locating their European army in these places.⁵¹ Tired of the century-long struggle taking place on their territory and accepting the new conditions of the enslaver, the Bulgarians were forced to live under an Ottoman yoke by the end of the 19th century.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. 1396. *Никополската битка в съдбата на България, Балканите и Европа*, съст. В. Гюзелев, София 1999.
2. Atiya A., *The Crusade of Nicopolis*, London 1934.
3. Beldiceanu-Steinherr I., *La conquête d'Andrinople par les Turcs: la pénétration turque en Thrace et la valeur des chroniques ottomanes*, "Travaux et mémoires" 1965, 1.
4. Dąbrowski J., *Władysław I Jagiellończyk na Węgrzech (1440–1444)*, Warszawa 1922.
5. Dinić M., *Pismo ugarskog kralja Zigmunda Burgundskom vojvodi Filipu*, „Zbornik za društvene nauke Matitse srpske” 1956, br. 13–14.

⁵¹ General research about the topic and the fate of the last Bulgarian rulers: П. Ников, *Турското завладяване на България и съдбата на последните Шишмановци*, „Известия на Историческото Дружество в София” 1928, 7/8, pp. 41–112.

6. Hauziński J., *Początki penetracji politycznej i etnicznej Turków Osmańskich na Bałkanach*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et Studia” 1985, 2.
7. Inalcik H., *Ottoman Methods of Conquest*, “Studia Islamica” 1954, 2.
8. Jarić V., *Konstantin Filozof i njegov Život Stefana Lazarevića, despota srpskoga*, „Glasnik Srpskog učenog društva” 1875, бр. XLII.
9. Leszka M. J., *Kwestia tzw. Powstania Konstantyna i Frużyna w bułgarskiej literaturze naukowej*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et Studia” 2014, 21.
10. Mitev N., *The Last Crusades in the Balkans from 1443–1444 or the Union between Central and Southeastern Europe against the Ottoman Invasion* (forthcoming).
11. Moutafova K., *On the Problem of the Ottoman Methods of Conquest (According to Neşri and Sultan Murad’s Gazavatname)*, “Études Balkaniques” 1995, 31, 2.
12. Ostrogorski G., *Istorija Vizantije*, Beograd 1969.
13. Radić R., *Oblasni gospodari u Vizantiji krajem XII i u prvim decenjama XIII veka*, „Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta” 1986, 24–25.
14. Salamon M., *Bizancjum i Bułgaria wobec ekspansji tureckiej w dobie bitwy na Kosowym Polu*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego. Prace Historyczne” 1992, 102 (Studia Polono-Danubiana et Balcanica V).
15. Stojanović L., *Stari srpski rodoslovi i letopisi*, Sremski Karlovitsi 1927.
16. *Świat chrześcijański i Turcy Osmańscy w dobie bitwy pod Warną*, red. D. Quirini-Popławska, Studia Polono-Danubiana et Balcanica VIII, Kraków 1995.
17. Swoboda W., *Warna 1444*, Kraków 1994.
18. Ангелов Д., *Борбите на българския народ против османската власт през първата половина на XV в. и походите на Владислав Варненчик*, [in:] *Варна 1444. Сборник от изследвания и документи в чест на 525-та годишнина от битката край гр. Варна*, съст. М. Михов et al., София 1969.
19. Ангелов Д., Чолпанов Б., *Българска военна история през Средновековието (X–XV век)*, София 1994.
20. Аспарухов М., *Археологически приноси към историята на средновековния Никопол*, ч. 1, Враца 1997.
21. Аспарухов М., *Никополското съкровище*, „Известия на музеите от Северозападна България” 1995, бр. 23.
22. Биелски М., *Владислав III Варненчик на Балканите (1443–1444)*, Велико Търново 2006.
23. Божилков И., Гюзелев В., *История на средновековна България VII–XIV в.*, София 1999.
24. Буда А., *Борьба албанского народа под водительством Скандербега против турецких завоевателей*, [in:] *Повествы о Скандербеге*, ред. Н. Н. Розов, Н. А. Христякова, Москва-Ленинград 1957.
25. Гандев Х., Цветкова Б., Нешев Г., *Участие на българите в общите противоосмански действия и походи*, [in:] *История на България*, Т. 4, ed. Х. Гандев et al., София 1983.
26. Гюзелев В., *Никопол през XI–XIV в. – вжодат на града в историята*, [in:] *История на Никопол*, ред. В. Гюзелев, Плевен 2004.
27. Димов Г., *Никополското съкровище – опит за интерпретация*, „Mediaevalia” 2012, бр. 5.
28. Иванов И., *Чумата в Европа и българските земи в края на Средновековието*, [in:] *Черно море между Изтока и Запада: Река Дунав – мост между народи и култури. Девети Понтийски четения, Варна, 16–17 май 2003*, съст. С. К. Панова et al., София 2005.

29. Игнатов В., *Завладяването на средновековна Провадия от турците*, „Военноисторически сборник“ 67, 1998, кн. 6.
30. *История на Османската империя*, ред. Р. Мантран, прев. Г. Меламед, София 2011.
31. Кузев А., *Восстание Константина и Фружина*, „Bulgarian Historical Review“ 1974, No. 3.
32. Кузев А., *Никопол и Холавник*, [in:] *Български средновековни градове и крепости*, Т. I: *Градове и крепости по Дунав и Черно море*, съст. В. Гюзелев, А. Кузев, Варна 1981.
33. Лазаров Л., *Данни за монетната циркулация на Провадийската крепост (по материали от Дългополския музей)*, Велико Търново 2001.
34. Манова Е., *Крайдунавският град Никопол в миналото*, „Военноисторически сборник“ 1980, бр. 49.
35. Матанов Х., Михнева Р., *От Галиполи до Лепанто*, София 1998.
36. Матанов Х., *Средновековните Балкани. Исторически очерци*, София 2002.
37. Мехмед Нешри, *Огледало на света. История на османския двор*, прев. М. Калицин, София 1984.
38. Митев Й., *Има ли временно подобрене на положението на българския народ след падането му под турско иго*, „Исторически студии“, 1955.
39. Митев Н., *Монетната циркулация в средновековния български град в края на XIV–XV век (по данни от Велико Търново, Ряховец, Шумен, Червен и Овеч)*, [in:] *Градът по българските земи (по археологически данни)*, ред. П. Георгиев, Шумен 2014.
40. Ников П., *Турското завладяване на България и съдбата на последните Шишмановци*, „Известия на Историческото Дружество в София“ 1928, 7/8.
41. Николов Г. Н., *Самостоятелни и полусамостоятелни владения във възобновеното Българско царство (края на XII – средата на XIII в.)*, София 2011.
42. Новичев А. Д., *К истории народного восстания в Турции под руководством Шейха Бедреддина Симави*, [in:] *Общество и государство на Балканах в средние века*, ред. М. М. Фрейденберг, Калининград 1980.
43. Павлов П., Тютюнджиев И., *Българите и османското завоевание (краят на XIII – средата на XV в.)*, Велико Търново 1995.
44. Павлов П., Тютюнджиев И., *Османските завоевания и „Държавата на духа“*, Велико Търново 2017.
45. Пенчев В., *Колективна находка със сребърни средновековни монети (XIV–XV в.) от района на град Никопол*, „Нумизматика, Сфрагистика и Епиграфика“ 2010, бр. 6.
46. Петров П., *Въстанието на Константин и Грузин*, „Известия на Института за история“ 1960, бр. 9.
47. Садулов А., *История на Османската империя*, Велико Търново 2000.
48. Снегаров И., *Турското владичество пречка за културното развитие на българския народ и другите балкански народи*, София 1958.
49. *Трима радетели за мюсюлмано-християнско единение през XV век. Шейх Бедредин. Николай Кузански. Георги Трапезундски*, съст. В. Гюзелев, София 2012.
50. Тютюнджиев И., *Българската анонимна хроника от XV век*, Велико Търново 1992.
51. Тютюнджиев И., *История на българския народ XV–XVII в.*, Велико Търново 2017.
52. Цветкова Б., Георгиева Ц., *Държавна организация, военна и административна уредба*, [in:] *История на България*, Т. 4, ed. X. Гандев et al., София 1983.
53. Цветкова Б., *Паметна битка на народите (Европейският югоизток и османското завоевание – края на XIV и първата половина на XV век)*, Варна 1979.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), s. 29–43
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDSP.10.2019.24.2
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0003-2805-3115

KRZYSZTOF DOBOSZ

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW
FACULTY OF HISTORY
E-MAIL: KRZYSZTOF.DOBOSZ@OUTLOOK.COM

SUBMISSION: 31.03.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 18.06.2019

Rumeli in the Period of Dynastic Instability. Why Were the Ottoman Balkans So Important for the Dynasty in the First Half of the 15th Century?

ABSTRACT

As Peter Mentzel states, the Balkans (Rumeli) were not only a borderland but also the core province of the early Ottoman state. The Rumelian military aristocracy played one of the most important roles in the internal policy. It constituted an important factor, which was powerful enough to create the Ottoman policy. That is why Murad I forbade the Ottoman princes to lead the *akıncı* warriors in order to avoid the risk of a dynastic war. He also started *devshirme* among Christian families in the Balkans so as to build trustworthy groups of servants for the dynasty. Obviously, the province gained importance in the difficult times after the defeat at Ankara (1402). During the civil war (1402–1413, *fetret devri*) Rumeli was governed by one of the brothers who claimed power over the whole Ottoman territory. The deciding struggles between the sons of Bayezid I took place in the Balkans and their result depended mainly on the attitudes shown by the Rumelian warriors and their frontier lords. The rulers who lost the support of the Rumelian military class quickly lost the throne of Rumeli as well. It happened in the cases of Emir Süleyman, prince Musa, and Düzme Mustafa.

KEYWORDS

Ottomans, Ottoman State, Fetret Devri, Rumeli, Balkans, Frontier Lords

Rumeli—the region ruined until the mid-fourteenth century by a series of calamities: wars, war-related plunders and the Black Death¹—evolved into a kind of the Promised Land for the Turks. The depopulated former territories of the Byzantine Empire, Serbia and Bulgaria, the power over which was divided between magnate dynasties fighting against each other, were an excellent place to settle down.² Initially, these sites were perceived as the domain of war (*dār al-ḥarb*). In response to the situation faced on the European side of the Black Sea straits, the Turks established a comprehensive frontier system with gazis as its basic element.³ Anatolia was a region where Christianity and Islam co-existed for hundreds of years. Meanwhile, the lack of such a tradition in the Balkans meant that local peoples were more inclined to fight against the Turks arriving from the east and south.⁴ In a relatively short time, the Turkish element became significant in the Balkans, and the frontier moved north and west.⁵ After the Battle of the Maritsa, which took place in 1371, the plains of Thrace and Macedonia were the place where the Anatolians settled in, especially during the devastating invasions led by Timur the Lame. It was then that a large influx of people arrived from different parts of the Ottoman lands in Asia, which was noted by the author of the *Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle*.⁶ The second similar event occurred in the 16th century when the Kalender Çelebi rebellion gave rise to civil unrest in Anatolia.⁷ In this sense, one may say that the Ottoman rule brought peace in the south-eastern part of the Balkans although this is sometimes interpreted as a situation unfavourable for Rumeli, especially at the time when the gazis had to be held back for political reasons.⁸

¹ A. E. Laiou-Thomadakis, *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire. A Social and Demographic Study*, Princeton 1977, pp. 7–8.

² M. M. Aktepe, *XIV. ve XV. Asırlarda Rumeli'nin Türkler Tarafından İskânına Dair*, „Türkiyat Mecmuası” 1953, 10, pp. 299–300.

³ M. Kiel, *The Incorporation of the Balkans into the Ottoman Empire, 1353–1453*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. I: *Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453*, ed. K. Fleet, Cambridge 2009, pp. 149–155.

⁴ L. Darling, *Reformulating the Gazi Narrative: When was the Ottoman State a Gazi State?*, „Turcica” 2011, 43, p. 35; R. P. Lindner, *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington 1983, p. 4.

⁵ Evidence of this is the fact that Evrenos Bey changed his location three times. See for reference: A. Kılıç, *Gazi Evrenos Bey. Bir Osmanlı Akıncı Beyi*, İstanbul 2014, pp. 65, 67; R. P. Lindner, *Anatolia, 1300–1451*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey...*, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 127.

⁶ Anonymous, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, hazır. N. Azamat, İstanbul 1992, pp. 48–49 [later in the text: Anonymous]; H. B. Karadeniz, *Osmanlılar ve Rumeli Uç Beyleri. Merkez ve Uç*, İstanbul 2015, p. 28; E. Zachariadou, *The Ottoman World*, [in:] *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 7: 1415–1453, ed. Ch. Allmand, Cambridge 1998, pp. 812, 814.

⁷ M. Kiel, op. cit., pp. 149–155.

⁸ E. Zachariadou believes that on one hand, the Treaty of 1403 concluded between Emir Süleyman and the neighbouring Christian countries limited the capabilities of the *akıncı* while on the other hand, the invasion led by Timur the Lame and the defeat at Ankara

After the defeat at Ankara—suffered in 1402 and brought by Timur the Lame—when princes İsa and Mehmed were fighting against each other in Anatolia and Mehmed was leading battles with the less influential beys, the Ottoman Rumeli enjoyed peace under the reign of Emir Süleyman. The situation in Anatolia calmed down after prince Mehmed's victory and at the time when prince Süleyman seized a significant part of the Ottoman possessions in that region in 1404–1405. The period of relative peace in the Ottoman provinces lasted until the rise of Musa Çelebi in 1409.⁹

The situation in Rumeli deteriorated in 1409 when the Anatolian beys (prince Mehmed, the ruler of Germiyan, Yakub II and the bey of Karaman) united against Emir Süleyman as they were faced with the threat of his expansion.¹⁰ Mehmed I, who ruled over the Ottoman territory of Rum, supported prince Musa, who was inclined to gain power in the European part of the Ottoman state. In the official Ottoman historiography, it was mentioned that prince Mehmed agreed to Musa's proposal to set out to Rumeli, gain its throne and rule over the territory on behalf of prince Mehmed.¹¹ As prince Musa began to rule over Rumeli on his own, he parted ways with the Rumelian military aristocracy, especially with the frontier lords. The ruling prince relied on the *kapıkulu* troops, which induced the Rumelians to seek the help of Mehmed I. Having defeated Musa in 1413, Mehmed united under his rule all the lands which remained in the hands of the Ottomans after the defeat at Ankara. The period of unrest in the Ottoman state lasted at least until 1425. It embraced problems faced by Mehmed I, which were solved at the time when Şeyh Bedreddin's rebellion was suppressed, and the first act of Düzme Mustafa's defiance, followed by the 5 year-long period of relative peace, and troubles that Murad II experienced with relation to Düzme Mustafa, the "little" Mustafa and İzmiroğlu Cüneyd Bey's revolt suppressed in 1425.¹²

increased the number of warriors who were arriving to Rumeli, which must have resulted in a tense social situation. See for reference: E. A. Zachariadou, *The Ottoman World...*, op. cit., p. 815. However, D. Kastiris emphasizes that the *akıncı* were dissatisfied with Süleyman's reign due to less marauding expeditions into the neighbouring Christian states as the plunders were one of the main sources of income for them. D. Kastiris, *The Sons of Bayezid. Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413*, Leiden–Boston 2007, pp. 136–137.

⁹ D. Kastiris, op. cit., pp. 111–112.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 111; İ. H. Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı tarihi*, I. c., Ankara 1972, pp. 335–336.

¹¹ M. M. Neşri, *Cihânnümâ*, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2013, pp. 202–203 [later in the text: Neşri-Öztürk]; M. Neşri, *Neşri Tarihi II*, hazır. M. A. Köymen, Ankara 1984, p. 36 [later in the text: Neşri-Köymen]; *Rûhî Târîhi*, hazır. H. E. Cengiz Y. Yücel, Ankara 1992 [later in the text: Pseudo-Ruhi], p. 424; D. Kastiris, op. cit., 111.

¹² R. Murphey, *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household 1400–1800*, London 2008, p. 45; D. Kastiris, op. cit., p. 45; E. A. Zachariadou, *The Ottoman World...*, op. cit., p. 815.

The Rumelian lords had too great real military and political power to lose so they decided to participate in the struggle launched by the princes of the Ottoman dynasty. Indeed, they shared power in Rumeli with the frontier lords.¹³ Heath Lowry states that there was a kind of customary division of power between the frontier lords who governed Rumeli and the Ottomans ruling over Anatolia.¹⁴ Even if it is a far-reaching hypothesis, the benefits of such a solution were undeniable. With the relatively low involvement of military forces and resources on the part of the bey, it enabled the rapid expansion and gaining control over huge territories before the end of the 14th century.¹⁵ However, after the defeat at Ankara, the high position of lords who governed Rumeli meant that the region was of key importance in the context of the struggle for the throne of the whole Ottoman territory and its unification under a single member of the dynasty.

This is illustrated by the example of the brothers who lost this battle: prince Süleyman and prince Musa, and their uncle—prince Mustafa, called “the False” (Ott. *Düzme*). In these three cases, it was essential that the princes were abandoned by the Rumelian military aristocracy.¹⁶ The most important and accurate source of information about the events associated with the first two members of the Ottoman dynasty is *Ahvâl*—a chronicle written in the court of Mehmed I, the elements of which are presented in *Cihânnümâ* by Neşri and *Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân* by Pseudo-Ruhi,¹⁷ also known as the *Oxford Anonymous*.¹⁸ Further descriptions can also be found in the texts written by other Byzantine and Ottoman authors.¹⁹

The story of the rivalry between Emir Süleyman and Musa at a glance: Prince Musa was boarded on a ship at the port in Sinop and travelled to Wallachia from where Mircea the Elder helped him to get to Rumeli. Afterwards, he arrived in Silistria. He rapidly gained support from *tovica* and other Rumelian timariots.²⁰ Oruç Beğ is the only chronicler who reports that this

¹³ C. Finkel, *Osman's Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923*, London 2006, pp. 18–19; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁴ H. Lowry, *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, New York 2003, pp. 141–142.

¹⁵ The frontier *akıncı* were not paid by the bey. See for reference: R. Murphey, op. cit., p. 45.

¹⁶ D. Kastritsis, op. cit., pp. 140–142.

¹⁷ Pseudo-Ruhi.

¹⁸ D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 28–33.

¹⁹ *Laonici Chalcocondylae Athenensis Historiarum Libri Decem*, ed. I. Bekker, Bonae 1843, pp. 170–171; Doukas, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, trans. H. J. Magoulias, Detroit 1975 [later in the text: Doukas].

²⁰ For *tovica* and other timariots see: P. Fodor, *Ottoman Warfare 1300–1453*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey...*, vol. I, op. cit., pp. 198–205.

attitude was the result of news spread among *tovica* saying that prince Musa might have held the position of *akıncı beği*.²¹ In that time, no prince could hold such a function in standard conditions. However, as H. B. Karadeniz suggests, Bayezid I could appoint his underage son as a commander of *akıncı*, which was an element of his centralisation policy. Probably, he aimed to make the dynasty members gain control over *akıncı* and therefore break the frontier lords' force.²² According to the extensive narration of *Ahvâl*, Musa came from Wallachia and took control over the entire Rumeli shortly after he had revealed his intention.²³ Unfortunately, that source is very laconic when it comes to the descriptions of how prince Musa seized power in Rumeli.²⁴ However, it indicates that prince Süleyman was in Anatolia at that time.²⁵ Having heard that Musa had taken over Rumeli, Süleyman became strongly alarmed. When he arrived in Rumeli, first he went to Constantinople where he offered the emperor certain lands, most likely in exchange for his support in the fight. It was only after this step that he launched the struggle with Musa. The author of *Ahvâl* reports that during the fight a few Rumelian lords decided to support prince Süleyman again, which forced Musa to escape and hide in the mountains. At that time, prince Süleyman settled down in Edirne while prince Mehmed probably used this situation to defeat Süleyman's forces at Ankara.²⁶ Meanwhile in Edirne, having drunk too much wine, Süleyman did not listen to his advisors who suggested starting the fight. As a result, the entire Rumeli started to perceive prince Musa as the ruler.²⁷

²¹ *Oruç Beğ Tarihi. Giriş, Metin, Kronoloji, Dizin, Tıpkıbasım*, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2008, p. 44 [later in the text: Oruç Beğ].

²² H. B. Karadeniz, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

²³ İdris-i Bitlisi, *Hest Bihışt*. II. cilt, hazır. M. Karataş, S. Kaya, Y. Baş, Ankara 2008, p. 235 [later in the text: İdris-i Bitlisi]; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 204–205; Neşri-Köymen, p. 37; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 425.

²⁴ H. B. Karadeniz believes that actually Musa promised *tovica* to change his policy towards the neighbours and make it more aggressive, which met their expectations and enabled him to gain their support. H. B. Karadeniz, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

²⁵ Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 204–205; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 37–38; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 425.

²⁶ İdris-i Bitlisi, pp. 233, 235–236; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 205–206; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 38–39; Pseudo-Ruhi, pp. 425–426; H. B. Karadeniz, *op. cit.*, p. 167; D. Kastritsis, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

²⁷ Anonymous, pp. 52–53; Âsık Paşazâde, *Osmanoğulların tarihi. Tevârîh-i Âl-i Osmân*, hazır. K. Yavuz, M. A. Yekta Saraç, İstanbul 2010, 68 [later in the text: Âsık Paşazâde]; İdris-i Bitlisi, pp. 239–241; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 206–208; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 39–40; Pseudo-Ruhi, pp. 425–427; D. Kastritsis, *op. cit.*, pp. 140–142. For the characteristics of the relationship between the oldest narrative sources see: H. İnalçık, *The Rise of Ottoman Historiography*, [in:] *Historians of the Middle East*, eds. B. Lewis, P. M. Holt, London–New York–Toronto 1962, p. 153.

Three facts should be noted here: firstly, Emir Süleyman was outside Rumeli at the time when prince Musa arrived there. Secondly, the entire Rumeli instinctively succumbed to Musa's reign right after he had appeared on the Ottoman territory. Thirdly, some Rumelians changed their mind and showed loyalty towards Süleyman after he had come to Rumeli. Therefore, one can assume that at least a few beys surrendered to Musa in order to avoid problems in case it turned out that he would become the ruler of Rumeli. When Süleyman returned, they behaved loyally towards him in the critical moment—at the time when the armed confrontation between brothers' troops was likely to happen.

To understand why certain beys rejected Süleyman's reign, it is worth taking a glance at the way he was presented in the source material. It must be admitted that the texts were written after the events described above yet it seems that the prince's image is not only the fruit of his defeat. He is portrayed as a man who cannot deal with difficulties. It can be clearly seen if one analyzes Musa's second approach to gain power in Rumeli. Emir Süleyman seems to be completely not interested in fighting—we can see a person who entertains oneself in a hamam and enjoys conversations while obviously drinking wine.²⁸ The chroniclers stemming from the gazi environment presented the same image of the ruler, which indicates that his behaviour was remarkably unacceptable for the gazis.²⁹ In the chronicles of the early Ottoman state, only three rulers were portrayed this way: Bayezid the Thunderbolt, Emir Süleyman and Bayezid II.³⁰ It seems that this biased image served to convince the audience that Emir Süleyman was not worthy to have the supreme power because of the lack of necessary predispositions.³¹ Perhaps, it was also aimed to discredit him in the eyes of those who could attribute the responsibility for his death to prince Mehmed who was responsible for the Musa's actions. Nevertheless, this perception of prince Süleyman might have been the reason for rejecting him as a candidate for the throne.

Musa's rule quickly proved to be very oppressive.³² Despite the different levels of detail, the narration in the majority of source texts has a negative con-

²⁸ Anonymous, p. 51; Âsık Paşazâde, 67; *Fatih Devri Kaynaklarından Düstûrnâme-i Enverî Osmanlı Tarihi Kısmı (1299–1466)*, hazırl. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2003, p. 42; Müneccimbaşı Ahmed ibn Lütfullah, *Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluş Tarihi. Câmîü'd-düvel (1299–1481)*, çev. A. Ağırakça, İstanbul 2014, p. 189; Neşri-Öztürk, p. 206; Neşri-Köymen, p. 39; Pseudo-Ruhi, pp. 425–426.

²⁹ H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 162–163, 169–170.

³⁰ N. Öztürk, 14–15. *Asır Osmanlı Kültür Tarihi. Devlet Düzeni – Sosyal Hayatı*, İstanbul 2014, pp. 247–251.

³¹ D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 156.

³² Ibidem, pp. 159–160.

notation. Aşık Paşazade notes that all sanjaks were given to Musa's people.³³ Similarly, the author of the *Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle* writes that Musa favoured his people and deprived the Rumelians of their posts.³⁴ It might not have been something strange—anything but an ordinary attempt to centralize the power. Previously, Rumeli had experienced such attempts, for instance under the reign of Bayezid the Thunderbolt.³⁵ Neşri's *Ahvâl* is the most comprehensive source of information here. The author writes explicitly that the most important reason for the reluctance shown by the Rumelian beys towards Musa was the completely arbitrary confiscation of assets, which was organised by the ruler.³⁶ Somewhat milder comments can be found in the *Oxford Anonymous*.³⁷ The confiscations are said to be carried out in an impertinent way: The prince chose those beys who seemed to be the richest and not only did he rob them of their wealth but also often killed them. That is why none of the Rumelian lords could be certain what their future would bring.³⁸ The chronicles written by the Byzantine and Serbian authors also report prince Musa's aggressive politics. These include the significant text by Constantine the Philosopher, who drew attention to the fact that initially, Musa seemed to act peacefully and fairly liberally but later he became harsh even to his servants.³⁹ Doukas was one of the Byzantine chroniclers who spoke about Musa in a similar tone.⁴⁰ Sphrantzes mentions only that Emperor Manuel II was engaged in the fight against Musa.⁴¹

The author of the *Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle* is the single historian who attempts to defend Musa and skips the problem of arbitrarily organised confiscations while focusing on the Rumelians' behaviour. He talks about the reasons for which Musa hated the Rumelian lords, describes how Musa tested Evrenos's loyalty but also presented the prince's generosity towards his own *kapıkulu* troops. Finally, the chronicler deals in detail with the Kör Şah Melik's escape to Constantinople and his getting into prince Mehmed's camp.⁴² This is a unique

³³ Âsık Paşazâde, 69; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 161.

³⁴ Anonymous, p. 54; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 161.

³⁵ H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 173–174, 182, 224–227.

³⁶ Neşri-Öztürk, p. 209, n. 2928; Neşri-Köymen, p. 41.

³⁷ Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 427.

³⁸ Neşri-Öztürk, p. 209, n. 2928; Neşri-Köymen, p. 41.

³⁹ *Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević von Konstantin dem Philosophen*, hrsg. u. übers. von M. Braun, Wiesbaden 1956, 31; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 144.

⁴⁰ Doukas, XIX, 7–10.

⁴¹ *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire. A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes*, trans. M. Philipides, Amherst 1980, III 1 [later in the text: Sphrantzes].

⁴² Anonymous, pp. 54–55; R. Murphey, op. cit., p. 45; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 184–189; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 160; A. Kılıç, op. cit., pp. 91–92.

fragment that might have been written by someone from Musa's environment, for example, a member of the *kapıkulu*. Its uniqueness lies in the fact that there can be heard the voice of the supporters of the defeated prince although usually it is the winner who writes the history.⁴³

The description of Musa's fall looks somewhat different. Before Mehmed arrived in Rumeli, the beys had informed him about their reluctance towards prince Musa. There also appeared high-rank fugitives who escaped from Musa. Due to the fact that Musa based his rule on the *kapıkulu* troops, fighting against him turned out to be an ordeal. Mehmed undertook his struggle for Rumeli three times. His first invasion in Rumeli was prepared by an arrangement with the Byzantine emperor, whom he promised peace after the conquest of the territory. Already during the first battle of Çatalca, the influential frontier lord—Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey—supported Mehmed and encouraged the prince to continue the fight against Musa. Although the Rumelian beys left Musa, he was still backed by remarkable *kapıkulu* forces. It was the janissaries who convinced Musa not to escape as they were afraid of revenge which the potential winners could take (*sen gidicek bizi dahı helâk iderler*).⁴⁴ They also forced prince Mehmed to flee from the battlefield. Musa did not kill Mehmed's captured people, which seems to somehow defy the story about favoring the *kapıkulu* troops only.⁴⁵ It also shows that, perhaps, the author of the *Oxford Anonymous* was right when pointing to the fact that loyalty was the reason for which Musa either disliked people or accepted them.⁴⁶ Mehmed returned to Anatolia but shortly after that, he managed to prepare the second expedition to Rumeli, during which he suffered a defeat again. To organize the third expedition, he sought help from his father-in-law—the bey of Dulkadir—and asked for more warriors. Having got support from the bey and from Constantinople, Mehmed set out to fight against Musa. Near Vize Mehmed received a letter from Evrenos Bey, in which he, as an experienced gazi, advised Mehmed on what to do, and also reported that frontier lords supported him. Edirne did not succumb to Mehmed's rule and decided to unconditionally accept the prince who would win the fight. Prince Mehmed followed Evrenos's advice and headed for Serbia and then for Bulgaria but Musa avoided a clash. Finally, the clash took place near Sofia—at Çamurlu. A big part of the Rumelian beys had fled to prince Mehmed before. The author of *Ahvâl* mentions that before the battle started,

⁴³ Âsık Paşazâde, 70.

⁴⁴ Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 428; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 190–191.

⁴⁵ Neşri-Öztürk, p. 212; Neşri-Köymen, p. 44; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 191.

⁴⁶ Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 427.

Musa gave the order to imprison certain Rumelian beys, which intensified the lords' hatred towards him.⁴⁷ Eventually, Musa's janissaries did not manage to stand the attack launched by Mehmed's troops. Musa, who escaped from the battlefield, was stopped in the muddy area of Çamurlu where he was captured by Mehmed's warriors and then strangled by one of them.⁴⁸

There are several noteworthy facts here: Right from the beginning, prince Musa stood in opposition to the military aristocracy in Rumeli and invested primarily in the *kapıkulu* troops and people showing loyalty towards him. What is more, he treated the Rumelian beys harshly. Secondly, Mehmed I lost the struggle with Musa twice. Thirdly, Mehmed's defeats did not prevent the Rumelian beys from supporting him. The reluctance towards Musa provoked their decision to change the ruler of Rumeli to such an extent that they wanted to give the throne to Mehmed despite his initial failure.

Historiography presents prince Musa's reign as a period of aggressive policy against the neighbouring states. He is considered a ruthless ruler whose character resembles Bayezid the Thunderbolt and who continues his policy.⁴⁹ Undoubtedly, he continued Bayezid's approach as far as the centralization of power is concerned. However, the Rumelian beys could perceive him as an untrustworthy continuator of the conquest policy. As noted by many authors, Mircea the Elder was said to help Musa in order to draw the *akıncı* away from Wallachia.⁵⁰

According to the source materials, his reign was not a period of internal peace in his state as well. This is why Mehmed gained support on the part of the frontier lords and, as a result, of the whole Rumeli. However, one may venture to say that if Musa had been behaving in a different way, the division of the Ottoman state into the Rumelian and the Anatolian part would have been more permanent.

A situation similar to that when Emir Süleyman lost his power happened in 1421. The entire Rumeli sided with Düzme Mustafa during his second rebellion and then quite easily transferred its loyalty to Murad II. The reports on those events can be found in the Ottoman and Byzantine sources and are quite extensive. It should be taken into account that the Ottoman sources do not men-

⁴⁷ Neşri-Öztürk, p. 219; Neşri-Köymen, p. 52; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 432; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 192–193; A. Kılıç, op. cit., p. 93.

⁴⁸ İdris-i Bitlisî, pp. 251–262; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 215–221; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 47–54; Pseudo-Ruhi, pp. 429–433; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 192–195; A. Kılıç, op. cit., pp. 93–94.

⁴⁹ D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 159.

⁵⁰ Neşri-Öztürk, p. 206; Neşri-Köymen, p. 37; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 424; D. Kastritsis, op. cit., pp. 136–137; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 166; A. Kılıç, op. cit., p. 88.

tion his first attempt to seize power in Rumeli but it is well-documented in the Byzantine historiography and actually there is no doubt that it happened.⁵¹

The narration is as follows: At first, Mustafa won support on the part of certain members of Evrenos's family (Evrenos died a few years earlier). As a result, the entire Rumeli turned against Mustafa. Following the advice of İzmiroğlu Cüneyd Bey, the prince decided to attack and conquer Anatolia in order to unite all Ottoman lands under his sceptre. Having crossed the straits, the Rumelians moved in the direction of Bursa. The battle took place at Ulubad where Mustafa arrived together with the Rumelian army. It was also then that some warriors decided to leave prince Mustafa's camp and sided with Murad II. The Ottoman texts mention for instance the members of Gümlüoğlu, Evrenosoğlu and Turahan families.⁵²

The following facts should be noted here: During his uncle's rebellion, Murad II stayed in Anatolia. Secondly, the entire Rumeli supported prince Mustafa. Thirdly, in the crucial point of the struggle, that is during the Battle of Ulubad, the greater part of the Rumelian forces decided to show their loyalty towards Murad II again.

The aforementioned facts lead to the conclusion that there is a certain analogy between the Rumelian lords' approach presented during the first Musa's attempt to seize power in Rumeli in 1409 and the second Mustafa's rebellion in 1421. It is remarkable that at first, all the beys supported the new candidate for the throne and then, in the crucial moment for the struggle between two members of the dynasty, some of them returned to the one that had held power before.⁵³ According to R. Murphey, it resulted from the fact that the lords felt highly responsible for the state. Their aim was to ensure that in the difficult time for the state when its future was uncertain, the throne would belong to a competent ruler who could guarantee the continuation of the dynasty and the statehood.⁵⁴ Without any doubt, this argumentation is true. However, it seems that there were also more down-to-earth motives, such as simply to survive. The lords wanted to survive in case the rulers who had been sitting on the throne so far were defeated. Such motivation seems to be true to some extent

⁵¹ A comprehensive report on the events of 1416 can be found in the chronicles by Doukas, Chalkokondyles and Sphrantzes. See: Doukas, XXII, 3–5; *Laonici Chalcocondylae Athenensis Historiarum Libri Decem*, ed. I. Bekker, Bonae 1843, pp. 203–204; Sphrantzes, IV 4. See also: N. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Gotha 1908, pp. 366–376; H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., pp. 204–212.

⁵² Anonymous, p. 63; Âsık Paşazâde, 83; Oruç Beğ, pp. 27–28; Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 236–237; Neşri-Köymen, p. 74.

⁵³ Neşri-Öztürk, p. 237; Neşri-Köymen, p. 73.

⁵⁴ R. Murphey, op. cit., p. 23.

in the light of George Sfrantzes's passage describing the moment when the grand vizier of Mehmed I—Bayezid Pasha—decided to side with Düzme Mustafa: „[...] his mission was to keep the West under Murad's authority, if possible.”⁵⁵ Generally, it is also compatible with the image shown in the most extensive description by Doukas.⁵⁶ Mustafa's attempt also shows that having the limited support of the frontier lords, one could gain power in Rumeli, especially if the opponent was a member of *kapıkulu* and not a member of the dynasty.⁵⁷ The Rumelian lords created a system which helped them survive in the uncertain times, regardless of the fact who would become the ruler of Rumeli. The Rumelian lords' activity was an important factor which influenced the outcome of the competition. Indeed, they constituted a strong and quite unified military factor.⁵⁸ At the same time, it was not obvious whom they would give their support. First, they somehow led to Emir Süleyman's fall, then to prince Musa's failure, and after all, they must have been responsible, to some extent, for Sheikh Bedreddin's rebellion and Mustafa's victory in 1421. The activity on the part of the lords from the Ottoman Anatolia, which suffered a great loss due to Timur the Lame's invasion, stood in contrast with the Rumelian lords' behaviour. This contrast can also be seen with regard to fights against the Anatolian beys. The Anatolian lords showed quite unwavering support for Mehmed I and then Murad II. The influential frontier lords somehow managed the Rumelian beys—it was clear when the Evrenos's family changed their mind and decided to support Mustafa, as well as at the time when the lords were persuaded by Mihaloğlu Mehmed Bey to leave Mustafa.⁵⁹

Let us ask a reversed question: when did a candidate for the throne lose the beys' trust? To answer this question, it may be helpful to take a glance at the cases of prince İsa, who tried to seize power in Anatolia three times, and Düzme Mustafa, who also attempted to take power more than once. As far as İsa's example is concerned, his initial defeat diminished his credibility in the eyes of his serfs. Although İsa's struggle with prince Mehmed was not directly related to Rumeli as it took place in Anatolia, it is worth taking a brief look at its course of action. Prince İsa had a great starting position since after the Battle of Ankara he took control over the important Ottoman territory—Bithynia—and an extremely notable city of Bursa.⁶⁰ He was involved in a struggle with

⁵⁵ Sphrantzes, IX 2.

⁵⁶ Doukas, XXIV 8.

⁵⁷ H. B. Karadeniz, op. cit., p. 210.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, p. 160; A. Kılıç, op. cit., p. 84.

⁵⁹ Ibidem.

⁶⁰ D. Kastritsis, op. cit., p. 79.

Mehmed, who gathered his forces in Amasya and Tokat and—which was crucial in shifting the balance of power—received support from Eyne Bey Subaşı—the governor of Balıkesir, who had been cooperating with Emir Süleyman before.⁶¹ Despite this, the part of the Ottoman territory which İsa conquered after the Battle of Ankara sided with him during the first conflict with prince Mehmed. During the second attempt to seize the lands which he previously possessed, he was always asked to prove his friendship with prince Mehmed. Next time, no one wanted to be subordinate to him in any way. The same might have happened in the case of the “false” Mustafa, who carried the stigma of failure during his second approach to seize power. Furthermore, the unfavourable atmosphere after the execution of Bayezid Pasha could also play a role here. Perhaps, that context reminded the Rumelian lords of Musa’s reign and made them fearful of losing their lives as Bayezid Pasha was executed despite the fact that he had sworn to be obedient to Prince Mustafa.

One more issue should be noted here. In both cases, the rulers of Rumeli stayed in Anatolia. The fact is that almost from the very beginning, the members of the Ottoman dynasty manifested their presence in Rumeli. The first conquests were controlled by the oldest son of Orhan—prince Süleyman. However, the ruler’s people knew that the gazis are too dangerous and should be under their direct control. For this reason, already during the reign of the third Ottoman ruler, Murad I, the princes were ousted from the Rumelian frontier.⁶² As a result, the ruler’s direct control over the Rumelian frontier meant that his highest dignitaries took part in expeditions and military projects organized in Rumeli. Hence, Gazi Evrenos most often acted in cooperation with Lala Şahin, Kara Halil Pasha, and after his death, with his son and the new grand vizier—Ali Pasha.⁶³ P. Metzel demonstrates that Rumeli was not only a borderland but also the core of the Ottoman state.⁶⁴

L. Darling emphasized the correlation between the ruler’s presence in Rumeli and the instability of the dynasty caused by the disloyalty among its serfs, especially among the frontier lords. The researcher notes that both Süleyman Pasha’s death and the occupation of Gallipoli by Amadeo VI of Savoy in 1366 took place at the moment when Murad I was outside Rumeli. At that time, he stayed in Anatolia.⁶⁵ He was forced to do so as he was faced with the

⁶¹ Ibidem, pp. 87–90.

⁶² L. P. Peirce, *The Imperial Harem. Woman and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, New York–Oxford 1993, p. 20.

⁶³ Oruç Beğ, pp. 27–28.

⁶⁴ P. Mentzel, *The Ottoman Balkans as Frontier, Borderland and Core*, [in:] *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, vol. I, ed. H. İnalcık, Ankara 2000, pp. 130–137.

⁶⁵ L. Darling, op. cit., p. 37.

threat posed by the Anatolian beyliks—Karaman and Eretna.⁶⁶ These inspiring observations made by the American researcher are worth applying to the next decades involving the civil war (*fetret devri*) and the transitional period during the reign of Mehmed I and Murad II, which may help us draw conclusions with regard to the correlation between the ruler's presence in Rumeli and the loyalty among the local lords.

During the civil war (1403–1413), the first Musa's attempt to capture Rumeli was made at the time when Emir Süleyman was in Anatolia.⁶⁷ The situation looked similar in the case of prince Mustafa, called Düzme. When he appeared in Rumeli in 1421, Murad II stayed in Anatolia. Rumeli fell into Mustafa's hands easily but then he was betrayed in the crucial moment of the struggle. Competing with his rival Musa, who was residing in Rumeli, prince Mehmed had to organize three expeditions to Rumeli and despite the local beys' support, he was considered the ruler of the territory only after his siege in the battle. As seen on the example of prince Mehmed (including his previous struggle with Emir Süleyman), it was much easier to try to seize power when he was in Rumeli rather than when he started from Anatolia. Most likely, the influence of the *akıncı* and their commanders was the deciding factor here. It was better to gain their support first rather than to be afraid of an attack coming from Rumeli.

It seems that the Rumelian lords sided with that member of the dynasty who resided in Rumeli. This was also pointed out by L. Chalkokondyles in his description of Musa's attempt to seize power there.⁶⁸ Having heard the news about Musa's arrival, Süleyman, who was in Anatolia at that time, was in a hurry to arrive in Rumeli as soon as possible because the one who appears on a given territory first becomes its ruler.⁶⁹ When the ruler did not reside in the European part of the Ottoman state, he had to be aware that he could lose support in favour of his brother or uncle. The similar situation could be observed in the period of Mehmed I's autonomous reign and after his death. However, it can be assumed that the Rumelian lords followed a survival strategy: They did not want to lose the possibility to function in case a candidate for the throne would win a struggle. At the same time, they left room for the return to loyalty towards the former ruler in case a candidate would be defeated. The lords could calculate which approach was the most profitable for them.

⁶⁶ H. İnalçık, *Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları*, İstanbul 2010, p. 83.

⁶⁷ Neşri-Öztürk, pp. 204–205; Neşri-Köymen, pp. 37–38; Pseudo-Ruhi, p. 425. It is strongly emphasized by the representative of the Byzantine historiography—Laonikos Chalkokondyles, *Laonici Chalcocondylae...*, op. cit., pp. 171–172.

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁹ Ibidem.

They knew that if a candidate managed to seize power, they would not create the impression that they had not wanted to accept him before. Otherwise, they would return to loyalty towards the previous ruler. Prince Musa's attitude seems to confirm this reasoning as he did not want to agree with it and perceived the Rumelian lords as traitors—this image emerges from the *Ottoman Anonymous Chronicle* whose author tries to stand up for the prince.⁷⁰ It seems that such a behaviour was acceptable to some extent, which can be seen in the case of Bayezid Pasha. Assuming that after the first lost struggle in Rumeli Bayezid Pasha could side with Murad II again,⁷¹ İzmiroğlu Cüneyd Bey persuaded Mustafa to execute him.

Rumeli, and especially its eastern part, which was ruled by the Ottomans for several decades and enjoyed a period of peace, could attempt to choose between the members of the dynasty. The fate changed during the reign of Prince Musa, who observed the steps taken especially by the aristocracy and could not accept their actions. One may draw a conclusion that Rumeli started to encounter difficulties at that time. However, if the territory had not been faced with them, the period of the division of the state—and, in turn, the instability in the entire Ottoman state—would have lasted longer.

Translated by Karolina Gajowiec

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PRIMARY SOURCES

1. Anonymous, *Tevârih-i Âl-i Osman*, hazır. N. Azamat, İstanbul 1992.
2. Âsık Paşazâde, *Osmanoğulların tarihi. Tevârih-i Âl-i Osmân*, hazır. K. Yavuz, M. A. Yekta Saraç, İstanbul 2010.
3. Doukas, *Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks*, trans. H. M. Magoulias, Detroit 1975.
4. *Fatih Devri Kaynaklarından Düstûrnâme-i Enverî. Osmanlı Tarihi Kısmı (1299–1466)*, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2003.
5. İdris-i Bitlisî, *Heşt Bihişt*. II. cilt, hazır. M. Karataş, S. Kaya, Y. Baş, Ankara 2008.
6. *Laonici Chalcocondylae Athenensis Historiarum Libri Decem*, ed. I. Bekker, Bonae 1843.
7. *Lebensbeschreibung des Despoten Stefan Lazarević von Konstantin dem Philosophen*, hrsg. u. übers. von M. Braun, Wiesbaden 1956.
8. Müneccimbaşı Ahmed ibn Lütfullah, *Osmanlı Devletinin Kuruluş Tarihi. Câmîü'd-düvel (1299–1481)*, çev. A. Ağırakça, İstanbul 2014.

⁷⁰ Anonymous, pp. 54–55.

⁷¹ Viziers used to act this way; the escape of Kör Şah Melik and İbrahim Pasha to prince Mehmed can be an example of this. D. Kastritsis, op. cit., pp. 165–166.

9. Neşri M. M., *Cihânnümâ*, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul 2013.
10. Neşri M., *Neşri Tarihi II*, hazır. M. A. Köymen, Ankara 1984.
11. *Oruç Beğ Tarihi. Giriş, Metin, Kronoloji, Dizin, Tıpkıbasım*, hazır. N. Öztürk, İstanbul, 2008.
12. *Rûhî Târîhi*, hazır. H. E. Cengiz Y. Yücel, Ankara 1992.
13. *The Fall of the Byzantine Empire. A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes*, trans. M. Philippides, Amherst 1980.

SECONDARY SOURCES

1. Aktepe M. M., *XIV. ve XV. Asırlarda Rumeli'nin Türkler Tarafından İskânına Dair*, „Türkiyat Mecmuası” 1953, 10.
2. Darling L., *Reformulating the Gazi Narrative: When was the Ottoman State a Gazi State?*, “Turcica” 2011, 43.
3. Finkel C., *Osman's Dream. The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923*, London 2006.
4. Fodor P., *Ottoman Warfare 1300–1453*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. I: *Byzantium to Turkey 1071–1453*, ed. K. Fleet, Cambridge 2009.
5. İnalçık H., *Kuruluş Dönemi Osmanlı Sultanları*, İstanbul 2010.
6. İnalçık H., *The Rise of Ottoman Historiography*, [in:] *Historians of the Middle East*, ed. B. Lewis, P.M. Holt, London–New York–Toronto 1962.
7. Jorga N., *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, Gotha 1908.
8. Karadeniz H. B., *Osmanlılar ve Rumeli Uç Beyleri. Merkez ve Uç*, İstanbul 2015.
9. Kastritsis D., *The Sons of Bayezid. Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402–1413*, Leiden–Boston 2007.
10. Kılıç A., *Gazi Evrenos Bey. Bir Osmanlı Akıncı Beyi*, İstanbul 2014.
11. Laiou-Thomadakis A. E., *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire. A Social and Demographic Study*, Princeton 1977.
12. Lindner R. P., *Anatolia, 1300–1451*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. I: *Byzantium to Turkey, 1071–1453*, ed. K. Fleet, Cambridge 2009.
13. Lindner R. P., *Nomads and Ottomans in Medieval Anatolia*, Bloomington 1983.
14. Mentzel P., *The Ottoman Balkans as Frontier, Borderland and Core*, [in:] *The Great Ottoman-Turkish Civilisation*, vol. I, ed. H. İnalçık, Ankara 2000, pp. 130–137.
15. Murphey R., *Exploring Ottoman Sovereignty. Tradition, Image and Practice in the Ottoman Imperial Household 1400–1800*, London 2008.
16. Öztürk N., *14–15. Asır Osmanlı Kültür Tarihi. Devlet Düzeni – Sosyal Hayatı*, İstanbul 2014.
17. Peirce L. P., *The Imperial Harem. Woman and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, New York–Oxford 1993.
18. Uzunçarşılı İ. H., *Osmanlı tarihi*, I. c., Ankara 1972.
19. Zachariadou E. A., *The Ottoman World*, [in:] *The New Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. 7: *1415–1453*, ed. Ch. Allmand, Cambridge 1998.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), S. 45–57
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDSP.10.2019.24.3
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-2634-2661

ALEKSANDAR ZLATANOV

SOFIA UNIVERSITY “ST. KLIMENT OHRIDSKI”, BULGARIA
HISTORY DEPARTMENT
E-MAIL: ALZLATANOV@ABV.BG

SUBMISSION: 8.02.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 20.05.2019

Czajkowski's Christian Army of the Sultan, 1853–1870

ABSTRACT

In the mid-19th century, a Polish writer, political agent and renegade, called Michał Czajkowski (Sadık Paşa), managed to do something remarkable in the Ottoman Empire. After the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853, in that complex international and geopolitical situation on the Balkans and amidst the triangle of the great empires—the British, French and Russian—he created the first official regular Christian military unit within the Ottoman Empire. That “Christian army” was composed almost entirely by Christians. The official Christian character of that Ottoman military unit made them an unique instrument and representative of the modernization processes during the Tanzimat era. As an Ottoman general Michał Czajkowski (Sadık Paşa) commanded his Slavic Regiment for nearly 20 years from 1853 to 1870 throughout the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

KEYWORDS

19th Century, Ottoman Empire, Michał Czajkowski (Sadık Paşa), Slavic Regiment, Polish in Balkans

In the mid-19th century, a Polish writer, political agent and renegade, called Michał Czajkowski (Sadık Paşa), managed to do something remarkable in the Ottoman Empire. After the beginning of the Crimean War in 1853, in that complex international and geopolitical situation on the Balkans and amidst the triangle of the great empires—the British, French and Russian—he created the first official regular Christian military unit within the Ottoman Empire. That

“Christian army” was composed almost entirely by Christians. The official Christian character of that Ottoman military unit made them a unique instrument and representative of the modernization processes during the Tanzimat era. As an Ottoman general Michał Czajkowski (Sadık Paşa) commanded his Slavic Regiment for nearly 20 years from 1853 to 1870 throughout the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

Michał Czajkowski was born in 1804 in the small town of Halczynec, today in Ukraine, back then part of the Russian Empire. Czajkowski’s ancestry on both maternal and paternal sides comes from the mid-Polish nobility (*szlachta*).¹ As a descendant of the famous hetman of the Zaporozhian Sich and other Cossacks commanders, Czajkowski was educated in the best Cossacks traditions and legends. He graduated two lyceums and at the age of 17 as a young landlord, he entered in the nobility circles in the region. After the death of his mother and uncles, Czajka inherited vast wealth and properties. Everything changed when the November Uprising against the Russian Empire broke in 1830. The young nobleman abandoned everything and immediately enlisted as a volunteer.² One year later, the Russian monarchy crushed the November Uprising, leaving Michał deprived of his inheritance and forced him to emigrate in France as the majority of the Polish participants and accomplices in the uprising. This vast emigration of those Poles is also known as the Great Emigration (*Wielka Emigracja*). Paris became the center of the Polish emigration and there Czajkowski began his literary activity. After 1836 Czajkowski drew closer to Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861)—the leader of Polish conservative-liberal camp of the Great Emigration also known as Hotel Lambert, which was residing in Paris. Hotel Lambert was one of the most vital and influential Polish émigré camps in exile of the Great Emigration. Czajkowski accepted the ideas of Czartoryski and joined the political activity of Hotel Lambert, with the idea to help create one “Polish foreign policy.”³

As such, in 1841 Michał Czajkowski arrived for the first time in the Ottoman Empire with a French passport and French protection, to create and lead the so-called Eastern Agency of Hotel Lambert. The Agency would work on one of the main political goals of the rich Polish circles in exile—the Slavs in the Euro-

¹ R. Rawita-Gawroński, *Michał Czajkowski (Sadyk-Pasza) jego życie, działalność wojskowa i literacka*, S. Petersburg 1901, pp. 4–5; J. Chudzikowska, *Dziwne życie Sadyka Paszy. O Michał Czajkowskim*, Warszawa 1971, pp. 11–23; M. Czajkowski, *Pamiętniki Sadyka Paszy Michała Czajkowskiego*, Lwów 1898, pp. 1–5.

² Czajkowski was part of the so called Volhynian Cavalry Regiment. See: K. Rózycki, *Pamiętnik Pułku Jazdy Wołyńskiej 1831 r.*, Kraków 1898, pp. 7–9; 31–38.

³ *Записки Михаила Чайковского (Мехмед-Садык-паша)*, „Русская старина” 1898, no. 2, pp. 450–451.

pean part of the Ottoman Empire.⁴ The objectives of the mission were to create an independent center of the Slavs on the Balkan Peninsula, gradually acquiring more freedom and independence within the Ottoman Empire. The most important goal, however, was to reduce the Russian influence over the Slavs. In order to do that they needed to work actively on an anti-Russian policy among all Slavic subjects of the Sultan, and using it for the Polish national question.⁵

It is important to be mentioned here that the British and mainly the French asylum, financial and political support for the Polish émigrés was strictly a pragmatic and geopolitical initiative. While the Poles were hoping to solve their national question and gain independence, both Western European powers calculated that can used them solely for their geopolitical interests, one of which was diminishing the Russian influence on the Sublime Porte.⁶ Czartoryski himself with his considerable political experience was able to grasp this situation in depth. In 1836 he suggested to the French Foreign Ministry that the Polish émigrés can and should be used as an instrument of the French foreign policy. Especially on a secret anti-Russian mission in the East, carried out by experienced Polish agents or military officers.⁷ Hence the next couple of decades the agents of Hotel Lambert will be used for various espionage, diversion and military missions in the East.⁸

Back in the Ottoman capital, the Czajkowski's activities in the East naturally were strictly observed by the Russian Empire. For that purpose, the Russian diplomatic network was engaged. Right after Czajkowski's arrival in Istanbul, we learn from some secret reports between the ambassador Titov (1807–1891) and the chief of the Russian secret police (also known as The Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery) count Benkendorf (1782–

⁴ For more on that topic see: J. Skowronek, *Polityka bałkańska hotelu Lambert (1833–1856)*, Warszawa 1976; H. Hahn, *Aussenpolitik in der Emigration. Die Exildiplomatie Adam Jerzy Czartoryskis 1830–1840*, München–Wien 1978; A. Cetnarowicz, *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałkanach. Hotel Lambert a kryzys serbski 1840–1844*, Kraków 1993.

⁵ R. Berry, *Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert and the Great Powers in the Balkans, 1832–1848*, "The International History Review" 1985, Vol. 7, p. 52.

⁶ P. Dangin, *Historie de la Monarchie de Juillet*, t. 1, Paris 1884, pp. 163–164.

⁷ Д. Симеонов, *Френската политика на Балканите, 1829–1853*, София 1977, pp. 117–118.

⁸ H. Hahn, *Possibilities and Limitations of Foreign Policy in Exile: Adam Jerzy Czartoryski's Hotel Lambert in Western Europe, 1831–1840*, [in:] *Eastern Europe and the West. Selective Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies*, ed. J. Morison, London 1992, p. 10; M. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, t. 2, Warszawa 1949, pp. 5–16 et passim.

1844), that they already received detailed information from the Russian diplomatic mission in Paris. Both commented that Czajkowski's travels and activities in the Ottoman Empire had to be observed and evaluated.⁹ Czajkowski was engaged with Hotel Lambert until 1850. In his almost ten year stay in the Ottoman Empire as an agent, Czajka led the vast network of the Eastern Agency throughout European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, unfolding large-scale action. Czajkowski achieved something remarkable for a factual informal representative, earning respect and recognition from the Sublime Porte. During that period he created influential connections in the Ottoman government. Maybe there is no such exaggeration in the assessment of the Prince Adam Czartoryski for his top agent's activity: "From Danube to the Adriatic Sea any work of importance for the Christian population was not undertaken without inviting the Polish agent to take over the leadership."¹⁰

In the same time, at the end of the 1840s, some changes in the Balkan geopolitical layers were materialized. The French Republic drew closer to the Ottoman Empire, defending its integrity, as well as with the Russian and Austrian Empires, to the detriment of the national movements in Hungary and the Balkans. With those steps, the Republic was trying to maintain its trade and economic interests and increase the influence within the Sublime Porte to fight the Russian positions there.

At this context, in 1850 due to the Petersburg's exerted influence on the Sublime Porte to deport Czajkowski and some other anti-Russian Polish political agents, and primarily after the retreated support for him from Paris at the same time, Czajkowski found a shelter as a subject to the Sultan converting to Islam and accepting the name Mehmed Sadık.¹¹ The retreated French support was a minor concession for the Republic, which aimed to gain a better political position in the East, strengthening the ties with the Ottomans and the Russians.¹² Of course, the strong Russian influence within the Porte was the other part of the explanation. With that conversion step, the Polish political agent didn't cause considerable damage to the Eastern Agency rather than an outburst in the Polish press.¹³ Czajkowski knew what will be the consequences of

⁹ АВПРИ, f. 151, inv. 482, No. 3267, pp. 2–8.

¹⁰ В. Смоховска-Петрова, *Михаил Чайковски-Садък паша и Българското възраждане*, София 1973, pp. 93–94.

¹¹ C. Badem, *Sadyk Pasha in the Light of Ottoman Archives (1848–1871)*, [in:] *The Crimean War 1853–1856. Colonial Skirmish or Rehearsal for World War? Empires, Nations and Individuals*, ed. J. Borejsza, Warsaw 2011, p. 94.

¹² Д. Симеонов, op. cit., p. 242.

¹³ „Czas” 1851, r. IV, nr 11 (15 stycznia), p. 2; „Goniec Polski” 1851, r. II, nr 7 (10 stycznia), p. 1 et passim.

such “radical” step—he will be condemned both by the Slavs and by the Poles as he wrote that to Prince Czartoryski in the summer of 1850—6 months before the actual conversion took place—when started to consider this very idea.¹⁴ The decision of Sadik did not come as a big surprise since at the end of the 1840s he started gradually and pragmatically change his political views towards the Sublime Porte, causing some conflicts with Hotel Lambert and Adam Czartoryski. One can notice that Czajkowski's political change of views towards Turkophilism was pragmatically aligned with the French foreign policy, as was his previous Slavophilism aligned with the practical political policies of Hotel Lambert in the East. At the end he probably saw the way out of his tough situation by staying in the East, seeing the opportunity to make a career as a subject to the Sultan. It is interesting though that in his memoirs, Czajka also points out that he has accepted without hesitation the proposition made to him to convert to Islam since he “loves from the heart” the Sultan Abdulmejid I (1823–1861) and the Grand Vizier Mustafa Reshid Paşa (1800–1858).¹⁵ Some authors suggest that Czajkowski's decision to convert to Islam is due to his “Cossack myth” or “dream,” which was not able to fulfill with Hotel Lambert.¹⁶ As the Polish historian Jerzy Skowronek explains, we don't have any hint or information that would suggest something like that.¹⁷ Indeed the topic will appear, but only after 1854.

After the conversion, Mehmed Efendi was provided materially by his majesty the Sultan with a small mansion in Sazlıbosna and more than 2 hectares of land.¹⁸ Initially, Mehmed Sadık Efendi performed some minor diplomatic tasks for the Sublime Porte. The outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853 changed the situation drastically. Immediately after the beginning of the war, Mehmed Sadık introduced a Memorandum to the Ottoman government through the sadrazam Reshid Paşa. He proposed the creation of regular regiments composed from the Cossack population of Northern Dobrudja and the Christian subjects of the Sultan. According to the project, the commanders had to be Poles and the unit would bear the name Ottoman Cossacks. The Sultan approved the Memorandum, and on November 27th 1853 issued an *irade*, promoting Sadık Efendi to the rank of *mirmiran* Paşa, and officially assigning

¹⁴ BCz, rkps. 5429, pp. 755–756.

¹⁵ *Записки Михаила Чайковского (Мехмед-Садык-паша)*, „Русская старина” 1898, бр. 9, p. 673.

¹⁶ В. Смоховска-Петрова, op. cit., pp. 106–110 et passim.

¹⁷ J. Skowronek, *Kontrowersje wokół Sadyka Paszy (na marginesie pracy Wandy Smochowskiej-Petrowej, Michał Czajkowski – Sadyk Pasza i Bałgarskoto wazraždane, Sofia 1973)*, „Przeгляд Historyczny” 1976, t. 67, nr 4, p. 662.

¹⁸ *Записки Михаила Чайковского...*, op. cit., p. 675.

him the task of organizing and commanding the Ottoman Cossack Regiment. The title of *mirmiran* was the equivalent of the brigadier general and it was usually conferred upon civilian Paşas.¹⁹

Sadık Paşa chose the Malorussian (or Ukranian) as a basic language of the Cossack Regiment due to its similarity to the Polish, Russian and other Slavic languages. The recruitment of volunteers for the Ottoman Cossack Regiment began simultaneously in Edirne, Istanbul and partly in Şumnu (Shumen).²⁰ It was formed almost exclusively by volunteers. From the very beginning, the unit was attached to the regular Ottoman army. The Christian character of the regiment was formed mainly by the Poles, who were the officers and sergeants and the Bulgarians as regular soldiers. Some of the Non-Muslims were criminals pardoned for their crimes in order to enlist in the regiment. There were also some Serbians, Hungarians, Russians, Albanians, Jews, Gypsies enlisted in the regiment. After the initial recruitment, at the beginning of 1854, the Slavic Regiment consisted of six squadrons, five regular and one irregular, the latter composed of Nekrassov Cossacks from Asia Minor.²¹

For the Sadık Paşa's dismay, during the initial recruitment of the new regiment, the genuine Cossack element in the face of the Dobrudja' Old Believers was actually missing. The mission of Sadık's envoy Janusz Woronicz (1805–1874) in Northern Dobrudja to recruit the real Cossacks turned out to be a total failure.²² Only a few Old Believers enlisted as volunteers and they were immediately given the rank of officers by Mehmed Sadık himself.²³ At the same time though the Sublime Porte managed to recruit some of the Dobrudja's Tatars and Cossacks population, but they were attached to the irregular Ottoman army. Later on, during the Crimean War, after a heavy defeat around Silistra, part of those irregular Old Believers was forcibly attached to the Mehmed Sadık's regiment. With them, the Polish renegade created two more incomplete squadrons.²⁴

On January 23rd 1854, all squadrons in full parade uniforms were fallen in line in the courtyard of the Edirne's governor konak. The ceremony was attended by all civil, cleric and official figures. The Cossacks took an official oath before their bishop and their flag, and everyone swore in whatever they wanted—the Bible, the Qur'an or the Torah. The governor and future Grand

¹⁹ С. Вадем, *Sadyk Pasha...*, op. cit., p. 95.

²⁰ "Цариградски вестник" 1853, год. IV, бр. 148 (21 ноември), p. 15.

²¹ М. Czajkowski, *Kozaczyzna w Turcyi: Dzieło w trzech częściach*, Paryż 1857, pp. 110–111.

²² *Записки Михаила Чайковского (Мехмед-Садык-паша)*, „Русская старина” 1898, бр. 10, p. 186.

²³ В. Кельсиев, *Польские агенты в Цариграде*, „Русский вестник” 1869, т. 84, p. 183.

²⁴ М. Czajkowski, *Kozaczyzna...*, op. cit., p. 111.

Vizier Mehmed Kibrıslı Paşa (1813–1871) held a touching speech in front of all about the importance of this Christian Regiment in which everyone would fight together under one banner and in which Christians could finally carry weapons.²⁵ Edirne's Metropolitan also gave a speech in which he stimulated the soldiers to be faithful to the Sultan.²⁶ After the oath, the regiment officially received the old banner of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. The two-colored silk banner depicts silver Muslim crescent with a star on the red background and golden Christian crest on the white background.²⁷ The Ottoman Cossacks Regiment would become popular as the “the Slavic Regiment” or “Kazak Alay”²⁸ among the Muslim and Non-Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire.

The news about the creation of the Christian Regiment during the Crimean War was spread in the European press too. The existence of the Ottoman Cossack Regiment was maybe firstly felt at most by the Christian subjects of the Sultan in Rumelia. The Slavic Cossacks brought substantial change in the social layers of the everyday life for the Non-Muslim population, infiltrating new and unknown until that time processes. The press articles, the original documents and reports from Russian, Ottoman, Polish and other officials showed very clearly that the Ottoman Cossacks Regiment grew extremely popular in a very short time. They were even called “our army” by the Christians. Wherever the Ottoman Cossacks pass through on their way, they were warmly greeted with sincere joy and admired greatly, especially by the Christian population.²⁹ People gathered from the entire region—cities, towns and villages.³⁰ Seeing the regiments' magnificent parade uniforms, swords, Christian crosses portrayed on the flags of their spikes, riding horses, and speaking their language, we can imagine that their Christian compatriots were mesmerized. No wonder that in the next 20 years literally thousands of Christians, mainly Bulgarians, were going to enlist as volunteers in the Christian army of the Sultan from all over Rumelia—from Istanbul, Edirne, Sliven, Shumen, Plovdiv, Sofia, Pleven, Bitola, Kazanlak, Kalofer, Sopot, Pirdop, Kotel, Razgrad, Gabrovo, Dubnitsa, Pirot, Vrana, Seres, Prilep, Nevrokop etc.

²⁵ “Цариградски вестник” 1854, год. IV, бр. 159 (6 февруари), p. 59.

²⁶ К. Суходолска, *Българите в неиздадените мемуари на Чайка Чайковски (Садък-паша). Съобщава с кратки бележки дъщеря му Каролина Суходолска*, „Сборник за народни умотворения, наука и книжнина” 1894, Т. 10, p. 455.

²⁷ *Записки Михаила Чайковского (Мехмед-Садък-паша)*, „Русская старина” 1898, бр. 10, p. 198.

²⁸ Kazak Alayı (from *Turkish*)—Cossack regiment.

²⁹ К. Суходолска, op. cit., p. 456.

³⁰ „Цариградски вестник” 1854, год. IV, бр. 162 (27 февруари), p. 72.

On the other hand, we have some Ottoman official reports curiously stating that after the establishment of the Ottoman Cossacks Regiment the Greeks and Armenians were constantly running away and hiding from them in various villages. As well as refusing to shelter them in their homes. Both, Armenians and Greeks, were declaring that they'd prefer to burn down their houses rather than let in those Christian traitors fighting for the Sultan.³¹ At the opposite, there were several records showing extreme sympathy and grief among Non-Muslims after tragic incidents with soldiers. For example in Yambol and Sliven, after the death of Cossack Regiment's soldiers, the entire population went to honor the deceased on the funeral.³²

Before the end of the Crimean War, in 1855, we can see another occasion on which Sadık Paşa was used as an instrument of the political modernization in the Ottoman Empire. Being in Istanbul at that time, Mehmed Sadık was ordered by the Sublime Porte to prepare a study on the possibility to officially draft Ottoman Christians to the army. At that time, while the Crimean War was still going on, there was a conference convened in Vienna for peace negotiations among the European great powers. One of the demands from the Ottoman side was to improve the status of Non-Muslims subjects in the Ottoman Empire. If Non-Muslims were to be equal to Muslims, then, among other things, they would also be subject to military service instead of paying the poll tax. This forced the Ottoman government to try to find how to include Non-Muslims in the army. The Sadık Paşa's report to the Grand Vizier considered places from where Christian volunteers could be recruited. For cavalry troops, he pointed out Tarnovo, Nisch, Yeni Pazar and Sarajevo, while for infantry—Mostar, Scodra, Janina, and Salonica.³³ According to the Sadık Paşa, as he wrote in his memoirs, the Sultan wanted this project to be discussed with the representatives of the European powers. Ultimately, they did not like the idea. The British ambassador in Istanbul Lord Stratford de Canning (1786–1880) even told Mehmed Sadık that this reform should not be allowed, because within a few years the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire would form a full and army trained and capable of fighting. Austria also didn't support the project, fearing the growth of military spirit among the Ottoman Slavs. After the Ottoman government met such opposition from all sides and from the European powers, they did not carry out this reform.³⁴

³¹ BAR Msc. 4904, vol. I, pp. 4–5.

³² И. Стойчев, *Казакъ алаятъ на Чайковски*, София 1944, p. 81.

³³ C. Badem, *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856)*, Leiden 2010, pp. 341–342.

³⁴ *Записки Михаила Чайковского (Мехмед-Садык-паша)*, „Русская старина” 1904, бр. 12, p. 512.

During the Crimean War, the Ottoman Cossack Regiment took an active part as a vanguard in the Dobrudja war theater and in the offensive actions of the Ottoman army at Bucharest and the Prut River.³⁵ Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1854 count Władysław Zamoyski (1803–1868) arrived in the Ottoman capital as a representative of Adam Czartoryski and Hotel Lambert. Both of them were trying to get permission from the Ottoman, British and French governments to create one entirely Polish Regiment (Legion), who would fight in the Crimean war too. It is important to be mentioned that Hotel Lambert tried extensively during the 1830s and 1840s to create a purely Polish military unit throughout Europe—namely Polish Legion—with the idea to use it to solve their national question, causing a great European war with Russia or Austria. Those attempts failed, unsupported by France and Britain. Now naturally those endeavors of Zamoyski caused a collision between Zamoyski himself and Mehmed Sadık.³⁶ At the end of 1854 Hotel Lambert and Zamoyski succeeded in their goal and the Sultan had issued an *irade* for the creation of one purely Polish Regiment.³⁷ This Polish Regiment has a rather short life. At the beginning it was named not “Polish Legion,” but “Second Ottoman Cossacks Regiment” and in November 1855 went under British command by the name “Cossacks Cavalry Division” (*Dywizja Kozaków Sułtańskich*). The Polish division did not participate in any combat activities during the war and was disbanded in July 1856.³⁸

After the Treaty of Paris and the end of the Crimean War in 1856, the Porte ordered the formation of the second Dragoon Regiment under Sadık Paşa's command. Part of the volunteers from the disbanded Polish Division enlisted in the new Dragoon Regiment. Both regiments with Sadık Paşa were appointed to guard the Greek border³⁹ and to execute various missions in the region like keeping the peace and fighting the outlaw brigands.⁴⁰ The very existence of the

³⁵ More about the Crimean campaign of Czajkowski and his Ottoman Cossacks Regiment see: M. Czajkowski, *Moje wspomnienia o wojnie 1854 roku*, Warszawa 1962.

³⁶ P. Wierzbicki, *Działalność Sadyka Paszy w czasie wojny krymskiej na tle jego relacji z obozem Czartoryskich*, [in:] *Polacy i ziemie polskie w dobie wojny krymskiej*, red. J. W. Borejsza, G. Bąbiak, Warszawa 2008, pp. 110–112.

³⁷ „Wiadomości Polskie” 1854, r. I (14 października), p. 98; „Wiadomości Polskie” 1855, r. I (10 stycznia), p. 147.

³⁸ For more on that topic see: P. Wierzbicki, *Dywizja Kozaków Sułtańskich. Polityczno-wojskowe koncepcje stronnictwa Czartoryskich w okresie wojny krymskiej (1853–1856)*, Kraków 2013.

³⁹ „Цариградски вестник” 1857, год. VII, бр. 339 (27 юли), p. 143.

⁴⁰ А. Чайковский, *Заметки о турецкой кавалерии и о славянском легионе, бывшем под командою Садыка-паши*, „Военный сборник” 1875, бр. 7, pp. 150–151.

Ottoman Cossacks Regiments was, of course, a result of a political decision, supported by the Sublime Porte in the spirit of Tanzimat reforms as well as from France and especially Britain. Mehmed Sadık knew that fact very well, mentioning it many times through the years his service as a subject to the Sultan.⁴¹ It must be mentioned that the existence of Sadık Paşa's Christian army put the Russian interests and influence in Rumelia at stake. Petersburg clearly showed to the Porte during and after the Crimean War that they are not satisfied with the situation.⁴² In a number of secret reports Russian officials clarified that if there are stationed or quartered soldiers from the Cossack Regiments in some region, the Russian influence there among the Non-Muslim were decreasing considerably.⁴³ Nothing can be done at that time though. Sadık and his Cossacks were supported from the highest levels within the Ottoman government as well as by the British Empire through their diplomatic network in Rumelia.

From 1860 to 1865 the Ottoman Cossacks Regiment was stationed in Monastir (today's Bitola) after 1865 Edirne became headquarters for the Cossacks. Sliven was their home in 1866–1868 and of course many more cities in Rumelia for a shorter period of time. The sources showed that wherever the Ottoman Cossacks are stationed, especially for a longer period, there are visible changes there. Those changes in the structure were spread mainly in the social sphere, but also in the military and even in the political realm to some extent. The Christians from those villages not only volunteered in the regiments but grew more confident. They were introduced to new ideas and manners, education, even in some cases protection from high ranking officers and sergeants of Slavic Regiment. The sources showed a number of cases in which when a Christian subject of the Sultan is robbed, mistreated or killed the Cossacks stationed in the same village were actively engaged in finding the perpetrators or resolving the issue.⁴⁴ In Islimiye or Sliven, for example, an ordinary Ottoman town, Sadık Paşa and the Polish officers from the Ottoman Cossacks Regiment played the role of transmitters of modernization in 1860s by introducing the European lifestyle to the inhabitants. Sadık started organizing for the first time official receptions with an equal number of men and women as well as receptions with European dances and modern clothes. Due to that infiltration, the most

⁴¹ BCz, rkps. 5464, pp. 1127–1128; M. Czapska, *Ludwika Śniadecka*, Warszawa 1958, pp. 194–196 et passim.

⁴² C. Badem, *Sadyk Pasha...*, pp. 104–105.

⁴³ В. Полторац, *Документи про Михала Чайковського в Державному архіві Одеської області*, [ін:] *Чорноморська минушина. Записки відділу історії козацтва на Півдні України*, Т. V, Одеса 2010, pp. 145–146; ДАОО, ф. 1, inv. 203, No. 15 for 1857, p. 37.

⁴⁴ АВПРИ ф. 180. Посольство в Константинополе, inv. 517/2, No. 1415, pp. 17–22.

eminent among the inhabitants of Sliven followed the example and started to organize dancing-parties, thematic meetings, or to pay scheduled visits of friends etc.⁴⁵

It is worth mentioning that the Cossack Regiments had also a military orchestra, which through the years, attended hundreds of Orthodox and Catholic masses, especially on Christian holidays. The musicians from the Christian army attended those masses in full Ottoman parade uniforms. After the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870, even the Ottoman Cossack's orchestra played during the celebration on the streets of Istanbul. In 1872, the military orchestra was detached in a special musical squadron.⁴⁶

After the mid-1860s, in the Ottoman government, deep political changes started. The changes led the conservative circles to gain more power within the Sublime Porte. Hence since 1866 the influential Ottoman statesman and future serasker Husseyin Avni Paşa (1819–1876) and the conservative “old Turkish” circles wanted to remove the Christian character and command of the Ottoman Cossacks Regiments, according to the memoirs of Sadık's aide-de-camp at that time.⁴⁷ Mehmed Sadık responded with resignation, claiming once again openly that the importance of the Christian army lies in their political aims, in their Slavic composition. And if they lose their political character, they would become just mercenaries, thus then their existence would not make any sense.⁴⁸

At that time, Sadık Paşa was still influential within the Ottoman Government and his resignation was not accepted. This uncertain situation continued as such until 1870 when The Sublime Porte decided officially to remove the Christian character, command and Slavic language of the Ottoman Cossacks Regiments and to incorporate them in the regular Ottoman cavalry. Sadık Paşa was alone back then, since his former colleagues, powerful friends or supporters within the Ottoman Empire and abroad has disappeared from either the world or from the political scene. His resignation was accepted in August 1870.⁴⁹ The event was covered widely in the press too.⁵⁰ The process of incorporation

⁴⁵ „Сливен” 2003, бр. 6 (21 септември), р. 17.

⁴⁶ И. Попов, *Изъ миналото на Одринъ*, София 1919, pp. 19–20; И. Стойчев, op. cit., pp. 84–87.

⁴⁷ A. Zlatanov, *Niepublikowane wspomnienia Michała Czajkowskiego – Sadyka Paszy*, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 2018, t. LIII, z. 2, p. 123. For a Bulgarian translation see: А. Златанов, *Непубликувани спомени за Михаил Чайковски – Садък паша*, [in:] *Българите в Османската империя, XIX в. Понятия, структури, личности*, съст. В. Рачева, София 2017, pp. 107–132.

⁴⁸ Ibidem.

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰ “Свобода” 1870, год. I, бр. 42 (16 септември), р. 332; „Свобода” 1870, год. I, бр. 42 (23 септември), р. 341 et passim.

or “conversion” of the Christian army was completed in 1872. By that time all the Polish officers and sergeants have deserted from the Ottoman army too. Some Bulgarian and other Slavs remained on Ottoman service in the next years. The “Christian army” ceased to exist in 1877 during the Russo-Turkish War.

In conclusion, we can state that the existence of the examined Christian army of the Sultan or Ottoman Cossacks Regiments had a great influence and left durable and visible traces among the Christian subjects of the Sultan in the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. All of the above mentioned clearly manifested the different layers and dimensions of Sadık Paşa’s and his Cossacks’s actions as an example of the infiltration of the new processes in the political, social and military sphere within the Ottoman Empire during and after the Crimean War.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVES

1. Biblioteka Academiei Române (BAR): msc. 4904.
2. Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich (BCz): rkps. 5429 + rkps. 5464.
3. Архив внешней политики Российской империи (АВПРИ): f. 151 (Политический архив), f. 180 (Посольство в Константинополе).
4. Державний архів Одеської області (ДАОО): ф. 1.

PRESS

1. „Czas”, Kraków 1851.
2. „Goniec Polski”, Poznań 1851.
3. „Wiadomości Polskie”, Paryż 1854–1855.
4. „Военный сборник”, Санкт-Петербург 1875.
5. „Русская старина”, Санкт-Петербург 1898, 1904.
6. „Русский вестник”, Москва 1869.
7. „Сборник за народни умотворения, наука и книжнина”, София 1894.
8. „Свобода” Букурещ 1870.
9. „Цариградски вестник”, Цариград 1853–1854, 1857.

PRINTED SOURCES

1. Czajkowski M., *Kozaczyzna w Turcyi: Dzieło w trzech częściach*, Paryż 1857.
2. Czajkowski M., *Moje wspomnienia o wojnie 1854 roku*, Warszawa 1962.
3. Czajkowski M., *Pamiętniki Sadyka Paszy Michała Czajkowskiego*, Lwów 1898.
4. Dangin P., *Historie de la Monarchie de Juillet*, t. 1, Paris 1884.
5. Rawita-Gawroński R., *Michał Czajkowski (Sadyk-Pasza) jego życie, działalność wojskowa i literacka*, S. Petersburg 1901.
6. Rózycki K., *Pamiętnik Pułku Jazdy Wołyńskiej 1831 r.*, Kraków 1898.

LITERATURE

1. Badem C., *Sadyk Pasha in the Light of Ottoman Archives (1848–1871)*, [in:] *The Crimean War 1853–1856. Colonial Skirmish or Rehearsal for World War? Empires, Nations and Individuals*, ed. J. Borejsza, Warsaw 2011.
2. Badem C., *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856)*, Leiden 2010.
3. Berry R., *Czartoryski's Hôtel Lambert and the Great Powers in the Balkans, 1832–1848*, "The International History Review" 1985, Vol. 7.
4. Cetnarowicz A., *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałkanach. Hotel Lambert a kryzys serbski 1840–1844*, Kraków 1993.
5. Chudzikowska J., *Dziwne życie Sadyka Paszy. O Michale Czajkowskim*, Warszawa 1971.
6. Czapska M., *Ludwika Śniadecka*, Warszawa 1958.
7. Hahn H., *Possibilities and Limitations of Foreign Policy in Exile: Adam Jerzy Czartoryski's Hotel Lambert in Western Europe, 1831–1840*, [in:] *Eastern Europe and the West. Selective Papers from the Fourth World Congress for Soviet and East European Studies*, ed. J. Morrison, London 1992.
8. Handelsman M., *Adam Czartoryski*, t. 2, Warszawa 1949.
9. Skowronek J., *Kontrowersje wokół Sadyka Paszy (na marginesie pracy Wandy Smochowskiej-Petrowej, Michał Czajkowski – Sadyk Pasza i Bałgarskoto wazrazdane, Sofia 1973)*, „Przegląd Historyczny” 1976, t. 67, nr 4.
10. Skowronek J., *Polityka bałkańska Hotelu Lambert (1833–1856)*, Warszawa 1976.
11. Wierzbicki P., *Dywidzja Kozaków Sultańskich. Polityczno-wojskowe koncepcje stronnictwa Czartoryskich w okresie wojny krymskiej (1853–1856)*, Kraków 2013.
12. Wierzbicki P., *Działalność Sadyka Paszy w czasie wojny krymskiej na tle jego relacji z obozem Czartoryskich*, [in:] *Polacy i ziemie polskie w dobie wojny krymskiej*, red. J. W. Borejsza, G. Bąbiak, Warszawa 2008.
13. Zlatanov A., *Niepublikowane wspomnienia Michała Czajkowskiego – Sadyka Paszy*, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 2018, t. LIII, z. 2.
14. Златанов А., *Непубликувани спомени за Михаил Чайковски – Садък паша*, [in:] *Българите в Османската империя, XIX в. Понятия, структури, личности*, съст. В. Рачева, София 2017.
15. Полторак В., *Документи про Михала Чайковського в Державному архіві Одеської області*, [in:] *Чорноморська минувшина. Записки відділу історії козацтва на Півдні України*, Т. V, Одеса 2010.
16. Попов И., *Изъ миналото на Одринъ*, София 1919.
17. Симеонов Д., *Френската политика на Балканите, 1829–1853*, София.
18. Смоховска-Петрова В., *Михаил Чайковски-Садък паша и Българското възраждане*, София 1973.
19. Стойчев И., *Казакъ алаятъ на Чайковски*, София 1944.

MATEUSZ SEROKA

CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES, WARSAW
E-MAIL: M.SEROKA@UW.EDU.PL

SUBMISSION: 21.01.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 6.06.2019

Searching for “New Muslims.” Croatian Elite’ Stance Towards Bosnian Muslims Elites in Croatian Travelogues in the Second Half of 19th Century

ABSTRACT

During the so-called Croatian National Revival and decades which follows, intellectuals involved in various variations of this movement considered Bosnia and Herzegovina to be part of the Croatian national space. As a consequence, Bosnians were seen as part of the Croatian nation. In particular, this concerned the Catholic and Muslim population. However, the main problem in the perception of Bosnia and Herzegovina was an encounter with its oriental shaped culture. The biggest challenge was contact with Bosnian Muslims, whose identity was shaped by Islam, the religion which was connoted in Croatia with the loss of control over many Croatian lands including Bosnia as well as backwardness. The testimonies of these problems are present in the travelogues from journeys to Bosnia and Herzegovina by Croatian intellectuals in the 19th century. On the one hand, they concerned Muslims as Croats who converted to Islam, as representatives of exotic culture, burdened with many stereotypes. In the Croatian nationalists’ attempts to recruit Bosnian Muslims, local intermediaries, members of the Muslim elite, were needed. For the Croats, the optimal partners were the activists from the pro-modernization circles of local elites. If such persons would accept Croatian identity they were seen as valuable allies who capable to enrich Croatian culture, but also help to Europeanise their fatherland. Croatian travellers from the second half of 19th century found such persons and especially appreciated such persons as Savfet-beg Bašagić and Osman Nuri Hadžić, one of the main Bosnian Muslim modernists of that time. However, Croatian intellectuals were also unwilling to get in touch with autonomist pro-modernization circles of Bosnian Muslims elite and prefer to conceal their existence. In case of the conservative part of Bosnian Muslims elites Croats would rather accept a critique originated from Croatian-leaning, pro-modernization groups because they perceived them as a threat to assimilation actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

KEYWORDS

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Croatian Non-Fiction Literature of 19th-Century Trav-
elogs, Islam, Modernisation Currents, Nationalism, Nation-Building

The second half of the 19th century brought to Bosnia and Herzegovina a series of political and social changes which transformed this peripheral European province of the Ottoman Empire into at least partially Europeanized land. At the end of Turkey's reign, modernization processes initiated by the Tanzimat reforms and national emancipation movements inspired by the so-called national renewal in the territories of Serbia, Montenegro or Croatia speeded up.¹ These phenomena gained momentum, especially after the start of the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungary in 1878, whose administration began activities aimed at top-down modernization of the economically underdeveloped and socially conservative country. Among the Bosnian ethnic groups living in Bosnia, Bosnian Muslims were the most affected one, who, along with the ousting of Turkey, were deprived of the position of a dominant ethnos. The loss of social and political power was also accompanied by the disintegration of the existing identity structure based on religious identification. While thorough the 19th century the Bosnian Orthodox and Catholics were subject to the influences of Western-type modernization currents, including the creation of the modern national identities already in the period before 1878, Muslims remained largely on the margins of these processes.² After the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, the basis of

¹ S. Kodrić, *Kako su Bošnjaci videli muslimanski Orijent i europski Zapad krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća?*, p. 45, [online] http://dspace.uni.lodz.pl:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11089/20053/%5b41%5d_56_Kodric.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [accessed: 12.01.2019].

² In case of Orthodox people of Bosnia and Herzegovina Serbian national idea had become gaining thanks to politics of Ilija Garašanin, foreign minister of then autonomous Serbia. In case of Bosnian Catholics modernization currents were spreading due to community's elite—Franciscan monks educated in Croatian and Hungarian schools, seminars and universities. See: S. Dujmović, „*Bosna i Hercegovina ne može ni da živi ni da umre*” – *situiranje identiteta Bosne i Hercegovine kod bosanskohercegovačkih Srba (do 1941. godine)*, [in:] *Identitet Bosne i Hercegovine kroz historiju. Zbornik radova*, ur. H. Kamberović, Sarajevo 2011, p. 22; S. M. Džaja, *Politički profil fra Grge Martića*, „*Bosna franciscana*” 1995, god. III, br. 4, pp. 55–64; T. Oršolić, *Franjevci – utemeljitelji prve hrvatske pučke škole u Tolisi i uopće u Bosni i Hercegovini. Od prve pučke škole 1823. do osnivanja državne škole 1893.*, „*Bosna franciscana*” 2006, g. XIV, br. 25, pp. 123–130. In case of Bosnian Muslim ethnics those ideas became more present in the last decade of the Ottoman rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, f. e. in the work of first Bosnian Muslim journalist Mehmed Šaćir Kurtćehajić. S. Dizdar, *Prvi Bošnjački novinar Mehmed Šaćir Kurtćehajić (1844–1872)*, „*Bosniaca. Journal of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina*”, 2012, No. 17, pp. 63–65.

modern collective identity was to be not so much the religion as ethnicity, for which the basic criterion for distinguishing was linguistic differences. In such a situation the distinctiveness of Bosnian ethnies was in a question.

Purpose of this text is to bring a short reconnaissance in the topic of an attitude of Croatian national movement elite to Bosnian Muslim elites in the second half of the 19th century. Material which will be used to the analysis above mentioned are Croatian four travelogues from journeys to Bosnia and Herzegovina published between 1858 and 1896. Their authors are Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, Đuro Pilar, Starinom Bošnjak vel Tugomir Alaupović and Ante Tresić Pavičić. The thesis of this article is that during their journeys to Bosnia and Herzegovina Croatian intellectuals were trying to get in touch with local Muslim elites but especially with those modernization oriented. Such bias was caused by their own cultural and ideological orientation—all of them were shaped by 18th and 19th-century ideas of enlightenment and progress which were an integral part of Croatian national idea.³ Because of that, they were searching for Muslim counterparts who could "discover" their Croatian ethnic roots and take part in projects of modernization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the text is covering the second half of the 19th century, when modern Bosniak national identity was not fully shaped, the term Bosnian Muslim or Bosnian Muslim ethnies will be consequently used instead of ethnonym Bosniak. Such a solution is based on ethnosymbolic theory of nationalism developed by British scientist Anthony D. Smith. In author's opinion, Smith's approach to the question of building modern national identity is more comprehensive as it is taking into account not only aspects such as spreading of information, making new education system and constructing tradition but also a wide variety of ethnic aspects that shaped national identity through the centuries.⁴ In the case of Balkans (as well as Central Europe) especially important are ethnolinguistic and religious identities and the question of forming a common culture of remembrance.⁵

³ D. Jelčić, *Preporod književnosti i književnost preporoda*, Zagreb 1993, pp. 74–76, 78, 136; M. Falski, *Porządkowanie przestrzeni narodowej – przypadek chorwacki. Studium z historii wyobrażeń kulturowych*, Warszawa 2008, pp. 45–48; A. Boguska, *Oświecenie, Chorwacja*, [in:] *Leksykon idei wędrownych na słowińskich Bałkanach XVIII–XXI wiek. Oświecenie. Religia. Racjonalizm*, Warszawa 2018, pp. 37–43.

⁴ A. D. Smith, *Etniczne źródła narodów*, tłum. M. Głowacka-Grajper, Kraków 2009, p. 7 et passim; A. D. Smith, *Kulturowe podstawy narodów. Hierarchia, przymierze i republika*, tłum. W. Usakiewicz, Kraków 2009, pp. 49–68.

⁵ J. Assman, *Pamięć kulturowa. Pismo, zapamiętywanie i polityczna tożsamość w cywilizacjach starożytnych*, tłum. A. Kryczyńska-Pham, Warszawa 2008, p. 15.

The elite of Bosnian Slavic Muslims then faced the necessity to take a stand against comprehensive social changes drawing their strength from external processes which started outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This led to the formation of two main groups of social and political activists—the first of them were conservatives and traditionalists rejecting as many civilization innovations as possible and trying to build a sense of individuality based on religious differences. The second one was a wide reformers' camp, who, to varying degrees, accepted new intellectual currents and institutions introduced by Austro-Hungarian administrators. Inside this camp, two overlapping groups emerged—on the one hand a stronger, focused around Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak and periodic "Bošnjak," promoting the idea of loyalty to new power, moderate social reforms and Bosnian national autonomy,⁶ and on the other heterogeneous environments of more radical modernists who advocate for profound social changes and questioning the separateness of Muslim ethnies towards the Croatian or Serbian people. Muslim intellectuals belonging to the latter, depending on national sympathies, focused around magazines such as "Bosanska vila" and "Gajret" (pro-Serbian activists) or "Nada" and "Behar" (pro-Croatian activists). In their radicalism, although they were not enemies of religion, they directed the criticism towards social conventions of the Ottoman era and religion influenced customs. Activists of these circles (e.g. Edhem Mulabdić, Osman Nuri Hadžić, Ademaga Mešić) advocated popularizing education, ending the boycott of Western economic and social institutions and new laws introduced by the occupation administration. They also accepted the ideas of modern national identity brought together with the end of Ottoman rule in Bosnia in which religion was only one of the elements shaping individual and collective identity. Therefore, they were open to the influence of Croatian or Serbian nationalists attempting to make Bosnian Muslims part of their nation.⁷

The political and social changes that affected Bosnia and Herzegovina in the second half of the nineteenth century did not escape the attention of the external participating observers, which include both Serbian and Croatian national activists. Both sides saw in civilization changes affecting BiH a factor conducive

⁶ R. J. Donia, *Islam pod dvoglavim orlom: Muslimani Bosne i Hercegovine 1878.–1914.*, prev. T. Praštalo, Zagreb–Sarajevo 2000, pp. 51–81; S. Šagolj, *Novinstvo i nastanak nacija u BiH (1850.–1914.)*, Split–Mostar 2011, pp. 381–402; A. Jahić, *Bošnjačka elita u prvoj polovini XX stoljeća – naslijeđe, kontekst, prioriteti, interesi*, „Godišnjak BZK Preporod” 2011, god. XI, pp. 141–142; Dž. Šuško, *Bosniaks & Loyalty: Responses to the Conscription law in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1881/1882*, “Hungarian Historical Review” 2014, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 538, 544–549.

⁷ M. Rizvić, *Behar. Književnohistorijska monografija*, Sarajevo 2000, pp. 9–10; Dž. Juzbašić, *Nacionalno-politički odnosi u bosanskohercegovačkom saboru i jezičko pitanje (1910–1914)*, Sarajevo 1999, pp. 30–32; S. Kodrić, op. cit., pp. 44–50.

to more or less openly articulated plans for including BiH into the area of their own national culture space, or, as in the case of Serbs, also their own state. Political, social and economic reforms and the changes brought about by them have been associated with the Europeanisation and cleansing of the neighboring country from the social and economic backwardness associated with Turkey and militant Islam. In the case of Croatian intelligentsia, an important source documenting the interest of Croatian activists in the situation of BiH in the nineteenth century are travelogues (in Croatian *putopisi*), in the Polish literary tradition, as a literary genre, they are referred to as *podróże* (travels).⁸

The nineteenth-century Croatian literary creativity arose primarily on the basis of the ideological model of national literature.⁹ According to its assumptions, the works had to be tendentious and useful for the national cause, which was manifested by the implementation of the "fun and learn" principle popular among national activists. By that means they became an instrument of shaping the concept of the Croatian national space, popularizing national history and strengthening national political myths. In Croatia, just like in the whole Central Europe area, not only genres that already had an established position in the literary hierarchy like poetry or drama have been included in the implementation of such defined tasks, but also prose and peripheral genres functioning on the borderline of artistic writing and non-fiction literature. One of the most widely used forms of this type was a travelogue describing domestic and foreign expeditions carried out by members of cultural and political elites. The resulting texts had the reputation of being close to the idea of an objective record of the reality with which the traveler was associated. So they could appeal to the part of the recipients who adhered to rationalism. Quite often, they have also become a good tool for political polemics with ideological opponents.¹⁰

From the perspective of the modern researcher of the subject, Croatian nineteenth-century journeys are not only interesting literature, but also among other themes, an invaluable source of knowledge about the attitude of Croatian national activists towards the Bosnian social elite in the late Ottoman period, and above all during the Austro-Hungarian occupation.¹¹

⁸ Cz. Niedzielski, *O teoretycznoliterackich tradycjach prozy dokumentarnej. Podróż – Powieść – Reportaż*, Toruń 1979, p. 5 et passim.

⁹ D. Duda, *Priča i putovanje*, Zagreb 1998, pp. 81–84, 103–104; D. Jelčić, op. cit., pp. 90–91, 140–141.

¹⁰ D. Duda, op. cit., pp. 48–54, 91–151.

¹¹ Among worth mentioning works of Polish scholars are articles about of Croatian travelogues written by Krystyna Pieniążek-Marković from the Adam Mickiewicz University of Poznań, Mateusz Seroka and Maciej Falski from the Warsaw University. See: K. Pieniążek-

Opinions presented by the authors of travelogues of that time were influenced by both cultural heritage of earlier centuries and the necessity to carry out current tasks being a part of work for their own nation. Therefore, on the one hand, Islam and the Ottoman culture were still perceived as extremely foreign cultural forces, which shaped the social and economic backwardness of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The general dislike towards Islam and Turkey among Croatian political and cultural elite was an effect of Croatian cultural contrapresentive mythomoteur. The Ottoman Empire was responsible for the deep crisis of Croatian statehood and the loss of the overwhelming majority of lands belonging to Triune Kingdome (including significant BiH lands) at the turn of the 15th and 16th centuries.¹² On the other hand, the Croatian elite was also convinced that Bosnia and Herzegovina still remained an ethnically Slavic land belonging to the Croatian national space. In order to realize the dreams of joining all lands in one country (South Slavic or later Croatian) one had to gain the trust of the local population and convince it to its conception. Both aspects of the Croatian mythomoteur were frequently reproduced in the Croatian literature canon from 16th century up to the time of Croatian National Revival. For this reason, Croatian activists going to Bosnia and Herzegovina more or less openly expressed their dislike or distrust towards the aspects of Bosnian reality shaped by the Turkish-Muslim culture (also in relation to the Christian population), and at the same time seeing ethnic proximity, they were trying to find interlocutors and potential collaborators also among Bosnian Muslims.¹³

The first signs of interest in the reforming trend among the Muslim elite in BiH can be observed even during the late Ottoman period. Croatian national movement activist and, writer and historian Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (1816–1889) pointed out the promoters of economic and social changes in Bosnia and

-Marković, *Hrvatski romantičari otkrivaju Bosnu*, [in:] *Sarajevski filološki susreti II. Zbornik radova*, knj. II, ur. S. Kodrić, V. Preljević, Sarajevo 2014, pp. 280–301; eadem, *Relacje ze spotkania z inną kulturą w dziennikach podróży chorwackiego romantyzmu*, [in:] *Spotkania międzykulturowe. 1. Literaturoznawstwo. Kultura*, red. K. Jarząbek, A. Ruttar, S. Sojda, Katowice 2013, pp. 114–123; M. Seroka, *Chorwacja turecka – Turcja europejska? Bośnia w podróżopisarstwie epoki jugosławizmu*, „Pamiętnik Słowiański” 2013, t. LXIII, z. 1–2, pp. 89–113; idem, *Środowisko sarajewskiej „Nady” i napływowi Chorwaci w Bośni i Hercegowinie w szkicach z podróży Antego Tresicia Pavičića*, [in:] *Czytać, wędrować, być. Tom dedykowany Profesorowi Zdzisławowi Daraszowi*, red. M. Bogusławska, J. Goszczyńska, J. Śuler-Galos, Warszawa 2016, pp. 101–112; M. Falski, *Pamięć społeczna a ideologia. Z problematyki autodefinicji kultury bośniackiej*, „Południowosłowiańskie Zeszyty Naukowe. Język – Literatura – Kultura” 2007, t. 4, pp. 51–64.

¹² J. Rapacka, *Śródziemnomorze – Europa Środkowa – Bałkany. Studia z literatur południowosłowiańskich*, Kraków 2002, pp. 347–348.

¹³ J. Assman, op. cit., pp. 93–98, 108–112, 132–136.

Herzegovina in his relation entitled *A journey through Bosnia (Putovanje po Bosni)*, published in 1858. Probably, due to his noble origin, author of the travelogue focused his attention mainly on representatives of the Muslim aristocracy. As a historian, national activist focused on social reforms and declared Slavophile, while traveling in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he sought evidence of the Slavic and Croatian character of this country. Therefore, for example, he recorded every surviving custom or an example of oral literature considered as Slavic heritage.¹⁴

Although he tried to move away from anti-Turkish and anti-Islamic resentments in his work, he definitely reacted positively to the meetings with these representatives of Muslim elites (including Turkish officials managing the country), who showed a tendency, for example, of Europeanizing their attire. However, he most enthusiastically described his meeting with the representative of the local Bosnian nobility, Dervišbeg Teskeredžić. Such a reaction was caused not only by the Europeanisation of the dress and interior decoration of the aristocrat's house (although the latter was described with a slight note of irony) but above all the commitment to change inter-faith relations and awareness of linguistic communication with visiting Croats:

Our host Dervišbeg is person respectable and smooth, advocating for reforms and progress, he does not prosecute Christians [...]. We were chatting with him about everything including our language, which is very appreciated by him and about which he said that is best spoken in Herzegovina, because it is not so mixed with Turkish words, as it is in Bosnia. He regrets that Bosnia stayed so far behind other Slavic countries—he knows a little bit its past and reason of its fall, he complains about roads and stupidity of people, who did not travel anywhere and see nothing.¹⁵

Kukuljević Sakcinski also recognizes that another Bosnian nobleman, Mehmed Hašijić, met in Banja Luka, who in turn is introducing himself to the Croat as a man striving to improve Bosnia's economic situation and open to developing contacts with the world outside the Ottoman Empire.¹⁶

¹⁴ I. Kukuljević Sakcinski, *Izabrana djela*, Zagreb 1997, p. 340, 366

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 366. Original text of quotation: „Domaćin Dervišbeg je čovjek ugledan i gladak, zauzet za reforme i napredak, ne preganja kèrščane [...]. Mi se razgovaramo s njime o svaćemu i o našem jeziku, kojega veoma cieni i o kojemu reće da se najbolje govori u Hercegovini, jer nije tako pomiješan s turskimi rječmi kao u Bosni. On žali na Bosnu, što je tako daleko zaostala za drugim zemljami slavenskim – pozna ponješto njezinu prošastnost i uzrok propasti, tuži se na drumove i na glupost ljudih, koji niesu nikuda putovali i ništa vidjeli” [The author's own translation].

¹⁶ Ibidem, pp. 338–339.

The possibilities of meeting with Bosnian Muslim elites increased after the beginning of the occupation of the Bosnian lands by Austria-Hungary. This coincided with the changes in generations in Croatian politics. Slavophile circles (from Illyrian and Yugoslav movements) dominating until the 1870s have weakened in favor of nationalists gathered around the Ante Starčević Party of Rights. The latter rejected the idea of creating a Southern Slavs state as well as supremacy of the Slavic identity in which the “local” identities—Croatian and Serbian—were to be located. Starčević’s supporters advocated the restoration of the Croatian state in the historical-ethnic boundaries, which with the then state of historical knowledge, was identified with setting them on the Drina River.¹⁷ Thus, Bosnia and Herzegovina became an integral part of the Croatian ethnic and state space. What more, activists and supporters of the Party of Rights were suspicious of the identity dimension of confessional. In their opinion, religion was a factor of division among Croatian people, therefore it was necessary to emphasize the ethnic aspects of the nation, such as language identity.¹⁸ Thanks to this, it was possible for them to recognize all Slavic, Shtokavian dialect speaking inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina as native Croats. The leader of the nationalist milieu also revealed clear Turkophilic tendencies motivated by aversion towards the authorities of the Hungarians and Austrians over Croatian lands. His positive attitude to the presence of the Ottomans in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus opposition to the commencement of the Austro-Hungary occupation of the country, justified the fact that the Turks left governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the hands of the local nobility, whom he called “Croats of the purest and noblest blood.”¹⁹ Based on this thesis, which Starčević set in his journalism in 1869, ten years later, the majority of Croatian political activists and intellectual elites, were almost convinced that Bosnian Muslims were, in fact, ethnic Croats.²⁰

However, the suspicious attitude to the Turkish heritage in Bosnia and Herzegovina was still a problem. Both the experiences of earlier Croats’ travels after BiH and the growing number of European reports from that and other areas of Turkey strengthened the image of the Ottoman Empire as a backward,

¹⁷ V. Posavec, *Povijesni zemljovid i granice Hrvatske u Tomislavovo doba*, Zagreb 1997, pp. 283–290; A. Starčević, *Politički spisi*, Zagreb 1971, pp. 110, 308, 312–313.

¹⁸ A. Starčević, *Našim prijateljem. Naputak 1871.*, [in:] T. Cipek, S. Matković, *Programatski dokumenti hrvatskih političkih stranaka i skupina 1842.–1914.*, Zagreb 2006, p. 241.

¹⁹ Idem, *Politički spisi...*, op. cit., pp. 198–199; idem, *Iztočno pitanje*, Varaždin 1995, pp. 3–41. The book is reprint of edition from 1899.

²⁰ An example of such thinking can be a book by 19th century Croatian historian Vejkoslav Klaić. See: V. Klaić, *Bosna. Podatci o zemljopisu i poviesti Bosne i Hercegovine. Prvi dio: Zemljopis*, Zagreb 1878, p. VII.

chaotic and practically unreformable being.²¹ Despite the politically motivated rhetorical acceptance of Bosnian Muslims, their conservatism documented by travelers was still a problem (for example in the *Trails. Through Bosnia (Puti. Po Bosni)* by Mihovil Pavlinović, the last report from Bosnia ruled by the Turks, the author emphasized the privileged position of Muslims in comparison to the Christians and their unwillingness to accept civilization innovations, for example, the railways).²² Therefore, Bosnia and Herzegovina was still treated as an area of the civilization mission for the Croats, in which it was necessary to find local allies.

The authors of works created after 1878, so in the new political situation, still experienced the same problems with the Bosnian reality. Turkish heritage is still treated cautiously by the Croats. This is evidenced by the impressions written by Đuro Pilar (1846–1893), a geographer, geologist and the first rector of University of Zagreb, who, while carrying out the semi-official mission for the occupation authorities, traveled to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1879. Collected observations from this journey Pilar published in magazine "Obzor" and then in a book *Sketches from the journey to Bosnia (Putopisne crttice iz Bosne)*.²³

Among other 19th century Croatian travelogues Pilar's one distinguishes a relatively small focus on the national question in Bosnia, what reflects in his Muslim ethnical descriptions. Therefore, Bosnian Muslims are described in the manner characteristic of positive sciences not in the national perspective. The desire to give readers a clear, objective description of the reality seen resulted in a detachment from the idea of national unity. Each meeting with a Bosnian Muslim (usually described by ethnonyms *Turak, Turčin*) was for

²¹ Examples of such narration can be found in Matija Mažuranić *Glance at Bosnia (Pogled u Bosnu)* from 1842, the first Croatian travelogue depicting Bosnia and Herzegovina in 19th century or in Adlofo Veber Tkalčević *A journey to Plitvice (Put u Plitvice)*. See: M. Mažuranić, *Pogled u Bosnu*, [in:] I. Mažuranić, M. Mažuranić, *Smrt Smail-age Čengića, Stihovi, Proza. Pogled u Bosnu*, Zagreb 1965, pp. 189–253; A. Veber Tkalčević, *Odabrana proza*, Vinkovci 1998, pp. 93–109. Two most famous European travelogues of that time are *Bosnie et Herzégovine: souvenirs de voyage pendant l'insurrection* from 1876 by Charles Yriarte and *Through Bosnia and the Herzégovina on foot during the insurrection, August and September 1875; with an historical review of Bosnia and a glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the ancient republic of Ragusa* from 1876 by Arthur J. Evans. Similar observations can be also found in 19th century travelogues of Polish authors—f. e. Manswet Aulich, Ignacy Pietraszewski, Waclaw Wężyk. See: S. Burkot, *Polskie podrózpisarstwo romantyczne*, Warszawa 1988, pp. 46–121.

²² M. Pavlinović, *Puti. Po Bosni*, [in:] F. Rački, M. Pavlinović, N. Nodilo, B. Lorković, *Izbori iz djela*, Zagreb 1969, pp. 203–206.

²³ A. Zindrum, *Bosna u ljeto 1879. godine. uz 160. obljetnicu rođenja putopisca Đure Pilara, "Bosna franciscana"* 2006, god. 14, br. 25, p. 280; Pilar Đuro, [in:] *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, t. 6, Maklj-Put, ur. M. Krleža, Zagreb 1965, p. 501.

Pilar encounter with a civilization different from his own, what Pilar seems to be aware of from the very beginning of his journey.²⁴ This is already proved by the description of the first hours spent in Bosnia, when his attention was drawn to the traces of attachment to the old, better for Muslims times, such as the map of Anatolia drawn up in Turkey and the way of saving the customer's account. Pilar was also interested in furnishing the interior of the cafe and the occupations of its clients:

Someone advised us to go to the Turkish cafe [...]. The Turkish cafes are all made of one pattern, so was this one. There was a spacious room and about ten people there, who were sitting on a long, chest like benches, covered with cane matting. A map of Anatolia translated into Turkish was hanging on the wall, next to which was a blackboard with scrips containing names of guests of café glued to blackboard's surface under which there was a long column of lines made with chalk, which maybe were showing a number of cafés probably drunk by each of them.²⁵

Despite the gradual familiarization with some aspects of Bosnian reality (diversity of manners, manifestation by the Muslim community of hostility towards the occupiers), Pilar still could not get rid of the distance especially in the face of manifestations of lack of education.²⁶ That is why, like Kukuljević Sakcinski, he sought among the Muslim elite people who it could be regarded as a forerunner of civilizational changes leading to improvement of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

He found such a person during a reconnaissance around Sanski Most, where Hussein-efendi Vaizade Čurčić accompanied him in the peregrinations around the area. He was supposed to be a trusted man of one of the previous Ottoman governors (*Vali*) of Osman-pasha, who enabled him to learn in one of Istanbul's madrasa. A good marriage allowed him, in turn, to expand the farm and achieve a high position among the Muslim clergy. During his conversation with him, Pilar paid particular attention to his social and political views:

²⁴ G. Pilar, *Putopisne crtice iz Bosne*, Slavonski Brod 2007, pp. 25–29. The book is a reprint of edition from 1879.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 25. Original text of quotation: „Netko predloži, da idemo u tursku kavanu [...]. Turske kavane sve su po jednom kalupu, a i ova bijaše prema tomu. Nadjoh prostranu sobu a u njoj desetak ljudi sjedeći na dugih, sandukom naličnih klupah, rogoznimi hasurami pokrivenih. Na stienah bijaše tlovid male Azije (Anatolije), turski tumačen, do njeg bijaše, crna tabla a na njoj, pod priljepljenimi ceduljami i imeni habitue-a kavane, dug stupac poteza kredom učinjenih, uznačujućih valjda broj kava, što je dotičnik na vjeru popio” [The author's own translation].

²⁶ Ibidem, pp. 41–42, 58, 65–66, 70.

At the time of last uprising [Herzegovina uprising which broke out in 1875] all people run for their lives, the herd was taken by the Turks, houses plundered and burned and many men slaughtered. Hussein effendi was boasting that he managed to save many lives and judging after what I have heard and seen then, it was true. Hussein effendi is true and enlightened Mohammedan, he climbed on heights of theological knowledge and gained the title of vaizade [preacher], but he is not a fanatic, he is just a philanthropist so during the uprising he was against detention on poor rayah. Most of all he was a great opponent of armed resistance against the Austrian army, by what the Turks called him a "friar" and, as he recalls, they almost killed him too [...].²⁷

Pilar's special recognition was, therefore, the attitude of the interlocutor towards the dissenters, who, as he noted, was confirmed in the words of other people met in this region. The Croatian traveler also liked his reluctance to resist the entering of the Austro-Hungarian army. He stressed that at the root of these attitudes was "lack of fanaticism," thanks to which Čurčić managed to limit the fratricidal struggle in his subordinate section of Bosnia, although—as is clear from the description—he failed to implement all plans in this respect, which he blamed for "hard-core" Muslims.

However, Pilar is disappointed with the faith in the treasures from the past hidden under the stones and in ruins (in which Čurčić do not differ from ordinary Bosnian Muslims), but also troublesome for the guest from Zagreb attachment to the Turkish past of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The latter forced the traveler to not always successful climbing to the heights of diplomatic skills:

Once he asked me: "Tell me please mister Gjuro, when will your army left Bosnia?" In which way you could reply to him? Is there any man who could and want to give him a positive answer on such a question? [...] I said to him: "You should know effendi, that Turkish emperor with ours emperor made an agreement, in which stands that our army will stay and our officials will rule Bosnia until peace and order comes everywhere, roads and railways built, telegraphs established, schools opened, and Turks with Christians see each other as a brothers [...]"²⁸

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 94. Original text of quotation: „Za vremena zadnjega ustanka sve se razbjeglo, stoka od Turaka odvedena, kuće poharane i popaljene i mnogo ljudi posječeno. Hussein efendi hvalio se je, da je mnogu glavu na ramenih sačuvao i po onom sudeć, što sam kasnije čuo i vidio, bilo je tako. Hussein efendi je korjenit i osvjedočen muhamedovac, on se je popeo na velik stepen teologičkoga znanja i dobio naslov vaizade [kaznodzieja] [...], ali on nije fanatic, on je pače filantrop i bio je za vremena ustanka proti strahovanju na siroti raji. Napose je bio velik protivnik oružanoga odpora proti austrijskoj vojsci i zato su ga Turci „fratom“ nazivali i umalo, kako veli, da i njega posjekli nisu [...]" [The author's own translation].

²⁸ Ibidem, pp. 68–71. Original text of quotation: „Jednom me upita: 'Reci ti meni gospodine Gjuro, kad će vaša vojska ostaviti Bosnu?' Što da mu čovjek na to odgovori? Koliko ima

Relations written in the nineties of the 19th century, in the period in which the Austro-Hungarian occupation stabilized, are characterized by the continuation of earlier Enlightenment and positivist trends and active attempts to find evidence of the Croatian character of Bosnian lands. The authors of the two travelogues from that time are poets—the first was Starinom Bošnjak, which is a probable pseudonym of Tugomir Alaupović (1870–1958), one of the founders of Croatian Cultural Society “Progress” (Hrvatsko Kulturno Društvo “Napredak”),²⁹ who in 1895 in prestigious cultural magazine “Vienac” published a text entitled *Sarajevo*. The second one was Ante Tresić Pavičić (1867–1949), a poet and political activist. In the 19th century, he was activist of the circles of Party of Rights, but in the 20th century he shifted to Yugoslav idea, and after establishing Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes he was performing the function of ambassador to Spain and United States of America.³⁰ In 1896 Tresić Pavičić published, in the magazine “Dom i svijet” a travelogue *Bosnia and Herzegovina. Travelogue sketches (Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice)*.

Both authors paid close attention to the social changes that took place as a result of the Austro-Hungarian occupation. The subject of their critical assessments became not only poor education of Bosnians (especially Muslims) but also elements of the Oriental culture that shaped rules of the social life of Muslim ethnies. At the same time, they were interested in language issues, changes in the political situation and the state of local culture. Their observations are characterized by perceiving themselves as promoters of social change and tools for the development of the Croatian national idea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The above considerations have maintained and even increased the interest in contacts with ordinary Bosnians as well as with the elites of each Bosnian ethnies. A particularly important place, due to the potential of use for the national-civilization mission, was occupied by views of the elites of Bosnian Muslims ethnies.

uobće ljudi, koji bi u stanju bili, kad bi i htjeli, dati pozitivna odgovora na to pitanje? [...] Rekoh mu: “Ti znaš effendija, da je turski car s našim carem učinio ugovor, da naša vojska u Bosni ostaje i naši činovnici Bosnom upravljaju dok nebude posvuda mir i red, putevi načinjeni, željeznice posagradjene, teli (telegraf) povučeni, škole postvarane, a Turci i kršćani se pazili kao braća [...]” [The author’s own translation].

²⁹ I. Pederin, *Književnost hrvatskoga realizma i „Vijenac” o Bosni i Hercegovini poslije Šenoinine smrti*, „Kačić” 1997, br. 29, p. 42

³⁰ V. Brešić, *Autobiografije hrvatskih pisaca*, prir. V. Brešić, Zagreb 1997, p. 370; *Tresić Pavičić Ante*, [in:] *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, t. 8, Srbija-Ž, , ur. M. Krleža, Zagreb 1971, pp. 365–366.

A good material showing the perception of the Bosnian elite at the end of the nineteenth century is, in particular, the account of Tresić Pavičić. During his Bosnian peregrinations (from the Bihać area up to the Croatian city of Metković) writer initially seems to be interested mainly in representatives of the local Muslim gentry. It does not differ in a significant way from his predecessors, who were also particularly fond of this social group. In Tresić's descriptions of these meetings, can be seen Ante Starčević's evident tendency to glorify this social layer. The existence of the native Bosnian gentry, which for several centuries remained the depository of power in the BiH area, was an important justification for the Turkophilic rhetoric of the leader of the Party of the Rights. As a result, Tresić softened the assessment of the behavior of Bosnian aristocrats in situations where his predecessors would probably be very critical.

This is present, for example, in justifying the dislike of the dissenters, noticed in case of a member of the Kulenović family met in Gjulhisar. The old Muslim is dissatisfied with the rise of the "rayah" position in relation to the times before the occupation. Tresić tried to give a rational explanation for this behavior. He claims that from the conversation he discerned that the interests of the old beg are going poorly; hence he found "rayah" as a scapegoat, which he blames for his failures. The traveler also attempted to talk with Kulenović on topics related to politics, which was clearly connected with the self-perceived task of shaping Bosnian Muslims national identity. Assuming that Kulenović should consider himself a Croat Tresić wanted to check the views of the nobleman, and it is possible that he would like to correct them a bit. Meanwhile, the assumption of the ethnic affiliation of the Muslim element to the Croatian nation, however, does not find enough confirmation. As Tresić writes: "beg did not have a clear political position," which means that the Croat is forced to draw the conclusion that Kulenović "inclines to Croatian" only on the basis of his particular reluctance to Serbs.³¹

As the results of a meeting with a representative of the old elite were far from the young writer's expectations, Tresić felt better describing new Muslim elites. However, in this context, he writes only about Osman Nuri Hadžić and Savfet-beg Bašagić. Both were associated with the magazine "Nada," created by Kosta Hörmann, a Croat working for the Austro-Hungarian authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, they had direct contacts with Croatian national circles from Zagreb. Tresić Pavičić's view of the elite of Bosnia (and the entire Muslim society) is clearly marked by the Croatian national ideology. This is evident not only through the selection of the characters described but also a very poor understanding of the Muslim intellectual circles. He includes in that

³¹ A. Tresić Pavičić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 8, p. 144.

group not only already mentioned Bašagić and Hadžić, but also Osman Beg Štafić, apparently not realizing that this is only a pseudonym adopted by Krsto Pavletić, one of the Croatian-Catholic writers publishing in “Nada” (similarly as in the case of Ivan Miličević, also writing under “Muslim” pseudonym).³²

In the case of Bašagić, the interest of the Croatian traveler focuses on the field of aesthetic and literary activity. Perhaps the choice of such a perspective was influenced by the absence of a Muslim poet in Sarajevo. Tresić did not manage to meet him in Sarajevo, so he could not obtain the expected information from him about the situation of the Muslim community.³³ For this reason, the author of the travelogue had to focus on another aspect of his activity. Thanks to the debut of Bašagić on pages of Croatian magazines at the beginning of the nineties of the 19th century, Tresić had an opportunity to read and enthusiastically describe his works full of oriental influence, which were thus introduced to Croatian literature, fitting well into the way of thinking about national culture present in the circles of the Party of Rights.

Writing about Bašagić, Tresić focuses solely on his cooperation with “Nada,” which he considers a bridgehead of the Croatian national idea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, he conceals parallel cooperation of this writer with founded by provisional government magazine “Bošnjak” which was propagating the vision of the autonomous Bosnian nation (there is also no mention about that letter in the description of activities of the occupation authorities). Also, he says no word about the activity of Muslim Reading Society (Kireathana) which was also connected to autonomous circles of Mehmed-beg Kapetanović Ljubušak.³⁴ Probably main reason of concealing those facts is that this would disrupt the vision of national unity of the Croats of the Triune Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia and their countrymen from Bosnia and Herzegovina which is being pushed throughout the text. Instead of giving a more panoramic view of problems related to the Muslim issue, the author gives information only about two representatives of the Muslim intelligentsia, cooperating with the Croatian national movement. In Tresić Pavičić narrative, Bašagić and Hadžić became best “proofs” for the two thesis—first about fully Croatian roots of the Bosnian Muslims and second about the effectiveness of the activities of Croatian nationalists in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

³² Idem, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 9, p. 168; S. Šagolj, op. cit., pp. 333–345.

³³ A. Tresić Pavičić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 10, p. 185.

³⁴ S. Kodrić, op. cit., p. 48.

However, such an approach to the problem cannot be regarded solely as an ordinary usurpation of a Croatian national activist. During his life Bašagić presented, often in parallel, two attitudes—one clearly pro-Croatian, convergent with the ideas of the Party of Rights, and the other one more heavily inclined towards strengthening the sense of separateness of his native community. Both, however, did not have to exclude each other, as it was also in case of several other significant figures of Muslim elites, for example, writer Edhem Mu-labdić.³⁵

Tresić particular attention is devoted to Osman Nuri Hadžić, who was part of a literary tandem with Ivan Aziz Miličević (as Osman-Aziz). Focusing the readers' attention on this figure is justified by, in travelogue's author opinion, the unique combination of rooting in the tradition of Hadžić own ethnoreligious group with work for social and national development. For Tresić he is, together with Miličević, the symbol of reconciliation between Croats Catholics and Croats Muslims. Author of the travelogue emphasizes Hadžić's religious education (he graduated from the Qur'anic school), which allows him to overcome religious "separatism" that is detrimental to the Croatian national idea. His "will to power" gives effects ineffective work on the "decaying spirit" of his Muslim brothers and inclusion in the project of modernizing society. In this context, he recalls then well-known Hadžić article *What will happen with Mohammedans of Bosnia (Što će biti sa muhamedovci Bosne)*, published on pages of the journal "Hrvatska" connected with the Party of Rights. The Bosnian intellectual attacks religious conservatives associated with the circle of Mostar clerics for maintaining a dislike for education, work and modern social institutions among the Muslim community. Their harmful activity was not only to consist in the fact that they did not "direct the people towards progress," but also did not set a good example by themselves, using religion to achieve their own material and political benefits. The faith in the idea of progress, which is reflecting through comments of Tresić, combined with the political beliefs typical for Starčević followers, influences the enthusiastic assessment of the effects of the wakening efforts of Nuri Hadžić. Tresić describes them as building "a rampart against foreign floods and denationalization."³⁶

At the same time, it is not difficult to notice that enthusiasm for Hadžić's criticism directed against traditionalists stemmed from the fact that some of the principles of Islam were raising many Tresić doubts. In the spirit of Star-

³⁵ S. Bašagić, M. Ćazim Ćatić, *Izabrana djela*, ur. O. Prohić, Zagreb 2005 pp. 26–34, 36–37, 335–336, 341–346; N. Kisić Kolanović, *Ademaga Mešić i hrvatska nacionalna ideja 1895.–1918. godine*, „Časopis za suvremenu povijest” 2008, god. 40, br. 3, pp. 1123–1135.

³⁶ A. Tresić Pavičić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 9, p. 168.

čević religious tolerance, he states generally that Islam has many beautiful principles and its dogmas are based on common sense. He tries to avoid describing the ritual sphere of Islam, because, as he points out, the devotees of one faith will always consider some of the rituals of the second faith ridiculous. So he briefly mentions all the most important manifestations of religiosity, such as ablutions that are not very effective in terms of body purity, circumcision, which in turn, praises as logical in more southern countries, preservation of the food taboos and specific fasting during Ramadan. At the same time, he notes that Bosnian Muslims often did not keep the abstinence order because, while avoiding wine, they were drinking rakija (by the way he mentions, in his opinion, senseless allegations which Christians and Muslims were doing each other about drinking alcohol). Although he does not laugh at the rituals themselves, just like some of his predecessors,³⁷ he negatively appraises the Islamic religiosity of many Bosnian Muslims as resulting in blind conservatism. Its symbol is for his prayer in a language they do not know completely. Tresić assumes that whispering of Arabic formulas is a form of behavior of people who once upon a time used to dabble with magic.³⁸ In his opinion such attachment to tradition made it harder for them to get closer to the rest of society:

Religious conservatism influences their way of thinking, their spirit and their body and their attire. True Mohammedan won't ever change his boots with black shoes, either his clothing with a French one. In every nation conservatism is a son of lack of knowledge and ignorance, so it is among them. Whereas they are ignorant in matter of faith they do not even manage to uproot some Christian elements which left even though they converted to Mahomet's faith. [...] Religious conservatism, together with great unacquaintance of their faith opens the field to superstition, which among Mohammedans is uncommonly developed.³⁹

In the influence of faith, he also sees the source of the largest difference in the principles of social life between Muslims and Christians. Namely, it is the social position of women—as in his opinion women of the Western civiliza-

³⁷ This kind of behaviour is present for example in the Matija Mažuranić travelogue. See: M. Mažuranić, op. cit., pp. 201–202, 220, 234, 241–242.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 165; A. Tresić Pavičić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 10, p. 186.

³⁹ Ibidem. Original text of quotation: „Vjerski konservatizam upliva na njihovo mišljenje, na njihov duh i na njihovo tielo, i na njihovu nošnju. Pravi muhamedanac neće nikada zamieniti svoje postole crnim cipelami, niti svoga odiela francezskim. Konservatizam je sin neznanja i neuke kod svakoga naroda, a tako i kod njih. Pošto su u vjeri neuki oni nisu iz nje još iztriebili neke kršćanske elemente koji im ostadoše pošto primiše Muhamedovu vjeru. [...] Vjerski koservatizam, uz veliko nepoznavanje svoje vjere, otvara široko polje praznovjerju, koje je u muhamedanaca neobično razvijeno” [The author's own translation].

tional circle are already almost completely liberated. He mentions extreme dependence of Muslim women on men and bringing women to the role of a "slave, perceived more like a beautiful thing, the solace of husband's life, created rather give birth to children than to be a human being." Rich women had to spend whole days on body care in harems or on gossiping and eating sweets at their girlfriends' houses. This had a negative impact on their interests and knowledge about the world. Muslim women were thus a passive group and actually lost to the society. One of the elements of enslavement was also their outfit. He describes that the girls who were twelve years old had already been subject to restrictions. Their attires most often consisted of colorful but covering silhouette trousers, as well as headscarves covering the head and the majority of the face. In addition, Muslim women were not educated even in the religious or musical sphere (by what their singing was resembling cries of young children, accompanied by the cacophony of harmony and gusle). So, their lives focused on matters of carnality and sexuality, of which a kind of "rite" was, conventionalized advances (*ašikovanje*).

Tresić mentioned, that the ban on meeting men outside the family also had another practical effect. In case of illness, they were dependent on the husband's decision. If he agreed to let the doctor in, he could save the woman's health and life. If he was not, then only the "help" of charlatans remained. Tresić saw a way out of this situation in the government taking necessary measures, aimed at creating a network of hospitals for women.⁴⁰

The writer also believed that excessive religiosity has distracted many Bosnian Muslims from the project of modernization of society. They did not want to be involved in modern social institutions (regardless of their pedigree) and were grouped around anti-modernization oriented Islamic clerics. This was what Tresić called denationalization in the context of Hadžić struggle with traditionalists.

As in the case of Bašagić, when he did not mention the Bosnian autonomists troublesome for the Croatian nationalists, so in the passages concerning Nuri Hadžić too, the topic of ethnophiletic tendencies in the Bosnian Muslim community appears only briefly and contextual.

Agreeing with Hadžić's criticism of the traditionalist Mostar clergy, Tresić confirms the existence of such problem, which he associates with religious over-zeal of the Bosnian Muslims, preventing them from gaining appropriate level of knowledge and isolating them from Catholics. This problem is barely marked by the author of the travelogue and does not appear any further in the text. However, this was a phenomenon that heavily affected the subsequent

⁴⁰ Ibidem, pp. 187-188.

development of the political situation in these territories. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Muslim community of Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into three major camps. The first of them (focused in Sarajevo) accepted modernization currents, coming from the occupation authorities. On its margins were functioning circles of Muslim supporters of Serbian and Croatian national ideas, which had their own projects of the modernization of Bosnian society. The second camp, moderately opposing to the authorities and distrustful to the national aspirations of the neighbors, represented the beliefs of the conservative part of the old Muslim elite. Its greatest resistance was caused by plans to carry out agrarian reforms and freeing peasants (mainly Christians) from the obligation to pay tribute to Muslim landowners. That circle was concentrated in the cities of central Bosnia, above all in Travnik. Perhaps its representative was a member of the Kulenović family met by Tresić in Gjulhisar. The third camp (his leader was Ali Fehmi-efendi Džabić) was shaped around traditionalist Muslim clerics who, based on religious issues, stressed the necessity to separate Bosnian Muslim community from the occupiers and the modernizing Christian neighbors. At the turn of the century, the center of activity of that circle became Mostar. Hence, it was the group in which was aimed criticism of Osman Nuri Hadžić journalism. The way Tresić treats this topic may be either a deliberate concealing of the problem or another effect of poor insight in internal disputes of the Bosnian Muslim community.⁴¹

Behind this second interpretation speaks the character of the whole reasoning about Muslims. Tresić, after an unsuccessful attempt to meet Bašagić for longer conversation, loses the opportunity to gather information from a member of the community he wants to describe. He himself admits that he gets information indirectly thanks to the Croats Catholics he meets and through his own observations, which are significantly influenced by his cultural and political superstitions. On the one hand, it was a problem for him, but on the other hand, significant facilitation of the “national work” he performed. Thanks to this coincidence, it was easier for him to present the Bosnian ethnics to the readers in a manner consistent with the assumptions of Croatian national activists.

The Bosnian Muslims are, therefore, in most cases, described as descendants of the Bosnian gentry, who converted to Islam in order to preserve their social position. He states that the religious roots of the Bosnian Muslims were in Bogomilism or Catholicism. Thus, for Tresić, it follows that they are people of Croatian origin. Confirmation of this thesis he finds in fairly good neighbor relations with Catholics, which stands out against the background of hatred and

⁴¹ R. J. Donia, *op. cit.*, pp. 83–143.

contempt towards the people of Orthodox faith (so the Serbs). In the same place, Tresić once again expresses the view that the greater attachment to faith is, the greater is the tendency towards harmful separatism. That is why, in his opinion, the proper direction of change is to put an emphasis on secular education:

Educated Mohammedan, who comprehends future and knows past of the country, as well as his own past, considers to be a Croat and feels that he has similar aspirations as Catholic because political aspirations motivated by faith are no longer possible to reach.⁴²

In Tugomir Alupović's travelogue *Sarajevo* (from a trip which took place about a year earlier than the Tresić Pavičić one), there are almost no direct references to specific figures belonging to the group of Muslim promoting the transformation of Bosnian society in the spirit of Occidentalism. There is only one place where such names are written (again Savfet-beg Bašagić and Osman Nuri Hadžić). It is a fragment in which Alupović comments administrative obstacles which the Austro-Hungarian occupation authorities were creating against Croats putting Croatian national issues on agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁴³ Despite this, he tries to encourage his countrymen to come to the neighboring country and to carry out the task of "republican education of society" in order to raise it to a higher level of organization and culture. As one of the instruments of this process, he recognizes the work carried out by the circle around magazines kept under the supervision of Kosta Hörmann:

To cease hatred between brothers of a different faith, to cultivate love among them, bring out points common to all of us. This is the first well which feeds Tugomir Alupović, Osman Hadžić, Bašagić, beg Štafić and many others. Its content will give to Bosnian belletrist and poet an occasion to get in touch with both western and occidental culture and to influence our people in Bosnia.⁴⁴

⁴² A. Tresić Pavičić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 10, p. 188. Original text of quotation: „Naobraženiji muhamedanac, koji shvaća budućnost zemlje i poznaje njezinu i svoju prošlost, drži se Hrvatom, i čuti da su mu sa katolikom srodne težnje, jer su njegove političke težnje, koje mu vjera uzbudjuje, za uvijek nemoguće” [The author's own translation].

⁴³ Starinom Bošnjak (T. Alupović), *Sarajevo*, „Vienac” 1895, god. XXVII, br. 22, p. 438.

⁴⁴ Idem, *Sarajevo*, „Vienac” 1895, god. XXVII, br. 29, p. 463 Original text of quotation: „Utišavati mržnju izmed braće raznih vjera, piriti ljubav medjusobnu, isticati točke, koje su nam svima zajedničke. To je prvo vrelo. Iz njega se napaja Tugomir Alupović, Osman Hadžić, Bašagić, beg Štafić i mnogi drugi. – Gradivo beletristi i pjesniku bosanskom davat će i dodir izmed zapadne kulture i istočne, te djelovanje tih kultura na naš narod u Bosni” [The author's own translation].

Despite the scant references to individual figures of the Muslim modernization movement, the attitude of the author to these circles can be deduced from the description of the Bosnian reality. As Tresić Pavičić, Alaupović, being shaped in the culture of the nineteenth-century progressive national republicanism, expresses his suspicion or even reluctance towards oriental social conventions or even the post-Ottoman spatial order of the Bosnian cities.⁴⁵ The author of the account was also suspicious of the nature of Bosnian Islam, which he perceived as dominated by ritual and unreflective religiosity. However, he did not directly attack Islam as a religion but its “distortions” resulting, as he supposes, from the lack of good education, including the lack of knowledge of Arabic as the language of Islamic liturgy. He also sheds on the score of non-reflexive religiosity the existence of social conventions, often referred to as fanaticism, in which he sees the cause of much social pathology.

In his opinion, as a result of religious conventions, most of the Bosnian Muslim women became slothful and socially useless (they did not do shopping, they could not sew, and even neglect the development of their own children, who were really looked after only by hodja, while studying in the mekteba). As a result, they devote themselves to occult practices and other superstitions, and to wasting time on rumors and meaningless conversations.

Alaupović consistently shows the face of a nineteenth-century liberal. It does not differ from the majority of its predecessors, who also criticized the oriental aspects of Bosnian culture, seeing them as an obstacle to establishing a social system preferred by the then liberal bourgeoisie (which expressed its views on this issue also through the appropriate urban planning of cities—hence the critique of oriental urbanism).⁴⁶ His pursuit of a veristic description of the lives of Muslim women is largely consistent with what Tresić Pavičić wrote. A similar view of the case was also presented by the Polish doctor Teodora Krajewska who was working in Bosnia at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. She also described Muslim women as generally cut off from the world and forced to live in terrible hygienic conditions under the influence of cultivated religious customs. She emphasized, however, that it often results not so much from the Quran itself, but from the fact that the custom “was born over the centuries under the influence of fanaticism.” She also noticed that there were also “progressive Muslims” in the womb of Bosnian Muslim ethnies, who were respectful towards women.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Idem, *Sarajevo*, „Vienac” 1895, god. XXVII, br. 16, pp. 254–255; A. Tresić Pavičić, *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, “Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 9, p. 165.

⁴⁶ C. E. Schorske, *Beč krajem stoljeća. Politika i kultura*, Zagreb 1997, pp. 47–78, 128–129.

⁴⁷ Starinom Bošnjak (T. Alaupović), *Sarajevo*, „Vienac” 1895, god. XXVII, br. 24, p. 382; T. z Kosmowskich Krajewska, *Pamiętnik*, Kraków 1989, pp. 71–72.

Alaupović himself recognizes that also Christians were a group on the margins of social life. That is why he emphasizes the need to include women in national work, and the feminine issue often appears in his text, always in connection with the failure to use the potential of either Muslim women or Christians. All of them are, in his opinion, victims of a lack of education and the result of well-established social conventions. Religion, although it appears in the background of this criticism, is not a decisive factor in shaping the character of Bosnian women. Alaupović most often draws attention to the materialism of poor and declassed people who preserve the type of life which is harmful to the development of what he considers proper social attitudes. Therefore, he strongly appeals to care for the education and personality development of women, who in this way can become full-fledged members of their communities.⁴⁸

However, in the enormous social problems Starinom Bošnjak vel Tugomir, Alaupović noticed changes initiated either by Croats or Muslim intellectualists going in the direction he desired. Alaupović (due to his musical interests) focuses on singing societies. He describes with appreciation activity of the Trebević Singing Society, which he describes as a "purely Croatian" organization. Its main driving force in that period was Croatian patriotism, thanks to which it was possible to gather both rich citizens from Croatia and local representatives of the lower layers. Although activities of the society were primarily directed at Bosnian Catholics, according to the beliefs of activists shaped by the ideas of the Party of Rights, the Muslims could also enroll. This openness led, in the years 1899–1900, to the conflict with the Sarajevo bishop Josip Stadler. He believed that faith is not only part of the sphere of privacy and should play its proper role in the life of the nation. Therefore, he tried to emphasize its presence in various social activities, including those concerning culture. In 1899, the Croatian Trebević Singing Society decided to organize the ceremony of introducing its banner. Due to the fact that the members of the organization could also be non-Catholics, lay people as well as Bosnian Franciscans who were playing a significant role in it, organizers wanted a lay celebration, while Stadler insisted on giving it a Catholic shape. Because in the voting of the society's members won the first option, Stadler forbade the diocesan priests who were members of the organization to appear at this ceremony due to the fact that "the desire to please a few Muslims deprives her of Catholic character."⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Starinom Bošnjak (T. Alaupović), *Sarajevo*, „Vienac" 1895, god. XXVII, br. 25, pp. 396–398.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, pp. 379; J. Krišto, *Riječ je o Bosni*, Zagreb 2008, pp. 43–50.

In addition to the question of singing societies, Alaupović also mentions the existence of Muslim reading rooms for books and magazines (*kiraethana*). The author of the travelogue classified them as institutions serving primarily personal and social development (which again justifies the principles of Islam prohibiting empty play). Its space serves Muslims both for the basic purpose of reading the press and books, as well as for official meetings (e.g. on Bajram). Social meetings take place in a cafe next door. As the author points out, both Turkish and Croatian magazines, as well as newspapers, are available in the reading room. Similarly, in cafes, which as spaces beyond the continuous supervision of the state, can provide the entire spectrum of the daily and cultural-social press regardless of their “national origin.”

Taking into account above mentioned beliefs and views of Alaupović about situation and society of Bosnia and Herzegovina it can be seen that they are deeply convergent with those of Osman Nuri Hadžić. As for Alaupović most of the Ottoman heritage in culture and customs of the inhabitants of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a kind of burden for this country it can be concluded that his attitude to the modernisation and pro-Croatian oriented Muslim has to be positive. Alaupović probably noticed that thanks to their help, it could be possible to more effectively Europeanize former Turkish province, and convince its Muslim inhabitants to choose Croatian national identity. In this context, it is not surprising that, just like Tresić, he found Bašagić and Hadžić, intellectuals cooperating with the Croatian national movement, worth mentioning in his travelogue.

All of presented in this work authors, as active members of nation-oriented but progressive circles of Croatian intelligentsia, were trying to contact with Bosnian Muslims. Their attention was focused on those people whom they could call Muslim occidentalists or progressists, so kind of counterparts and potential collaborators. However, until the last decade of the 19th century, most of those meetings were rather matter of accident, than well-planned action, especially because nearly all journeys were quite short stays. As an effect, there was no place to begun longer and regular cooperation with the aim of modernising Bosnian society, not mentioning carrying on national propaganda among Bosnians of all faiths. After the Austro-Hungarian occupation had stabilized, Croats got more chances to attract members of the young Muslim elite to the Croatian national idea and its components inspired by the idea of progress. Consequences of such change can be seen in travelogues of Tresić Pavičić and Tugomir Alaupović (*Starinom Bošnjak*). Both Tresić and Alaupović planned at least some of their meetings and sought particular persons to speak to. In contrast to Kukuljević Sakcinski and Pilar, they could also get acquainted with

beliefs of such then Croatian-leaning activists like Bašagić and Hadžić even before they started their journey. That fact largely influenced their own beliefs. Like their predecessors, they had their views on Bosnia and its ethnies already shaped by the national idea before coming to the neighbouring country. They were somehow obsessed with "prejudices" flowing from then European culture, so they wanted to modernise and Europeanise Bosnia and Herzegovina to get its people closer to Croatia. More frequent contacts with part of new Bosnian Muslim elites, the testimony of which can be travelogues, affected their way of thinking. Both authors were not only projecting European views on Bosnians but in contrast to Kukuljević and Pilar, they were taking over some views of Bosnian Muslim progressive intelligentsia (it can be noticed especially when it comes to Islam). Travelogues witness also about kind of unwillingness to contact and cooperate with two biggest groups of Bosnian Muslim elites—promodernisation circle around Kapetanović Ljubušak and traditionalist circle around Džabić, concealing which ultimately led to the failure of plans to assimilate a bigger number of adherents of Islam to Croatian national culture. In effect activity of Croatian intellectuals helped to finally shape a modern national identity of Bosniak nation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Assman J., *Pamięć kulturowa. Pismo, zapamiętywanie i polityczna tożsamość w cywilizacjach starożytnych*, Warszawa 2008.
2. *Autobiografije hrvatskih pisaca*, prir. V. Brešić V, Zagreb 1997.
3. Bašagić S., Ćatić Ćazim M., *Izabrana djela*, Zagreb 2005.
4. Burkot S., *Polskie podróżopisarstwo romantyczne*, Warszawa 1988.
5. *Czytać, wędrować, być. Tom dedykowany Profesorowi Zdzisławowi Daraszowi*, red. M. Bogusławska, J. Goszczyńska, J. Šuler-Galos, Warszawa 2016.
6. Dizdar S., *Prvi Bošnjački novinar Mehmed Šaćir Kurtćehajić (1844–1872)*, "Bosniaca. Journal of the National and University Library of Bosnia and Herzegovina", No. 17 (2012).
7. Donia R. J., *Islam pod dvoglavim orlom: Muslimani Bosne i Hercegovine 1878.–1914.*, Zagreb–Sarajevo 2000.
8. Duda D., *Priča i putovanje*, Zagreb 1998.
9. Džaja S. M., *Politički profil fra Grge Martića*, „Bosna franciscana”, III (1995), br. 4.
10. *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, t. 6, *Maklj-Put*, ur. M. Krleža, Zagreb 1965.
11. *Enciklopedija Jugoslavije*, t. 8, *Srbija-Ž*, ur. M. Krleža, Zagreb 1971.
12. Falski M., *Pamięć społeczna a ideologia. Z problematyki autodefinicji kultury bośniackiej*, „Południowosłowiańskie Zeszyty Naukowe. Język – Literatura – Kultura” 2007, t. 4.
13. Falski M., *Porządkowanie przestrzeni narodowej – przypadek chorwacki. Studium z historii wyobrażeń kulturowych*, Warszawa 2008.
14. *Identitet Bosne i Hercegovine kroz historiju. Zbornik radova*, ur. H. Kamberović, Sarajevo 2011.

15. Jahić A., *Bošnjačka elita u prvoj polovini XX stoljeća – naslijeđe, kontekst, prioriteti, interesi*, „Godišnjak BZK Preporod” 2011, god. XI.
16. Juzbašić Dž., *Nacionalno-politički odnosi u bosanskohercegovačkom saboru i jezičko pitanje (1910–1914)*, Sarajevo 1999.
17. Kisić Kolanović N., *Ademaga Mešić i hrvatska nacionalna ideja 1895.–1918. godine*, „Časopis za suvremenu povijest” 2008, god. 40, br. 3.
18. Klaić V., *Bosna. Podatci o zemljopisu i povijesti Bosne i Hercegovine. Prvi dio: Zemljopis*, Zagreb 1878.
19. Kodrić S., *Kako su Bošnjaci videli muslimanski Orijent i europski Zapad krajem 19. i početkom 20.stoljeća?*, [online] http://dSPACE.uni.lodz.pl:8080/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11089/20053/%5b41%5d_56_Kodric.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y [accessed: 12.01.2019].
20. Krajewska z Kosmowskich T., *Pamiętnik*, Kraków 1989.
21. Krišto J., *Riječ je o Bosni*, Zagreb 2008.
22. Kukuljević Sakcinski I., *Izabrana djela*, Zagreb 1997.
23. *Leksykon idei wędrownych na słowiańskich Bałkanach XVIII–XXI wiek. Oświecenie. Religia. Racjonalizm*, Warszawa 2018.
24. Lorković B., Nodilo N., Pavlinović M., Rački F., *Izbori iz djela*, Zagreb 1969.
25. Mažuranić I., Mažuranić M., *Smrt Smail-age Čengića, Stihovi, Proza. Pogled u Bosnu*, Zagreb 1965.
26. Niedzielski Cz., *O teoretycznoliterackich tradycjach prozy dokumentarnej. Podróż – Powieść – Reportaż*, Toruń 1979.
27. Oršolić T., *Franjevci – utemeljitelji prve hrvatske pučke škole u Tolisi i uopće u Bosni i Hercegovini. Od prve pučke škole 1823. do osnivanja državne škole 1893.*, „Bosna franciscana” 2006, god. XIV, br. 25.
28. Pederin I., *Književnost hrvatskoga realizma i „Vijenac” o Bosni i Hercegovini poslije Šenoine smrti*, „Kačić” 1997, br. 29.
29. Pilar Đ., *Putopisne crtice iz Bosne*, Slavonski Brod 2007.
30. Posavec V., *Povijesni zemljovid i granice Hrvatske u Tomislavovo doba*, „Radovi – Zavod za hrvatsku povijest” 1997, t. 30.
31. *Programatski dokumenti hrvatskih političkih stranaka i skupina 1842.–1914.*, prir. T. Cipek, S. Matković, Zagreb 2006.
32. Rački F., Pavlinović M., Nodilo N., Lorković B., *Izbori iz djela*, Zagreb 1969.
33. Rapacka J., *Śródziemnomorze – Europa Środkowa – Bałkany. Studia z literatur południowo-słowiańskich*, Kraków 2002.
34. Rizvić M., *Behar. Književnohistorijska monografija*, Sarajevo 2000.
35. Šagolj. S., *Novinstvo i nastanak nacija u BiH (1850.–1914.)*, Split–Mostar 2011.
36. *Sarajevski filološki susreti II. Zbornik radova*, knj. II, ur. S. Kodrić, V. Preljević, Sarajevo 2014.
37. Schorske C. E., *Beč krajem stoljeća. Politika i kultura*, Zagreb 1997.
38. Seroka M., *Chorwacja turecka – Turcja europejska? Bośnia w podróżopisarstwie epoki jugoslawizmu*, „Pamiętnik Słowiański” 2013, t. LXIII, z. 1–2.
39. Seroka M., *Środowisko sarajewskiej „Nady” i napływowi Chorwaci w Bośni i Hercegowinie w szkicach z podróży Antego Tresicia Pavičića*, [in:] *Czytać, wędrować, być. Tom dedykowany Profesorowi Zdzisławowi Daraszowi*, red. M. Bogusławska, J. Goszczyńska, J. Šuler-Galos, Warszawa 2016, pp. 101–112.

40. Smith A. D., *Etniczne korzenie narodów*, Kraków 2009.
41. Smith A. D., *Kulturowe podstawy narodów. Hierarchia, przymierze i republika*, Kraków 2009.
42. *Spotkania międzykulturowe. 1. Literaturoznawstwo. Kultura*, red. K. Jarząbek, A. Ruttar, S. Sojda, Katowice 2013.
43. Starčević A., *Iztočno pitanje*, Varaždin 1995.
44. Starčević A., *Politički spisi*, Zagreb 1971.
45. Starinom Bošnjak (Alaupović T.), *Sarajevo*, „Vienac” 1895, god. XXVII (1895), br. 16, 22, 24, 25, 29.
46. Šuško Dž., *Bosniaks & Loyalty: Responses to the Conscription law in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1881/1882*, “Hungarian Historical Review” 2014, Vol. 3, No. 3.
47. Tresić Pavičić A., *Bosna i Hercegovina. Putopisne crtice*, „Dom i svijet” 1896, br. 8, 9, 10.
48. Veber Tkalčević A., *Put na Plitvice, Odabrana proza*, Vinkovci 1998.
49. Zindrum A., *Bosna u ljeto 1879. godine. uz 160. obljetnicu rođenja puto-pisca Đure Pilara*, „Bosna franciscana” 2006, god. 14, br. 25.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), s. 85–110
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDSP.10.2019.24.5
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0001-5864-5264

KRZYSZTOF POPEK

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW
FACULTY OF HISTORY
E-MAIL: POPEK.KJ@GMAIL.COM

SUBMISSION: 3.12.2018
ACCEPTANCE: 12.07.2019

De-Ottomanisation of Land. Muslim Migrations and Ownership in the Bulgarian Countryside after 1878¹

ABSTRACT

The turn of the 19th and 20th c. brought about deep changes in the Bulgarian ownership structure: what the Russians labeled the Agrarian Revolution, related to all processes of land changing hands from Muslim to Bulgarian ones. The basis for most activities related to seizures of Muslim estates were migrations and the abandonment of property during the war in 1877–1878. During the period of the Provisional Russian Administration in Bulgaria (March 1878–June 1879) the Agrarian Revolution was one of the most important tasks that the Tsar's representatives addressed in Bulgaria. Bulgarian control over land was to be the foundation of Christian domination in the state, which the Russians also saw as a guarantee of their continued influence in the Eastern Balkans. This involved both dispossessions and lotting out *chiftliks* among the agrarian workers who cultivated the land, as well as taking control over properties abandoned by war refugees (so-called *muhajirs*). The article is focused on the Muslim medium and small peasants, the cases of owners of *chiftliks* will not be considered, according to a large range of the topic.

KEYWORDS

Muslims Minority in Bulgaria, Agrarian Revolution in Bulgaria, Bulgarian History, 19th Century, Balkans

¹ Research presented in this article was financed by the grant of the Polish National Science Center: *The Balkan Migration Processes in the 19th Century. Cases of Bulgaria and Serbia* (2017/25/N/HS3/00576).

The land was of crucial importance to the Bulgarian society, which until the mid-20th century primarily inhabited rural areas, and was mainly occupied with livestock rearing and farming.² When the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) broke out, which led to the establishment of the modern Bulgarian state, as much as 70 percent of agricultural land was owned by Muslims, who made up ca. 50 percent of the population of these areas. They included both *beys*—owners of large farms (so-called *chiftliks* and *gospodarluks*³), and medium and small peasants. The turn of the 19th and 20th c. brought about deep changes in the Bulgarian ownership structure: what the Russians labeled the Agrarian Revolution, related to all processes of land changing hands from Muslim to Bulgarian ones. During the period of the Provisional Russian Administration in Bulgaria (March 1878–June 1879) this was one of the most important tasks that the Tsar’s representatives addressed in Bulgaria. Bulgarian control over land was to be the foundation of Christian domination in the state, which the Russians also saw as a guarantee of their continued influence in the Eastern Balkans. This involved both dispossessions and lotting out *chiftliks* among the agrarian workers who cultivated the land, as well as taking control over properties abandoned by war refugees (so-called *muhajirs*).

The article is focused on the Muslim medium and small peasants (the cases of owners of *chiftliks* will not be considered, according to a large range of the topic). The article’s goal is to present that after the creation of the Bulgarian state not only the situation of the Muslim beys deteriorated markedly. The Muslim medium and small peasants were victims of the transformation as well. Contrary to Bulgarian claims, popular especially during the communist regime, that only “Turkish feudalists” lost out as a result of the Agrarian Revolution and that it was not aimed against the ordinary Muslim population, a whole host of Islamic small farmers suffered, and entire settlements were sometimes bought out as a result.⁴ The process was not exclusively anti-feu-

² M. Neuburger, *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*, Ithaca-London 2004, p. 170.

³ The difference between these terms is unclear. In Ottoman-Turkish sources, they are used inconsistently, often interchangeably. Formally, a *chiftlik* was a large private estate, while in the case of *gospodarluks* ownership rights were limited, e.g. with regard to collecting rent. С. Драганова, *Кюстендилски регион 1864–1919. Етнодемографско и социалноикономическо изследване*, София 1996, pp. 26–29, 87.

⁴ *От Варненския губернатор до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, Варна 20.11. 1879*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 7 л. 30–31; Д. Косев, Х. Христов, Ж. Натан, В. Хаджиниколов, К. Василев, *История на България*, Т. 2, София 1955, pp. 26–29; М. Палангурски, *Нова история на България*, Т. I: Княжество (1879–1911), София 2013, p. 64.

dalist (if it is even possible to talk about feudalism in the case of the Ottoman Empire), but also ethnicity-related.⁵

Muslims were not a homogenous group in the Bulgarian lands—among them, there were Turks, Slavophone people (Pomaks), Roma, Tatars, Circasians, etc. It is worth pointing out that in the 19th century most members of the Muslim population identified themselves through the prism of religion (as *ummah*) and membership of local communities (except for the Albanians). National identity based on language and ethnic origin was not a widespread concept in the Balkan Peninsula at that time, especially among Muslims. In the sources, both administrative and diplomatic, which are the methodological basis of the text, the term “Muslim” is usually alternative to “Turk.” That phenomenon is linked to the biggest problem with the researches of the migrations and ownership in the Bulgarian lands until the 20th century. There was the mix-up linked to the different civil, national, religious, and ethnic terms, using in the different contexts and without the uniform definitions.⁶ The term ‘Turk’ was used as the ethnic or national, religious (means Muslim), even civil (a subject of the sultan).⁷ The statistic data are full of the manipulations, defects, and false information. The best example is the Ottoman censuses. According to the different Turkish sources, in the 1870s, Bulgarians were 24–39% of the whole Balkans inhabitants, Greeks—9–16%, and Muslims—11–24%.⁸ Justin McCarthy claimed that the Ottoman Empire in the turn of the 19th and 20th century is “a nightmare for demographer”—the same problem is linked to Bulgaria in that time.⁹ That is why it is important to confront the sources of the different provenance: the internal one (as the recourses from the Balkan state’s or Ottoman archives), but also the external (for example, the diplomatic materials from the British archives are full of the interesting information).

The basis for most activities related to seizures of Muslim estates were migrations and the abandonment of property during the war in 1877–1878. Justin McCarthy estimates that ca. 500,000 Muslims were forced to flee from Bulgaria

⁵ И. Ялъмов, *История на турската общност в България*, София 2002, pp. 78–79.

⁶ V. Mutafchieva, *The Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy*, [in:] *Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria*, eds. A. Zhelyazkova, J. S. Nielsen, J. Kepell, Sofia 1994, p. 25.

⁷ М. Сарафов, *Населението в градовете: Русе, Варна и Шумен*, „Периодическо списание“ 1882, кн. 3, pp. 44–45; В. Арденски, *Загаснали огнища. Изселническите процеси сред българите мохамедани в периода 1878–1944 г.*, София 2005, p. 10.

⁸ K. Karpát, *Ottoman Population 1830–1914. Demographic and Social Characteristic*, London 1985, p. 45.

⁹ J. McCarthy, *Muslim in Ottoman Europe: Population from 1880 to 1912*, “Nationalities Papers” 2000, No. 1 (28), p. 29.

during the conflict, and up to 250,000 died as a result of military operations, hunger, disease, and cold.¹⁰ The Agrarian Revolution was most often related to preventing the recovery of the land left behind as a result of fleeing for refuge—during the owner's absence, the Bulgarians disposed of it freely, disregarding ownership rights. The Muslims who did not decide to leave during the war found themselves in a much better position, although their ownership rights were also sometimes violated.¹¹ This is why seizures of Muslim estates were much more limited in the north-eastern regions of Bulgaria, where fighting did not break out on such a large scale, and Muslim emigration did not become a mass phenomenon.¹²

In February (O.S. January) 1878 in San Stefano, a peace treaty was signed by the fighting sides, which also included provisions regulating the issue of the *muhajirs*. Article 11 of the treaty guaranteed the ownership rights of the Muslim refugees, including the possibility to manage their land from outside the borders of the Principality of Bulgaria. Mixed Bulgarian and Turkish commissions under Russian supervision were announced, which were supposed to regulate the refugees' property issues within two years. After this period, all land with an unregulated status was going to be put up for auction, and the revenue was to benefit war widows and orphans.¹³ The Treaty of Berlin signed in July 1878 kept the majority of the provisions of Article 11 of the Treaty of San Stefano, with the exception that the Bulgarian-Turkish commissions for refugee land were described in less specific terms. Additional guarantees were introduced, concerning the need to regulate all matters related to lands legally owned by the Sublime Porte (state-owned land and *waqfs*).¹⁴

Initially, the majority of these guarantees seemed to be fiction. From the early stages of the Russo-Turkish War in 1877–1878, the Russians encouraged the local Christians to settle on the land abandoned by the *muhajirs*, and after the Bulgarian state was established, they sent Bulgarians from Macedonia, Thrace and mountain regions to the abandoned settlements. The *muhajirs'* lands and estates were first leased out, with the rent going to the state treasury or local authorities (although theoretically it should have been sent to the for-

¹⁰ Дж. Маккарти, *Смърт и изгнание: Етническото прочистване на османските мюсюлмани (1821–1922)*, прев. К. Панайотова, София 2010, pp. 126–129.

¹¹ *Palgrave to Marquis of Salisbury, Sophia 20.06.1879*, FO 78/2838/87–89.

¹² R. Crampton, *The Turks in Bulgaria, 1878–1944*, [in:] *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority*, ed. K. Karpat, Istanbul 1990, p. 46.

¹³ *Traktat pokojowy zawarty przez Rosję i Turcję w San Stefano (19.02/3.03.1878)*, [in:] *Historia Bułgarii 1870–1915. Materiały źródłowe z komentarzami*, t. 1: *Polityka międzynarodowa*, red. J. Rubacha, A. Malinowski, A. Giza, Warszawa 2006, pp. 26–27.

¹⁴ *Traktat berliński (13.07.1878)*, [in:] *Historia Bułgarii 1870–1915...*, op. cit., t. 1, p. 41.

mer owners).¹⁵ This was justified by practical reasons—arable land could not be allowed to lie fallow indefinitely, and the owner's fate was unknown.¹⁶ In this situation, after returning, the *muhajirs* frequently did not even attempt to sell their property, discouraged by the prospect of arguing with the new tenants and the hostility of the local authorities. They either left for the Ottoman Empire again or moved to another area of the Principality and established new settlements.¹⁷ It was even more difficult to recover nationalized property, such as estates which were first under the control of the Russian army and then the Ministry of War.¹⁸

Following a wave of criticism from the Sublime Porte and the great powers, in the end, the Russian authorities decided to regulate the issue of repatriates repossessing the land. The regulation of the Board of the Russian Imperial Commissioner in Bulgaria regarding Turkish refugees of 14 (2) August 1878 guaranteed that the Muslim émigrés from the period of the Liberation War would repossess their estates or, if this were impossible, receive compensation equivalent to their value. This was conditional on proving one's ownership before a court. The exception was the Muslims guilty of crimes against the Bulgarians during the Great Eastern Crisis, Circassians, and persons who refused to give up weapons.¹⁹ On 1 September (20 August) 1878, the Ottoman authori-

¹⁵ *От Министерство на вътрешните дела до Министерство на финансите*, 29.09.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 190 л. 4; *От Бургарска окръжна постоянна комисия до Бургарско окръжно управление*, 28.09.1890, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 190 л. 23; *Журналъ совета императорского Российского Комисара в България*, 23.12.1878, ДА-Варна ф. 78к оп. 2 а.е. 11 л. 1; *От Севлиево окръжен началник до Министерство на финансите*, 02.1880, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 37 л. 41; *Преписка между окръжния началник и Градски управителен съвет в Самоков*, Самоков 25.11.1878, [in:] *Миграционни движения на българите 1878–1941*, Т. 1: 1878–1912, съст. В. Василиева, В. Гигов, Г. Стоянова, К. Георгиева, К. Недевска, София 1993, pp. 40–44; *Изложение за състояние на Севлиевското окръжие през 1890–1891*, Севлиево 1891, pp. 7–8; „Държавен вестник“ 1882, год. IV, бр. 3 (12 януари), p. 7; „Държавен вестник“ 1882, год. IV, бр. 4 (14 януари), p. 8; „Държавен вестник“ 1882, год. IV, бр. 5 (21 януари), pp. 7–8; А. М. Mirkova, „Population Politics“ at the End of Empire: Migration and Sovereignty in Ottoman Eastern Rumelia, 1877–1886, „Comparative Studies in Society and History“ 2013, No. 55 (4), p. 964.

¹⁶ *Прошение от жителите на Балчишка околия до Народно събрание*, 22.11.1880, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 26 л. 56–58; Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава и нейните малцинства 1879–1885*, София 1999, p. 151; R. Crampton, op. cit., pp. 45–46.

¹⁷ *Преселвания и изселвания в Старозагорски окръг през 1881–1883 г.*, [in:] *История на българите 1878–1944 в документи*, Т. 1: 1878–1912, ч. 1: *Възстановяване и развитие на българската държава*, ред. В. Георгиев, С. Трифонов, София 1994, pp. 83–84

¹⁸ *Прошение от Исмаил Хакки Рашидоглу из Русе до Дипломатически агент в Цариград*, Цариград 18.03.1881, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 31 л. 2.

¹⁹ *Журналъ императорского Российского Комисара в България*, 2.08.1878, ДА-Варна ф. 78к оп. 2 а.е. 1 л. 1–6.

ties issued an official protest against the August regulation as a document which severely infringed the rights of the refugees.²⁰ Under this pressure, the Russian occupation authorities decided to make further concessions and changed the procedures of returning the repatriates' land. Instead of court proceedings, which were often long and problematic, in indisputable cases, it was sufficient to present the deed to the property issued in the Ottoman times (*tapu*).²¹

The regulation of August 1878 did not expedite the process of returning to the *muhajirs* the estates which had been leased out during their absence from the country. Due to the generality of the regulation, there was a lot of confusion surrounding this problem. In 1878, the Governor of Sofia directed a series of questions to the Ministry of Finance, concerning the procedures of returning land and estates to the Muslim refugees. The answer to the document only tells us that the repatriates were not allowed to enter the estate before all procedures related to proving their ownership had been completed.²² In this situation, the local authorities simply did not know how to act when a Muslim repatriate turned to them asking to repossess their estate.²³ The Varna gubernatorial authorities which had the lease of abandoned estates under their jurisdiction returned the land and estates if the lease contract had come to an end.²⁴ If it was still ongoing, the owner had to wait. In such cases, another land was often leased out to the owner and support in the form of food supplies was offered, to buy time for deciding the issue of ownership before a court.²⁵ The matter was additionally complicated by the fact that during the process of

²⁰ O. Köse, *The Policies of the Bulgarian State towards the Minorities (1878–1914)*, „Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi” 2012, 3(6), pp. 229–230.

²¹ Ж. Назърска, *Малцинствено-религиозната политика в Източна Румелия (1879–1885)*, [in:] *Мюсюлманските общности на Балканите и в България*, Т. 1, ред. А. Желязкова, София 1997, p. 122.

²² *Рапорт от Софийски губернатор до Министерство на финансите, 3.10.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 33 л. 5, 8.

²³ *От Софийски губернатор до Финансовия отделение на Руската императорски комисар, София 6.12.1878*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 1; *От Софийски губернатор до Финансовия отдел на Руската императорски комисар, София 13.02.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 3; *От Министерство на правосъдието до Министерство на финансите, 6.10.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 24; *Протокол на Министерския съвет от 11 юни 1880 г.*, ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 24–26.

²⁴ *Рапорт от Варненски губернатор до Министерство на финансите, 3.10.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 33 л. 1–2; *Рапорт от Варненски губернатор до Министерство на финансите, 8.10.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 33 л. 3.

²⁵ *От Софийски губернатор до Министерство на финансите, София 19.09.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 22; *От Министерство на финансите до Софийски губернатор, 26.09.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 23.

leasing the land out to refugees all sorts of mistakes and irregularities occurred, e.g. a piece of land was leased out to two persons at the same time.²⁶ On the other hand, after the war ended, the refugees frequently ignored the laws passed by the Russians and the Bulgarians and did not attempt to prove their ownership to anyone. Unless their land was being used at the moment of their return, they simply reoccupied it, regardless of the regulations. However, the local authorities decided that unless they proved their ownership of the estate, they would be evicted and moved to replacement housing.²⁷

In virtually all parts of the country, there were a number of complaints about violating the *muhajirs'* land rights with regard to selling, buying, and leasing. In the regions near Varna, the number of such cases was especially high. The Foreign Minister, Marko Balabanov, explained to representatives of Turkey and the great powers that such situations were not caused by ill will, but by a great number of cases and by the offices being overburdened. He emphasized that the problem of returning property after emigration did not affect only Muslims, but Christians as well. He pointed out that most often the local authorities were guilty of irregularities and those specific clerks would be held responsible. The Bulgarian head of diplomacy promised to appoint special commissions, which would examine the cases described in petitions.²⁸

Indeed, to regulate the problem of returning estates to the Muslim refugees, and at the same time to implement Article 12 of the Treaty of Berlin, on 4 August (23 July) 1879 commissions for refugees were appointed. Their main task was to analyze the deeds presented by the *muhajirs* returning to Bulgaria, to check their authenticity, and to make a decision about returning the estate or, if this was impossible, estimating the compensation in the form of money or another estate. The commissions dealt only with indisputable cases, and if more persons were claiming the ownership of a property, the dispute was to be settled by a court. The governor of a given district, as well as two Bulgarians and two Muslims appointed by the Prince, were to sit on the commissions. The meetings of these bodies were to be held every day until all cases of war refugees were resolved. Appeals against the commission's decisions were to be heard by appellate courts. Initially, it was assumed that all cases related to regulating the status of refugee estates would be resolved within three years.²⁹

²⁶ Изложение на Коста Темелкова с Балчишкия окръжен съвет, Балчик 13.09.1879, ДА-Варна ф. 78к оп. 2 а.е. 30 л. 2–5.

²⁷ Из протокол нр. 1 от заседание на Министерски съвет с постановление за начина на връщане на недвижимите имоти на избягалите турци (София, 28 април 1880), [in:] Русия и възстановяването на българската държавност (1878–1885 г.), ред. кол., София 2008, pp. 311–312.

²⁸ Palgrave to Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 26.07.1879, FO 195/1246/21–22.

²⁹ Указ на княза Александър I, София 23.07.1879, ДА-Варна ф. 78к оп. 2 а.е. 25 л. 1.

In Sofia, a superior commission was appointed, on which the president of the National Assembly and the governors of Varna and Sofia sat (these were the two regions from which the most complaints were lodged). The commission coordinated work on the restitution of estates of the war refugees across the country.³⁰ There were great numbers of cases to be heard—by May 1881, as many as 1,300 cases concerning the *muhajirs*'s ownership rights had been submitted.³¹ As a result, the waiting time for decisions could be very long, especially if the dissatisfied parties lodged an appeal³² or because of the negligence of the Bulgarian institutions (e.g. in 1881, when the district court was moved from Sevlievo to Tarnovo, a number of documents concerning ownership cases were lost).³³ The commission's efficiency was also negatively impacted by frequent changes in the makeup of the central commission in Sofia.³⁴

Commissions for refugees were appointed with the approval of the Ottoman authorities, which declared their willingness to cooperate and to provide all the necessary documents.³⁵ On the other hand, the decision was criticized not only by the Bulgarian liberals, who were in the opposition at the time but also by the ruling conservatives. The Minister of Finance, Grigor Nachovich, was attacked for this project in January 1880 at a meeting of the Council of Ministers. The other members of the government believed that Muslims should not be given any privileges and their cases should be heard according to the same rules as all the other ones, by common courts.³⁶

³⁰ *Lascales to Earl Granville, Sofia 9.07.1880*, no. 107, FO 195/1312 (no pages); *Lascales to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 13.04.1880*, no. 59, FO 195/1311 (no pages); *Lascales to Earl Granville, Sofia, 24.07.1880*, no. 118, FO 195/1312 (no pages); Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., pp. 155–156.

³¹ *Решение но. 5600, 13 май 1881 г.*, НБКМ-БИА ф. 11 а.е. 38 л. 3–4.

³² *Превод от прошение на Ахмед Мехмед Девлетоглу и Мусулан оглу Хабибулах до председател на Пловдивско окръжно гражданско съдилище, 3.11.1884*, ЦДА ф. 565к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 7–8; *Министерство на външните работи и изповеданията до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, София 2.07.1880*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 30 л. 163.

³³ *Прокурор на Търновски окръжен съд до Министерство на правосъдието, Търново 20.09.1881*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 26 л. 170; *Прожение от Мустафа Дебнелята из Севлиево до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, Цариград 10.12.1880*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 26 л. 174.

³⁴ *Протокол на Министерския съвет от 11 юни 1880 г.*, ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 24–26; *Протокол на Министерския съвет от 1 септември 1880 г.*, ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 94–96.

³⁵ *Mr. Palgrave to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sophia 31.10.1879*, [in:] *Ethnic Minorities in the Balkan States 1860–1971*, vol. 1: 1860–1885, ed. B. Destani, Cambridge 2003, p. 429.

³⁶ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 7.01.1880*, copy no. 1, FO 195/1311 (no pages).

The main problem at the early stages of the commissions' work was that their decisions depended on Bulgarian mayors. Each deed, according to the procedures, had to be authenticated by the local communal council, which led to situations where the mayor could decide arbitrarily who would recover their land and who would not. There were even claims that for the first two months of the commissions' operation, this regulation obstructed their work.³⁷ The Muslim repatriates accused the commissions of checking the land rights of the returning Muslims in a chaotic and subjective manner.³⁸ As a result of Grigor Nachevich's efforts, the procedure of authenticating deeds by mayors was abandoned in March 1880, which met with the resistance of commissions for refugees.³⁹ The decision was influenced by the British Consul in Sofia, John Ashburgham, who later received two petitions of thanks from the Muslims.⁴⁰

The fundamental problem related to the work of the commissions was the fact that the Bulgarian side naturally was not invested in the *muhajirs* repossessing their estates, and Nachevich's position cannot be regarded as a common one. The minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of 10 May (28 April) 1880 read that returning land in the region of Lom Palanka was to be based only on documents issued by the Russian occupation authorities after 14 (2) August 1878, while all deeds dated earlier than that were to be rejected.⁴¹ The minutes show that the local authorities and commissions for refugees were not the only ones to act against the interests of the returning *muhajirs*; the government, by ordering to break the regulations it had introduced, did so as well. This kind of selective approval of documents was against the law on commissions for refugees. Just after the war, the authorities in Sofia did not even have any scruples about lying to the Sublime Porte and the great powers on the subject of procedures related to refugees recovering the property. Bulgarian politicians frequently said one thing and did another.

The Ottoman Commissioner in Sofia, Nidhat Pasha, after expressing an initial approval, later frequently criticized the work of commissions for refugees, e.g. for isolating and marginalizing their Muslim members.⁴² The Bulgarians were accused of driving out *muhajirs* and forcibly seizing their property—

³⁷ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 20.01.1880*, copy no. 13, FO 195/1311 (no pages); *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 3.03.1880*, no. 38, FO 195/1311 (no pages).

³⁸ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 8.02.1880*, no. 24, FO 195/1311 (no pages).

³⁹ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 3.03.1880*, no. 38, FO 195/1311 (no pages).

⁴⁰ *Lasalles to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 9.04.1880*, no. 58, FO 195/1311 (no pages).

⁴¹ *Протокол на Министерския съвет от 28 Април 1880 г.*, ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 1–2.

⁴² *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 27.01.1880*, no. [16], FO 195/1311 (no pages); Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., p. 157.

such information was given to the Ottoman authorities by the refugees in Constantinople, who had been prevented from repossessing their estates.⁴³ Many complaints came from Sofia and its vicinity, where there was discontent about mass dispossessions, forcing the owners to sell their property at undervalued prices, and a lack of support from the authorities when their house or land was illegally taken.⁴⁴ The account of the former wealthiest man in Sofia, Halil Bey, included accusations that the Bulgarians unnecessarily kept the repatriates in suspense for months on end, during which the latter wasted time and money, only to find out that what was legally theirs would be taken away from them.⁴⁵ He accused the mayor of Sofia of issuing certificates of ownership on a whim. At the same time, the Sublime Porte proposed alternative ways of returning the property to refugees, which were repeatedly rejected by the Bulgarian side.⁴⁶ On the other hand, the authorities in Sofia claimed that the majority of the problems related to the procedures of returning the property to the *muhajirs* resulted from the Sublime Porte's activities, such as issuing fake deeds.⁴⁷ The Muslims were also accused of not showing any respect for Bulgarian court sentences and not accepting testimonies of Christian witnesses.⁴⁸

There were also voices which showed that the lives of the refugees gradually improved after the war ended. Already in November 1878, two delegations visited the Bulgarian government: a Jewish and a Muslim one, which expressed their gratitude for respecting their ownership rights, especially in comparison to the events during the conflict.⁴⁹ William Palgrave, who traveled to Samokov, Dupnitsa, and Kyustendil in September 1879, praised the Principality's authorities for making progress with regard to respecting the rights of the Muslims, including the return of property to war refugees and the work of the commissions.⁵⁰ However, opinions like this were drowned out by an avalanche of com-

⁴³ *Протокол на Министерския съвет от 11 юни 1880 г.*, ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 24–26; „Витоша” 1879, год. I, бр. 10 (30 юни), р. 1.

⁴⁴ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 22.12.1879*, FO 195/1246/275–279; *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 22.03.1880*, no. 46, FO 195/1311 (no pages); *Lascalles to Earl Granville, Sofia 24.07.1880*, no. 118, FO 195/1312 (no pages); *Palgrave to Marquis of Salisbury, Sophia 20.06.1879*, FO 78/2838/87–89; *Протокол на Министерския съвет от 14 май 1880 г.*, ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 10–12; *От Министерството на финансите до Софийски губернатор, София 19(29).09.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 22; *От Министерството на финансите до Софийски губернатор, София 26.09.1879*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 23.

⁴⁵ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 29.12.1879*, FO 195/1246/284.

⁴⁶ *Draft of W. Eshburham, 31.12.1879*, FO 78/3116/2–3.

⁴⁷ *Lascalles to Earl Granville, Sofia, 24.07.1880*, no. 118, FO 195/1312 (no pages).

⁴⁸ „Витоша” 1879, год. I, бр. 10 (30 юни), р. 1.

⁴⁹ *Palgrave to Marquis of Salisbury, Sophia 28.11.1878*, FO 78/2838/114.

⁵⁰ *Palgrave to Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 28.09.1879*, FO 195/1246/109–110.

plaints from the Muslim refugees concerning violations of their ownership rights, which were brought to Sofia, Constantinople, and representatives of the great powers.

The omnipresent criticism and the willingness to make the work of courts and commissions more efficient led to further concessions on the part of the authorities in Sofia with regard to returning the property to the *muhajirs*.⁵¹ In April 1880, during a session of the Council of Ministers, it was decided that the provisions of the August regulation would be abandoned. From that moment on, all persons forced to take refuge during the war and later would receive a guarantee of their ownership rights. Special funds were allocated to compensations for the illegal lease of mills belonging to the Muslims who would prove their rights.⁵² In June, 100,000 francs were allocated to helping Islamic refugees who found Christians living in their houses after their return.⁵³ Then, in September 1880 Prince Alexander Battenberg issued a decree which said that Bulgarian refugees were to repossess their land without going to court. Woodlands, mills, shops, and land which was not cultivated by them personally or only rented out were excluded—in these cases, they had to complete all the formalities before a commission for refugees.⁵⁴ In October, the monarch issued another decree, which gave the same rights to the *muhajirs*.⁵⁵

Bulgarian historian Zhorzheta Nezarska concluded that the monarch's edict of October 1880 was not caused by the willingness to resolve the refugee problem, but was meant to help Alexander Battenberg gain political capital by posing as a protector of Muslims in the Principality.⁵⁶ As a result, the document did not have much of an influence on the recovery of the Muslim estates abandoned during the war. They continued to have to prove their rights before commissions for refugees or, in contentious cases, before the court. The local authorities did not follow the regulations; they refused to pay out the sums

⁵¹ Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., p. 156.

⁵² *Из протокол нр. 1 от заседание на Министерски съвет с постановление за начина на връщане на недвижимите имоти на избягалите турци (София, 28 април 1880)*, [in:] *Русия и възстановяването...*, op. cit., pp. 311–312.

⁵³ *Указ за отпускане на средства за настаняване и подпомагане на бежанците, София 11.06.1880*, [in:] *Миграционни движения на българите...*, op. cit., Т. 1, p. 92.

⁵⁴ *Указ нр. 428 на княз Александър I за българите бежанци (17 септември 1880)*, [in:] *История на българите...*, op. cit., Т. 1, ч. 1, p. 419; *Протокол нр. 47 от заседанието на министерски съвет с постановление за реда за връщане на имотите на завърналите се в България турски бежанци (София 15 септември 1880)*, [in:] *Русия и възстановяването...*, op. cit., pp. 315–316

⁵⁵ *Указ нр. 544 на княз Александър I за бежанците турци (11 октомври 1880)*, [in:] *История на българите...*, op. cit., Т. 1, ч. 1, p. 420.

⁵⁶ Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., p. 156.

awarded for illegally leasing out the *muhajirs'* property during their absence, and if the land was returned, they sometimes gave back only some parts of it, while the other ones went into the hands of Bulgarian settlers. In the face of an increasing number of Bulgarians flowing in from Macedonia and Thrace, there were still cases of illegal dispossessions. There are accounts of cases where a *muhajir* received a sum calculated by the local authorities and was informed that he had sold his estate. Writing complaints often resulted in repressions against the author by the authorities or the police.⁵⁷ The local Christians often decided to take matters of ownership in their own hands. In 1880, the Bulgarian residents of Teteven and its vicinity turned to the Ministry of Finance for an approval of seizing the lands of the local Turks—"the most bloodthirsty brigands and fanatics." The Bulgarians reasoned that the Muslims' grazing lands belonged to them because earlier, during the Turkish period, the pastures had been illegally taken away from them.⁵⁸

Seeing that the edict of October 1880 remained only on paper, in February 1881, in order to control the situation, the government announced a ban on selling Muslim lands, including areas under the jurisdiction of Islamic religious communities (mainly *waqfs*). This was supposed to put the process of the turnover of lands belonging to the war refugees under the government's strict control. The protests of the Sublime Porte and the Western great powers, who found the regulation to mainly negatively affect the Muslims in Bulgaria, led to the government rescinding it in May 1881.⁵⁹

In early 1881, it was emphasized that the problem of regulating the issue of the refugees' lands was resolved in the case of the majority of the people who returned to the country. The more complicated cases involved the Muslims who remained abroad and claimed their ownership rights through attorneys. It was they who were accused of using lies and fake documents, and curious situations were described where three different representatives appeared with documents concerning one property. Such cases were considerably delayed due to the constant waiting for correspondence from the owners in the Ottoman Empire.⁶⁰ Therefore, the principle was adopted that a party in court proceedings who resided abroad had four months, counting from the moment of a court subpoena being issued, to prepare the appropriate letters of attorney

⁵⁷ *Brophy to Lascales, Varna 9.10.1880*, no. 31, FO 195/1312 (no pages); Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., pp. 156–158.

⁵⁸ *Прошение от жителите на Тетевен и околии до Министерството на финансите, [1880]*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 31 л. 100–103.

⁵⁹ Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., p. 164.

⁶⁰ *Представление от Търновско окръжен управител до Министерство на правосъдието, Търново 5.02.1881*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 4 л. 36–37.

or to appear personally in Bulgaria.⁶¹ There were also suggestions to restrict the activity of attorneys: to definitively eliminate those representing the owners who had lost their ownership rights on the basis of the August regulation and to require attorneys to have letters from the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Constantinople alongside letters from their clients.⁶²

Dispossessions of war refugees were often justified by the fact that due payments were not made during the owners' absence from the country. These included overdue state taxes, usually calculated on the basis of the old Ottoman rates, but also the costs of repairs completed by the temporary inhabitants.⁶³ The land was taken away from the refugees on the basis of outstanding debts, run up before the war, which remained unpaid because the debtor had emigrated. When interests reached a certain sum, the land was given to the creditor.⁶⁴ If the creditor was not interested in the estate and wanted to reclaim the debt in cash, an auction was organized to sell the property left by the refugee.⁶⁵ Bulgarian banks and agricultural credit banks offered preferential loans to peasants, which allowed them to buy out the land on their own—the lowest interest rate was 5–6 percent per year.⁶⁶

The transfer of the *muhajirs'* land sometimes did not go according to the law or was close to violating it. Husein Kara Mustafov from the village of Isunja Alahan (the district of Tarnovo) returned to Bulgaria from his emigration dur-

⁶¹ *От Министерство на правосъстието до Министерство на външните работи, София 24.08.1881, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 31 л. 64.*

⁶² *От Търновско окръжен управител до Прокурор при Търновски окръжен съд, Търново 29.01.1881, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 4 л. 38.*

⁶³ *Lascalles to Earl Granville, Sofia 24.07.1880, no. 118, FO 195/1312 (no pages); Протокол на Министерския съвет от 8 май 1880 г., ЦДА ф. 284 оп. 1 а.е. 1 л. 8–9; Журналъ совета императорского Российского Коммисара в България, 23.12.1878, ДА-Варна ф. 78к оп. 2 а.е. 11 л. 1; Рапорт от Земеделската каса в Балчик до Началник на Балчишкия окръг, Балчик 7.08.1879, ЦДА ф. 176к оп. 1 а.е. 35 л. 37–38.*

⁶⁴ *Препис, Русе 16.07.1879, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 7 л. 111; Рапорт на Земеделската каса до Русенски окръжен управител, Русе 5.11.1879, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 7 л. 114–115; „Витоша” 1880, год. I, бр. 72 (27 февруари), р. 4.*

⁶⁵ „Витоша” 1880, год. I, бр. 74 (5 март), р. 4; „Витоша” 1880, год. I, бр. 84 (12 април), р. 4; Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., р. 164.

⁶⁶ *Sir A. H. Layard to the Marquis of Salisbury, Philippopolis 12.12.1879, [in:] Ethnic Minorities...*, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 416–417; *Opinia nr 2992 ministra spraw wewnętrznych na temat zakupu i sprzedaży ziemi, skierowana do Ministerstwa Sprawiedliwości (10.09.1879), [in:] Historia Bułgarii 1870–1915. Materiały źródłowe z komentarzami, t. 3: Polityka wewnętrzna, red. J. Rubacha, A. Malinowski, Warszawa 2009, pp. 96–97; Продаване и купуване на недвижими имоти в Старозагорски окръг през 1881–1883 г., [in:] *История на българите...*, op. cit., Т. 1, ч. 1, pp. 85–86.*

ing the war in 1882. In April 1883 he regained his ownership by a court decision, but straight after the sentence was announced, he left the country again, without giving the land into anyone's care. The mayor concluded that the estate had been abandoned and took it over for the benefit of the local commune. It was not until 1888 that the heirs of Kara Mustafov issued a demand to reclaim the property. However, the local authorities decided that they had exceeded the deadline given to the war refugees to return and therefore lost their ownership rights.⁶⁷

After the Bulgarian state was established, the government regularly resettled Bulgarians from Macedonia and Thrace on lands abandoned by the Muslims, which led to multiple disputes. Mustafa Ismailov from the settlement of Hodja Mahle, near Kesarevo, left Bulgaria in 1882, having leased out his property. However, during his absence, the land fell under the state's control and, on the basis of the law on settling empty lands of May 1880, given to Bulgarian settlers. From 1883 Mustafa Ismailov tried to reclaim his property, not through official channels, however, but by directly contacting the Macedonian settler living there, Stoimen Nastanov. The Muslim offered to buy the land back from the settler several times, but the latter refused, emphasizing that he had received it from the government. In early 1885, the district authorities decided that Mustafa Ismailov had not completed the procedure for repossessing his estate before the deadline, so the land was granted to Nastanov.⁶⁸ Similar disputes happened between other *muhajirs* and the local population which had taken over their lands during the war.⁶⁹

With a view to quickly regulating the problem of the empty houses and land left behind by the Muslim war refugees, auctions were organized. The principle which was adopted was that the farmers had the right of pre-emption with regard to arable land. The goal was to avoid these areas being bought out by speculators, who would then resell them at inflated prices. For instance, after the war the price of land soared in Varna—while during the Turkish period a house could be bought there for ca. 10,000 kurush, in 1881 the price ranged from 40,000 to 50,000 kurush.⁷⁰ In the case of houses, the leaseholders had the right of pre-emption if they did not have any outstanding payments. At the same time, village mayors could make a requisition for land for the peasants

⁶⁷ От Търновско окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 15.06.1890, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 195 л. 27.

⁶⁸ От Търновско окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 11.04.1890, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 195 л. 22–23.

⁶⁹ Прошение от Павел Пенчов от ок. Оряхово от 6 февруари 1883 г., ЦДА ф. 708к оп. 1 а.е. 390 л. 1–2.

⁷⁰ „Свободна България“ 1881, бр. 1 (15 януари), р. 3.

who were “in the greatest need and the most trustworthy,” which would be granted without an auction.⁷¹

The issue of the Muslim refugees repossessing their estates was different in southern Bulgaria, where an Ottoman Empire autonomous province, controlled by the Bulgarians, was created. For the Russian occupation authorities, the transfer of Muslim land to Christians in Eastern Rumelia was of particular importance—its aim was also to give the province a Bulgarian character. It was not until the Organic Statute was introduced on 26 (14) April 1879 that the uncontrolled transfer of land from Muslim to Christian hands was restricted. The entire chapter XIV of Eastern Rumelia’s constitution regulated the problem of unused land, large estates, and *waqfs*, which was introduced under the pressure from the Western great powers and the Sublime Porte.⁷² After the Russian occupation ended, the lot of the refugees attempting to repossess their estates was easier in comparison to the Principality, and the law was by and large observed. The province’s courts kept to the decisions of the Treaty of Berlin and chapter XIV of the Organic Statute. When it was noticed that the implementation of court sentences pertaining to the return of property was dependent on the whim of the local authorities dominated by the Bulgarians, it was decided to put these cases under the jurisdiction of mixed Bulgarian and Turkish commissions.⁷³ According to the data collected by the Plovdiv commission for refugees, during the period when the autonomous territory existed 1,946 decisions were issued concerning *muhajir* estates, with 865 going in favor of the former owners and ordering that their land should be returned. The results of the work of the commissions operating in other cities were similar.⁷⁴ Plovdiv’s policy with regard to this problem frequently led to the dissatisfaction of Bulgarian peasants; e.g. agitation was caused by the case of the inhabitants of Shipka, where one of the most important battles of the Liberation War had taken place, and which was, therefore, a symbolic place. The local Bulgarians were evicted from the Turkish houses they had appropriated in the settlement of Sheynovo.⁷⁵

In the Principality of Bulgaria, the deadline given to the *muhajirs* to return while retaining their full land rights to the abandoned property was set to

⁷¹ *Постановление на Ловчанската окъжна постоянна комисия, 29.04.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 68–69.

⁷² Е. Стателова, *Източна Румелия. Икономика, политика, култура 1879-1885*, София 1983, pp. 126–127.

⁷³ R. Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁷⁴ А. М. Mirkova, *op. cit.*, pp. 969–970.

⁷⁵ R. Crampton, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

13 (1) January 1885.⁷⁶ After this date, all land with unregulated status was seized by the state.⁷⁷ However, this was the case only on the territory of the Principality, and in Eastern Rumelia, it was not made specific. After 1885, when Eastern Rumelia was united with Bulgaria, in the formerly autonomous province, the land with unregulated status continued to be in the hands of leaseholders.⁷⁸ The rent collected from this land went to the state treasury, which was justified by the fact that the Muslim émigrés who remained abroad did not pay taxes.⁷⁹ After the unification, both in the south and in the north, some matters concerning refugees taking back possession of their land remained unregulated, and disputes and court trials continued until the turn of the 1880s and 1890s. This was a result of negligence on the part of the local authorities and the Ministry of Finance, as well as a lack of straight forward and clear procedures regarding the *muhajirs'* empty estates.⁸⁰ Protracted court trials also followed from the fact that many of them did not start until 1884, and were additionally prolonged by appeals.⁸¹ Examining land rights cases after 1885

⁷⁶ *Ashburgham to the Marquis of Salisbury, Sofia 20.01.1880*, copy no. 13, FO 195/1311 (no pages); К. Иречек, *Български дневник*, Т. 2: 1881–1884, съст. Е. Стателова, София 1995, pp. 51, 75.

⁷⁷ The local authorities tried to set their own deadlines for the returning Muslims. In November 1881, Sofia's district court gave the war refugees two years to return while retaining their right to the abandoned property. Following complaints from the Sublime Porte that the decision was illegal, the court responded that a similar practice was employed in the Ottoman Empire. After the two-year period the land in the Sofia district was to be nationalised. Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., pp. 164–165.

⁷⁸ *От Министерство на финансите до Началник на Отделението за Държавните имоти, 13.05.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 145 л. 25.

⁷⁹ *От Бургарски окръжен управител до Министерство на финансите, 20.08.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 146 л. 14–15; *От Бургарски окръжен управител до Началник на IV Отделението на Министерство на финансите, 21.10.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 146 л. 20; *Постановление но. 93, 10.03.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 146 л. 27; *Протокол на Общински комитет на Дунав-Ювай, 25.03.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 147 л. 239; *Писмо от окръжно управление Старозагорско до м. на финансите, 27 юни 1890 г.*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 192 л. 13.

⁸⁰ *От Централно съкровищничество (Министерство на финансите) до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 6.02.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 29; *От Министерство на вътрешните дела до Министерство на финансите, 15.03.1890*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 189 л. 340; *Доклад до Министерство на финансите*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 62; *От Бургарско окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 29.03.1890*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 190 л. 269; *От Бургарско окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 11.01.1890*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 190 л. 263–264.

⁸¹ *От Ловчанското окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 1.11.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 18–19.

was also justified by special circumstances. If the heir of an estate was a child during their residence abroad, they could return and start proceedings to reclaim their possession after coming of age.⁸² The Bulgarian authorities, the Sublime Porte, and representatives of the great powers were inundated by complaints from the Bulgarian *muhajirs*, who protested against the violation of their land rights already in 1882.⁸³ Individual complaints continued to be lodged until the end of the 1880s and in the 1890s; they included not only complaints about holdbacks from the refugees reclaiming their property but also cases of Bulgarian neighbors appropriating parts of their arable land by gradually moving the boundary strip.⁸⁴

Bulgarian courts acknowledged the arguments of Muslim repatriates about illegal use of their land by the state or about groundless dispossession usually years later.⁸⁵ The later attitude of the Bulgarian authorities towards the Muslim repatriates and their reclaiming of land was much more lenient. For instance, Mehmed Ahprazov from Karnobat fled during the war and his estate, i.e. a house, 860 ha of arable land and 70 ha of meadows, was taken over by the Burgas district authorities and leased out. In 1882 Ahprazov returned to Eastern Rumelia, repossessed his land and found a new leaseholder. Later, his sisters were in charge of managing the estate, while he permanently moved to Constantinople. The court trial against the local authorities for the return of the rent collected in 1878–1882, in the amount of 148 leva, went on for seven long years. In the end, Ahprazov won the case.⁸⁶ During the tenure of Stefan Stambolov as Prime Minister (1886–1894), a number of regulations were introduced which were meant to encourage Muslim émigrés to return; e.g. in March 1892 some measures were introduced to facilitate the recovery of debts from the Principality's citizens by persons who had left for Turkey

⁸² *Постановление на Ловчанската окръжна постоянна комисия, 19.04.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 15–16; Решение бр. 258 на Варненски окръжен съд, Варна 11.06.1895, ДА-Варна ф. 112к оп. 3 а.е. 177 л. 21–22.*

⁸³ *Draft by Lascelles, 16.06.1882, FO 78/3412/6.*

⁸⁴ *Списък на нотите на агенството адресувани до разните турски министерва от начало на 1888 год. до днес и останали без одговор, Цариград, 9.11.1889, НБКМ-БИА ф. 290 а.е. 164 л. 11–21; Решение бр. 131 на Варненски окръжен съд, Варна 15.03.1897, ДА-Варна ф. 112к оп. 3 а.е. 181 л. 15–17; Решение бр. 176 на Варненски окръжен съд, Варна 24.03.1897, ДА-Варна ф. 112к оп. 3 а.е. 182 л. 16–18.*

⁸⁵ *Решение но. 163 в името на Негово Царско Височество Фердинанд I княз българский, 11 април 1890, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 192 л. 31–34.*

⁸⁶ *От Бургарски окръжен управител до Началник на IV Отделението на Министерство на финансите, 23.08.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 146 л. 16; Решение в името на Негово Царско Височество Фердинанд I Княз България, 19.07.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 146 л. 17–18.*

(or their heirs). To this end, special sub-units of agricultural credit banks were established, which were supposed to deal with such liabilities.⁸⁷

Another problem related to the land of war refugees were speculators, who either bought out the land abandoned by the Muslims *en masse*, or gave usurious loans to Bulgarian farmers to buy out the land.⁸⁸ Almost all farmers were interested in buying post-Turkish land, so prices were inflated. Additionally, peasants were unaccustomed to using money, so they were easy to swindle. The annual interest rate of usurious loans was rarely below 50 or 60 percent. As a result, as Petar Gabe pointed out already in the early 20th century, in the Varna district it was difficult to find a farmer who did not have a difficult credit situation. He also quoted a somewhat anecdotal story of a peasant who took out a loan to buy an ox and soon after had to sell two oxen and a few cows and sheep to pay back the loan.⁸⁹ Already in September 1879, efforts were made to overcome this phenomenon, mainly by means of stricter control over transactions involving the Muslims who were leaving. It was recommended that any deed which raised any doubts whatsoever be refused, that only local peasants be allowed to buy out land and that any outsiders be forbidden to do it, that farmers be supported with cheap loans for buying out land, and that the size of bought plots be limited to 250 ha per person.⁹⁰ The problem reappeared when influential people became involved in the business. In 1889, the mayor of Bistrovica, Pene Dimitrov, was disciplinarily dismissed and charged with offenses. In 1885, he had sold refugees' estates and *waqfs*, such as arable land and a mill, at deflated prices, without having obtained the permission of the district

⁸⁷ Решение на Министерство на Търговия и Земеделието, 21.03.1892, НБКМ-БИА ф. 272 а.е. 4274 л. 19–20.

⁸⁸ От Министерство на правосъдието и вероизповеданията до Главен управител на Източна Румелия, 7.12.1884, ЦДА ф. 565к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 18; От Ловчанския окръжен началник до Министерството на финансите, 17.07.1880, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 26 л. 25; „Варненски общински вестник“ 1888, год. 1, бр. 2 (14 новември), р. 1; Т. Карайотов, *Мухаджирският (бежанският) въпрос в Одрински вилает в края на XIX век, 1909*, [in:] *История на българите 1878–1944 в документи*, Т. 1: 1878–1912, ч. 2: *Българите в Македония, Тракия и Добруджа*, ред. В. Георгиев, С. Трифонов, София 1996, р. 16; J. Rubacha, *Gospodarka Bułgarii na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, „Śląskie Studia Historyczne” 2011, nr 17, р. 146.

⁸⁹ П. Габе, *Значението на новите заселвания и нови капитали за икономическото развитие на България*, Добрич 1903, pp. 40–43.

⁹⁰ Препис от едно писмо изпратено от Министерство на правосъдието до Министерството на вътрешните дела, София 20.09.1879, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 7 л. 26–27; Препис от едно окръжно писмо до губернаторите изпратено от министъра на вътрешните дела, 2.10.1879, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 7 л. 28.

authorities and the Ministry of Finance.⁹¹ Another important politician of the National-Liberal Party during Stambolov's regime, Ivan Andonov, also made his fortune in the same way.⁹²

One of the main problems related to the land abandoned by the *muhajirs* was the circulation of fake deeds, which continued to plague the country until the end of the 19th century.⁹³ What contributed to the spread of this problem was the fact that the fine in the case of proven forgery was only 6 percent of the value of the property to which the document pertained. As a result, forgers felt they could act with impunity, even if the offense was detected.⁹⁴ Using forged documents, the Muslims sold many properties which did not belong to them, which naturally caused a lot of disorder. There were also cases where there were several deeds to one estate or piece of land.⁹⁵

The business of forging documents was related to the fact that a large amount of local documentation was destroyed during the war, and receiving a suitable certificate from Constantinople was a very difficult task.⁹⁶ The organs of the Bulgarian state refused to cooperate on this matter. When in the late 1880s the Ottoman authorities turned to the Bulgarian side requesting to verify the fate of the property belonging to a group of refugees, the Bulgarians only answered that the given name did not figure in their real-estate registers and that they did not have current information about the estate in question.⁹⁷

⁹¹ *От Министерство на финансите до Министерство на вътрешните дела*, 02.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 166; *Продавателен запис, Бистрица 19.04.1885*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 167; *Продавателен запис, Бистрица (no date)*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 168; *Продавателен запис, Бистрица 19.04.1885*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 169; *Продавателен запис, Бистрица 25.04.1885*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 170; *Продавателен запис, Бистрица 25.04.1885*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 150 л. 171.

⁹² „Балканска зора” 1893, год. IV, бр. 938 (17 юни), pp. 2–3; „Балканска зора” 1893, год. IV, бр. 940 (19 юни), p. 3.

⁹³ „Балканска зора” 1892, год. II, бр. 552 (7 февруари), p. 1.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁹⁵ *Lascalles to Earl Granville, Sofia, 24.07.1880*, no. 118, FO 195/1312 (no pages); *От Ловчански окръжен управител до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, Ловеч 24.09.1881*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 26 л. 177; *Прошение от Али Пехливан Мехмедоглу, жител от Бласничево (Ловчанско), до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, Цариград 2.09.1881*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 26 л. 178; *Министерство на външните работи и изповеданията до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, София 29.04.1880*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 30 л. 69; *Прошение на Сеид Али от Каменица, Никополски окръжие, Цариград 22.08.1883*, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 51 л. 77; К. Иречек, *Български дневник...*, Т. 2, p. 51.

⁹⁶ А. М. Mirkova, *op. cit.*, p. 970.

⁹⁷ *Превод на писмото от Адиеето до Българско агентство, 2.05.1888*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 81; *От Ловчанското окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 10.03.1889*, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 96.

This led to many complications, e.g. in a situation where it was uncertain what the status of the land in question was: had it been private property or *waqf*?⁹⁸ The refugees simply did not have the appropriate documents confirming their land ownership, and in any given local commune everyone just knew to whom the land belonged.⁹⁹

Initially, the Sublime Porte itself participated in the business of forging documents pertaining to the estates abandoned in Bulgaria. In 1882, governor of Eastern Rumelia Aleko Bogoridi asked for copies of deed registers kept in Constantinople, which would be a basis for more efficient verification of land rights of the refugees returning to Eastern Rumelia. However, the materials he received turned out to be partly modified to the advantage of some Muslims who had not possessed land before the war.¹⁰⁰

The circulation of forged documents was not exclusively a problem for the Bulgarians, but for the repatriates as well. As soon as 1889, Ahmed Ilyazoolu from Giozeken (the district of Anhialo) attempted to reclaim his mill in the settlement of Eni Kioy and the three adjacent fields, which he had inherited from his late wife. After he had left the country during the war, the estate was seized by two Turks: Husein Feradov and Oman Hamzoolu. The trial went on for many years due to the fact that both sides had deeds written in Turkish—most likely one of the *tapu* was a forgery.¹⁰¹

Organized crime developed around the business of forging deeds. In 1891, the Plovdiv daily “Балканска зора” reported that a forger of Bulgarian deeds was arrested in Constantinople. The arrest led to an entire crime ring. In October, a big trial of the persons involved in this procedure was held in the capital of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰²

Already in 1889, it was postulated that external translations should be forbidden and that clear rules should be established with regard to the institutions which would be allowed to provide official translations of documents from

⁹⁸ *От Вакуфска комисия до Министерство на финансите, 24.01.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 154 л. 40; От Софийско окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 11.02.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 154 л. 47.*

⁹⁹ *От Финансовия отделение на Руската императорски комисар до Софийски губернатор, 16.03.1879, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 6 л. 4.*

¹⁰⁰ *От Министерство на външните работи и изповеданията до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, София 24.12.1879, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 7 л. 62; А. М. Mirkova, op. cit., p. 970.*

¹⁰¹ *От Бургарски окръжен управител до Министерство на финансите, 30.03.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 146 л. 6–7.*

¹⁰² „Балканска зора” 1891, год. 1, бр. 278 (17 февруари), p. 3; „Балканска зора” 1891, год. II, бр. 478 (29 октомври), p. 3.

Turkish to Bulgarian.¹⁰³ It seemed that the problem of forged deeds would be eliminated in 1892 when it was officially announced that Ottoman *tapus* would not be accepted and would be fully replaced by Bulgarian deeds within five years, which local communal authorities were obligated to enforce.¹⁰⁴ The process took much longer and continued until the first decade of the 20th century.¹⁰⁵ At the stage of replacing these documents, there were irregularities as a result of which some new deeds ended up in the hands of persons who did not, in fact, had rights to a given property.¹⁰⁶ However, until 1910, during court trials, it sometimes happened that the sides presented documents in Turkish.¹⁰⁷ Even during that period, the Sublime Porte issued *tapus* pertaining to lands on the Bulgarian territory.¹⁰⁸

...

Migrations and the transfer of land from Muslim to Christian hands were of key importance for the political, social and economic change on the Balkan Peninsula in the 19th c.: the collapse of the Ottoman socio-economic system and the birth of new forms of functioning, characteristic of the 20th c.¹⁰⁹ The Agrarian Revolution brought about beneficial changes for Bulgarian agriculture, stabilized the situation and created conditions for production growth. Towards the end of the first decade of the 20th c., Bulgaria found itself among the top

¹⁰³ *От Ловчанското окръжно управление до IV Отделение на Министерство на финансите, 1.11.1889, ЦДА ф. 159к оп. 1 а.е. 151 л. 18–19; От Министерство на външните работи и изповеданията до Дипломатически агент в Цариград, София 8.05.1885, ЦДА ф. 321к оп. 1 а.е. 57 л. 78.*

¹⁰⁴ *Протоколна книга на Провадийския градски общински съвет, 1893, ДА-Варна ф. 87к оп. 1 а.е. 9 л. 39–47; Протоколна книга на Провадийския градски общински съвет, 1893, ДА-Варна ф. 87к оп. 1 а.е. 10 л. 1, 7–8; „Варненски общински вестник” 1903, год. 16, бр. 16 (19 юли), pp. 1–2; „Варненски общински вестник” 1903, год. 16, бр. 17–18 (21 август), pp. 2–3; „Варненски общински вестник” 1903, год. 16, бр. 19–20 (30 септември), pp. 1–2.*

¹⁰⁵ *Протоколна книга на Козлуджашки селски общински съвет, 1904, ДА-Варна ф. 484к оп. 1 а.е. 2 л. 1–4, 13–14, 20–23, 28–33.*

¹⁰⁶ *Решение бр. 199 на Варненски окръжен съд, Варна 19.04.1897, ДА-Варна ф. 112к оп. 3 а.е. 183 л. 19–21.*

¹⁰⁷ „Балканска зора” 1892, год. II, бр. 552 (7 февруари), p. 1; J. Rubacha, *Gospodarka Bułgarii...*, op. cit., p. 146.

¹⁰⁸ М. Сарафов, *Дипломатически дневник 1909–1912. България и Турция в навечерието на Балканските войни*, съст. Ц. И. Величкова, София 2008, p. 125.

¹⁰⁹ К. Karpat, *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, Leiden–Boston–Koln 2002, pp. 354–355, 376.

countries in the region in terms of cattle and swine breeding and was even second in the world in sheep farming. The development of grain, fruit, tobacco, as well as famous rose oil production, is assessed similarly. Agriculture determined almost half of the revenues of the state. As a result, the position of peasants in Bulgaria improved, especially in the case of the dominant group of small farmers, who cultivated farms smaller than 5 ha. Right after the war, the Bulgarians came to own a total of 450,000 ha of post-Turkish land, which amounted to ca. 10 percent of the entire area of the country. It is estimated that by 1900 Christians had taken over a total of ca. 607,000 ha of land.¹¹⁰ In 1880, 25 percent of agricultural land in the Principality and in Eastern Rumelia remained in Muslim hands; in 1900 this percentage dropped to 15 percent.¹¹¹ The strengthening of the ownership of Bulgarian peasants as a result of the Muslim *exodus* was the basis for the increase of their political importance, which was later related to the creation of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union and the regime of Aleksandar Stamboliyski after World War I.¹¹²

Some historians estimate that after 1878 the Bulgarians made an effort to create difficult economic conditions for the Muslims, to drive them into debt, to force them into selling out their estates. The Bulgarian policy supposedly focused on “strengthening the Bulgarian national element” by means of disposessions which hit the Muslims in the first place.¹¹³ After the state was established, there were voices which claimed that the Slavs would attempt to completely dispossess the Muslims and the Greeks and divide their land among themselves.¹¹⁴ Konstantin Jireček wrote that “the Bulgarian nation was possessed with a great desire to seize all property.”¹¹⁵ It was claimed that this was supposed to be the Bulgarians’ revenge for the repressions following the April Uprising, which also involved mass disposessions of its partici-

¹¹⁰ „Витоша” 1879, год. I, бр. 47 (14 ноември), р. 2; M. Neuburger, op. cit., pp. 174–175; V. Şimşir, *The Turks of Bulgaria (1878–1985)*, London 1988, pp. 6–7; Б. Лори, *Съдбата на османското наследство. Българската градска култура 1878–1900*, прев. Л. Янакиева, София 2002, р. 81; J. Rubacha, *Bułgaria na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Bułgarskie metamorfozy w publikacjach „Świata Słowiańskiego” 1904–1914*, Olsztyn 2012, pp. 386–387.

¹¹¹ S. K. Pavlowitch, *Historia Bałkanów (1804–1945)*, tłum. J. Polak, Warszawa 2009, p. 174.

¹¹² M. Tanty, *Balkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne*, Warszawa 2003, p. 57; M. Dymarski, *Recepcja osmańskiego systemu rządów w państwach bałkańskich w XIX–XX wieku*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia” 2014, t. 21, p. 142.

¹¹³ Ж. Назърска, *Българската държава...*, op. cit., р. 63.

¹¹⁴ Mr. Layard to the Marquis of Salisbury, *Constantinople 17.04.1878*, FO 881/3574/97–99.

¹¹⁵ К. Иречек, *Княжество България. Негова повърхнина, природа, население, духовна култура, управление и новейша история*, ч. I: *Българска държава*, Пловдив 1899, р. 223.

pants.¹¹⁶ In Turkish historiography, there is an opinion that due to the brutality with which Muslim possessions were appropriated in Bulgaria after 1878, the Agrarian Revolution should be treated as a civil war.¹¹⁷

However, it cannot be concluded that the Bulgarian authorities expressly and uncompromisingly acted so that Muslim property would transfer to Bulgarian hands. The Bulgarian historian Dimitar Sazdov has identified three stages of the Agrarian Revolution:

1. From the war's outbreak until the spring of 1878, when the Bulgarians were acting cautiously, not yet knowing the outcome of the war or the provisions of the peace treaty;
2. From the spring of 1878 until the end of the Russian occupation, when there were mass and uncontrolled seizures of Muslim lands, while the Russians made the first general attempt to legally regulate the process;
3. Following the end of the Russian occupation, when the regulations pertaining to the process of dispossession were fully adopted and Muslim ownership rights were taken into consideration in a broader manner.¹¹⁸

The policy of the Agrarian Revolution became clearly more moderate from the mid-1880s onwards, which followed from the fact that it was considered essentially implemented. An illustration of this greater moderation is a situation which occurred in 1894 near Razgrad. When there was a crop failure in the Muslim-dominated settlements of Balbunar, Kisli Kioy, Drianovo, and Balbunar Indje, the government in Sofia decided to grant the affected farmers considerable tax exemptions.¹¹⁹ The tax reliefs ranged from 25 percent to complete exemption. If such a situation had occurred at the turn of the 1870s and 1880s, the Bulgarians would probably have had no scruples to take it as an opportunity to seize the Islamic peasants' land.

¹¹⁶ *Brophy to Layard, Bourgas 12.09.1877*, FO 195/1144/74.

¹¹⁷ В. Şimşir, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹¹⁸ Д. Саздов, М. Лалков, Т. Митев, Р. Мишев, В. Мигев, *История на Третата българска държава*, София 1992, pp. 23–26.

¹¹⁹ „Държавен вестник” 1894, год. XVI, бр. 9 (14 януари), pp. 1–2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVES

1. Foreign Office Archives, Public Record Office, London, FO: 78 (Political and Other Departments: General Correspondence before 1906, Ottoman Empire); 195 (Embassy and Consulates, Turkey, formerly Ottoman Empire: General Correspondence, Bulgaria), 881 (Foreign Office: Confidential Print).
2. Народна Библиотека „Св. Св. Кирил и Методи“ – Български исторически архив в София, НБКМ-БИА: ф. 11 (Драган Цанков), ф. 272 (Иван Е. Гешов), ф. 290 (Димитър Греков).
3. Държавен архив във Варна, ДА-Варна: ф. 78к (Окръжно управление – Варна), ф. 87к (Градско общинско управление – Провадия), Ф. 112 (Областен съд – Варна), ф. 484 (Селско общинско управление – с. Суворово).
4. Централен държавен архив в София, ЦДА: ф. 159к (Министерство на финансите), ф. 284 (Министърски съвет), ф. 321к (Дипломатическо агентство в Цариград), ф. 565к (Дирекция на правосъдие на Източна Румелия), ф. 708к (Държавен съвет).

PRESS

1. „Балканска зора“, Пловдив 1891–1893.
2. „Варненски общински вестник“, Варна 1903.
3. „Витоша“, София 1879–1880.
4. „Държавен вестник“, София 1882, 1894.
5. „Периодическо списание“, София 1882.
6. „Свободна България“, Варна 1881.

PRINTED SOURCES

1. *Ethnic Minorities in the Balkan States 1860–1971*, vol. 1: 1860–1885, ed. B. Destani, Cambridge 2003.
2. *Historia Bułgarii 1870–1915. Materiały źródłowe z komentarzami*, t. 1: *Polityka międzynarodowa*, red. J. Rubacha, A. Malinowski, A. Giza, Warszawa 2006.
3. *Historia Bułgarii 1870–1915. Materiały źródłowe z komentarzami*, t. 3: *Polityka wewnętrzna*, red. J. Rubacha, A. Malinowski, Warszawa 2009.
4. Габе П., *Значението на новите заселвания и нови капитали за икономическото развитие на България*, Добрич 1903.
5. *Изложение за състояние на Севлиевското окръжие през 1890–1891*, Севлиево 1891.
6. Иречек К., *Български дневник*, Т. 2: 1881–1884, съст. Е. Стателова, София 1995.
7. Иречек К., *Княжество България. Негова повърхнина, природа, население, духовна култура, управление и новейша история*, ч. I: *Българска държава*, Пловдив 1899.
8. *История на българите 1878–1944 в документи*, Т. 1: 1878–1912, ч. 1: *Възстановяване и развитие на българската държава*, ред. В. Георгиев, С. Трифонов, София 1994.
9. *История на българите 1878–1944 в документи*, Т. 1: 1878–1912, ч. 2: *Българите в Македония, Тракия и Добруджа*, ред. В. Георгиев, С. Трифонов, София 1996.

10. *Миграционни движения на българите 1878–1941*, Т. 1: 1878–1912, съст. В. Василева, В. Гигов, Г. Стоянова, К. Георгиева, К. Недевска, София 1993.
11. *Русия и възстановяването на българската държавност (1878–1885 г.)*, ред. кол., София 2008.
12. Сарафов М., *Дипломатически дневник 1909–1912. България и Турция в навечерието на Балканските войни*, съст. Ц. И. Величкова, София 2008.

LITERATURE

1. Crampton R., *The Turks in Bulgaria, 1878–1944*, [in:] *The Turks of Bulgaria: The History, Culture and Political Fate of a Minority*, ed. K. Karpat, Istanbul 1990.
2. Karpat K., *Ottoman Population 1830–1914. Demographic and Social Characteristic*, London 1985.
3. Karpat K., *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History*, Leiden–Boston–Koln 2002.
4. Köse O., *The Policies of the Bulgarian State towards the Minorities (1878–1914)*, „Sosyal Bilimler Araştırmaları Dergisi” 2012, 3 (6).
5. Dymarski M., *Recepcja osmańskiego systemu rządów w państwach bałkańskich w XIX–XX wieku*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia” 2014, t. 21.
6. McCarthy J., *Muslim in Ottoman Europe: Population from 1880 to 1912*, „Nationalities Papers” 2000, No. 1 (28).
7. Mirkova A. M., *“Population Politics” at the End of Empire: Migration and Sovereignty in Ottoman Eastern Rumelia, 1877–1886*, „Comparative Studies in Society and History” 2013, No. 55 (4).
8. Mutafchieva V., *The Turk, the Jew and the Gypsy*, [in:] *Relations of Compatibility and Incompatibility between Christians and Muslims in Bulgaria*, eds. A. Zhelyazkova, J. S. Nielsen, J. Kepell, Sofia 1994.
9. Neuburger M., *The Orient Within: Muslim Minorities and the Negotiation of Nationhood in Modern Bulgaria*, Ithaca-London 2004.
10. Pawłowicz S. K., *Historia Bałkanów (1804–1945)*, tłum. J. Polak, Warszawa 2009.
11. Rubacha J., *Bułgaria na przełomie XIX i XX wieku. Bułgarskie metamorfozy w publikacjach „Świata Słowiańskiego” 1904–1914*, Olsztyn 2012.
12. Rubacha J., *Gospodarka Bułgarii na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, „Słupskie Studia Historyczne” 2011, nr 17.
13. Şimşir V., *The Turks of Bulgaria (1878–1985)*, London 1988.
14. Tanty M., *Bałkany w XX wieku. Dzieje polityczne*, Warszawa 2003.
15. Арденски В., *Загаснали огнища. Изселническите процеси сред българите мохамедани в периода 1878–1944 г.*, София 2005.
16. Драганова С., *Кюстендилски регион 1864–1919. Етнодемографско и социалноикономическо изследване*, София 1996.
17. Косев Д., Христов Х., Натан Ж., Хаджиниколов В., Василев К., *История на България*, т. 2, София 1955.
18. Лори Б., *Съдбата на османското наследство. Българската градска култура 1878–1900*, прев. Л. Янакиева, София 2002.
19. Маккарти Дж., *Смърт и изгнание: Етническото прочистване на османските мюсюлмани (1821–1922)*, прев. К. Панайотова, София 2010.
20. Назърска Ж., *Българската държава и нейните малцинства 1879–1885*, София 1999.

21. Назърска Ж., *Малцинствено-религиозната политика в Източна Румелия (1879–1885)*, [w:] *Мюсюлманските общности на Балканите и в България*, Т. 1, ред. А. Желязкова, София 1997.
22. Палангурски М., *Нова история на България*, Т. I: Княжество (1879–1911), София 2013.
23. Саздов Д., Лалков М., Митев Т., Мишев Р., Мигев В., *История на Третата българска държава*, София 1992.
24. Стателова Е., *Източна Румелия. Икономика, политика, култура 1879\1885*, София 1983.
25. Ялъмов И., *История на турската общност в България*, София 2002.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), s. 111–130
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDsp.10.2019.24.6
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0001-8684-4551

MONIKA SKRZESZEWSKA

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW
INSTITUTE OF SLAVONIC STUDIES
E-MAIL: SKRZESZEWSKA@GMAIL.COM

SUBMISSION: 1.05.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 21.08.2019

***Poturica gori od Turčina* or...?
The Influence of Islam on “Our Muslims”
in Serbian Nationalistic Discourse
(Review from the Second Half of the 19th Century to the 1920s)**

ABSTRACT

The article aims to show the issue of the influence of Islam on “our Muslims,” as one of the most important heritage of the Ottoman Empire in the Balcan Peninsula, in the Serbian nationalistic discourse. The analysis includes the discourse from the period of the national revival (Vuk Karadžić and Ilija Garašanin), the Austro-Hungarian administrative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Milenko M. Vukićević and Serbian magazines), travelogues (Georgije Magarašević and Spiridon Gopčević) and geography, ethnographic and ethno-psychological research (Jovan Cvijić, Jovan Hadži Vasiljević and Čedomil Mitrinović) which considers the case of *poturice*—Serbian converts. The text shows how the stereotypical influence of Islam was duplicated and altered from the second part of the 19th century to the first years of the 20th century.

KEYWORDS

Turks, *poturice*, *poturica gori od Tučina*, Serb Muslims, Muslims, Islam

Introduction

The Ottoman heritage is still perceptible in almost every social and cultural aspect in the Balkan Peninsula. One of the most significant Ottoman influence over that region is probably the confession of Islam. Some South Slavs converted to Islam under the authority of the Turkish Empire in the Balkans, therefore, Muslims, both ethnic Turks and Slavs, were denoted “Turks” (*Turci*) to show their connection with a regime based on the alien religion. However, in Serbian nationalistic and mythological dictionary “Turks” meant the worst enemies, occupiers who were guilty of fall of the medieval Serbian Empire and low position of Serbian nation from the 14th century.¹

Next to *Turci*, Islamized local Slavs were additionally recognized as *poturice*—Turkishness. They became Turks by Islamization but, in biological point of view, still stayed Serbs (two lexemes, Slavs and Serbs, were treated as synonyms in the Serbian national discourse). Because of those roots, *poturice* became even most dangerous enemies than the ethnic Turks. We could see it in the stereotype of “worse *poturica* than Turk itself” (*poturica gori od Turčina*). Its belief was—they adopted the new religion and culture to improve or keep their positions in the social hierarchy so they were worse part of the nation as they betrayed their own Slavic race.² Additionally, Islam had to corrupt them. The conversion made them fanatical therefore they thought they were better than the Turks and that position gave them cause to exploit, like Turks, non-Muslim *rayah (raja)*, it means their “old brothers,” who were at the bottom of the ladder.³

In the Balkan Peninsula religion was (also the whole tradition associated with), and still is, the most crucial factor in division its societies and also a fac-

¹ M. Šuica, *Percepcija osmanskog carstva u Srbiji*, [in:] *Imaginarni Turčin*, ur. B. Jezernik, Beograd 2010, pp. 285–286, 289–291; H. Kamberović, *Turci i kmetovi – mit o vlasnicima bosanske zemlje*, [in:] *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu. Zbornik radova*, ur. H. Kamberović, Sarajevo 2003, p. 69.

² The betrayal was the central theme of the Serbian folk epic and the Kosovo myth. The codification of the Kosovo folk myth, in which *poturice* were the main traitors (they were the updated character of Vuk Branković), was done by Petar II Petrović Njegoš in his poem the Mountain Wreath (*Gorski vijenac*). From the poem we could find out that Islam was adopted by cowards and greedy (*isturči se plahi i lakomi*). See: B. Zieliński, *Serbska powieść historyczna. Studia nad źródłami, ideami i kierunkami rozwoju*, Poznań 1998, pp. 59–64; A. Kola, *Mito-logika pamięci, czyli o Kosowie w „Górskim wieńcu” Petara II Njegoša raz jeszcze (pasaże strukturalistyczno-konstruktywistyczne)*, „Litteraria Copernicana” 2016, nr 3 (19), p. 158.

³ O. Milosavljević, *U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o „nama” i „drugima”*, Beograd 2002, pp. 193, 203.

tor in the perception of “better us” and “worse they.” The dichotomy was an essential way to create unfavourable theories about the personality of *poturice*. Slavs neophytes were at the same time “ours” because of Serbian heritage and “alien” due to Islam which was considered something outside and negative but something which played a key role for “our world.” That is why the destructive influence of Islam was a dominant feature and the stereotypical image was more negative than the image about Turks.⁴ This perception of one of the most perceptible Ottoman influence has been many times updated in the 19th and 20th centuries. The purpose of the article is to show how the stereotype based on religion was duplicated or altered by one of the most important Serbian activists as Vuk Karadžić, Ilija Garašanin, Milenko M. Vukičević, Georgije Magarašević, Spiridon Gopčević, Jovan Cvijić, Jovan Hadži Vasiljević and Čedomil Mitrović.⁵

Serbs and *Poturice* from the Second Half of the 19th Century to the First Years of the 20th Century

Liberation from the Ottoman Empire and Slavic unification were a basic assumption of the Serbian national revival in the 19th century. What was interesting—Muslims were the group that the most significant Serbian activists started to seek.⁶ Serbian liberation, based on the folk epic and the Kosovo myth (mythical memory of medieval Serbian Empire and tradition of fight with the Ottoman Turks), supposed not only to revive Serbian statehood but, first of all, unite in a struggle against the Ottoman Empire other South Slavs considered Serbs and called “Serbs” or “brothers” (*braća*).⁷ In this conception, the Orthodox supposed no longer to be the only factor to define what the Serbian nation should consist of. Its position seized the Serbian language (exactly Shtokavian which have the largest range over the South Slavs) which was derivative

⁴ A. Pajdzińska, *My, to znaczy... (z badań językowego obrazu świata)*, „Teksty Drugie. Teoria, literatura, krytyka, interpretacja” 2001, nr 1 (66), pp. 38, 45–46; E. W. Said, *Orientalizm*, tłum. W. Kalinowski, Warszawa 1991, p. 116.

⁵ The role of the myth “*poturica gori od Turčina*” in the Serbian nationalistic discourse was studied, for example, by Olivera Milosavljević (op. cit., pp. 201–208). The issue of “Serb Muslims” has a special place in Serbian discourse and is a very broad topic. In this text, only the representative authors who in their works directly referred to the influence of Islam, were chosen.

⁶ H. Kamberović, *Turci i kmetovi...*, op. cit., p. 69.

⁷ L. Moroz-Grzelak, *Bracia Słowianie. Wizje wspólnoty a rzeczywistość*, Warszawa 2013, p. 135.

included to Serbian liberation mythology. Thanks to the language, the concept of “Serbs three faiths” could be pushed through.⁸

The theory that the Serbian language should be a main basic of Serbian nation started to be binding, meanwhile, religion, exactly Orthodox folk tradition, had never been completely withdrawn. It was, next to the language, an important factor to specify Serbs, particularly Serb Muslims. It determined ethnic and biological descent but also was a sign of share common historic tradition which should not be forgotten because of conversion and which was shared thanks to Serbian language.⁹ Due to the Serbian roots treated simultaneously as Slavic, it means due to the tradition of fighting with Ottoman Turks and remember the sacrifice of national heroes, Muslims could be incorporated into the Serbian nation.¹⁰ Excluded as well. Everything depended on their attitude towards the Christian brothers. “When you talk with me as my brother Bosniak (*Bošnjak*; then it was a demonym and the term for converts or Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina), I am your brother and your friend, but when you talk with me as a stranger, as an Asian (*Azijatin*), as an enemy of our family and ethnonym, I oppose it.” This declaration Petar II Petrović Njegoš wrote to Osman-paša Skopljak, vizier of Skadar, in 1847.¹¹ The obligation to return to Orthodoxy (*vjera prađedovska*) under the threat of death and dictate to fight with the Ottoman enemies, were conditions to come back to Serbian nation and became the central motive of Njegoš’s *Mountain Wreath* (*Gorski vjenac*).¹² The Prince-Bishop of Montenegro did not accept the concept of various religion in the Serbian nation, despite Serbian roots, and presented a vision of, admittedly mythological, emancipated pure religious Serbian state without treacherous *poturice*.¹³ Just to mention, expelling Muslims from the Serbian nation is a rare case.¹⁴

⁸ D. Gil, *Ewolucja i funkcje ideji narodu w Serbii od schyłku XVIII w.*, „Slavia Meridionalis” 2017, No. 17, p. 3, [online] <https://doi.org/10.11649/sm.1325> [accessed: 21.08.2019].

⁹ Ibidem, pp. 3–4.

¹⁰ O. Milosavljević, op. cit., p. 193.

¹¹ „[...] Kada sa mnom govoriš kako moj brat Bošnjak, ja sam tvoj brat, tvoj prijatelj, ali kada govoriš kao tuđin, kako Azijatin, kako neprijatelj našega plemena i imena, meni je to protivno [...]” [All translations, unless otherwise noticed, were made by the author]. *Njegoš Osman-paši Skopljaku*, [online] https://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/njegos-pismo_skopljaku.html [accessed: 20.04.2019].

¹² See the second footnote and D. Gil, *Prawosławie, historia, naród. Miejsce kultury duchowej w serbskiej tradycji i współczesności*, Kraków 2005, pp. 119–120.

¹³ I. Čolović, *Smrt na Kosovu Polju. Istorija kosovskog mita*, Beograd 2016, pp. 168, 174; B. Aleksov, *Poturica gori od Turčina: srpski istoričari o verskim preobraćenjima*, [in:] *Historijski mitovi...*, op. cit., p. 232.

¹⁴ O. Milosavljević, op. cit., p. 201.

Vuk Karadžić, who played the most important role during the Serbian national movement and grounded the concept of “Serbs three faiths,”¹⁵ in his article *Serbs All and Everywhere (Srbi svi i svuda)* from 1849 claimed that *poturčenici* were pious like they used to be while being Orthodox and “probably there are no such pious people than *Bošnjaci* among the confessors of Islam.”¹⁶ It means that old folk religious tradition or religion itself determines certain behavior patterns and traits (as well as Islam), as it was already mentioned, mainly an obligation to fight with Ottoman Turks for restoration the old golden times. Although Njegoš based on Karadžić’s love the folk tradition, only the second national activist changed the attitude towards *poturice*.¹⁷ Since Muslims had been hegemonically included to the Serbian nation by Karadžić, they had to fulfill Serbian historic duties. In other words, as they were called “Serbs” in his propaganda, they had to be “real Serbs,” not *poturice* or *poturčenici* so the influence of Islam should be negligible or not predominant. An exchange of words “Turks” and *poturice* for “Serbs” might help change the old perception of “others” as the use of specific term describing “others,” that have a positive or negative meaning, plays a huge role in perception.¹⁸ Meanwhile, even Karadžić did not throw away from his dictionary the negative word. For him, they could be Serbs but Serbs bearing the mark of Ottoman heritage. However, he probably wanted to familiarize the popular lexeme because he might have Huseinbeg Gradašćević in mind.¹⁹

Gradašćević, “the Dragon of Bosnia” (*Zmaj od Bosne*), was seeking for Bosnian autonomy and opposing the Ottoman military reforms and privileges given to Serbia after Serbian risings.²⁰ For today’s Bosniaks, he is a hero who fought for the independence of Bosnia.²¹ One of the main streets in Sarajevo,

¹⁵ M. Dąbrowska-Partyka, *Literatura pograniczna, pogranicza literatury*, Kraków 2004, p. 152.

¹⁶ „[...] Kao što su ovi poturčenici prije u hrišćanskom zakonu bili pobožni, tako isto po stanu i u turskome, i danas može biti da u cijelome zakonu Muhamedovu nema pobožnijih ljudi od Bošnjaka: to pokazuje i današnja njihova nepokornost Sultan-Mahmutu i mrzost na nj i na njegove nove uredbe i premjene” (V. Karadžić, *Srbi svi i svuda*, [in:] *Ideja o Velikoj Srbiji: od Ilije Garašanina do Tomislava Nikolića. Izvori velikosrpske ideologije, politike i agresije*, ur. Z. Despot, D. Tatić, Zagreb 2012, pp. 68–69).

¹⁷ O. Milosavljević, op. cit., pp. 50, 53–54.

¹⁸ A. Pajdzińska, op. cit., pp. 45–46.

¹⁹ M. Demirović, *Bosna i Bošnjaci u srpskoj politici*, Bihać 1999, p. 81.

²⁰ V. Bišćević, *Bosanski namjesnici osmanskog doba (1463–1878)*, Sarajevo 2006, pp. 358–359 and next.

²¹ D. Agičić, *Bosna je... naša! Mitovi i stereotipi o državnosti, nacionalnom i vjerskom identitetu te pripadnosti Bosne u novijim udžbenicima povijesti*, [in:] *Historijski mitovi...*, op. cit., p. 157.

famous during the last war “Sniper Alley,” bears his name. Despite this, Serbian researchers, even nowadays, claim that his rebellion from 1831 against the Ottomans has “Serbian national sign” (*srpsko nacionalno obeležje*) because it was a part of Serbian liberation aimed to include Bosnia to Serbia.²² Gradašćević’s case shows that calling him and other Ottoman Bosniaks “Serbs” in various Serbian publications might be a counterbalance for the negative stereotype of *poturice*, a proof for “Serbs three faiths” theory and an attempt to include “other” world in “our.”²³ Karadžić might try to enter Muslims from multi-generational Islamic families which converted to Islam many years ago in Serbian history and created a new canon of national heroes without the stereotypical image.²⁴

The national unity of Serbs and Muslims has become one of the assumptions of the first political programme of Great Serbia—Ilija Garašanin’s *Načertanije* from 1844.²⁵ The Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina should be convinced for the struggle for the reconstruction of the medieval Serbian Empire and Slavic unification under the Serbian aegis.²⁶ For this purpose, it was necessary “publication of a short and general history of Bosnia which should include the fame and names of some Bosniaks who converted to Islam. It is obvious that it must be written in the spirit of Slavic nationality and national unity of Serbs and Bosniaks.”²⁷ Although *Načertanije* was secret until 1906, convince Muslims of their (alleged) origin became a political goal. It was believed that effective agitation would turn into pro-Serbian political action.²⁸

Karadžić’s and Garašanin’s propaganda regarding the Serbianness of Muslims and their unification with Serbs was particularly active during the Austro-Hungarian period (1878–1914), especially after the Radical Party came to power in Serbia (the nineties of the 19th). First of all, it was the time of Benjamin Kallay’s politics of *bošnjaštvo* (he was an Austro-Hungarian minister of finance and administrator of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1882 to 1903).

²² S. Jarčević, *Bivši Srbi – rimokatolici, muslimani, Rumuni, Crnogorci*, Novi Sad 2007, pp. 54–55.

²³ Croatian activist and writers did the same. The example is Josip Eugen Tomić’s novel *Zmaj od Bosne* from 1879. See: I. Banac, *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika*, prev. J. Šantija, Zagreb 1988, pp. 339–340.

²⁴ See more about the romantic historicism of Karadžić: B. Zieliński, op. cit., pp. 54–59.

²⁵ M. Dąbrowska-Partyka, op. cit., p. 153.

²⁶ L. Moroz-Grzelak, op. cit., p. 152.

²⁷ „[...] štampati kratka i obšta narodna istorija Bosne u kojoj ne bi smela izostaviti slava i imena nekih muhamedanskoj veri prešavši Bošnjaka. Po sebi se predpostavlja da bi ova istorija morala biti spisana u duhu slavenske narodnosti i sa svim u duhu narodnog jedinstva Srba i Bošnjaka” (I. Garašanin, *Načertanije*, [in:] Z. Despot, D. Tatić, op. cit., p. 62).

²⁸ M. Dąbrowska-Partyka, op. cit., p. 155.

It was a national project of a community of three major ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For each group religion was an important basis for creating separate national identities. Thus, religion, Serbian propaganda of unification and anti-Kallay's attitude became the basis for the Bosnian Serbs' fight for religious and educational autonomy from the 1896 century to 1905.²⁹ Second of all, new educated classes of Serbs, Croats and Muslims appeared then in Bosnia and Herzegovina and started to be active at the same time with local political circles. They tried to form their own national identity through literature because of Kallay's politics they could not act on the more open front at least until the beginning of the 20th century. Their activities focused around Bosnian magazines e.g. "Behar," "Nada," "Bosanska vila" or "Zora."³⁰ Due to the fact that a new Muslim elite began to form (they created their own identity based on Islam or called themselves Croats³¹), the Serbian magazines "Bosanska vila" and "Zora" began nationalizing Muslims. It was particularly important when, at the end of the 19th century, Muslims and Serbs started to cooperate in the struggle for religious and educational autonomy (the alliance survived until around 1910).³² What more, it was also a time when some Muslims started to call themselves Serbs (it was an emigration Muslim community in Belgrade or Tsargrad,³³ for example, after the uprising in Herzegovina in 1882).³⁴ Therefore, pro-Serbian oriented confessors of Islam started to be especially needed for propaganda in Bosnia and Herzegovina but also in Serbia.³⁵

"Bosanska vila" from Sarajevo, which was the first magazine of Serbs from Bosnia and Herzegovina, published, among other things, various proverbs, phraseology and sections about Serbian national customs, to indicate the Slavic heritage of Muslims, it means the heritage before Islamization. Also, Pro-serbian-oriented Muslims, such as Osman Đikić, Avdo "Srbin" Karabegović,

²⁹ I. Banac, op. cit., pp. 336–337; I. Hadžibegović, M. Imamović, *Bosna i Hercegovina u vrijeme austougarske vladavine (1878–1918)*, [in:] *Bosna i Hercegovina od najstarijih vremena do kraja Drugog svjetskog rata*, ur. I. Tepić, Sarajevo 1998, pp. 266–268.

³⁰ I. Lovrenović, *Bosnia. A Cultural History*, trans. S. Wild Bičanić, New York 2001, pp. 150, 152.

³¹ I. Banac, op. cit., p. 340.

³² I. Hadžibegović, M. Imamović, op. cit., pp. 268, 271.

³³ M. Demirović, op. cit., p. 191.

³⁴ It was an uprising against the new military law which assumed military service for the Austro-Hungarian army. This uprising was the first collaboration of Serbs and Muslims. See: I. Hadžibegović, M. Imamović, op. cit., pp. 233, 236.

³⁵ See more: Dž. Juzbašić, *Politika i privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austougarskom upravom*, Sarajevo 2002, pp. 184–191.

Avdo Karabegović Hasanbegov and Omer-beg Sujemnapašić Skopljak,³⁶ a relative of Osman-paša Skopljak, the recipient of the letter from Njegoš,³⁷ published their Serbianness poems in “Bosanska vila” and “Zora.” Nationalizing Muslims consisted in, above all, taking over their folk literature and treating it as Serbian (like Karadžić did). That is why, the poems of above-mentioned “Serb Muslims” were very welcome, especially because they used terms “Serbs,” “brother” or “brothers of one blood” which showed the national unity in their literary production. It is interesting because both magazines supposed to be “places” of meetings the Serbian literary circles but became a way of expression of national identity and opposition to the Kallay’s project, like “Zora” from Mostar publishing from 1896 to 1901. “Bosanska vila” was published from 1885 to 1914 so it has many periods in nationalizing Muslims but “Zora” came out exactly during the fight for religious and educational autonomy of Bosnian Serbs and its character was influenced by e.g. Serbia. That is why it fulfilled special functions.³⁸

Zora’s subtitle “List za nauku, zabavu i književnost” (Bosanska vila’s as well) shows that the Mostar’s magazine supposed to teach. Such a goal was chosen by a historian Milenko M. Vukićević from Serbia. Serbian historicism in this period served primarily for educational purposes.³⁹ Thus, Vukićević who published in “Zora” started to show who Muslims supposed to be. In the ninth and tenth issues of the magazine from 1898, Serbian historian’ description of the merits of Ali-aga Dadić from Mostar was published. Vukićević presented him as a Muslim who grown up in the spirit of fighting for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and who set an example of solidarity between “the brothers” in the 18th century. The researcher, referring to the contemporary historic period for him, especially to Muslims who chose their own national way, wrote: “[...] the idea of independence is forgotten. This is the source of the misfortunes of Serbs three faiths in Bosnia and Herzegovina both in the past and today. And it will be until Serbs three faiths from Herzegovina do not understand that the liberation could happen only through agreement and common work.”⁴⁰

³⁶ I. Ramić, *Književni časopisi austrougarskog perioda kao prostor saobražavanja bošnjačke usmene tradicije I pisane književnost*, „Društvene i humanističke studije” 2016, br. 1, pp. 21, 29.

³⁷ S. Jarčević, op. cit., p. 49.

³⁸ S. Vervaet, *Centar i periferija u Austro-Ugarskoj. Dinamika izgradnje nacionalnih identiteta u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878. do 1918. godine na primjeru književnih tekstova*, Zagreb–Sarajevo 2013, pp. 139, 237, 241.

³⁹ B. Zieliński, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴⁰ „[...] zaboravlja se sama ideja nezavisnosti. U tome je ležala sva nesreća Srba u Bosni i Hercegovini sve tri vjere kako u prošlom vijeku, tako i u ovom pa i danas. I ležaće sve donde

However, Dadić and his sons, also patriots like their father, did not succeed in the national mission but “they showed that the faith is not important when it comes to the good of the homeland.”⁴¹

In 1906 Vukićević left a more detailed description of Dadić’s and also Gradašćević’s merits for Serbian liberation. What is interesting, he published the Garašanin’s *Načertanije* under the title *Program spoljne politike Ilije Garašanina na koncu 1844 god.* in the Radical Party’s magazine “Delo. List za nauku, književnost i društveni život” in the same year.⁴² It was a time when the Serbian propaganda of unification and “Serb Muslims” became stronger in Serbia due to a change of political circumstances after 1903.⁴³ The Karađorđević dynasty and the Radical Party returned to politics and Vukićević was close to them.⁴⁴ For example, “Delo” in 1908 published an obituary of pro-Serbian oriented Muslim Avdo Karabegović, a poet who was written to “Bosanska vila” and “Zora” and whose nickname was “Serb” (*Srbin*). It says that he was “the first apostle of the idea of brotherhood no matter of faith”⁴⁵ and that “he loved *Srpstvo* [a synonym of all Serbs] and his homeland the most in the world. One idea for him was to see it liberated. With this desire, he passed away [...] Let the Serbian earth, which he strongly loved, be light on him.”⁴⁶

Vukićević surely was inspired by the first political programme of Great Serbia. One of his work, *Outstanding Serb Muslims [Znameniti Srbi Muslomani]*,⁴⁷ might be treated as a direct inspiration of one of the assumptions in the programme, as we already know, writing a common history of Serbs and Bosniaks “in the spirit of Slav nationality and unity.” For Vukićević, Gradašćević and Dadić were not *poturice/poturčenici*. They were “Serb Muslim” (*Srbin Musloman* or *Srbin muhmedanovac*). It means that they were ethnic Serbs but

dok Srbi sve tri vjere Herceg Bosne ne uvede da im je spas samo u slozi i zajedničkom radu” (*Zora. List za zabavu, nauku i književnost*, 1898, br. 9).

⁴¹ „Oni nisu uspjeli kao ni mnogi drugi, ali su pokazali kako se ne gleda na vjeru, kad se radi za dobro otadžbine” (*Zora. List za zabavu, nauku i književnost*, 1898, br. 10).

⁴² Z. Despot, D. Tatić, op. cit., p. 13.

⁴³ I. Banac, op. cit., p. 111.

⁴⁴ See more: Ch. Jelavich, *Milenko M. Vukićević: from Serbianism to Yugoslavism*, [in:] *Historians as Nation-Builders. Central and South-East Europe*, eds. D. Deletant, H. Hanak, London 1988, pp. 109–110 and next.

⁴⁵ “Avdo Karabegović, bio je prvi apostol one ideje: ‘Brat je mio, koje vjere bio’” (*Delo. List za nauku, književnost i društveni život*, 1908, br. 49, p. 359).

⁴⁶ „Od svega na svetu najviše je ljubio *Srpstvo* i svoju domovinu, i jedini ideal bio mu je, da je vidi oslobođenu. Sa tom željom je i umro [...] Laka mu bila srpska zamlja koju je tako žarko ljubio” (ibidem, p. 364).

⁴⁷ M. M. Vukićević, *Znameniti Srbi Muslomani*, Beograd 1906, [online] https://www.rastko.rs/istorija/mvuk_muslimani.pdf [accessed: 18.04.2019].

Muslims by his religious affiliation. For example, Gradašević was pious as Karadžić claimed. He respected and quoted Koran, used to pray five times a day and was a teetotaller.⁴⁸ For the other hand, the memory of Kosovo was a pattern of heroism, fame and national or even historical goals for his rebellion.⁴⁹

As we could see, Islam was rather a harmless lifestyle not a factor determining nationality like Serbian descent. This propaganda image supposed to be the direct reason for adapting "other" Muslims to "our" Serbs. For Vukićević, earlier also for Karadžić, the bad influence of Islam was negligible because the Orthodox folk tradition was dominant even in families where Islam had been struck up root for generations. Serbian historian presented the patriotic image of neophytes, next to Gradašević and Dadić also Mehmed Sokolović, Sinanpaša Sijerčić and Hasan-aga Krajišnik, who, in his theory, did not forget about their national heritage and, despite new religious culture, stayed legitimate members of the Serbian nation. Their activities supposed to be an example for other Serb Muslims and they supposed to become new Serbian national heroes. When the historian described Sokolović's case (which is different from the others because Sokolović represented the first generation of "Islamized Serbs") he wrote: "his work [mainly the restoration of the Patriarchate in Peć in 1557] shows how Serb can be a good Muslim who loves its own nation and is not afraid to be called Serb. Other Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina should understand this."⁵⁰

Other Examples from the 19th Century

Considering the next examples, we would treat the cases of Karadžić, Garašanin and Vukićević as exceptions which tried to familiarize outside Islam with inside Serbian world. Other researcher combined the religious attitude with the language concept. The combination two opposition nation categories, secular and religious or cultural versus ethnic, is a characteristic of Serbian discourse which

⁴⁸ „[...] Husein je bio pravi muslomanin; u svemu je živio po Kuranu, nije pio nikakava pića, molio se Bogu svaki dan pet puta, i često, razgovarajući se s kim, dizao je oči k nemu i šaptao neke stihove iz Korana [...]” (M. M. Vukićević, op. cit., p. 48).

⁴⁹ „Nema Srbina, kome srce življe ne zakuca, kad se primiče polju Kosovu, gdje su pali toliko srpski junaci, braneći srpsku državu i nezavisnost. Pa i ova kita Husejinovih Srba muslomana bješe zagrejana slavom i imenom svojih predaka [...]” (ibidem, p. 43).

⁵⁰ „Ovakav rad Mehmeda Sokolovića pokazuje: kako Srbin može biti i dobar musloman, pa da mu to ništa ne smeta da voli svoj narod, da mu ništa ne stoji na putu da se i sam Srbinom zove. Ovo bi trebalo dobro da shvate i uvide Srbi muslomani u Bosni i Hercegovini” (ibidem, p. 24).

concerns Muslims. It makes analysis Serbian perception of Muslim problematical, ambiguous and fluid. We are dealing with both positive and negative attitudes towards Muslims at the same time. Many Serbian authors generally include them in the Serbian nation because of language and Serbian roots but never completely abandoned the old stereotype about the influence of alien Islam on them, for example like Georgije Magarašević and Spiridon Gopčević. It should be emphasized, however, that they left travelogues behind which in the 19th century was very popular but was not free of stereotypes.

Magarašević, Serbian writer and historian who declared an obligation to continue work of Dositej Obradović (who actually laid the foundations of the language concept) and Karadžić, the founder of "Serbska letopis" ("Serbian Chronicle"), one of the first Serbian literary periodical⁵¹, in his memoirs from a few days trip to reviving Serbia in 1827⁵² described the case of *Turci*, it means *Bošnjaci/poturčeni Srbliji* (*Turci, po većoj česti Bošnjaci, dakle poturučeni Srbliji*). Just to mention, his memoirs were the first written record of the stereotype *poturica gori od Turčina*.⁵³ As he claimed they were Serbs but added:

What a merciless destiny did to our brothers. The change of faith changed them completely! They did not want to know that they come from Slavic line, they were defective but Serbs who persecute their brothers [...], they boast about Islam. Accepting a foreign religion, renouncing their family, origin and blinded by fanaticism, *poturice* became much worse than Turks!⁵⁴

As we could see, he accepted Karadžić's concept of "Serbs three faiths" but did not change his religious attitude and repeated the old image of *poturice*.

Gopčević, Serbian-Austrian astronomer and historian born in Trieste, at the end of the 19th century in his book *Old Serbia and Macedonia* wrote:

It is true that Mohammedan Serbs (*muhamedovski Srbi*) are not Turks because they did not change the language. However, they lost their national identity in the first generation. Mohammedan Bosniaks (*muhamedovski Bošnjaci*) show a dangerous example as well!

⁵¹ See more: *The History of the Letopis Matice srpske*, [online] <https://www.maticasrpska.org.rs/en/letopis-matice-srpske/> [accessed: 16.08.2019].

⁵² Đ. Magarašević, *Putovanje po Srbiji u 1827. godini*, Beograd 1983.

⁵³ B. Aleksov, op. cit., p. 232.

⁵⁴ „[...] Šta je nemilostiva sudba s braćom našom počinila. Izmena zakona i vere kako ih je sasvim izmenila! Neće da znaju, ni da čuju, da su grane slavenskoga stable, no suve i otpadoše, već Srblije, rođenu braću svoju gone, i što su preci njiovi u krajnoj nuždi i nevolji, oružjem tiranstva prinuđeni, primili, tim se sada potomci gorde i veličaju. Primivši tuđ zakon, odrekli su se roda i kolena i fanatizmom zaslepljeni poturice jesu gori od Turaka! [...]” (Đ. Magarašević, op. cit., p. 262).

They do not understand the Turkish language at all and if they speak Serbian, they do not consider themselves Serbs but Turks [...]. *Muhamedovski Bošnjaci* claim that they are important “like Turks” and much better than their Christian brothers. In point of fact, they are much worse. They are renegades and idlers.⁵⁵

Again, the concept of “Serbs three faith” simultaneously with the religious stereotype was updated but Gopčević’s case is interesting because of three reasons.

First of all, he distributed Serbs amongst Bosniaks. He shows a new perspective which started to be popular from the end of the 19th century—converts were also in “Old Serbia” (*Raška*, Kosovo and Macedonia). The use of the language concept as a basis of a nation was dominant from him and its transfer to Macedonian and Macedonian Muslims (without a distinction that they are *Torbeše*), played a huge role in the Serbo-Bulgarian conflict over Macedonia.⁵⁶ What more, he called Albanian population of Kosovo “Arnautashi” which means “Albanians of alleged Serbian descent” so they were the same converts like *Poturice*.⁵⁷ He probably never did research in Kosovo and his two theories were manipulations.⁵⁸ Robert Elsie writes about his study—it “is a pseudo-scholarly work on ethnic relations in the region that paved the way for unprecedented territorial claims by Serbia.”⁵⁹ What is important for the text—he treated Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina and “Old Serbia” like one group which took over the old stereotype.

Second of all, he used the adjective “Mohammedan” which was characteristic Western European way to describe Muslims. The lexeme could be a synonym to “Muslim” but generally had offensive (also wrong) meaning.⁶⁰ Gopčević, who probably used it because of his ties with Western Europe, might use it as a synonym to negative word *poturice*. However, the adjective was also used by Vukićević, Karadžić and Garašanin in a positive context. Due to irregularly

⁵⁵ „Istina, da se muhamedovski Srbi ne turče, jer pridržavaju svoj jezik, ali oni sa svim izgube već u prvom kolenu srpsku narodnu svest. Muhamedovski Bošnjaci pokazuju isti grozni primer! Ma da ne razumu baš ništa turski, i ako u opšte srpski govore, to se ipak ne smatraju, da su Srbi već Turci [...]. Muhamedovski Bošnjaci drže, da su oni «kao Turci» neka osobitost i da su mnogo bolji od svoje hrišćanske braće, ma da su u stvari mnogo gori, i to odmetnici i lenjištine” (S. Gopčević, *Stara Srbija i Makedonija*, Beograd 1890, p. 182).

⁵⁶ See more: O. Milosavljević, op. cit., pp. 209–214.

⁵⁷ See more: ibidem, pp. 221–223.

⁵⁸ Ch. Promitzer, *Austria and the Balkans: Exploring the Role of Travelogues in the Construction an Area*, [in:] *Southeast European Studies in a Globalizing World*, ed. K. Kaser, Graz 2015, pp. 204–205.

⁵⁹ R. Elsie, *A Biographical Dictionary of Albanian History*, London 2012, p. 177.

⁶⁰ E.W. Said, op. cit., p. 110.

existence this term in Serbian nationalistic discourse, it is complicated to advise the exact meaning. Third of all, he might also broaden the meaning of *poturice*. A better position in social hierarchy and exploitation of *raja* made them idlers. As a matter of fact, it is consequences of Ottoman administration, but in some later works, this theory was a basis to a theory of their intellectual disability.

Serbs and *Poturice* in the First Half of the 20th Century

Due to the development of geography, ethnographic, ethnopsychological research, fieldwork and, of course, different political circumstances (the end of the Ottoman Empire and creation Kingdom of Yugoslavia), we shall deal with a new perspective about Muslims and Islam as the Ottoman heritage in the Balkan Peninsula. Romantic and stereotypical theories about Muslims could probably be seized through field research about nations, their states and geographical influence on the nations.⁶¹ The most important Serbian geographer and ethnologist was Jovan Cvijić. His studies from 1887 to 1915 were published as *The Balkan Peninsula and the South Slavic lands* (first in Paris, 1918) which is the most popular scientific work of him. Other researchers who worked in a similar period were Jovan Hadži Vasiljević and Čedomil Mitrinović.⁶²

Although Cvijić's theories about four types of Slavic psyche (*dinarski tip*, *centralni tip*, *istočnobalkanski tip*, *panonski tip*) and influence of geographical environment on psyche each type, were popular (also criticized),⁶³ the research results of his imitators, Vasiljević and Mitrinović, were not. Vasiljević was a historian and ethnographer who mainly carried out research on the Old Serbia (like Gopčević). That is why one of his works was devoted to Muslims from those regions—*Muslims of our blood in South Serbia* (1924).⁶⁴ Meanwhile, we do not know much about Mitrinović⁶⁵ who published e.g. work titled *Our Muslims. A Study for Orientation in the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Muslims Issue*

⁶¹ See more: M. Górny, „Futurystyczna geografia”. *Rola geografów w kształtowaniu granic Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i Południowo-Wschodniej w latach 1914–1920*, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 2013, t. XLVIII, pp. 117–139.

⁶² B. Aleksov, op. cit., pp. 239–240, 242.

⁶³ M. Górny, op. cit., p. 129 and next.

⁶⁴ J. H. Vasiljević, *Muslimani naše krvi u Južnoj Evropi*, Beograd 1924.

⁶⁵ He was probably a brother of Dimitrije Mitrinović, Serbian philosopher, poet, revolutionary and formulator the political movement “Yough Bosnia” (*Mlada Bosnia*). What is interesting, works of Čedomil are quoted even by modern researchers.

(1926).⁶⁶ Comparing three theories about influence of Islam on Muslims which, first, they belong to Cvijić's "Dinaric type"⁶⁷ (*dinarski tip*; this type of South Slavs had the largest range and besides represented the true spirit of the Serbian nation), second, come from South Serbia (Vasijević) and, thirdly, come from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Mitrinović), interesting questions are—(1) do those geographical works present different from one other analyses about influence of Islam, (2) do those works present new theories about Islam, it means lacking mythological and religion images because of the new research and political perspective; if yes—how do they treat this Ottoman heritage and (3) why local confessor of Islam started to be called "Muslims" (*muslims*) by Vasiljević and Mitrinović, so what was their place in Serbian nation then?

Cvijić in his work, *Psychic characteristics of the South Slavs* which was the second part of *The Balkan Peninsula*, considered Muslims from Sava river, Bosnia, Hercegovina, past Sandžak to Kosovo, *muhamedanski* or *muslimanski Srbi* and *muslimanski, muhamedanski* or *poislamljeni Dinarci*. He did not distinguish them because it was basic argumentations about the existence of Yugoslav unity and, consequently, the necessity of a common state.⁶⁸ Regarding the influence of Islam he claimed: "Probably no other faith changes the whole life and character of a nation like Islam."⁶⁹ This religion at the same time changed and did not the interior "our" world. Muslims were "ours" (*Srbi, Dinarci*) but "aliens" (*muslimanski* and *muhamedanski* were synonyms for Cvijić), however, main Dinaric features had to be saved. Just to mention, Cvijić was inspired by Karadžić's idea of the folk and originality of Serbs. For example, the Dinaric type was most brave during the fights with Ottoman Turks, that is one of the reasons, Cvijić recognized "Dinaric Serbs" as the most valuable part of the nation.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Č. Mitrinović, *Naši muslimani. Studija za orientaciju pitanja bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana*, Beograd 1926.

⁶⁷ Although Cvijić used the term "rasa" (rase), he did not entirely mean racial theories of the Dinaric racial type which were popular in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, see: A. Stojanović, *Eugenics and Racial Hygiene in the Theory and Political Thought of the Serbian/Yugoslav Extreme Right 1918–1944*, "Acta historica medicinae, pharmaciae, veterinae" 2015, No. 1 (34), pp. 18–28. Also Njegoš, Magarašević and Gopčević (and others) understood the rase similar to Cvijić, mainly as using Serbian language and demonstrating Serbian national consciousness.

⁶⁸ M. Górný, op. cit., p. 137.

⁶⁹ „[...] Možda nijedna vera ne menja tako duboko celokupan život i karakter nekog naroda kao islam. [...] ali ipak nije mogao uništiti najglavnije dinarske osobine" (J. Cvijić, *Psihičke osobine Južnih Slovena*, Beograd 2016, p. 102).

⁷⁰ D. Gil, *Prawosławie...*, op. cit., pp. 110–111, 159.

Muslims stayed Serbs because of language, the memory of Slavic origins,⁷¹ surnames ending in *ić* like Serbian and memory of Christian ancestors, it means *slava*.⁷² Cvijić alternated between religion/biological and language concept of Serbian nation which was, as we already know, popular also in the 19th century. However, Serbian religion tradition is narrowed here to *slava*, not a myth. Slava is a Serbian Orthodox Christian holiday of family's patron saint who gave it the surname. Meanwhile, *slava* is not only characteristic of Orthodox Serbs in the Balkan Peninsula but the argument of religion syncretism allows Cvijić authoritarian considered Muslims as Serbs according to the ideology "where is Serb, here is *slava*" (*gde je Srbin, tu je i slava*) and show that Islam has never changed the Orthodox and Slavic tradition.⁷³ Additionally, this theory helped united the nation in the face of territorial fragmentation.⁷⁴

Apart from some unchanged Dinaric features, Islam did not let converts be "rightful Serbs." As Cvijić claimed they opposed Serbian liberation and only noble Muslims could reconcile Islam and Serbian heritage, like, the same though Vukićević, Mehmed Sokolović did.⁷⁵ Unlike the historian, he repeated that other Muslims wanted to keep their estates and higher position in the social hierarchy, that is why they converted into Islam and because of new religion started to be conquerors like the Ottoman Turks.⁷⁶ Also, they thought they were better Muslims than the Ottoman Turks and wanted to show that they were worthy new faith, e.g. they were even willing to proselytism.⁷⁷ Cvijić, as well as Magarašević, called it fanaticism. What more, better social position and exploit works of *raja* made them believed that human work is useful because of Allah's destiny (*k'smet*)⁷⁸ so they became wean of thinking and working (Gopčević).⁷⁹

This conviction came from the stereotype *poturica gori od Turčina*. Although Cvijić made an extensive characterization of Muslim character traits, this is the main negative feature of "outside" Islam. Of course, Cvijić next to

⁷¹ And also family ties that is why Muslims from Montenegro and Raška preserved "blood revenge" (*krvna osveta*). J. Cvijić, op. cit., p. 103.

⁷² Ibidem.

⁷³ O. Milosavljević, op. cit., pp. 29–30, 53.

⁷⁴ D. Gil, *Evolucija...*, op. cit., p. 4/21.

⁷⁵ „Samo su najplemenitiji mogli u prošlosti pomiriti sa islamom svoje srpsko poreklo i pokoravati se, svesno ili ne, nacionalnim težnjama. [...]. Jedan od najznatnijih, Mehmed Sokolović, obnovio je 1557. godine srpsku patrijaršiju [...]" (J. Cvijić, op. cit., p. 114).

⁷⁶ Ibidem, p. 107.

⁷⁷ Ibidem, pp. 112–114.

⁷⁸ Actually, this word is general used but not accepted in Islam.

⁷⁹ Ibidem, p. 104.

subjective image that they were, for example, hospitable and kind (always like other Slavs),⁸⁰ presented objective and familiar Ottoman influences like food, coffee, smoking, type of houses, position of Muslim women and Turkish words,⁸¹ but, above all, he updated the out-of-date religious stereotype although he based on the Karadžić's idea. What is interesting, some Muslims features, like uncritical, naivety or lack of energy,⁸² are characteristic of Edward Said's discourse of Orientalism which indicates certain regularity in the West European and Serbian perception of Muslims.⁸³

Vasijević, who carried out his research from 1912 to 1913, used the word *muslimani* which started to be popular then but he used it as a synonym to *poturčenjaci*. Due to the place of research, he also recognized Macedonian Muslims—*Torbeši*, but even those Muslims were perceived in the negative meaning of *poturice*. As author claimed, they had Serbian roots like Serbian language and surnames, Serbian village names,⁸⁴ knowledge of old Serbian folk songs about e.g. Kosovo and celebration of *slava*,⁸⁵ meanwhile, they did want to remember about this. Instead, they would like to be fanatical and better Muslims than Ottoman Turks itself. Sharing faith with them and Turkish protection made *poturčenjaci* become *mekušci* (Mollusca) and *poltroni* (a word from the Italian language which means poltroons). Generally, it means that they were sluggards as they used to live in better conditions because of the Ottoman regime based on Islam. It was a reason for the mutual reluctance between Christians and Muslims. Additionally, they were timid and this is also a consequence of religious conversion, as the author claimed. They were aware of their betrayal, which is why they fell shame along with fear.⁸⁶

Vasijević, as we could see, did not bring to the since new non-religion reflection about Muslims and the influence of Islam but unlike to Cvijić he presented them as a closed, distanced, inhospitable group. What more, they do not understand, as the researcher claimed, that there was such a thing as a brotherhood between two religions, Christian and Islam, but one nation (*brat mio, koje vere bio*). It was also the guilt of Islam.⁸⁷

Mitrinović repeated mentioned stereotypical perception about *Muslimani* as well. He openly claimed that theory *poturica gori od Turčina* was justified

⁸⁰ Ibidem, p. 109.

⁸¹ Ibidem, p. 111.

⁸² Ibidem, p. 105.

⁸³ See: E. Said, op. cit., p. 71.

⁸⁴ J. H. Vasijević, op. cit., p. 5.

⁸⁵ Ibidem, p. 24.

⁸⁶ Ibidem, p. 27.

⁸⁷ Ibidem, pp. 20–21, 27–28.

because of Muslim fanaticism and proselytism.⁸⁸ In his, what is important, theoretical work (unlike Cvijić's and Vasiljević's), they were also sluggards because of the Ottoman system, they did not like to think, they believed in destiny (*k'smet*) and were a closed group but the group which would like to show itself in a favorable light (some features were presented by Said). For the last theory, the proof was a quotation from Njegoš's *Mountain Wreath* that "no one lies as disgustingly as Turčin" (*niko grđe ko Turčin ne laže*).⁸⁹ For the one hand, he also claimed that Islam was established falsely and did not have a key influence on Slavic soul and race,⁹⁰ but, for the other hand, he asserted that when the "racial element" was fresh, Serbs gave the Ottoman Empire outstanding individuals (he might have Sokolović in mind like other Serbian activists).⁹¹ However, the researcher went the furthest in his analysis. He considered the influence of Islam, exactly above mentioned features, also on Muslim homosexuality and alcoholism.

Mitrinović wrote that Muslims "were close to taking drugs but they did not have them so they choose alcohol." Drinking alcohol, even though Islam forbids it, was caused by new political circumstances, the Austro-Hungarian administration.⁹² It showed their unbelievableness in being Muslims and their moral and social decline as well. Serbian researcher paid special attention to homosexuality as a direct Ottoman trait.⁹³ Islamic East or Orient, as Said named it, was an inexhaustible source of descriptions of all sexual deviations, like e.g. homosexuality, for the Western part of the world which was closed in sexual issues then.⁹⁴ Non-heterosexual relations had even been recognized as the main source of the collapse of systems built on the basis of Islam.⁹⁵ In Mitrinović's case, we deal with a reverse situation—the fall of the Ottoman Empire became the cause of homosexual tendencies that did not occur in the Slavic world before. Considering it first and foremost as a social issue which has to be solved, the researcher created the basis for the theory of the need to nationalize Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina. The confessors of Islam are presented here as a problem that needs to be solved, which also Said recognised as a feature of Orientalism discourse.⁹⁶ The first step should be "social anti-

⁸⁸ Č. Mitrinović, op. cit., pp. 38–39.

⁸⁹ Ibidem, pp. 75, 105–106.

⁹⁰ See footnote numer 65.

⁹¹ Ibidem, pp. 43, 109.

⁹² Ibidem, p. 128.

⁹³ Ibidem, p. 135.

⁹⁴ E. Said, op. cit., pp. 160–161, 279, 281; S. El Feki, *Seks i cytadela. Życie intymne w arabskim świecie przemian*, tłum. A. Nowakowska, Wołowiec 2015, pp. 28–30.

⁹⁵ S. El Feki, op. cit., p. 38.

⁹⁶ E. Said, op. cit., p. 303.

-Islamization.”⁹⁷ Mitrinović additionally associated homosexual issues with theories of lower type of Serbian people⁹⁸ (unlike Cvijić who claimed that Serbs, especially from Herzegovina, were the purest type of Dinaric type). As a matter of fact, the theory was not new (see for example Magarašević or Vasiljević and his comparison to Mollusca), but in this case, belonging to the lower type was another proof of the necessity for full assimilation of Muslims.⁹⁹ Interestingly, Islam did not disturb as a religion.

Conclusions

The stereotype of *poturice* and the bad influence of Islam on them has a special place in the Serbian nationalistic discourse. For the one hand, it stayed a similar system of perception and vocabulary because even the erasing of the term “*poturice*” and replacing it with “Serb Muslim” did not change the reception. *Poturice* were admittedly considered Serbs but were not completely recognized as rightful members of the Serbian nation because of Islam. The image of this religion, which derives from the anti-Ottoman character of the Serbian national identity, portrayed it as something foreign and negative. For the other hand, from the second part of the 19th century to the first years of the 20th century, we were dealing with an attempt to tame Islam among Serbs and, what is interesting, the same vocabulary was used. However, the modern concept of a nation based on the Serbian language did not help. Although it was accepted, promoted and stood out right next to the Orthodox folk tradition, the religion stayed the most important for Serbs and influenced on perceptions of “others.” Probably, because of this, Serbian-Muslim alliance from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century and Serbian identity among the Muslims did not have a chance.¹⁰⁰

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Agičić D., *Bosna je... naša! Mitovi i stereotipi o državnosti, nacionalnom i vjerskom identitetu te pripadnosti Bosne u novijim udžbenicima povijesti*, [in:] *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu. Zbornik radova*, ur. H. Kamberović, Sarajevo 2003.
2. Aleksov B., *Poturica gori od Turčina: srpski istoričari o verskim preobraćenjima*, [in:] *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu. Zbornik radova*, ur. H. Kamberović, Sarajevo 2003.

⁹⁷ Č. Mitrinović, op. cit., p. 168.

⁹⁸ Ibidem, p. 138.

⁹⁹ E. Said, op. cit., pp. 302–303.

¹⁰⁰ See: I. Banac, op. cit., p. 339 and next.

3. Banac I., *Nacionalno pitanje u Jugoslaviji. Porijeklo, povijest, politika*, prev. J. Šantija, Zagreb 1988.
4. Bišćević V., *Bosanski namjesnici osmanskog doba (1463–1878)*, Sarajevo 2006.
5. Cvijić J., *Psihičke osobine Južnih Slovena*, Beograd 2016.
6. Čolović I., *Smrt na Kosovu Polju. Istorija kosovskog mita*, Beograd 2016.
7. Dąbrowska-Partyka M., *Literatura pograniczna, pogranicza literatury*, Kraków 2004.
8. *Delo. List za nauku, književnost i društveni život*, 1908, br. 49.
9. Demirović M., *Bosna i Bošnjaci u srpskoj politici*, Bihać 1999.
10. El Feki S., *Seks i cytadela. Życie intymne w arabskim świecie przemian*, tłum. A. Nowakowska, Wołowiec 2015.
11. Elsie R., *A Biographical Dictionary of Albanian History*, London 2012.
12. Garašanin I., *Načertanije*, [in:] *Ideja o Velikoj Srbiji: od Ilije Garašanina do Tomislava Nikolića. Izvori velikosrpske ideologije, politike i agresije*, ur. Z. Despot, D. Tatić, Zagreb 2012.
13. Gil D., *Ewolucja i funkcje idei narodu w Serbii od schyłku XVIII w.*, "Slavia Meridionalis" 2017, No. 17, [online] <https://doi.org/10.11649/sm.1325> [accessed: 21.08.2019].
14. Gil D., *Prawosławie, historia, naród. Miejsce kultury duchowej w serbskiej tradycji i współczesności*, Kraków 2005.
15. Gopčević S., *Stara Srbija i Makedonija*, Beograd 1890.
16. Górny M., „Futurystyczna geografia”. *Rola geografów w kształtowaniu granic Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej i Południowo-Wschodniej w latach 1914–1920*, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej” 2013, t. XLVIII.
17. Hadžibegović I., Imamović M., *Bosna i Hercegovina u vrijeme austougarske vladavine (1878–1918)*, [in:] *Bosna i Hercegovina od najstarijih vremena do kraja Drugog svjetskog rata*, ur. I. Tepić, Sarajevo 1998.
18. Jarčević S., *Bivši Srbi – rimokatolici, muslimani, Rumuni, Crnogorci*, Novi Sad 2007.
19. Jelavich Ch., *Milenko M. Vukičević: from Serbianism to Yugoslavism*, [in:] *Historians as Nation-Builders. Central and South-East Europe*, eds. D. Deletant, H. Hanak, London 1988.
20. Juzbašić Dž., *Politika i privreda u Bosni i Hercegovini pod austrougarskom upravom*, Sarajevo 2002.
21. Kamberović H., *Turci i kmetovi – mit o vlasnicima bosanske zemlje*, [in:] *Historijski mitovi na Balkanu. Zbornik radova*, ur. H. Kamberović, Sarajevo 2003.
22. Karadžić V., *Srbi svi i svuda*, [in:] *Ideja o Velikoj Srbiji: od Ilije Garašanina do Tomislava Nikolića. Izvori velikosrpske ideologije, politike i agresije*, ur. Z. Despot, D. Tatić, Zagreb 2012.
23. Kola A., *Mito-logika pamięci, czyli o Kosowie w „Górskim wieńcu” Petara II Njegoša raz jeszcze (pasaże strukturalistyczno-konstruktywistyczne)*, „Litteraria Copernicana” 2016, nr 3 (19).
24. Lovrenović I., *Bosnia. A Cultural History*, trans. S. Wild Bičanić, New York 2001.
25. Magarašević Đ., *Putovanje po Srbiji u 1827. godini*, Beograd 1983.
26. Milosavljević O., *U tradiciji nacionalizma ili stereotipi srpskih intelektualaca XX veka o „nama” i „drugima”*, Beograd 2002.
27. Mitrinović Č., *Naši muslimani. Studija za orientaciju pitanja bosansko-hercegovačkih muslimana*, Beograd 1926.
28. Moroz-Grzelak L., *Bracia Słowianie. Wizje wspólnoty a rzeczywistość*, Warszawa 2013.
29. *Njegoš Osman-paši Skopljaku*, [online] https://www.rastko.rs/rastko-cg/povijest/njegospismo_skopljaku.html [accessed: 20.04.2019].
30. Pajdzińska A., *My, to znaczy... (z badań językowego obrazu świata)*, „Teksty Drugie. Teoria, literatury, krytyka, interpretacja” 2001, nr 1 (66).

31. Promitzer Ch., *Austria and the Balkans: Exploring the Role of Travelogues in the Construction an Area*, [in:] *Southeast European Studies in a Globalizing World*, ed. K. Kaser, Graz 2015.
32. Ramić I., *Književni časopisi austrougarskog perioda kao prostor saobražavanja bošnjačke usmene tradicije I pisane književnost*, "Društvene i humanističke studije" 2016, br. 1.
33. Said E.W., *Orientalizm*, tłum. W. Kalinowski, Warszawa 1991.
34. Šuica M., *Percepcija osmanskog carstva u Srbiji*, [in:] *Imaginarni Turčin*, ur. B. Jezernik, Beograd 2010.
35. Vasiljević J.H., *Muslimani naše krvi u Južnoj Evropi*, Beograd 1924.
36. Vervaeet S., *Centar i periferija u Austro-Ugarskoj. Dinamika izgradnje nacionalnih identiteta u Bosni i Hercegovini od 1878. do 1918. godine na primjeru književnih tekstova*, Zagreb-Sarajevo 2013.
37. Vukičević M. M., *Znameniti Srbi Muslimani*, Beograd 1906, [online] https://www.rastko.rs/istorija/mvuk_muslimani.pdf [accessed: 18.04.2019].
38. Zieliński B., *Serbska powieść historyczna. Studia nad źródłami, ideami i kierunkami rozwoju*, Poznań 1998.
39. Zora. *List za zabavu, nauku i književnost*, 1898, br. 9.
40. Zora. *List za zabavu, nauku i književnost*, 1898, br. 10.

AGATA PAWLINA

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW
FACULTY OF PHILOLOGY
INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
E-MAIL: AGATA.PAWLINA@DOCTORAL.UJ.EDU.PL

SUBMISSION: 30.12.2018
ACCEPTANCE: 11.07.2019

Traces of the Ottoman Musical Tradition in Early 20th-Century Western-Style Turkish Art Music

ABSTRACT

The Turkish Five (*Türk Beşleri*) is a name given to a group of composers whose works set out the direction for modern Western-style Turkish art music. After the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the new generation of musicians trained in Europe had been given the task to establish a new musical tradition for the modern Turkish society. It was supposed to replace the Ottoman musical tradition. According to outlines given by the Turkish government, the new “National Music” (*Millî Musiki*) should encompass elements of Western-style art music and melodies of Turkish folk music. Five composers were especially successful in fulfilling this task, Necil Kâzım Akses, Hasan Ferit Alnar, Ulvi Cemal Erkin, Ahmet Adnan Saygun and Cemal Reşit Rey. By their compositions, they brought to live music that was appreciated by Kemal Atatürk himself. Although they were supposed to avoid any elements of the Ottoman musical tradition, even in the most popular works of this period, one can hear influences that were not to be heard in the *Millî Musiki*. In this paper, the author presents the main guidelines and historical overview of the “musical revolution” which took place in Turkey of the early-republican period (1923–1938). Next, provides a list of compositions which prove her thesis that composers born in 1904–1908, as the youngest generation of the Ottoman Empire’s elite, did not completely reject the Ottoman musical heritage in which they were raised and brought some of its elements into 20th-century Western-style Turkish classical music.

KEYWORDS

Turkish Music, Ottoman Music, Turkish Five, Milli Musiki

Introduction and Basic Musical Terms

In 1923 the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed. Its first president, Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), dedicated his life to conducting wide-ranging legal, political and social reforms in his newly founded secular nation-state. The very important ideological framework of those reforms was the desire to cut off ties to the Ottoman Empire's legacy, regardless of possible cultural loss for the society. Ayhan Erol accurately worded it saying: "Atatürk's ideal was to build up a «nation» from the ashes of the empire. The state tried to construct an official (westernized) culture which underestimated the cultural needs of the Turkish people."¹ It is generally believed that the most important cultural changes in Turkey of the early-republican era (1923–1938) took place in the fields of language and customs, especially those related to Islam. This paper aims to show that Western-style Turkish classical music (field of culture sometimes forgotten in the context of the westernization process in the Republic of Turkey) had been a significant symbol and medium of change.²

Before we start evaluating how the ideal of new national Turkish music had been formulated and put into practice by the first generation of modern composers, called today The Turkish Five, it is crucial to define basic musical terms and concepts used in this paper. Contemporary musicology formulated several possible classifications of music genres and a few definitions of "classical" or "art" music as one of them.³ The author understands "classical music" or "art music" in three ways. First is the professional way—as being performed by professional musicians educated in specialized institutions of musical education. Second is highly formalized—as written works regarding its theory and history and formalized system of transmitting its tradition, regardless of developing or not musical notation. Third is elitist—as being created and performed for or by the members of the highest social stratum at

¹ A. Erol, *Music, Power and Symbolic Violence, The Turkish State's Music Policies During the Early Republican Period*, "European Journal of Cultural Studies" 2012, No. 1 (15), p. 39.

² It is important to remember that the early-Republican Turkish government was not the first to perceive music as a symbol of modernization process within the state. Throughout the most of the 19th century, remaining sultans of the Ottoman Empire, starting with Selim III (1789–1807) and Mahmud II (1808–1839), conducted reforms within their court's cultural institutions and Western-style classical music had been played by professional musicians in Istanbul and beyond since then. See more about the westernization process of the musical culture in the Ottoman Empire in another Author's paper. A. Pawlina, *Muzyka klasyczna Europy w Imperium Osmańskim*, „Przegląd Orientalistyczny” 2014, nr 1–2.

³ See, e.g. *Music*, [in:] *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, eds. S. Sadie, J. Tyrrell, M. Levy, New York–London 2002.

some point of its history. With those three features in mind, to define “Western-style classical music,” instead of in-depth musicological definition, the author wishes to use simple popular connotation known by all Readers—it is music that the Reader knows from European philharmonics and opera theaters. In the context of contemporary Turkish musical culture that term can be applied to all compositions created by Turkish artists in the 20th and 21st-century using principles of European compositional techniques and Western musical instruments.

On the other hand, ‘Ottoman-style classical music,’ as a phenomenon, not particular known, requires some further remarks. It emerged as the youngest of art music traditions of the Muslim Middle East at the court of the Ottoman Empire’s rulers in the late 16th century. Its practice had been transmitted by oral tradition (within close master-pupil relation) in *meşkhane*s—one of the cultural facilities of sultan’s court and Mevlevi Order.⁴ Its theory encompasses elements of Arabic and Persian musical traditions and had been described in numerous treatises, called *edvar*, within the period of 16th–21st century.⁵

Even though Western-style and Eastern-style art music shares an ancestor—ancient Greek music theory, throughout centuries they became very different from each other. The most significant difference in theory of music, one that had been used by Kemalists⁶ to build a strong anti-Eastern music argument, was its sophisticated monophonic system of melodic patterns called *makam* and rhythmic patterns called *usul*,⁷ juxtaposed with European

⁴ For detailed definition of *meşk* in English see: J. M. O’Connell, *Fine Art, Fine Music, Controlling Turkish Taste at the Fine Arts Academy in 1926*, “Yearbook for Traditional Music” 2000, Vol. 32, p. 120.

⁵ For further readings in English on the Ottoman music’s history and theory see: C. Behar, *The Ottoman Musical Tradition*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. S. Faroqhi, vol. 3, New York 2006, pp. 398–407; D. Ertan, *Cycles and Peripheries, An Ottoman “Kitâb el-Edvâr”*, “Asian Music” 2007, No. 1 (38); W. Feldman, *Music of the Ottoman Court, Makam, Composition and the Early Ottoman Instrumental Repertoire*, Berlin 1996; *Writing the History of “Ottoman Music”*, eds. M. Greve, E. Oğuz, O. Nobrega, Würzburg 2015.

⁶ A term used to describe followers of Kemalism or Atatürkism—ideology based on Kemal Atatürk’s vision of a modern Turkey, in which culture and society was to fully embrace Western way of living. For details see e.g.: S. J. Shaw, E. K. Shaw, *Historia Imperium Osmańskiego i Republiki Tureckiej*, t. 2, tłum. B. Świetlik, Warszawa 2012, pp. 562–585.

⁷ For further readings in English on Middle-Eastern classical music’s modal system see: A. Shiloah, *Scales, Modes and Rhythms*, [in:] *Music in the World of Islam, A Socio-Cultural Study*, Detroit 2001. On Turkish makams and usuls: E. Popescu-Judetz, *A Summary Catalogue of the Turkish Makams*, İstanbul 2010; K. Signell, *Makam, Modal Practice In Turkish Art Music*, Washington 1977; O. Yarman, *A Comparative Evaluation of Pitch Notations in Turkish Makam Music, Abjad Scale & 24-Tone Pythagorean Tuning – 53 Equal Division of the Octave as a Common*

polyphony, especially tonal harmony.⁸ Tension and disputes between practitioners of both traditions, Western-style and Eastern-style classical music, were an important part of public debate and Turkish culture as a whole throughout all 20th century, as we will see below.

***Millî Musiki*—The National Music and “musical revolution”⁹ (1923–1938)**

Musical reform policies were indicative of the overt political strategy of situating the Ottoman past in opposition to the bright future of an alliance with Europe.

Kathryn Woodard,
*Music Mediating Politics in Turkey*¹⁰

For Kemal Atatürk and his political advisors for reforms in the musical education system and in the music itself were no less important than those conducted in other fields of Turkish cultural life. Ideological principles of those reforms had been formulated by Ziya Gökalp (1876–1924), influential sociologist and philosopher, often characterized as the father of Turkish nationalism. In the second part of his book-manifesto entitled “The Principles of Turkism” (tur. *Türkçülüğün Esasları*), in short chapter he describes the current state of music known in Turkey and states that the invention of a new national-style music (tur. *Millî Musiki*) is essential for the foundation and cultural development of modern Turkish society. He gives very specific guidelines (quoted in

Grid, “Journal of Interdisciplinary Music Studies” 2007, No. 2 (1); S. Yöre, *Makam in Music as a Concept, Scale and Phenomenon*, “Zeitschrift für die Welt der Türken/Journal of World of Turks” 2012, No. 3 (4); *Maqām Traditions of Turkic Peoples*, eds. J. Elsner, G. Jähnichen, Berlin 2006; *The Structure and Idea of Maqām, Historical Approaches*, eds. J. Elsner, R. P. Pennanen, Tampere 1997.

⁸ See: Western Polyphony and Harmony, [in:] The New Grove Dictionary..., op. cit.

⁹ In following chapters the term “musical revolution” will be written without quotation mark. The author believes that we can call changes in the early 20th-century music in Turkey as a “revolution” because of their impact on high culture of Turkey of the early Republican period. It seems that Ayhan Erol would agree with that term, saying “For Atatürk, the revolution had to be an all-encompassing undertaking affecting every aspect of life in Turkey. Thus, all kinds of reforms implemented by the state were perceived as a revolution. There is no doubt that music had an important place within reforms that Atatürk wanted to realize. The music reform was an example of the most important symbolic violence aimed at imposing a particular vision of the state”. A. Erol, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁰ K. Woodard, *Music Mediating Politics in Turkey*, Kindle 5 Edition 2011, p. 4.

full below) for future composers and performers of music. Guidelines that had been carried out by the newly founded state-endorsed cultural institutions within a few years after publishing “The Principles of Turkism” in 1923.

Nowadays [in Turkey] we encounter three types of music, Eastern music, Western music and folk music.¹¹ But which one of those can we deem as our national music? I have shown above that we should regard Eastern music as morbid and foreign to our nation [tur. *hem hasta hem de gayrî millî*]. Folk music is a part of our culture, Western music—a part of our new civilization and both cannot be regarded as foreign. Thus, our national music must emerge from a fusion of folk music and Western harmony [here means, polyphony].

Our folk music gave us plenty of melodies. If we gather those melodies and combine them with Western compositional techniques we will gain music that will be both—national and European. [...] And that is precisely our program of musical change with accordance to the principles of Turkism. The next step—putting those guidelines to practical use, lays in hands of our future national musicians.¹²

As we may see, Gökalp uses very emotional language in his description of the music. Nowadays, it is clear that the purpose of it was rather ideological than scientific. Gökalp’s historical overview of Ottoman-Turkish and European music, mentioned in the quote, is only one page-length, vague and significantly diverges from musicological knowledge.¹³ He focuses on the most obvious differences between musical traditions of the Ottoman Empire and Europe and values the first as boring, hermetic, too ancient for modern times and unable to incorporate any changes. Thus, he argues, it should be completely abandoned and replaced by European polyphony with elements of Turkish folk music.

Even though Gökalp’s knowledge of the Ottoman-style art music was clearly insufficient, his opinions on it turned out to be crucial for the musical culture of the young Republic of Turkey. It seems that by publishing this short chapter regarding music, he formulated the main purpose of the musical revolution—creating Turkish-style music, a new national-style genre in European classical music. For political purposes, as soon as possible, Turkish-style music, in terms

¹¹ Turkish counterparts of those musical terms used by Gökalp are as follows: *Şark musikîsi, Garp musikîsi, Halk musikîsi*, Z. Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, ed. 7th, Istanbul 1968, p. 130.

¹² Ibidem, pp. 130–131 [The author’s own translation].

¹³ Gökalp’s views on the Ottoman musical culture had been widely discussed and criticized by Turkish and non-Turkish musicologists. The list of references on this topic is provided by Erol, see: A. Erol, op. cit., p. 41. For further readings in English on his contemporary critics see also: O. Tekelioğlu, *Modernizing Reforms and Turkish Music in the 1930s*, “Turkish Studies” 2001, No. 1 (12).

of aesthetics and cultural value, had to achieve level equal to e.g. 19th-century Russian, Polish or Hungarian-styles in music. The first step to obtaining this objective was conducting reforms in Turkish musical education.

In 1924 the Law on Unity of Education (tur. *Tevhîd-i Tedrîsât Kanunu*) established a state-operated school of music in Ankara called *Musiki Muallim Mektebi*. Its main purpose was to educate teachers of Western-style art music for future generations of composers and performers. The first beginning of school year there took place on 1 September 1924, with only six students enlisted.¹⁴ The same Law abolished Ottoman institutions of musical education and outlawed teaching Ottoman-style art music.¹⁵ Fine Art Commission (*Sanayi-i Nefise Encümeni*), whose purpose was overseeing the process of change in fine arts and musical culture, had been established a few months later.¹⁶ During next four years all educational institutions and musical bands of Eastern and Western-style music, which existed during late Ottoman period in Istanbul, had been either abolished or reformed, renamed and moved to Ankara, the new capital city of Turkey. The most important of those, former imperial military band, now “newly” established orchestra undertaking the name of *Riyaset-i Cumhur Musiki Heyeti* (The Orchestra of the President of Republic) had been moved to Ankara on 27 April 1924.¹⁷ The eastern-style musical tradition suffered greatly in 1925 when along with abolition of the Mevlevi Order the last existing institutions of education and performance of it had been banned.

Institutional part of the musical revolution had been successfully progressing,¹⁸ but still in the early 1930s, Kemal Atatürk was not satisfied with its

¹⁴ See: F. Kılıç, *Çok Sesli Batı Müziğinin Türk Modernleşmesindeki Önemi*, [in:] 38. ICANAS (*Uluslararası Asya ve Kuzey Afrika Çalışmaları Kongresi*) 10–15.09.2007, vol. 1, Ankara 2009, p. 459.

¹⁵ The first conservatory of the Ottoman-style classical music in the Republic of Turkey had been established about fifty years later, in 1975. *Türk Musikisi Devlet Konservatuvarı* is now a part of Technical University of Istanbul [online] http://www.tmdk.itu.edu.tr/en/main/page_detail/25 [access: 11.07.2019].

¹⁶ J. M. O'Connell, *Fine Art, Fine Music...*, op. cit., p. 132.

¹⁷ In 1935 its name had been changed to *Cumhurbaşkanlığı Senfoni Orkestrası* (Presidential Symphony Orchestra) and nowadays it remains one of the most prestigious institutions of Western-style classical music in Turkey. It seems to be proud of its Ottoman roots and celebrates its nearly 200 years-existence (1826–2018) [online] <https://www.cso.gov.tr/tar304hccedile.html> [access: 11.07.2019].

¹⁸ For further readings in English on timeline and details of musical revolution in Turkey see: J. M. O'Connell, *Fine Art, Fine Music...*, op. cit.; in Polish: A. Pawlina, *Turkizm w muzyce. Związki muzyki i polityki w młodej Republice Tureckiej (1923–1938)*, „Wrocławskie Studia Erazmiańskie” 2018, t. 12: Orient Daleki i Bliski.

achievements. In 1934, in one of his opening speeches for the Turkish Parliament, he stated that the Ministry of Culture should regard musical reforms as its priority. As soon as possible, modern national Turkish-style music, imagined by Ziya Gökalp, should be brought to life by legal and further institutional means. Only with this objective accomplished, the modernization process of Turkish culture will reach its “universal level.”¹⁹ In the framework of Kemalist ideology “universal” always meant “Western” or “European.” As a result of this speech, in 1934 the Ottoman-style classical music had suffered final blow—it had been formally banned from the radio broadcasts. Although the legal ban had been revoked two years later, in practice, marginalization of the Eastern-style Turkish classical music (as it started to be called from now on) in public space continued until the 1970s.²⁰

When the Eastern-style art music suffered political censorship and struggled to survive, Turkish folk music, a phenomenon redefined by the Kemalists, became the main field of research in newly founded educational institutions. Ankara State Conservatory (*Ankara Devlet Konservatuarı*) had been established in 1936 and two years later, as a part of it, specialized Archive of Turkish Folk Music (*Türk Halk Ezgileri Arşivi*) was founded. In 1937–1957, every year, those institutions organized scientific ethnomusicological expeditions to various regions of Anatolia to gather and analyze Turkish folk music.

***Türk Beşleri*—The Turkish Five.**

Works Influenced by Ottoman Musical Tradition

With institutional and educational background established, the first generation of modern Turkish composers could finally bring to life Western-style Turkish art music as it was imagined by Turkey’s authorities. Five composers are deemed to be especially influential while fulfilling this task, Necil Kâzım Akses (1908–1999), Hasan Ferit Alnar (1906–1978), Ulvi Cemal Erkin (1906–1972), Cemal Reşit Rey (1904–1985) and Ahmet Adnan Saygun (1907–1991). The idea for their collective name, “The Turkish Five,” seems to be based on the name of 19th-century creators of the Russian national style in music called

¹⁹ See: S. Y. Ataman, *Atatürk ve Türk musikisi*, Ankara 1991, p. 4.

²⁰ Further readings in English on how the Ottoman-style classical music survived the period of its neglecting in the official republican debate and culture and gained a name of “Eastern-style Turkish classical music” see: W. Feldman, *Cultural Authority and Authenticity in the Turkish Repertoire*, “Asian Music” 1990, No. 1 (22); J. M. O’Connell, *In the Time of Alaturka, Identifying Difference in Musical Discourse*, “Ethnomusicology” 2005, No. 2 (49); K. Signell, *Turkey’s Classical Music, a Class Symbol*, “Asian Music” 1980, No. 1 (12).

“The Mighty Handful” or simply “The Five.”²¹ By attributing this name on the first generation of Turkish composers of the Republican era, Turkish researchers are symbolically expressing the fact that art music of Turkey reached the desired level and became an equal and important part of the modern history of Western music.

Indeed, all members of the Turkish Five dedicated their knowledge, skills and creativity to Atatürk’s vision of modern Turkish musical culture with a full-hearted commitment. Each of them, except the oldest Cemal Reşit Rey, started their careers by being sent to Europe for one year-length musical training as a part of a scholarship funded by the state in years 1924–1928. Necil Kazım Akses and Hasan Ferit Alnar studied in Vienna, Ahmet Adnan Saygun in Prague, Ulvi Cemal Erkin in Paris.²² Upon coming back to Turkey they were not only skillfully composing pieces inspired by Turkish folk music, but also took an important part in ethnomusicological research in Anatolia and in establishing modern musical and educational institutions (bands, orchestras, music halls, etc.). They personally knew Turkish authorities, including Kemal Atatürk and İsmet İnönü (1884–1973), the second president of the Republic, and occasionally they were creating music ordered specifically by them.²³ Therefore, their artistic efforts were significantly influenced by the cultural policies of the state.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Contemporary Turkish Music (tur. *Çağdaş Türk Müziği*) flourished. George Weldon, English conductor who in 1951 attended the 4th Anglo-Turkish Music Festival in Ankara, was “most impressed by Turkey’s musical progress” and commented in detail some works of “five main Turkish composers.” According to him, each of them “appears to have a creative style of his own, and their output includes all types of music, ranging from symphonic works to oratorio and opera. [...] There are, of course, many younger composers developing on their own lines, but under the guidance of those already established.”²⁴ Max T. Krone, another conductor who attended the same festival, in his review, unknowingly confirms that Gökalp’s vision of *Millî Musiki* had been brought to life: “Saygun’s is a new and refreshing voice in

²¹ All of them lived in Saint Petersburg in the second half of the 19th century, Mily Balakirev, Alexander Borodin, Cesar Cui, Modest Mussorgsky and Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov.

²² E. E. Kaya, *Cumhuriyet Sonrası Müzik Politikamız ve Batıya Yönelim*, „SBArD Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi” 2011, no. 17, p. 118.

²³ The famous example of that is given by the history of creation of the first Turkish opera “Özsoy” by Ahmet Adnan Saygun. Atatürk himself choose the topic—the Turkish-Iranian friendship, for the occasion of diplomatic visit of Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. “Özsoy”’s premiere took place in Ankara on 19 June 1934. For further details see e.g.: K. Woodard, op. cit.

²⁴ G. Weldon, *Music in Turkey*, “Tempo, New Series” 1951, No. 20, pp. 29–30.

Western music. He is a scholar in the field of folk music [...] and his music has a rhythmic, melodic and harmonic flavor that smacks both the East and the West. [...] He has arranged many Turkish folk songs for the chorus.”²⁵

But even though “national composers” were supposed to avoid any elements of the Ottoman musical tradition, in a small part of the Turkish Five’s works, one can hear influences that were not to be heard in the *Millî Musiki*. Those Ottoman-style inspirations can be traced either in terms of compositional techniques (e.g. using Ottoman-Turkish instruments, harmonizing Ottoman-Turkish composer’s pieces, incorporating elements of Ottoman-Turkish modal system into melodic progression, etc.) or in non-musical elements (e.g. title or, in vocal music, chosen topic and plot) of works listed below:²⁶

Hasan Ferit Alnar

Cello Concerto (1943)—in 1st and 2nd movement melodic progression is influenced by Ottoman-Turkish makam *Hicaz*.

Kanun Konçertosu (1944–51)—the first musical piece in which Western-style orchestra accompanies Eastern-style instrument solo, *kanun*—kind of large zither, one of the main instruments in Middle Eastern classical makam music; significantly influenced by Ottoman-style art music.

Those two pieces are composed in Western-style, but Hasan Ferit Alnar composed also numerous pieces in Eastern-style as the only one from The Turkish Five. He was *kanun*-player himself.

Necil Kazım Akses

İtri'nin Neva Kâr Üzerine Scherzo for orchestra (1969–70)—İtri was the Ottoman composer who lived in late 17th and early 18th century; in the piece Akses used exact melodies of İtri’s *Neva Kâr* composition and harmonized it in scherzo form.

Bir Divan’dan Gazel (1976)—song for tenor solo and orchestra; *divan* in classical Ottoman literature is a compilation of poems and *gazel* is one of the classical forms in Ottoman poetry and art music.

Viola Concerto (1977)—a melodic progression of the 2nd movement is influenced by Ottoman-Turkish makam *Bestenigâr*.

Mimar Sinan (the 1980s)—unfinished opera (only 1 act exists); Mimar Sinan was the famous Ottoman architect, lived c. 1490–1588.

²⁵ M. T. Krone, *Music in Turkey*, “Music Educators Journal” 1952, No. 2 (39), p. 28.

²⁶ The author gathered here list of pieces influenced by the Ottoman musical tradition or the Ottoman culture as a whole, for further investigation in the future. Titles are given along with years of creation, musical genre and a short explanation of possible source of inspiration.

Ulvi Cemal Erkin

Köçekçe. Orkestra için dans rapsodisi. (1943)—orchestral suite; *köçekçe* was a piece of dance music played as an accompaniment for male dancers dressed as women, phenomenon popular in urban Ottoman culture.

2nd Symphony (1948–1958)—its third movement called *Allegro alla köçekçe*; see above.

Cemal Reşit Rey

Karagöz (1930–31)—symphonic poem; *karagöz* is the traditional Turkish shadow play, popular during Ottoman times.

Çelebi (the 1940s)—opera; its plot is based on the life of Çelebi Mehmet Efendi, Ottoman musician of the 18th century. In one of the tenor's arias Reşit Rey quoted Ottoman-Turkish song (*şarkı*), composed by Müezzîn Çelebi in the 18th century and used Ottoman-Turkish tambourine *def* in instrumental accompaniment.

Fatih (1953)—symphonic poem; 'fatih' in Turkish means 'conqueror'; Mehmed the Conqueror was the sultan of the Ottoman Empire in 1444–1446 and 1451–1481; his main achievement was the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

Sultan Cem (1922–1923)—opera; Cem Sultan (1459–1495) was the third son of Sultan Mehmed II, sent to exile after being defeated by his brother Bayezit.

Ahmet Adnan Saygun

Yunus Emre Oratoryosu (1942)—oratorio based on poems of Yunus Emre, Turkish folk poet of 13th/14th century; Saygun uses in it mostly elements of Turkish folk music but in some fragments (bass arias) Ottoman makams' can be felt in melodic progressions and *ney*, kind of flute, that had been used in Mevlevi Order's ceremonies, is being used in instrumental accompaniment.

2nd Violin Quartet (1957)—melodic progression is influenced by Ottoman-Turkish makam *Bestenigâr*.

Conclusion

Until this day only a few of Turkish Five's compositions inspired by Ottoman-Turkish music had been analyzed in detail using musicological methodology.²⁷ It is worth to emphasize, that some of those pieces, like Ulvi Cemal Erkin's *Köçekçe* or Hasan Ferit Alnar's *Kanun Konçertosu*, were the most popular works of the period and are still often performed and recorded nowadays. The question is—if the first generation of Turkish national composers clearly agreed with state's musical policies, why would they use elements of Ottoman musical culture, deemed as "morbid" and "primitive," as inspiration for their music?

²⁷ See: M. Aydın, *Türk Beşleri'nin Eserlerinde Gelenekli Müziklerimize İlişkin Unsurların Kullanımları ve Bu Unsurların Kullanımları Ekseninde İki Örnek Piyano Eserinin Analizi*, [in:] 38. ICANAS (Uluslararası Asya ve Kuzey Afrika Çalışmaları Kongresi), vol. 1, Ankara 2009 and references to that paper.

Scientific intuition and reasoning bring us to the conclusion that it had been caused by the fact that all composers of the Turkish Five were born in the late Ottoman period, in the families of high social stratum. Birth and growing up in the biggest cities of the Ottoman Empire (Cemal Reşit Rey in Jerusalem, Ahmet Adnan Saygun in Izmir, Necil Kazım Akses, Hasan Ferit Alnar and Ulvi Cemal Erkin in Istanbul) influenced on them. They were exposed to the Ottoman urban culture in which Eastern musical styles flourished for centuries. Progressing their musical education and careers under the political supervision of Turkey's Kemalist government, they focused on Western-style music. However, they did not want to completely neglect a few centuries old, strong Eastern-style musical tradition. More importantly, they must have deemed this music, nowadays called "Ottoman-Turkish art music" or "Eastern-style Turkish art music," as their own. Since they were approved by Turkish authorities as "Turks" in terms of nationalist's definition of Turkishness, and their works were acknowledged by the state's officials, the music they have known since they were younger must have been "Turkish" enough to incorporate its elements into modern Turkish national style.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Akses, Necil Kâzım, [in:] V. Sözer, *Müzik Ansiklopedik Sözlük*, İstanbul 2005.
2. Alnar, Hasan Ferit, [in:] V. Sözer, *Müzik Ansiklopedik Sözlük*, İstanbul 2005.
3. Aracı E., *Reforming Zeal*, "The Musical Times" 1997, No. 1855 (138).
4. Ataman S. Y., *Atatürk ve Türk musikisi*, Ankara 1991.
5. Aydınlar M., *Türk Beşleri'nin Eserlerinde Gelenekli Müziklerimize İlişkin Unsurların Kullanımları ve Bu Unsurların Kullanımları Ekseninde İki Örnek Piyano Eserinin Analizi*, [in:] 38. ICANAS (Uluslararası Asya ve Kuzey Afrika Çalışmaları Kongresi) Bildiriler, 13. Müzik kültürü ve eğitimi, vol. 1, Ankara 2009.
6. Behar C., *Musikiden Müziğe. Osmanlı/Türk Müziği, Gelenek ve Modernik*, İstanbul 2008.
7. Behar C., *The Ottoman Musical Tradition*, [in:] *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, vol. 3, ed. S. Faroqhi, New York 2006.
8. Çolak Y., *Ottomanism vs. Kemalism, Collective Memory and Cultural Pluralism in 1990s Turkey*, "Middle Eastern Studies" 2006, No. 4 (42).
9. Deniz E., *Cycles and Peripheries, An Ottoman "Kitâb el-Edvâr"*, "Asian Music" 2007, No. 1 (38).
10. Erol A., *Music, Power and Symbolic Violence, The Turkish State's Music Policies During the Early Republican Period*, "European Journal of Cultural Studies" 2012, No. 1 (15).
11. Feldman W., *Cultural Authority and Authenticity in the Turkish Repertoire*, "Asian Music" 1990, No. 1 (22).
12. Feldman W., *Music of the Ottoman Court, Makam, Composition and the Early Ottoman Instrumental Repertoire*, Berlin 1996.
13. Gökalp Z., *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, İstanbul 1968.

14. Kaya E. E., *Cumhuriyet Sonoası Müzik Politikamız ve Batıya Yönelim*, „SBArD Sosyal Bilimler Araştırma Dergisi” 2011, no. 17.
15. Kılıç F., *Çok Sesli Batı Müziğinin Türk Modernleşmesindeki Önemi*, [in:] 38. ICANAS (Uluslararası Asya ve Kuzey Afrika Çalışmaları Kongresi) Bildiriler, 13. Müzik kültürü ve eğitimi, vol. 1, Ankara 2009.
16. Krone M. T., *Music in Turkey*, “Music Educators Journal” 1952, No. 2 (39).
17. O’Connell J. M., *Fine Art, Fine Music, Controlling Turkish Taste at the Fine Arts Academy in 1926*, “Yearbook for Traditional Music” 2000, Vol. 32.
18. O’Connell J. M., *In the Time of Alaturka, Identifying Difference in Musical Discourse*, “Ethnomusicology” 2005, No. 2 (49).
19. Pawlina A., *Muzyka klasyczna Europy w Imperium Osmańskim*, „Przegląd Orientalistyczny” 2014, t. 1–2.
20. Pawlina A., *Turkizm w muzyce. Związki muzyki i polityki w młodej Republice Tureckiej (1923–1938)*, „Wrocławskie Studia Erazmiańskie” 2018, t. 12: Orient Daleki i Bliski.
21. Reisman A., *Post Ottoman Turkey Classical European Music & Opera*, Kindle Edition 2009.
22. Rey, Cemal Reşit, [in:] V. Sözer, *Müzik Ansiklopedik Sözlük*, İstanbul 2005.
23. *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, eds. S. Sadie, J. Tyrrell, M. Levy, New York–London 2002.
24. Saygun, Ahmet Adnan, [in:] V. Sözer, *Müzik Ansiklopedik Sözlük*, İstanbul 2005.
25. Signell K., *The Modernization Process in Two Oriental Music Cultures, Turkish and Japanese*, “Asian Music” 1976, No. 2 (7).
26. Signell K., *Turkey’s Classical Music, a Class Symbol*, “Asian Music” 1980, No. 1 (12).
27. Shaw S. J., Shaw E. K., *Historia Imperium Osmańskiego i Republiki Tureckiej*, t. 2, tłum. B. Świetlik, Warszawa 2012.
28. Tekelioğlu O., *Modernizing Reforms and Turkish Music in the 1930s*, “Turkish Studies” 2001, No. 1 (2).
29. Weldon G., *Music in Turkey*, “Tempo, New Series” 1951, No. 20.
30. Woodard K., *Music Mediating Politics in Turkey*, Kindle Edition 2011.
31. *Writing the History of “Ottoman Music”*, eds. M. Greve., E. Oğuz, O. Nobrega, Würzburg 2015.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), s. 143–166
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDsp.10.2019.24.8
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-3183-0512

PAWEŁ MICHALAK

ADAM MICKIEWICZ UNIVERSITY IN POZNAŃ
FACULTY OF HISTORY
E-MAIL: PAWELMALDINI@POCZTA.ONET.PL

SUBMISSION: 14.05.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 29.08.2019

The Image of Turkey in the Public Discourse of Interwar Yugoslavia During the Reign of King Aleksandar Karađorđević (1921–1934) According to the Newspaper “Politika”

ABSTRACT

Bearing in mind the Ottoman burden in relations between Turkey and other Balkan states, it seems interesting to look at the process of creating the image of Turkey in the public discourse of inter-war Yugoslavia according to the newspaper “Politika,” the largest, and the most popular newspaper in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). It should be remembered that the modern Serbian state, on the basis of which Yugoslavia was founded, was born in the struggle to shed Turkish yoke. The narrative about dropping this yoke has become one of the cornerstones for building the prestige and the position of the Karađorđević dynasty. On the one hand, the government narrative did not forget about the Ottoman yoke; on the other, there were made attempts to present Kemalist Turkey as a potentially important partner, almost an ally in the Balkans, which parted from the Ottoman heritage.

KEYWORDS

Yugoslavia, Turkey, King Aleksandar Karađorđević, Interwar Period, Turkish-Yugoslavian Relations

Introduction

In the 1920s, there was a very popular statement among Yugoslav political commentators to describe the international situation of their country, that the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was surrounded by the problems (*brige*). The appearance of this catchy term resulted from the fact that this word is also an acronym that we get from the first letters of the names of all neighbours of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes—Bulgaria, Romania, Italy, Greece, Albania, Hungary and Austria.¹ This curiosity and language play turned out to be an excellent diagnosis of the young kingdom's position on the international stage. The uncertainty of the existence in the first months after the end of the Great War and the smaller or larger territorial disputes between Yugoslavia and almost all its neighbours created the leitmotif of the Yugoslavian foreign policy—to watch over the consolidation of the post-Versailles order in Central and Southeastern Europe.² It was intended to achieve this goal in two ways. The first was to resolve the disputable issues with all the neighbours and set up at least correct relations as soon as possible.³ The second was to strengthen the role of Yugoslavia in the region and to make it a leader of this part of Europe.⁴ To achieve the latter, the Kingdom of SCS has taken an active part in two regional alliances: The Little Entente⁵ and the so-called Balkan Entente, known also as the Balkan Pact.⁶ The anti-revisionist policy brought Belgrade closer to Czechoslovakia and Romania, with which it shared common concerns about the revisionist tendencies of Hungary. In addition, Romania and the Kingdom of SCS were even closer to keeping Bulgaria in check. The cooperation of these three countries resulted in the creation of the Little Entente block, which perfectly matched the French assumptions of creating the anti-Bolshevik *cordon sanitaire*.⁷ Possible

¹ D. Djokić, *Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes*, London 2010, p. 81.

² A. Mitrović, *Spoljnopolitička doktrina novostvorene jugoslovenske države*, [in:] *Politički život Jugoslavije 1914–1945*, ur. A. Acković, Beograd 1973, p. 317.

³ Б. Димитријевић, С. Сретеновић, *Спољна политика Краљевине СХС/Југославије 1918–1941*, „Историја 20. века” 2008, 2, p. 53.

⁴ *Ibidem*; Б. Глигоријевић, *Краљ Александар Карађорђевић*, књ. III, Београд 2010, p. 9.

⁵ About the Little Entente see i.e.: D. Bober, *Rola i miejsce Jugostawii w polityce Malej Ententy (1920–1938)*, Poznań 1981 [unpublished PhD dissertation]; M. Vanku, *Mala Antanta 1920–1938*, Titovo Užice 1969.

⁶ About the so-called Balkan Entente see i.e.: Ž. Avramovski, *Balkanska Antanta (1934–1940)*, Beograd 1986.

⁷ Б. Димитријевић, С. Сретеновић, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

cooperation with France was to guarantee the support in the confrontation with Italy, the growing power of which was feared in Belgrade and in Paris.⁸ In the 1920s the fear of the expansionist policy of Italy was one of the few factors that brought Yugoslavia and Turkey together.⁹ Nevertheless, it was the idea of pan-Balkan cooperation in the spirit of the slogan "Balkans for the Balkan peoples," propagated from the beginning of the 1930s, which led to closer political ties with Turkey.¹⁰ This does not mean, of course, that Turkey was ignored by the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the 1930s. There is no doubt, however, that it initially played a secondary role. It was no different with the place and significance of the Kingdom of SCS in Turkey's foreign policy. For obvious reasons, until 1923, in the international arena, Turkey focused primarily on the war with Greece and maintaining the direction of reforms begun by Kemal Mustafa Pasha, the future Atatürk ("the Father of Turks"). The situation changed after the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923 and the Republic of Turkey obtained international legitimacy. After 1923, there can be distinguished two phases in the foreign policy of interwar Turkey. In the first one, in the years 1923–1932, Turkish rulers focused mainly on strengthening the position after the Lausanne Treaty.¹¹ For this reason, in the 1920s, the Balkans, and consequently Yugoslavia, played the peripheral role in the policy of Turkey which focused mainly on the Middle East.¹² The situation changed at the beginning of the 1930s when Turkey began to strengthen its position in the Balkans and became one of the most involved promoters of the idea of Balkan cooperation. It is this Balkan vector that allows to distinguish the second phase of Turkish interwar foreign policy, the phase of increased diplomatic activity in the Balkans in the years 1932–1939.¹³

Taking the above into account and bearing in mind the Ottoman burden in relations between Turkey and other Balkan states, it seems interesting to look at the process of creating the image of Turkey in the public discourse of inter-war Yugoslavia. It should be remembered that the modern Serbian state, on the basis of which Yugoslavia was founded, was born in the struggle to shed Turkish yoke, initiated by the first Serbian uprising in 1804 headed by Đorđe

⁸ A. Mitrović, op. cit., p. 322.

⁹ D. Barlas, A. Vlašić, *The Balkan Entente in Turkish–Yugoslav relations (1934–41): The Yugoslav Perspective*, "Middle Eastern Studies" 2016, Vol. 52, No. 6, p. 1012.

¹⁰ Although it should be noted that both the above-mentioned slogan and the idea of pan-Balkan cooperation are much older, and its roots can be traced back to the 19th century.

¹¹ J. Paszkiewicz, *Uwarunkowania geopolityczne bałkańskiej polityki Turcji w latach 20. i 30. XX wieku*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia” 2014, t. XXI, p. 187.

¹² Ibidem, p. 188.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 187.

Petrović, known as Karađorđe, and finished with the London Treaty of 1913, which ended the First Balkan War. The narrative about dropping this yoke has become one of the cornerstones for building the prestige and the position of the Karađorđević dynasty. The great victory of Serbian arms over the Turks at the Battle of Kumanovo (October 23–24, 1912) contributed to the creation of the myth strengthening the political position of King Aleksandar Karađorđević, who was commanding in this battle.¹⁴ Therefore, the issue of presenting the image of Turkey in the public discourse of interwar Yugoslavia seems to be all the more interesting. On the one hand, the government narrative did not forget about the Ottoman yoke; on the other, there were made attempts to present Kemalist Turkey as a potentially important partner, almost an ally in the Balkans, which parted from the Ottoman heritage.

Press and the Press System in the Interwar Yugoslavia in the Service of Royal Policy

The most important medium actually allowing to make such acrobatics and create such an image in the mass consciousness of the Yugoslav society was still the press. In the first half of the twentieth century, it was still the most popular and definitely most accessible medium of information, which could significantly affect the public opinion's perception of current political events. The Vidovdan Constitution¹⁵ has left many loopholes allowing for the control and censorship of the press, although the article 13th of this Basic Law guaranteed that the press was free. The same paragraph specifies, however, that it is forbidden to publish and disseminate the newspapers and the articles that would offend the state authorities, members of the royal family, leaders of other states and Skupština—Serbian parliament. It also forbade the titles that would publish content, calling on the citizens to forcefully overthrow and change the constitution or other laws, as well as calls for the violation of public morality.¹⁶ The Law of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on the Protection of Public Security and Order in the State (*Zakon Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca o zaštiti javne bezbednosti i poretka u državi*) published on August

¹⁴ More about the so-called myth of Kumanovo, see: P. Michalak, *Bitwa pod Kumanowem na łamach gazety „Politika” – mit umacniający pozycję polityczną króla Aleksandra Karađorđevića*, „Balkanica Posnaniensia” 2012, t. XIX, pp. 169–179.

¹⁵ The Vidovdan Constitution, was the first constitution of Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes, which was named after the St. Vitus Day (Serbo-Croat: *Vidovdan*) June 28, 1921, when it was enacted.

¹⁶ *Устав Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца од 28. Јуна, 1921 год.*, Београд 1921, p. 5.

2, 1921, clarified that one of the types of crimes prosecuted under the penal code were, among others, press crimes, understood as writing, publishing, printing and disseminating books, newspapers, posters or announcements which called for overthrowing the elected state authorities, or openly threatened public peace and order.

The press act of August 6, 1925 was also far from liberal.¹⁷ Although it officially maintained the freedom and independence of the press (article 1.) and did not allow the creation of a censoring institution outside the constitutional war and emergency time (article 2.), a few of its provisions affected—if not directly, then indirectly—freedom of speech and media. One of them was article 7., which assumed that before distribution, every freshly printed number should be delivered in five copies to the local representative of the authorities, who sent one copy to the National Library in Belgrade, University Library in Zagreb, National High School Library in Ljubljana, and the public library located in the region where the newspaper was published.¹⁸ Such a warrant made it possible to get acquainted with the newspaper's content by the government representatives even before it was released for sale, which naturally allowed for the public interference in the published content. This type of censorship can be confirmed by numerous reports of local authorities, and police, including complaints, denunciations, and even clippings of articles, or entire numbers of newspapers of various types, both journals and rarely published periodicals, collected in the documents of the State Protection Department (*Odeljenje za Državnu Zaštitu*) in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.¹⁹ The reports informing about the subsequent articles of the press titles that were not favourable to the authorities, suggesting a closer look at them to extend censorship, were not uncommon.²⁰

What is more, article 19. of that Press Law contained a list of offenses, the committing of which made it possible to block any publication. These were the texts: offending the King and the royal family, the parliament, the texts openly calling for the change of the current constitution and the law by force, and those insulting public morality. It was also possible to forbid publishing

¹⁷ „Службене новине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца” 1925, г. VII, бр. 179 – XXXIX (8 август), pp. 1–10.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 2.

¹⁹ See i.e.: Arhiv Jugoslavije (further AJ), 14 – 25 – 64, 14 – 65 – 204, 14 – 65 – 205, 14 – 65 – 206, 14 – 77 – 275, 14 – 78 – 113, 14 – 78 – 296, 14 – 78 – 297, 14 – 78 – 305, 14 – 78 – 309, 14 – 78 – 311.

²⁰ One of many examples could be a report on the weekly newspaper “Borba” sent on February 2, 1926 to the Headquarters of the Drinska Division in Valjevo, see: AJ, 14 – 78 – 113.

the newspapers accused of spreading hatred against the state and hostility on “tribal” grounds, i.e. national or religious, as well as indirectly calling on citizens for a forceful change in the constitution or state law.²¹ The importance of the press and the awareness of the role it plays in shaping the society could be proven by the fact, that one of the first laws established by King Aleksandar I after the introduction of his dictatorship on January 6, 1929, was related the new press law. Announced on the same day, it was far more restrictive than—already rigorous—the press law from August 6, 1925.²²

As it could be seen, the Yugoslav authorities were very concerned about the possibility of influencing and controlling the media message in the public discourse. An additional instrument, which allowed King Aleksandar I to control the press was the Central Press-Bureau (*Centralni Presbиро – CPB*), established on April 18, 1929. It was one of the first institutions of that kind in Europe.²³ The Chief of the Central Press-Bureau was an official with the rank of the deputy minister, directly reporting to the prime minister.²⁴ The importance of this institution may be proven by the fact, that its first director was Toni Šlegl the former director of the Zagreb daily “Novosti” and a close friend of King Aleksandar I. Unfortunately, he was shot just after taking this office.²⁵ The next Chiefs of CPB were successive: Milan Marjanović, Milan Nikolić, Teofilo Dju-ronović, Kosta Luković, Boško Bogdanović, Predrag Milojević, and Milorad Radovanović. The length of their term of office was not strictly specified, that is why they were elected and removed from the office according to the vision of the government which currently was in power. The activities of CPB were divided into four sections: the national press, the foreign press, radio, and administration. The employees of these departments prepared daily reports about the articles appearing in both domestic and foreign press.²⁶ Each banovina²⁷ had

²¹ „Службене новине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца”, г. VII – 1925 (8. Август), бр. 179 – XXXIX, р. 3.

²² I. Dobrivojević, *Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra 1929–1935*, Beograd 2006, p. 301.

²³ *Закон о Централном Пресбироу*, АЈ, 38–1–1, р. 1.

²⁴ *Организација штампе и пропаганде у Југославији*, АЈ, 38–1–1, р. 1; B. Simić, *In the Spirit of National Ideology. Organization of State Propaganda in Eastern and Southern Europe in the 1930s, Comparative Perspectives of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria*, Beograd 2013, p. 61.

²⁵ B. Simić, *In the Spirit of National Ideology...*, op. cit., p. 61.

²⁶ Ibidem, pp. 60–61; Б. Симић, *Агенција „Авала”, „Зборник Матице српске заисторију” 2007*, бр. 75–76, pp. 79–83.

²⁷ Banovina was an administrative unit of the internal division in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia introduced by King Aleksandar in 1929.

its own CPB section, which monitored the activities of the local press.²⁸ All the articles attacking King Aleksandar I, his family and government, or opposing his policy were blocked. Therefore, when defending their own interests, the publishers of most newspapers, including the major ones, such as “Politika,” “Vreme,” and “Pravda,” decided to introduce a certain kind of preventive censorship, resigning in some sense from the position of editors in chief to become the censors from the CPB, but thanks to that fact they avoided possible financial losses, which could have resulted from banning the publication of a single issue or even the whole newspaper.²⁹ Considering all the above mentioned facts and remembering about the 9th paragraph of the press law from 1929, which stated that every publisher was obliged to accept and unconditionally publish each note given him by the authorities in an upcoming issue, the conclusion could be drawn that in the political situation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia almost every article printed in legally publishing press had to be more or less in line with the political vision of government, and thus also the vision of the King Aleksandar I.

Therefore, it is worth examining how the image of Turkey and the evolution in Turkish-Yugoslav relations was presented and commented in Yugoslav interwar press during the reign of King Aleksandar I. The perfect example that fits these assumptions is the daily “Politika,” the largest, and the most popular newspaper in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). This newspaper can be considered as a specific mirror, which reflected the King’s political concepts and thus also his policy towards Turkey. The newspaper was founded by Vladislav Ribnikar on January 25, 1904, in Belgrade. It was one of the oldest and most prestigious daily in the Balkans. During the reign of the King Aleksandar I (1921–1934), “Politika” was regarded as the most opinion-forming newspaper in the Kingdom. In the late twenties, it was a title with the largest daily print run of approximately 75,000 copies (the second was “Vreme” with approx. 60,000 copies and the third “Pravda” with approx. 25,000 exemplars). Despite the widely proclaimed political neutrality, “Politika” almost always supported the official political line of the King and the government.³⁰ On the one hand, it was probably determined by the economic pragmatism and the desire to avoid any problems with publishing a single issue.³¹ On the other hand, it seems that the personal connec-

²⁸ Закон о Централном Пресбируу, А], 38–1–1, п. 1–2; В. Simić, *In the Spirit of National Ideology...*, op. cit., p. 64.

²⁹ М. Симић, *Лист „Политика“ и његов утицај на ширење демократских идеја у периоду између два рата*, Београд 1987, pp. 120–123.

³⁰ Ch. A. Nielsen, *One State, One Nation, One King: The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar and his Yugoslav Project 1929–1935*, Columbia University 2002 [unpublished PhD dissertation].

³¹ М. Симић, op. cit., pp. 119–123.

tions of the part of journalists with the royal court also played the role. Milan Gavrilović, considered as the main personage of "Politika" in the period 1924–1930, may be regarded as an example of such a relationship. Gavrilović was a member of the Agrarian Party (*Zemljoradnička Stranka*) and had quite extensive contacts with military elites. What is more, King Aleksandar's Marshal of the Court, general Aleksandar Dimitrijević was his friend from the youth.³² Even Henryk Malmogme, Polish charge d'affaires in Belgrade, spoke about the high probability that "Politika" published the articles inspired by the government circles. He mentioned it in his report from September 18, 1929, dedicated to the military convention of the Little Entente.³³ Even if we assume that "Politika," as the other major Yugoslav newspaper, did everything to keep even just a sham of independence, the result of this struggle was rather poor, which was confirmed by the political opposition, who stated that if someone wants to find out what actually happens in the Kingdom, they should not read "Politika" and "Vreme" but rather German, English and even the Italian press.³⁴ And although the question of objective presentation of the internal situation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in e.g. the Italian press can also be doubtful, the fact of using this fairly drastic comparison may confirm how much native Yugoslav newspapers (even the most prestigious ones) were subordinated to the main political line of the King and the ruling circles. The above mentioned reasons allowed to conclude that such important issues in the Yugoslav foreign policy like relations with Turkey should have found its place on the sheets of the most frequently read newspaper in the country, which would in some way prepare the public opinion for the upcoming changes and justify the royal policy toward the post-ottoman epigone.

Turks Know the Serbs and Value Their Spirit.

The Image of Turkey in Public Discourse of Interwar Yugoslavia During the Restoration of Diplomatic Relations in the 1920s

The joining of Turkey to the First World War on the side of the Central States in 1914 led to the termination of the diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Serbia, which was still strained after the Balkan Wars.³⁵ However, at the begin-

³² Ibidem, p. 120.

³³ AAN, *Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie*, 469, vol. 101, 18.09.1928, p. 89.

³⁴ I. Dobrivojević, *Cenzura u doba šestojanuarskog režima kralja Aleksandra*, „Istorija XX. veka” 2005, 2, p. 54.

³⁵ Д. Тодоровић, *Питање уостављања дипломатских односа између Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Републике Турске (1923–1925)*, „Balcanica” 1973, Т. IV, p. 265.

ning of the 1920s, the governments of both countries probed the possibility of starting a peaceful coexistence. The case was complex because of fact that the peace treaty signed in Sèvres on August 10, 1920, was basically a dead letter of law in the face of the overthrowing of the Sultanate and the seizure of power in Turkey by Mustafa Kamal Pasha, who officially broke off the treaty. Due to the fact that until winning the war against Greece in 1922 the Kemalist authorities were generally not recognized by any major country in the world, in the first 5 years after the First World War (1918–1923) Turkey was on the sidelines of the activities of Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The already mentioned international Conference in Lausanne, which began its proceedings on November 20, 1922, turned out to be the breakthrough point in the Yugoslav-Turkish relations. Already four days after its launch, "Politika" has published the interview of the head of the Turkish Foreign Ministry Ismet Pasha with his Yugoslav counterpart Momčilo Ninčić, in which the former categorically denied that Turkey would interfere in the internal situation of the Kingdom of SCS and led propaganda among the Muslim population of the Kingdom.³⁶ It is worth emphasizing that one of the main fears of Yugoslavia in the context of the relations with Turkey, was potential Turkish impact on Turks and Albanians from the so-called Southern Serbia (that's mean Macedonia, Kosovo, and Sanjak of Novi Pazar) who until the First Balkan War of 1912 were living in the Ottoman Empire and whose loyalty towards Yugoslav state were questioned.³⁷ That is why the Yugoslav authorities decided to take action to remove 200,000 Muslims of Southern Serbia from the country.³⁸ Finally, under the Yugoslav-Turkish Convention of July 11, 1938, the government in Ankara undertook to adopt 40,000 Muslim Turkish families from Southern Serbia in the next six years.³⁹ It should be noted, however, that Muslims in interwar Yugoslavia were not a homogeneous organism and while someone could raise some doubts regarding the loyalty of the parts of inhabitants of Southern Serbia, Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina found themselves fairly quickly in the new realities and Yugoslav Muslim Organization⁴⁰

³⁶ „Politika“ 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), п. 3.

³⁷ V. Jovanović, *Iseljavanje Muslimana iz Vardarske Banovine*, [in:] *Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije: viđenje srpskog faktora*, ur. M. Bjelajac, M. Obradović, V. Jovanović, Beograd 2007, p. 98.

³⁸ V. Jovanović, *In Search of Homeland: Muslim Migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey 1918–1941*, "Токови историје" 2008, 1–2, p. 63.

³⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 64

⁴⁰ More about Yugoslav Muslim Organization see i.e.: A. Purivatra, *Jugoslavenska Muslimanska Organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, Sarajevo 1977.

(founded in Sarajevo in February 1919) headed by Mehmed Spaho,⁴¹ has become an inseparable part of the Yugoslav political landscape.

Nevertheless “Politika’s” narrative line of that time created the image of Yugoslavia as the leader of the Balkan states’ block in the rivalry with Turkey. An interesting example reflecting the political line of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs in relation to Turkey and the entire region was the article by journalist Andra Milosavljević on the proceedings at the conference. In the article *Balkan block in Lausanne (Balkanski blok u Lozani)*, published on November 24, 1922,⁴² he presented the speech by Minister Ninčić during a working meeting of the representatives of the Balkan countries organized by the Yugoslav delegation, just before the special commission dealing with the access of Bulgaria to the Aegean Sea started its proceedings.⁴³ The meeting was attended by the representatives of the Balkan states. The Kingdom of SCS was represented by Momčilo Ninčić, Greece by Elefterios Venizelos, Romania by Ion G. Duca, and Bulgaria by Aleksandar Stamboliyski. Andra Milosavljević reported with a fervent triumphalism that under the leadership of the Yugoslav delegation, the Balkan Christian countries took one front against Turkey. During the meeting, Ninčić presented the concept of expanding the neutral zone overseen by the Entente forces in Western Thrace (on the Bulgarian-Turkish border on both sides of the Marica River) by 20–30 km. This solution—according to the head of the Yugoslavian Ministry of Foreign Affairs—had to provide Bulgaria with access to the Aegean Sea.⁴⁴ In this way—said Andra Milosavljević—nine years after the battle over Bregalnica,⁴⁵ the representatives of the Balkan states cooperated on the matters whose effects will affect the future of the entire Balkans. “My country is not directly involved in this dispute—said Ninčić—but this dispute concerns my country because it will affect peace and stabilize the whole region.”⁴⁶ According to Milosavljević, it was possible to get the impression that the Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs spoke not only on behalf of the Kingdom of SCS but the entire region. His speech and argumen-

⁴¹ More about Mehmed Spaho see i.e.: H. Kamberović, *Mehmed Spaho (1883–1939). Politička biografija*, Sarajevo 2009.

⁴² „Политика”, 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), p. 3.

⁴³ J. Paszkiewicz, *Grecja a bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe na Bałkanach 1923–1936*, Poznań 2012, p. 114.

⁴⁴ „Политика” 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), p. 3.

⁴⁵ It was one of the main battles of the Second Balkan War, which took place from June 30 to July 9, 1913. Bulgarians on one and the combined Serbian-Montenegrin forces on the other side stood in the battle against each other. Despite similar losses, the strategic victory was for the Serbs and Montenegrins, who forced the Bulgarians to move to the defensive.

⁴⁶ „Политика”, 1922, бр. 5240 (24.11), p. 3.

tation had a huge impact on all, and the whole meeting highlighted the solidarity of all the Balkan states.⁴⁷ However, it should be emphasized that during the entire conference Ninčić was very careful that all postulates of Yugoslavia would be heard (mainly to ensure the repayment of war reparations by Turkey), but in general the attitude of Yugoslav delegation towards Ankara was neither negative nor aggressive. Both the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister Nikola Pašić, and probably King Aleksandar were keen to prepare the soil for the future Yugoslav-Turkish cooperation.⁴⁸ The first attempts were made at the turn of May and June 1923, when a representative of Turkey Cavid Bey came to Belgrade from Bucharest. The Turkish diplomat was supposed to check out the possibilities of establishing diplomatic relations.⁴⁹ Although the official activities of diplomacy of both countries had to wait, through this visit both sides indirectly acknowledged the existence of their own countries in the international arena.⁵⁰ Eventually, the Treaty of Lausanne was approved on July 24, 1923. He revised the Treaty of Sevres and eventually restored Turkey's outposts in the Balkans (Eastern Thrace, Gallipoli) and brought the international legitimacy of the governments of Atatürk and the Republic of Turkey (proclaimed finally on October 29, 1923). During the deliberations, France played a very important role because it wanted to draw Turkey into its Balkan policy.⁵¹

The next two years brought a certain stoppage in the Balkan politics of Turkey, but 1925 saw one of the breakthroughs. In May that year, the first representative of France after the First World War arrived to Turkey. In February 1926 an agreement regarding the Syrian-Turkish border was signed, which improved further relations on the Ankara-Paris line because it should be remembered that Syria was a French protectorate which secured the interests of France in the Middle East.⁵² It also seems that France exerted some pressure on Yugoslavia in order to reach Turkey as soon as possible.⁵³

Despite the Ninčić's declarations on the willingness to reach the agreement with Turkey as soon as possible, the negotiations began to get complicated. The more robust Turkey was no longer willing to make concessions to the

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Д. Тодоровић, *op. cit.*, pp. 267–268.

⁴⁹ Ž. Аврамовски, *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938*, t. 1, Zagreb 1986, pp. 175–176.

⁵⁰ Д. Тодоровић, *op. cit.*, p., 268.

⁵¹ V. Vinaver *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata (Da li je Jugoslavija bila francuski „satelit“)*, Beograd 1985, p. 55.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 98.

⁵³ Д. Тодоровић, *op. cit.*, p., 284.

Kingdom of SCS, both in terms of accepting Muslim displaced persons from Southern Serbia and to satisfy the Ottoman debt and reparations owed to Serbia after the Balkan Wars. The denser atmosphere can be immediately seen in press publications. It was probably not a coincidence that at this time “Politika” started to publish more articles criticizing and accusing Kemalist Turkey of fuelling the idea of Pan-Islamism among the Muslim inhabitants of Macedonia, which Ankara could use for its own interests.⁵⁴ An example of such anti-Turkish rhetoric was an anonymous article published on July 11, 1925,⁵⁵ entitled: *In Kemal's Turkey (U Kemal'jovog Turskoj)*, with a meaningful subtitle: *Hatred of Turks against Serbian [sic!] brothers in Turkey*. The author of this text described the adventures of an unidentified citizen of Yugoslavia who was to be persecuted by local authorities for no reason from the very beginning of the journey through Turkey. Immediately after his arrival he was arrested for 6 hours and after leaving the prison he was allegedly followed by a local police officer. The visit was only to confirm the very unfavourable attitude of the Turks towards the Yugoslavs, which was also noticed by several other Yugoslavian Muslims who decided to go to Kemalist Turkey.⁵⁶ This country has become—according to the words of that traveller—a nationalist and chauvinist state. It is impossible to clearly determine the reasons for the publication of this text. Perhaps it was aimed at responding to the pressure from the French and emphasizing that the Yugoslav resentment towards the Turks is still alive and the authorities would be very easily able to explain to the nation why the freezing of relations with the Ottoman successors took place. It cannot be ruled out that it was a form of putting pressure on Turkey, because only a month later on August 24, 1925, an official representative of Turkey arrived to Belgrade and submitted credentials. Even before coming to Yugoslavia, the representatives of Ankara assured that there were no formal contraindications to finding an agreement between the two countries and that Turkey would accept the displaced Turkish persons from Yugoslavia, under the condition that they sell their property (land) so that they could have their own capital necessary to settle in Turkey. The government in Ankara wanted to avoid the troubles encountered during the reception of the displaced persons from Greece.⁵⁷

After such declarations, the tone of the Yugoslavian side also began to be more conciliatory, which was also reflected in the press publications. It could be seen i.e. in the article published on August 25, 1925, in “Politika,” entitled

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ „Политика”, 1925, бр. 6181 (11.07), п. 5.

⁵⁶ Ibidem.

⁵⁷ Д. Тодоровић, *op. cit.*, п. 284

Turkey's Representative in Belgrade [*Predstavnik Turske u Beogradu*], in which the journalists informed about the arrival of the deputy and summed up the event by stating that the Yugoslav authorities want to sign a peace treaty as soon as possible, once the problems between the two countries can be solved.⁵⁸ However, in this case, no one mentioned the problem of resettlements but rather the reparations from 1913 in the context of the damage done by the Ottoman army in Southern Serbia, which at the time seemed a less controversial problem. Finally, the Yugoslavian-Turkish Treaty of Friendship was signed on October 28, 1925, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was the second Balkan state after Bulgaria (October 18, 1925) with which Kemalist Turkey signed such an agreement.⁵⁹ The treaty was ratified at the end of the year, and the symbol of the tightening of the relations between the Kingdom of SCS and Turkey was the visit of the head of the Turkish diplomacy Tevfik Rüştü Aras in Belgrade on December 24–26, 1925.⁶⁰ Journalists of “Politika” referred to this visit with a perceptible dose of sympathy, which was also visible in the interview with the Turkish Minister. In a conversation published in the issue of December 25, 1925, the journalists cited a statement of a Turkish politician who stressed that: “We [Turkey] are interested in the Balkan matters comprehensively as a whole, but we have no conflicting interests here with the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” In addition, Tevfik Rüştü Aras stressed that Yugoslavia was particularly close to Turkey, because the Turks: “[...] know the Serbs and value their spirit.”⁶¹ The politician also stressed that just like Turkey in the Middle East, the Kingdom of SCS in the Balkans is a power that can protect order and peace and that is why they should cooperate with each other.⁶² It is worth emphasizing that this article is a rare case of a positive message coming from a narrative about the centuries-old relationship between Serbia and the Ottoman Empire. This time, journalists did not emphasize the “Turkish yoke” but quoted Tevfik Rüştü Aras’s statement, which meaning was contained in, among others this experience of the Ottoman administration in the territories of Serbia. Much more often, however, the Ottoman legacy’s image in the articles published in “Politika” had negative connotations.

A great example of this are the articles devoted to the anniversaries of historical events, such as the Balkan Wars, or the already mentioned battle of Kumanovo (October 23–24, 1912), which were the cornerstone of the narrative

⁵⁸ „Politika”, 1925, бр. 6226 (25.08), p. 3.

⁵⁹ J. Paszkiewicz, *Uwarunkowania geopolityczne...*, op. cit., p. 190.

⁶⁰ Ž. Avramovski, *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji...*, T. I, op. cit., p. 293.

⁶¹ „Politika”, 1925, бр. 6348 (25.12), p. 2.

⁶² Ibidem.

uniting the new Yugoslav reality. Obviously, one of the main motives of such a narrative must have been to emphasize the fact of overthrowing the Ottoman captivity, which somehow imposed the narrative about the interwar Turkey. King Aleksandar and his father Peter were presented as the liberators of Serbs and Yugoslavs from the Turkish yoke, and the continuators of the great predecessor, Đorđe Petrović, the leader of the first Serbian uprising, which began the Serbian struggle for liberation from Ottoman Turkey.⁶³ As "Politika" wrote, they cut off the chains of slavery that bound the nation.⁶⁴ In the articles devoted to these events, "Politika" frequently quoted the phrase about the Turkish yoke and displayed the events from Kumanovo as the opening of a new era in Serbian/Yugoslav history.⁶⁵ All this has somehow strengthened the image of Ottoman Turkey as the tormentor. These events were presented in "Politika" from the very beginning of the King's Aleksandar reign.

However, it is worth mentioning that there were some derogations of this rule, i.e. in years 1925, 1929, 1933 and 1934 when "Politika" did not place on its sheets any information about the celebration of the following anniversary of the battle of Kumanovo.⁶⁶ It seems that the lack of articles devoted to these events resulted from both the multitude of important circumstances in the internal policy of the state, which caught the attention of the journalists of the Belgrade journal more than historical memories, as well as from the then relations of the Yugoslavia and Republic of Turkey. In October 1925, both countries signed the said treaty of friendship. In 1929, the authorities focused mainly on strengthening the foundations of the royal dictatorship introduced on January 6. In turn, in early October 1933, King Aleksandar made a private trip to Turkey, where he personally talked with Atatürk about the idea of creating the Balkan Entente. In October 1934 it was only eight months since Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Turkey signed the Balkan Pact. At the beginning of this month, King Aleksandar was assassinated in Marseilles.

As it could be seen in each of the years discussed above, the circumstances in internal politics and in Yugoslav-Turkish relations required a positive message. It seems, therefore, that it was not a coincidence that in those years the editorial office of "Politika" decided to keep silent about the celebrations of the anniversary of the battle of Kumanovo. In this situation, Turkey was seen as a close ally, so it certainly was not a good time to recall the difficult history of mutual relations, and the narrative about the battle of Kumanovo was impossible to separate from this burden.

⁶³ P. Michalak, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

⁶⁴ „Политика” 1927, бр. 7002 (25.10), p. 5.

⁶⁵ „Политика” 1923, бр. 5568 (24.10), pp. 3–4; „Политика” 1932, бр. 8784 (24.10), p. 4.

⁶⁶ P. Michalak, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

Pax Balcanica.**The Image of Turkey in the Public Discourse of Yugoslavia During the Period of Creation the Pan-Balkan Cooperation**

As it was already mentioned, the beginning of the 1930s was a turning point in the activity of Turkish diplomacy in the Balkans, and thus in Turkish-Yugoslav relations. Greater activity of Turkey in this area resulted, among others, from the fact that as a result of the "great crisis" the powers withdrew from more involved activities in this part of Europe, thus creating a space for the action for Turkey.⁶⁷ The beginning of the third decade of the twentieth century favoured tightening the ties in the Balkans. The Balkan states have convinced themselves that the Republic of Turkey has in fact dissociated itself from the heritage of the Ottoman Empire and has no revisionist tendencies. In addition, when the situation inside the country strengthened, it began to be recognized by the other Balkan states as an important player in the region, cooperation with which could bring both political and economic benefits.⁶⁸ The Turkish-Greek agreement of October 30, 1930, was tangible and symbolic evidence of a breakthrough. It showed that if even the recent rivals were able to overcome the controversy in the most complex issues, the cooperation with Turkey was possible for every other Balkan state.⁶⁹ Behind-the-scenes diplomatic activities during the Balkan conferences were also not without significance for warming up the image of Turkey and improving the relations with the Balkan states, including Yugoslavia.⁷⁰ The last factor influencing the enhanced activity of Turkey in the Balkans in the 1930s, which is worth mentioning, was the growing sympathy and respect towards Atatürk. In the interwar Yugoslavia, the keen relations between King Aleksandar and Kemal Pasha favoured the father of the Turks. Its sources should be sought in a similar understanding of interests in the Balkan foreign policy of both countries, in a similar conception for the construction of a centralist state of a homogeneous nation (both Turkish and Yugoslav), but above all in the mutual respect of the rulers for their own military achievements.⁷¹ The respect which King Aleksandar had for Kemal was mentioned by Ivan Meštrović, in his memoirs about a dinner which took place

⁶⁷ D. Barlas, *Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s*, "Journal of Contemporary History" 2005, Vol. 40 (3), pp. 442–443.

⁶⁸ J. Paszkiewicz, *Uwarunkowania geopolityczne...*, op. cit., p. 190

⁶⁹ Ibidem, p. 191.

⁷⁰ A. Кадијевић, *О архитектури југословенског посланства у Анкари*, „Наслеђе” 2010, vol. XI, p. 57.

⁷¹ Ibidem, p. 58.

in Zagreb on December 18, 1933. During one of the conversations, when someone called Atatürk an interesting man, the King of Yugoslavia said in response that Kemal was more than interesting and that for Turkey he turned out to be as important as Peter the Great was for Russia. King Aleksandar also emphasized that an agreement between him and the President of Turkey was very quickly established. He noted that the ruler of Turkey was a man with broad horizons, which was to be confirmed by showing respect for the historical legacy of Hagia Sophia, including its Christian heritage. At the planned change of the mosque into the Museum, Atatürk announced the scratching of plasters and the unveiling of some frescoes and mosaics. In addition to these, the King of Yugoslavia also underlined the understanding of Mustafa Kemal for the idea of the Balkan Pact and the necessity of attracting Bulgaria to it, in order to prevent the Bulgarians from falling into Mussolini's embrace.⁷² It was not a secret that in the interwar period Italy was constantly striving to take control of Yugoslav Dalmatia. For this reason, one of the issues of Italian foreign policy was the creation of an anti-Yugoslav bloc, which attempted to involve not only revisionist states of the region like Bulgaria, Hungary, or Austria but also Turkey and Greece in a certain period of time.⁷³

The warmer Yugoslav-Turkish relations in the early 1930s did not escape the attention of the Polish representatives in Belgrade. Although they were generally aware of the difficulties in building the consensus between the Balkan states and highlighted the difficulties between individual countries in the relations with Bulgaria or Albania,⁷⁴ the improving relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey were not overlooked. In one of the reports, it was noticed that in the "Balkan Week" organized by Turkey on May 21–26, 1932 in Istanbul, which was devoted to industrial and commercial matters, among the invited representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia, only Athens and Belgrade governments sent they envoys. This situation—emphasized in the report—perfectly highlighted the actual state of relations between the Balkan states and indicated which of them were in fact interested in broadly understood issues included under the general name "Union Balkanique."⁷⁵

There is no doubt that 1933 was one of the most important points in Yugoslav-Turkish relations during the interwar period. It was that year in October that the unofficial trip of the Yugoslav royal couple to Istanbul took place

⁷² I. Meštrović, *Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje*, Zagreb 1993, pp. 226–228.

⁷³ See i.e.: J. Paszkiewicz, *Grecja a bezpieczeństwo...*, op. cit., pp. 186–199; idem, *Jugosławia w polityce Włoch w latach 1914–1941*, Poznań 2004, pp. 111–129.

⁷⁴ See i.e.: AAN, *Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie*, 469, vol. 88, 13.10.1930, pp. 1–2.

⁷⁵ AAN, *Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie*, 469, vol. 04.06.1932, pp. 59–61.

(October 4, 1933). During this travel, King Aleksandar was seeking Kemal's support for the creation of the Balkan Pact and the incorporation of Bulgaria into it. According to Branko Lazarević, a representative of Yugoslavia in Turkey, this visit turned out to be the new opening in the relations between the two countries.⁷⁶ What is more, according to general Aleksandar Dimitrijević, it was this visit that improved mutual relations of the leaders of both countries to such an extent that it strengthened cooperation and accelerated efforts to sign the Balkan Pact.⁷⁷ In turn, the result of this new opening was the signing of a non-aggression and friendship pact on November 26, 1933,⁷⁸ during the trip of the head of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Belgrade. That breakthrough found its response among the broad masses of the Yugoslav society, so it could not escape the attention of the media, including "Politika," whose journalists referred to both events.

The famous tour of King Aleksandar, who was one of the main proponents of the creation of the so-called Balkan Entente, in late September and the first days of October 1933, during which he visited all potential signatories of the pact (not only Turkey, but also Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece), met with great interest and was widely and favorably depicted in "Politika."⁷⁹ The issues from October 4, 5, and 6, reported on the course of visit to Turkey. The journalists emphasized the openness, warm and cordial welcome of the King Aleksandar and his wife Queen Maria by the Turkish social and political elite, as well as by Atatürk himself. The titles of the articles commenting on this unofficial trip of the King in the Balkans perfectly reflect the moods that were to be strengthened by the medial discourse. The titles of some articles such as: *The New Era in the Balkans?* [*Nova Evropa na Balkanu?*], or *Pax Balcanica. Balkan Nations for Balkans* [*Pax Balcanica. Balkanski narodi Balkanu*] speak for themselves.⁸⁰ It should be emphasized, however, that this enthusiasm of the Turkish and Yugoslav public opinion was not the invention of propaganda detached from reality. In the reports of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such information can also be found. The diplomats emphasized the epoch-making significance of King Aleksandar's visit to Turkey, during which Turkish society wel-

⁷⁶ Б. Лазаревић, *Дипломатски списи*, Београд 2000, р. 38.

⁷⁷ М. Теодосијевић, *Mustafa Kemal Ataturk u jugoslovenskoj javnosti*, Београд 1998, р. 17.

⁷⁸ Ж. Аврамовски, *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaji Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938*, т. II, Загреб 1986, pp. 159–160.

⁷⁹ „Политика” 1933, бр. 9110 (24.09), р. 2; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9113 (27.09), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9115 (29.09), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9116 (30.09), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9118 (02.10), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9119 (03.10), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9120 (04.10), р. 1–2; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9121 (05.10), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9122 (06.10), р. 1; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9126 (10.10), р. 1.

⁸⁰ „Политика” 1933, бр. 9117 (01.10), р. 3; „Политика” 1933, бр. 9127 (11.10), pp. 1–2.

comed the Yugoslav ruler with optimism. This trip confirmed the rightness of the political direction in which Turkey and Yugoslavia were heading together, led by Atatürk and King Aleksandar.⁸¹

The King's visit to Istanbul was just a prelude to even more important events that took place on November 1933. It was on 26 of that month that Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, came to Belgrade to meet with Bogoljub Jevtić, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kingdom of Yugoslavia, a day later and sign a peace and non-aggression pact on behalf of Turkey. The editorial staff of "Politika," of course, did not remain passive about these events. On November 26, it noted the arrival of the Turkish minister, and the day later it published an interview with him, whose main point was to emphasize that the Turkish-Yugoslav pact is transparent and will serve to guarantee peace and harmony not only in the Balkans but also throughout the whole international arena.⁸² However, it seems that the commentary written by Andra Milosavljević, one of Politika's most important commentators on international politics, was much more important. The article entitled *Today's Friendship Pact with Turkey Was Prepared 11 Years Ago* [*Današnji pakt prijateljstva sa Turskom pripremljen je još pre 11 godina*] was published as the main text of the issue on November 27, 1933, so at the time when the treaty was signed. In his text, Milosavljević stated that the pact with Turkey was prepared already 11 years before when after the Greek defeat in Asia Minor, King Aleksandar refused the British government, which attempted to obtain the Kingdom of SCS in order to seize the Black Sea Straits and Istanbul. The ruler of the Kingdom stated that all disputes with Turkey had already been resolved on the battlefield in 1912. According Milosavljević such an answer was the best example of the manifestation of friendly relations with Turkey.⁸³ Bearing in mind the overtones of the articles published even at the time of the peace conference in Lausanne, which, although not anti-Turkish in its meaning, were far from the texts of a somewhat conciliatory nature, it is impossible not to see the inspiration of the Turkish royal government policy.

An apogee of presenting Turkey in a favourable light on the pages of "Politika" and the proof of a significant change in the presentation of this state in the public discourse were articles accompanying the finalization of negotiations and the signing of the Balkan Pact on February 4, 1934. The idea of creat-

⁸¹ *Извештаји Министарства иностраних послова Краљевине Југославије за 1933. Годину. Извори за историју међународних односа 1930–1940*, Т. IV, ур. Нада Петровић и Јелена Ђуришић, Београд 2009, pp. 403–404.

⁸² "Политика" 1933, бр. 9174 (27.11), pp. 1–2.

⁸³ *Ibidem*, p. 1.

ing the so-called Balkan Entente, which was supposed to guarantee the protection of Balkan countries' interests, was at the same time the assumption of the increasingly popular concept of collective security, expressed in the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1929.⁸⁴ Agreed finally on February 4, 1934, and signed on February 9 of the same year, the Balkan Pact assumed the international cooperation and protection of interests of its signatories: Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey.⁸⁵

The daily reported in details on the course of the last preparatory talks before the signing of the pact, which took place in Belgrade (February 3–4, 1934) and the very ceremony of signing the agreement in Athens (February 9, 1934).⁸⁶ A perfect complement to the narrative of "Politika," which strengthened the message about the significance of the Balkan Pact's significance for the security of the state were two caricatures published at that time in the Belgrade daily.



Image 1: *Балкан и Европа*, „Политика” 1934, бр. 9240 (4.02), р. 2, [online] <http://www.digitalna.nb.rs/wb/NBS/novine/politika/1934/02/04#page/1/mode/1up> [accessed: 30.04.2019].

⁸⁴ M. Dymarski, *Ententa Bałkańska (1934), jako element ładu geopolitycznego w Europie*, [in:] *Studia z nauk społecznych i humanistycznych*, red. M.S. Wolański, W. Baluk, Wrocław 2006, p. 57.

⁸⁵ Ž. Avramovski, *Balkanska Antanta...*, op. cit.; Б. Димитријевић, С. Сретеновић, op. cit., pp. 54–55; M. Dymarski, op. cit., pp. 59–60.

⁸⁶ „Политика” 1934, бр. 9239 (03.02), pp. 1–2; „Политика” 1934, бр. 9240 (04.02), р. 1; „Политика” 1934, бр. 9245 (09.02), р. 1.

The first of them, entitled *The Balkans and Europe* [*Balkan i Evropa*], published on February 4, 1934,⁸⁷ presented the conversation of the god of war and the angel of peace, who met at the crossroads, one of which led to Belgrade, the other to Geneva. In the picture, the god of war resting on the road says to the angel: "Hey, you little, you forgot the mask against poisonous gases." He replied: "I will not need it because I am going to the Balkans, where the air is much purer than in the cultural West."⁸⁸

The second caricature published on February 9, 1934, that is, on the day of signing the pact,⁸⁹ presents the debate at two different conference tables. At the first one there are fatigued and distressed "European diplomats," one of whom states: "Gentlemen, we cannot allow for the balkanization of Europe." At the second table there are happy and smiling "Balkan diplomats" (from the left there are heads of Foreign Ministry of the countries—respectively: Greece—Dimitros Maximos, Romania—Nicolae Titulescu, Turkey—Tevfik Rüştü Aras, and Yugoslavia—Bogoljub Jevtić, and the other two chairs are waiting for the representatives of Bulgaria and Albania), among whom someone could hear the voice: "Gentlemen, we cannot allow for the Europeanisation of the Balkans," it is difficult to present the main idea of the pact—"Balkans for the Balkan nations"—more accurately. It is also worth noting that this type of representation of the relationship between Yugoslavia and the rest of the Balkan states, including Turkey, was an unquestionable breakthrough.




Image 2: „Политика”, 1934, бр. 9245 (09.02), п. 1,
 [online] <http://www.digitalna.nb.rs/wb/NBS/novine/politika/1934/02/09#page/0/mode/1up> [accessed: 30.04.2019].

⁸⁷ „Политика” 1934, бр. 9240 (04.02), п. 2.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

⁸⁹ „Политика” 1934 г., бр. 9245 (09.02), п. 1.

The greatness of the breakthrough is perfectly demonstrated by the fact that the Balkan Pact, which included the agreement with Turkey—one of the main *spiritus movens* of the whole idea—was presented in the opposition to the relations with the rotten west. It is obvious that the adoption of such a narrative was politically inspired, but there was no doubt that had it not been for systematic work on redefining this narrative about Turkey, such a solution would probably have been impossible.

Conclusion

The First World War, leading to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, ended almost 500 years of Turkish domination in the Balkans. However, it began the process of De-Ottomanisation, which could be observed both in Turkey itself and in the newly created Balkan countries. It should be noted, however, that creating the image of Turkey and Turks in the public discourse of interwar Yugoslavia proceeded in two ways. On the one hand, it operated according to a well-known pattern of De-Ottomanisation quoted, among others by Maria Todorova, according to which the Turks were presented as representatives of a foreign, completely different, barbaric civilization,⁹⁰ and almost all the commemoration of the anniversary of liberation from the Turkish rule (such as the battle of Kumanovo) was presented as dropping the Turkish yoke and the return to Western European civilization. On the other hand, it seems that the state authorities were watching over the way in which public discourse showed relations with Kemalist Turkey and tried not to take the burden of the history of Ottoman rule in the Balkans. It seems that Yugoslav politicians who created the foreign policy of Yugoslavia turned out to be political realists who, in the early 1920s, in the period of the Greek-Turkish war, appreciated the political, social, and economic potential of Turkey. Therefore, in principle, since the first years of the existence of both countries, they were careful that the difficult relations of the past do not close the door to possible agreement and cooperation.

This is perfectly evident in “Politika,” which together with the tightening of the ties between the two countries more and more sparingly emphasized this Ottoman yoke, under which the Yugoslavians had to function for almost half a millennium, more willingly publishing the articles referring to contemporary relations with optimism. The change in the attitude towards Turkey and the Turks in the interwar Yugoslav public discourse is best proven by the articles

⁹⁰ M. Todorova, *The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans*, [in:] *Imperial Legacy—The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, ed. L. C. Brown, New York 1996, p. 71.

published in "Politika" four years after the death of King Aleksandar. In an article published three days after the death of Atatürk on November 13, 1938, entitled *The Historical Figure of Kemal Atatürk [Istorijski lik Kemala Ataturka]*, the author Vasilj Popović wrote straightforwardly that along with the death of Kemal Mustafa, one of the most eminent leaders of the Turkish nation, the Turkish state and one of the greatest politicians of the Middle East went down in history.⁹¹ In turn, on November 17, 1938, in the text *My First Meeting with Kemal Atatürk [Moj prvi susret sa Kemalom Ataturkom]*, the author—colonel Novica B. Rakočević concludes his memories with an eloquent sentence: "Glory to the great and immortal genius of Kemal Atatürk."⁹² It seems that these words are the best proof of to what extent the way of presenting Turkey and the Turks changed in the Yugoslav media during the interwar period, during and after the reign of King Aleksandar. Certainly, it would be impossible to use such words for the leader of the nation of the recent tormentors a decade earlier.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARCHIVES

1. Archiwum Akt Nowych, Warszawa, AAN: zespól 469 (Poselstwo RP w Belgradzie).
2. Arhiv Jugoslavije, Beograd, AJ: fond 38 (Centralni Pres-biro).

LEGAL ACTS

1. „Службене новине Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца” 1925, г. VII, бр. 179 – XXXIX (8 август).
2. *Устав Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца од 28. Јуна, 1921 год.*, Београд 1921.
3. *Закон Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца о заштити јавне безбедности и поретка у држави*, Београд 1921.

PRESS

1. „Политика” [“Politika”], Београд 1922–1938.

PUBLICATIONS

1. Avramovski Ž., *Balkanska Antanta (1934–1940)*, Beograd 1986.
2. Avramovski Ž., *Britanci o Kraljevini Jugoslaviji. Godišnji izveštaj Britanskog poslanstva u Beogradu 1921–1938*, t. I–II, Zagreb 1986.
3. Barlas D., *Turkish Diplomacy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Opportunities and Limits for Middle-power Activism in the 1930s*, “Journal of Contemporary History” 2005, Vol. 40 (3).

⁹¹ „Политика”, 1938, бр. 10942 (13.11), р. 2.

⁹² „Политика”, 1938, бр. 10946 (17.11), р. 2.

4. Barlas D., Vlašić A., *The Balkan Entente in Turkish–Yugoslav Relations (1934–41): The Yugoslav Perspective*, "Middle Eastern Studies" 2016, Vol. 52, No. 6.
5. Bober D., *Rola i miejsce Jugosławii w polityce Małej Ententy (1920–1938)*, Poznań 1981.
6. Djokić D., Nikola Pašić and Ante Trumbić. *The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes*, London 2010.
7. Dobrivojević I., *Cenzura u doba šestojanuarskog režima kralja Aleksandra*, „Istorija XX. veka” 2005, 2.
8. Dobrivojević I., *Državna represija u doba diktature kralja Aleksandra 1929–1935*, Beograd 2006.
9. Dymarski M., *Ententa Bałkańska (1934), jako element ładu geopolitycznego w Europie*, [in:] *Studia z nauk społecznych i humanistycznych*, red. M. S. Wolański, W. Baluk, Wrocław 2006.
10. Jovanović V., *In Search of Homeland: Muslim Migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey 1918–1941*, „Токови историје” 2008, 1–2.
11. Jovanović V., *Iseljavanje Muslimana iz Vardarske Banovine*, [in:] *Pisati istoriju Jugoslavije: viđenje srpskog faktora*, ur. M. Bjelajac, M. Obradović, V. Jovanović, Beograd 2007.
12. Kamberović H., *Mehmed Spaho (1883–1939). Politička biografija*, Sarajevo 2009.
13. Кадијевић А., *О архитектури југословенског посланства у Анкари*, „Наслеђе” 2010, vol. XI.
14. Meštrović I., *Uspomene na političke ljude i događaje*, Zagreb 1993.
15. Michalak P., *Bitwa pod Kumanowem na łamach gazety „Politika” – mit umacniający pozycję polityczną króla Aleksandra Karadjordjevicia*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia” 2012, t. XIX.
16. Mitrović A., *Spoljopolitička doktrina novostvorene jugoslovenske države*, [in:] *Politički život Jugoslavije 1914–1945*, ur. A. Acković, Beograd 1973.
17. Nielsen Ch. A., *One State, One Nation, One King: The Dictatorship of King Aleksandar and his Yugoslav Project 1929–1935*, Columbia University 2002 [unpublished PhD dissertation].
18. Paszkiewicz J., *Grecja a bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe na Bałkanach 1923–1936*, Poznań 2012.
19. Paszkiewicz J., *Jugosławia w polityce Włoch w latach 1914–1941*, Poznań 2004.
20. Paszkiewicz J., *Uwarunkowania geopolityczne bałkańskiej polityki Turcji w latach 20. i 30. XX wieku*, „Balcanica Posnaniensia. Acta et studia” 2014, t. XXI.
21. Purivatra A., *Jugoslavenska Muslimanska Organizacija u političkom životu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca*, Sarajevo 1977.
22. Simić B., *In the Spirit of National Ideology. Organization of State Propaganda in Eastern and Southern Europe in the 1930s, Comparative Perspectives of Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria*, Beograd 2013.
23. Šubić-Kovačević I., *Kontrola i zabrana oporbenog zagrebačkog tiska 1921–1929*, „Radovi Zavoda za hrvatsku povijest Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu” 2016, T. 48, бр. 1, 2016.
24. Teodosijević M., *Mustafa Kemal Atatürk u jugoslovenskoj javnosti*, Beograd 1998.
25. Todorova M., *The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans*, [in:] *Imperial Legacy—The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, ed. L. C. Brown, New York 1996.
26. Vanku M., *Mala Antanta 1920–1938*, Titovo Užice 1969.
27. Vinaver V., *Jugoslavija i Francuska između dva svetska rata (Da li je Jugoslavija bila francuski “satelit”)*, Beograd 1985.
28. Глигоријевић Б., *Краљ Александар Карађорђевић*, књ. 1–3, Београд 2010.
29. Димитријевић Б., Сретеновић С., *Спољна политика Краљевине СХС/Југославије 1918–1941*, „Историја 20. века” 2008, 2.

30. *Извештаји Министарства иностраних послова Краљевине Југославије за 1933. Годину. Извори за историју међународних односа 1930–1940*, Т. IV, ур. Н. Петровић, Ј. Буришић, Београд 2009.
31. Лазаревић Б., *Дипломатски списи*, Београд 2000.
32. Симић Б., Агенција „Авала“, „Зборник Матице српске за историју“ 2007, бр. 75–76.
33. Симић М., *Лист „Политика“ и његов утицај на ширење демократских идеја у периоду између два рата*, Београд 1987.
34. Тодоровић Д., *Питање упостављања дипломатских односа између Краљевине Срба, Хрвата и Словенаца и Републике Турске (1923–1925)*, „Balcanica“ 1973, Т. IV.
35. Топалвоић Ж., *Турска*, Београд 1932.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), s. 167–180
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDSP.10.2019.24.9
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0002-5752-5890

PIOTR MIROCHA

JAGIELLONIAN UNIVERSITY IN KRAKÓW
FACULTY OF PHILOLOGY
E-MAIL: PAMIROCHA@GMAIL.COM

SUBMISSION: 9.01.2018
ACCEPTANCE: 17.07.2019

Semiotics of the Ottoman Bridge: Between Its Origins and Ivo Andrić

ABSTRACT

One of the persisting motives in the Southeastern European cultures is a bridge. This metaphor occurs since at least 19th century, when it became used in political projects aiming to unite Southern Slavs (e.g. J. J. Strossmayer). In most of the cases, it symbolizes bridging the gap between the West and the East. However, it was the Ottoman stone bridges that were filled with a plethora of metaphorical meanings, mostly thanks to the Yugoslavian novelist Ivo Andrić. Stone bridges, a part of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkan, started to be perceived as symbols of humanist values and durability of edifices among the contingency of human existence.

KEYWORDS

Spatial Semiotics, Ivo Andrić, Ottoman Architecture, Western Balkans, Yugoslavia, Orientalism

Introduction

If one wished to characterize the former Yugoslavian lands with the use of architectonic objects, Ottoman bridges like Old Bridges of Višegrad and Mostar or Stone Bridge in Skopje would be among the buildings most permeated with meanings. Their iconicity was formed to a large extent by the literary oeuvre of Ivo Andrić.

This popularity led to banalisation and much of modernist Yugoslavian bridge symbolism, whose main contributor was Andrić, entered the general symbolical universe of Western and Slavic meanings of this category of objects. Both comparative mythology, Slavic ethnolinguistics and classical psychoanalysis are rather consistent in enumerating its connotations. Firstly, a bridge can stand for a masculine element in the cosmos, as contrasted with the feminine, e.g. river or water in general.¹ Another possible and culturally even more common symbolism of the bridge is one of transition or transgression² be it from mother's womb to the world, from life to death,³ from an old to a new year,⁴ or from any possible point to another,⁵ i.e. being reducible to any change or transition in general.⁶ Last but not least, the very act of building a bridge was traditionally considered sacred and their builders were not infrequently included into the class of priests, which is, for instance, reflected in a title of the Catholic pope, *pontifex maximus*,⁷ ultimately originating in the Roman mythology.

However, while this plethora of cultural meanings may contribute to the productivity of reading of a bridge metaphor, it does not explain the very phenomenon of Andrić's portrait of the Ottoman edifices. While their iconicity was mentioned at the very beginning of this paper, it would be advisable to define what it means for an object to be an icon. According to the classical semiotic investigations of Charles S. Peirce, an icon is a sign that derives its meaning from the physical resemblance to the denotation, icons *imitate* it.⁸

On the other hand, *iconic studies*, developing in the last decades, distance themselves from such a Peircian notion of icon, regarded as too static and too attached to pictorial depictions. Instead, they stress dialectics of presence and absence, set in motion by an icon that generates a surplus of meaning.⁹ In this paper both explications of this notion can be of great use, firstly—

¹ *Słownik stereotypów i symboli ludowych*, t. 1: Kosmos. Ziemia, woda, podziemie, red. J. Bartmiński, Lublin 1999, pp. 326, 297. P. Friedman, *The Bridge: A Study in Symbolism*, "The Psychoanalytic Quarterly" 1952, No. 21 (1), p. 50.

² *Мифы народов мира. Энциклопедия*, Т. 2: К-Я, ред. С. А. Токарев, Москва 1982, p. 176.

³ P. Friedman, op. cit., p. 50.

⁴ *Мифы народов мира...*, op. cit., p. 177.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

⁶ P. Friedman, op. cit., p. 50.

⁷ *Мифы народов мира...*, op. cit., p. 176.

⁸ Ch. S. Peirce, *What is a Sign?*, [in:] *The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, Bloomington 1998, pp. 5-6.

⁹ G. Boehm, *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen. Die Macht des Zeichens*, Berlin 2007, p. 38.

pointing to its connection to the denotation (e.g. a physical bridge), secondly—explaining the emergence of the surplus meanings. Only such a combination would allow answering a question of how engineering structures were able to embody, for instance, the Yugoslavian attempt to overcome the *East : West* contradiction.

Subject of Investigation

As it has been already mentioned, the subject of these investigations is the Ottoman bridges in the Western Balkan area (and more specifically former Yugoslavia). They are perceived as icons in the framework of semiotics (signifiers by the virtue of resemblance) and *iconic turn* (signifiers possessing a meaning irreducible to their signified). This meaning can be, however, enriched with the use of an everyday understanding of the notion *icon*, too—as an object of religious or entirely secular cult.

This concept is well reflected by the Oxford English Dictionary, which distinguishes two meanings of this lexeme without any specifiers:

1. A devotional painting of Christ or another holy figure, typically executed on wood and used ceremonially in the Byzantine and other Eastern Churches.
2. A person or thing regarded as a representative symbol or as worthy of veneration.¹⁰

Interestingly, this second meaning is completely absent from the normative Serbian dictionary in its newest compact edition, *Rečnik Matice srpske*:

ikona ž grč. slika Isusa Hrista, Bogorodice ili sveca izrađena na drvenoj ili limenoj podlozi u vizantijsko-pravoslavnoj umetnosti; slika sveca čiji se dan slavi kao krsno ime.¹¹

Meanings connected to computing, as well as to “secular icon cult” are completely absent. This may be a result both of a conservative approach of dictionary compilers, as well as of a reluctance on the side of language users to use

¹⁰ “Icon”, [in:] *Oxford English Dictionary*, [online] <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/icon> [accessed: 4.01.2019].

¹¹ *Rečnik srpskoga jezika*, ur. M. Vujanić, D. Gortan-Premk, M. Dešić, R. Dragičević, M. Nikolić, Lj. Nogo, V. Pavković, N. Ramić, R. Stijović, M. Radović-Tešić, E. Fekete, Novi Sad 2011, p. 451 [**icon** fem. Greek a picture of Jesus Christ, Virgin Mary or a saint painted on a wooden or metal surface in the Byzantine-Orthodox art; a picture of the saint whose feast day is celebrated as a patron saint day].

a word connected to own religious sphere in a secular manner.¹² These remarks can, however, stay marginal, as in one culture objects may be treated in the role of *icons*, without being named as such.

Last but not least, the presupposition about iconicity of the analyzed objects can be, thus, strengthened not only with regard at a culture-forming role of the novels and stories written by Ivo Andrić, one of the codifiers of the mythical role played by a bridge. It is also derived from the very fact of them being used as souvenirs in bookshop window displays in every bigger city of Western Balkans.

Following parts of this paper will try to explain what exactly the connotative content of the Ottoman and Andrićian “bridge” symbol is and in which cultural codes (resp. semiospheres) it is valid.¹³

Icons Outside the Semiosphere?

The above-mentioned proofs for the iconic status of the Ottoman bridges do not mean that this condition is not questionable. As Russian semiotician Yuriy Lotman stated, signs (icons included) exist and signify only in the framework of a specific semiosphere.¹⁴ Given that in the modern era one of the most strongly defined semiospheres is national cultures,¹⁵ there emerges a question in the framework of which community one can talk about iconicity of the analyzed objects after the Yugoslavian federation dissolved.

¹² It is also worth noting that this polysemy is not that eminent in Polish dictionaries and if appears, it limits itself to the semantic domain of fashion. However, it is not absent at all, which means that even a strictly normative use would give a possibility to transfer the word from one semantic domain to another. For example, *Wielki słownik języka polskiego* distinguishes following meanings: “1. [in an Orthodox church] *art* a painting of a Byzantine or Early Christian style depicting holy personages surrounded by religious symbolic, most often painted on wood, without perspective and chiaroscuro, 2. [on a computer] *IT* a picture on a screen of a computer monitor, on which one clicks in order to open an application, file, folder or perform other operation in the system, 3. [style] a person or a thing perceived as a symbol of something” (*Wielki słownik języka polskiego*, red. P. Źmigrodzki, [online] http://wsjp.pl/index.php?id_hasla=4680&ind=0&w_szukaj=ikona [accessed: 4.01.2019]).

¹³ The idea of connotative content of a symbol is understood as in the tradition of spatial semiotics originated by R. Barthes, *Introduction to the Semiotics of Space*, [in:] *The City and the Sign. An Introduction to Urban Semiotics*, eds. M. Gottdiener, A. Ph. Lagopoulos, New York 1986; U. Eco, *Function and Sign: Semiotics of Architecture*, [in:] *The City and the Sign...*, op. cit.

¹⁴ Ю. Лотман, *Внутри мыслящих миров*, Москва 1996.

¹⁵ Cf. e.g. A. Kłoskowska, *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005, pp. 15–51.

In this context discussions about the national belonging of Ivo Andrić could be mentioned,¹⁶ as they entail the entirety of the projected semiosphere of a preferred national culture with its attitude towards the Oriental heritage and its interpretations of the Ottoman architecture. Nationalist interpretations of the Andrić's work that emerged during the 1990s were split along ethnic lines.

Serbian nationalist readings tended towards exclusive rights to the Nobel prize winner, which was combined with an Orientalist perspective on his depiction of Bosnia and Bosnian Muslims. This is well illustrated by the Radovan Karadžić's interpretation of the story *Pismo iz 1920* to support his views on impossibility of multi-ethnic coexistence in Bosnia, as well as by interpretations of *The Bridge on the Drina* as a novel exclusively about the "suffering of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina," as proposed by literary critic Zoran Konstantinović.¹⁷

Just as Andrić's ambivalent perception of the Ottoman heritage was ignored by the Serbian nationalist audience, material remnants of those times were met with similar silence. In fact, Ottoman heritage influenced Serbian architecture thoroughly and historically it was not uncommon to affirm this impact, which is visible e.g. in adapting features of vernacular houses in Yugoslavian folklorism or meticulous conservation of some of the Turkish monuments in the real-socialist times. However, for instance, a synthesis *History of Serbian Culture (Istorija srpske kulture)* edited by Pavle Ivić and published in 1994, when dealing with architecture, omits the Ottoman past completely—it focuses on medieval art and post-1833 historicist construction, while from rural architecture only those styles are discussed that display the least Oriental influences.¹⁸

Croatian nationalists were not coherent in their approach towards Ivo Andrić, as the writer started to be absent from the school curricula, while his Croatian ethnic background was still stressed.¹⁹ Not only is the Yugoslavian

¹⁶ Cf. I. Lovrenović, *Ivo Andrić: Paradoks o šutnji*, „Časopis za kulturu, književnost i društvena pitanja” 2008, br. 13 (1–2); K. Sang Hun, *Andrić as an Object of Hate: Reception of Ivo Andrić's Works in the Post-Yugoslav Context*, „Slavistična revija” 2011, No. 59 (1); A. Bartulović, *Postjugosławiańskie interpretacje orientalizmu Iwo Andricia: niejednoznaczność osmańskiego dziedzictwa w Bośni i Hercegowinie*, „Łódzkie Studia Etnograficzne” 2017, nr 56.

¹⁷ K. Sang Hun, op. cit, p. 60.

¹⁸ *Istorija srpske kulture*, ur. P. Ivić, Beograd 1994. On the other hand it should be noted that the rare remnants of the Ottoman past in Serbia are in general well reconstructed after a period of nationalist attacks throughout the 1990s and early 2000s: Islam-Aga Hadrović Mosque in Niš and Šejh-Mustafa Türbe in 2013, Bajrakli Mosque in Belgrade in 2012. In a cliché media discourse their uniqueness and bearing witness to multiculturalism of Serbia is not infrequently stressed.

¹⁹ Cf. I. Lovrenović, op. cit.; K. Sang Hun, op. cit.

Nobel prize winner relatively absent in the semiotic universe of the Croatian national culture; a similar fate is also shared by the Ottoman architectonic heritage. As Zagreb-based architect Zlatko Karač points out, Turkish-Ottoman monuments are not only preserved in a small number and poor shape, but they have been poorly researched until recently. While most of them were destroyed in the late 17th-century Reconquista, some other—even not that distinctly Islamic objects as bridges—were demolished as late as after the World War II. On the other hand, today rare existing remnants of the Ottoman heritage are affirmed, reconstructed with respect paid to their past and often treated as bearing witness to a meeting of the East and the West, as it was in the case of the reconstruction of the Đakovo Church of All Saints.²⁰ Last but not least, this was not always the case—the destruction of the Mostar Old Bridge by Croatian nationalist militias in 1993 is often interpreted as an act of urbicide targeted against it as a symbol of multiculturalism and Bosnian-Croatian coexistence.²¹

Most of the Bosniak nationalist readings perceived Andrić as an Orientalist and a forerunner of chauvinist Great Serbia. An example of such perspective can be found e.g. in a Muhsin Rizvić's study *Bosnian Muslims in Andrić's World (Bosanski Muslimani u Andrićevom svijetu)*.²² The author accuses the Yugoslavian Nobel prize winner of imposing "a sense of historical guilt on the Turks and Bosnian Moslems, justifying the crimes committed over the Moslem population in the 1990s."²³ A completely different attitude guided Bosniak perception of the Ottoman architectonic heritage, whose appreciation was never really discontinued. It was affirmed by Austro-Hungarian authorities, trying to gain the loyalty of their new subjects by building in an Orientalist neo-Moorish style. This legacy was less followed in Royal Yugoslavia, but even there the Turkish traits were present in folklorist architecture. The end of the 1930s witnessed a birth of a new generation of Bosnian architects affirming a synthesis between Corbusian high modernism and the traditional Ottoman heritage—Dušan Grabrijan, Juraj Neidhardt and Zlatko Ugljen, active throughout the whole real-socialist period.²⁴ In the Bosniak nationalist approaches towards

²⁰ Z. Karač, *Tursko-islamska arhitektura i graditeljstvo u Hrvatskoj*, [in:] *Hrvatska i Turska. Povijesno-kulturni pregled*, ur. K. Jurčević, O. Ramljak, Z. Hasanbegović, Zagreb 2016.

²¹ E. Gunzburger Makaš, *Interpreting Multivalent Sites: New Meanings of Mostar's Old Bridge, "Centropa"* 2005, No. 5 (1); M. Coward, *Urbicide. The politics of urban destruction*, London 2008.

²² M. Rizvić, *Bosanski Muslimani u Andrićevu svijetu*, Sarajevo 1995.

²³ K. Sang Hun, *op.cit.*, p. 56.

²⁴ D. Grabrijan, J. Neidhardt, *Arhitektura Bosne i put u suvremeno*, Ljubljana 1957.

the Ottoman heritage such a viewpoint is connected with a more ambivalent view on modernity and, what is more important, national exclusivism, denying a possibility of any Orthodox (i.e. Serb) or Catholic (i.e. Croat) influence.²⁵

Icons and Orient

The stereotypical symbolism of a bridge can be subsumed under a nexus of meanings derived from its transgressive or transitional connotations, as it has been already mentioned in the introductory part of the paper. However, it is not the only stereotypical meaning superstructured over this kind of objects. It coincided with the rise of nationalisms when a clichée formulation labeling a number of Central and Eastern European regions as bridges between the East and the West emerged. Not only was Yugoslavia dubbed such a bridge by Josip J. Strossmayer; such denomination was e.g. a part of a geopolitical concept conceived by Czechoslovakian president Edvard Beneš. This metaphor is also excessively used in promotional materials of various eastern regions of Poland. A danger contained in such a banalized use was discovered by a Balkanist critique. It points out that the cliché figure of the bridge stands for something lacking own specific features, a mere connector between a starting point and a destination. As Maria Todorova writes in the preface to her book *Imagining the Balkans*:

The Balkans [...] have always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroads. The bridge as a metaphor for the region has been so closely linked to the literary oeuvre of Ivo Andrić, that one tends to forget that its use both in outside descriptions, as well as in each of the Balkan literature and everyday speech, borders on the banal. The Balkans have been compared to a bridge between East and West, between Europe and Asia. [...] The Balkans are also a bridge between stages of growth, and this invokes labels such as semi-developed, semi-colonial, semi-civilized, semi-oriental.²⁶

In that way a bridge metaphor would perfectly fulfill the function expected by the Western imperialist discourses about the Balkan. This observation was later elaborated by Katarina Luketić, who pointed out not only the use of the bridge metaphor by the imperialist Great Powers of the late 19th century but also its kinship with the Nazi German notion of *Südosteuropa*.²⁷

²⁵ I. Lovrenović, *Kulturni identitet Bosne i Hercegovine?*, [online] <http://ivanlovrenovic.com/2014/03/kulturni-identitet-bosne-i-hercegovine> [accessed: 4.01.2019]. This does not mean that such syntheses are not studied in local specialist *milieus*, not that thoroughly influenced by nationalism.

²⁶ M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford 2009, pp. 15–16.

²⁷ K. Luketić, *Balkan: od geografije do fantazije*, Zagreb 2013.

This kind of Balkanist critique of possible imperialist uses of the bridge metaphor should be obviously distinguished from some strains of Serbian nationalist criticism of Andrić as a 'Jesuit', an agent of the anti-national West. They are entwined in another kind of Balkanist discourse—a nationalist one, as it has been demonstrated well by Luketić.²⁸

An additional problem in the investigations about the bridges interpreted in the context of overcoming *East : West* contradiction in the Western Balkans emerges in connection to the very construction of the notion *East*. As it has been already mentioned, Ivo Andrić can be perceived as the main producer of the connotative content of bridges. However, his attitude towards what is Oriental, Muslim or non-European is sometimes perceived as controversial and reproducing Orientalist stereotypes.²⁹ Most of the accusations concern Andrićian depiction of Oriental characters, while his symbolical interpretations of the role of the Ottoman bridges should be rather (re)evaluated in the context of literary conceptions and depictions of peripheral modernization, its possibility, and dangers it can entail, the conceptions and depictions that in the Andrić's writing seem to be rather nuanced.

On the other hand, the plethora of meanings superstructured on the figure of the bridge by modernist writing—mostly in the Andrić's oeuvre—create a semantic surplus that can probably avoid the trap of Balkanism.

Bridges

Meanings of codes are, regardless of being languages or edifices, determined historically. Although an attempt of a non-semiotic perception of any object runs a danger of falling into a coil of infinite semiosis, one of the goals of these investigations is to prove the historical character of the iconicity of the analyzed objects and contingency of the Ivo Andrić's role as the initiator of their connotative content.

As a historian of the Ottoman art Selen Morkoç points out, Turkish architects of the 15th and 16th century perceived their works as things of utilitarian and pragmatic character, while the idea of art for art's sake was alien to them.³⁰ This is witnessed by the treatises written by Mimar Sinan, the architect of the

²⁸ Ibidem.

²⁹ Cf. M. Rizvić, op. cit.; E. Kazaz, *Egzistencijalnost/povijestnost Bosne – Interpretacija u zamci ideologije*, „Novi izraz” 2001, no. 10–11, [online] <http://postjugo.filg.uj.edu.pl/baza/files/424/andric-bosna.pdf> [accessed: 4.01.2019]; I. Lovrenović, *Ivo Andrić...*, op. cit.; K. Sang Hun, op. cit.; A. Bartulović, op. cit.

³⁰ S. Morkoç, *A Study of Ottoman Narratives on Architecture: Text, Context and Hermeneutics*, Bethesda 2010, p. 222.

Višegrad's Old Bridge, where he presents himself as an artisan, not making any difference between representative or sacral buildings and any other engineering structures:

I was eager and aspired to the carpenter's trade. I became a steadfast compass in the master's service and kept an eye on the centre and the orbit (*merkez ü medâr*). Later, like a [moving] compass drawing a circumference, I longed to move to [other] lands. For a time, I traversed the Arab and Persian lands in the service of the sultan and acquired a sought-after bit [of wisdom] from the crenellation of every *iwan* and a provision [of knowledge] from every ruined dervish lodge.³¹

On the other hand, already in the Ottoman era perception of architecture was ambivalent. Although the profession of the architect was perceived pragmatically, their works were sometimes interpreted as a *mystical body*, a model of the universe (or analogously, but going even further—architect's body was interpreted as an architectonic object).³²

On a primarily engineering structure of the bridge, modernist literature superstructured a whole series of connotations, for which, in the case of the Southern Slavic literary universe, Ivo Andrić was the most responsible author. His understanding of the bridge symbolism can be reconstructed for example on the basis of a novel *The Bridge on the Drina*, story *The Bridge on the Žepa* or essay *Bridges*.³³ The latter may depict in the most concise way signification of BRIDGE as a sign that was created by Andrić. The Yugoslavian Nobel prize winner treats this kind of building above all as a symbol of humanist values, common to all human being:

[Bridges] are more important than houses, more sacred, and more universal than temples. They belong to all and treat all alike; they are useful, always built for a purpose, at a spot where most human needs entwine; they are more durable than other buildings and serve no secret or evil purpose.³⁴

³¹ M. Sinan, *Sinan's Autobiographies. Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, ed. G. Necipoğlu, trans. H. Crane, E. Akin, Leiden 2006, p. 115.

³² S. Morkoç, pp. 258–274.

³³ I. Andrić, *Sabrana djela*, knj. 1: Na Drini ćuprija, Sarajevo 1981; I. Andrić, *Most na Žepi*, [in:] *Sabrana djela*, knj. 6: Žeđ, Sarajevo 1981; I. Andrić, *Mostovi*, [in:] *Sabrana djela*, knj. 10: Staze-lica-predeli, Sarajevo 1981.

³⁴ „[Mostovi] su važniji od kuća, svetiji, jer opštiji, od hramova. Svačiji i prema svakom jednaki, korisni, podignuti uvek smisljeno, na mestu na kom se ukrštava najveći broj ljudskih potreba, istrajniji su od drugih građevina i ne služe ničem što je tajno ili zlo”. Translations by A. Kurtović from the Ivo Andrić's essay *Bridges (Mostovi)*; I. Andrić, *Bridges*, “Spirit of Bosnia” 2006, No. 1 (1), [online] <http://www.spiritofbosnia.org/volume-1-no-1-2006-january/bridges/> [accessed: 4.01.2019].

For Andrić their transport function seems to consist only of the positive aspects of the relations between human beings. Bridges can also stand for the rational element present (since) forever in human nature:

[Bridges] show the place where humankind encountered an obstacle and did not stop before it, but overcame and bridged it the way humankind could, according to understanding, taste, and circumstances.³⁵

The symbol of the bridge incorporates not only the conviction about the historically fixed elements of human nature; the Yugoslavian Nobel prize winner fills it also with the very idea of endurance and eternity:

For everything is a transition, a bridge whose ends fade away into the infinity and toward which all earthly bridges are nothing but mere playthings, pale symbols.³⁶

However, apart from the connotations explicated by Ivo Andrić in his oeuvre, the bridge symbol derives its meanings also from geographical settings of the novel and stories. These connotations are additionally strengthened due to the Ivo Andrić's status as the only Yugoslavian Nobel prize winner. Bearing in mind all the previously mentioned contents (or also because of them), the bridge became simultaneously a positive metaphor of Yugoslavia and/or the Balkans. On the other hand, this metaphor is not lacking ambivalence—as it has been already mentioned, it can be interpreted as a Balkanist one, pointing to its mere communicative function between a starting point and a destination.

Evolution of the connotative content specific to the bridge symbol in the Western Balkans proceeded, thus, from a relative absence of signification in the times of the construction of the first objects in the Ottoman era, through a modernist meaning complex produced mostly by Ivo Andrić, up to its deconstruction in the last three decades.

This deconstruction renders the Andrićian ideas about overcoming the division between the East and the West into a position of *unwanted heritage*, a term usually applied to pieces of art, for instance modernist architecture built in the times of the real-socialism in Yugoslavia (cf. e.g. a Croatian film *Neželjena baština* from 2016 directed by Irena Škorić). Originally, however, it was coined by an Austrian art historian, living at the break of the 20th century, Alois Riegl.

³⁵ „[Mostovi] pokazuju mesto na kome je čovek naišao na zapreku i nije zastao pred njom, nego je savladao i premostio kako je mogao, prema svom shvatanju, ukusu, i prilikama kojima je bio okružen”.

³⁶ „Jer, sve je prelaz, most čiji se krajevi gube u beskonačnosti, a prema kom su svi zemni mostovi samo dečije igračke, bleđi simboli”.

For him, *unwanted heritage* (*ungewolltes Denkmal*) was constituted by all monuments that were worthy of protection due to their aesthetic value rather than the ideology of memory in a given community.³⁷ While the use of this term in reference to Andrić or the Yugoslavian architecture deviates from the original use, appreciating only the aesthetic value of an object, and not its social message, it is useful to stress its potential for countering hegemonic ideologies of memory.

Not only had the deconstruction of the narrative of the common past rendered the Andrićian bridge symbolism obsolete; the very historical facts added up to its ambivalence. One can just mention massacres on the Višegrad bridge perpetrated in 1992 by Serbian nationalist militias on the local Muslim population or the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar by Croatian nationalist militia in 1992, later interpreted as an act of a deliberate uricide.

This necessary ambivalence is perhaps best reflected by the Saša Stanišić's novel *How the Soldier Repairs the Gramophone* (*Wie der Soldat das Grammophon repariert*),³⁸ where the Višegrad bridge and a neighboring riverside is still an innocent childhood scenery, but the whole picture is becoming overshadowed by symptoms of an imminent war terror. It is a question of the future if, from a plethora of possible re-semiotisations, the bridge will ever be filled with the Andrićian symbolism of the common fate of the Western Balkan nations.

Conclusions

This paper was an attempt to prove the semiotically iconic status of the Ottoman bridges in the national cultures of the former Yugoslavian countries. However, their status in e.g. Serbian or Croatian semiosphere is ambivalent. This architecture is perceived as neither own, nor alien, nor as such, that could be in all its aspects integrated with the universes of the national cultures. A similar position is occupied by the Andrić's works—they can be either marginalized or interpreted in a nationally reductionist manner. A peculiar situation can be observed in Bosniak culture, where nationalist circles on one hand try to affirm Ottoman architectonic heritage and, on the other, portrait Ivo Andrić and his narrative as exclusively Orientalist. Drawing on the reception of the Andrićian bridge symbolism, an interesting process of meaning production for the Ottoman bridges was reconstructed—from the absence of signification, through modernist-humanist meaning complex, up to its deconstruction.

³⁷ A. Riegl, *Der moderne Denkmalkultus. Sein Wesen und seine Entstehung*, Wien 1903, pp. 6–7.

³⁸ S. Stanišić, *Wie der Soldat das Grammophon repariert*, München 2008.

One can notice a parallel with another type of the iconic object, namely, with modernist housing of former Yugoslavia. While most of the architectonic heritage could be easily inscribed into new, nationalist narratives about the ethnic past and into new, ethnically split semiospheres of national cultures, the modernist housing had become a symbol for a real-socialist, multinational federation, too.

It was built as, on one hand, a modern machine for living in, free from surplus meanings. As it was demonstrated in this paper, such an engineering, pragmatic approach to construction is, however, not exclusive to modernity. Its manner is somehow similar to Ottoman architecture, also putting a strong emphasis on an architect's work as a craft.

On the other hand, since the very beginning of the Yugoslavian modernist project, it was intended as a symbol of the country's non-aligned modernity, overcoming the East : West division.³⁹ The rather unexpected parallel with the post-Andrićian bridges, thus, holds also in this respect. However, similarly as in the case of the latter, since the end of the 1980s, the old significations were deconstructed and re-semiotised (the latter mostly as the Oriental heritage, the former as relics of a failed socialist urban culture),⁴⁰ and both the *blocks*, as well as the *bridges* became an unwanted heritage.

Despite this fact, both types of buildings maintained their iconic status, which can lead to its renewed re-signification—a process that may be heralded by a new reception of the Ivo Andrić's opus, possibly to be expected after the 2013 re-issue of the Nobel prize winner's collected works in Croatia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Andrić I., *Bridges*, "Spirit of Bosnia" 2006, no. 1 (1), [online] <http://www.spiritofbosnia.org/volume-1-no-1-2006-january/bridges/> [accessed: 4.01.2019].
2. Andrić I., *Most na Žepi*, [in:] *Sabrana djela*, knj. 6: Žeđ, Sarajevo 1981.
3. Andrić I., *Mostovi*, [in:] *Sabrana djela*, knj. 10: Staze-lica-predeli, Sarajevo 1981.
4. Andrić I., *Sabrana djela*, knj. 1: Na Drini ćuprija, Sarajevo 1981.
5. Barthes R., *Introduction to the Semiotics of Space*, [in:] *The City and the Sign. An Introduction to Urban Semiotics*, eds. M. Gottdiener, A. Ph. Lagopoulos, New York 1986.

³⁹ V. Kulić, *Architecture and Ideology in Socialist Yugoslavia*, [in:] *Unfinished Modernisations. Between Utopia and Pragmatism*, eds. M. Mrduljaš, V. Kulić. Zagreb 2012; B. Le Normand, *Designing Tito's Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism*, Pittsburgh 2014, p. 23.

⁴⁰ Cf. e.g. J. Prokopljević, *Do Not Throw Concrete Blocks! Social and Public Housing in New Belgrade and Their Representations in Popular Culture*, "Fusion Journal" 2015, No. 6.

6. Bartulović A., *Postjugoslovańskie interpretacije orientalizmu Ivo Andrića: nejednoznaćność osmańskiego dziedzictwa w Bośni i Hercegowinie*, „Łódzkie Studia Etnograficzne” 2017, nr 56.
7. Boehm G., *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen. Die Macht des Zeichens*, Berlin 2007.
8. Coward M., *Urbicide. The Politics of Urban Destruction*, London 2008.
9. Eco U., *Function and Sign: Semiotics of Architecture*, [in:] *The City and the Sign. An Introduction to Urban Semiotics*, ed. M. Gottdiener, A. Ph. Lagopoulos, New York 1986.
10. Eco U., *Theory of Semiotics*, Bloomington 1976.
11. Friedman P., *The Bridge: A Study in Symbolism*, “The Psychoanalytic Quarterly” 1952, No. 21 (1).
12. Grabrijan D., Neidhardt J., *Arhitektura Bosne i put u suvremeno*, Ljubljana 1957.
13. Gunzburger Makaš E., *Interpreting Multivalent Sites: New Meanings of Mostar’s Old Bridge*, “Centropa” 2005, No. 5 (1).
14. Icon (n.d.), *Oxford English Dictionary*, [online] <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/icon> [accessed: 4.01.2019].
15. *Istorija srpske kulture*, ur. P. Ivić, Beograd 1994.
16. Karać Z., *Tursko-islamska arhitektura i graditeljstvo u Hrvatskoj*, [in:] *Hrvatska i Turska. Povijesno-kulturni pregled*, ur. K. Jurćević, O. Ramljak, Z. Hasanbegović, Zagreb 2016.
17. Kazaz E., *Egzistencijalnost/povijestnost Bosne – Interpretacija u zamci ideologie*, „Novi izraz” 2001, br. 10–11, [online] <http://postjugo.filg.uj.edu.pl/baza/files/424/andric-bosna.pdf> [accessed: 4.01.2019].
18. Kłoskowska A., *Kultury narodowe u korzeni*, Warszawa 2005.
19. Kulić V., *Architecture and Ideology in Socialist Yugoslavia*, [in:] *Unfinished Modernisations. Between Utopia and Pragmatism*, eds. M. Mrduljaš, V. Kulić, Zagreb 2012.
20. Le Normand B., *Designing Tito’s Capital: Urban Planning, Modernism, and Socialism*, Pittsburgh 2014.
21. Lotman Ŭ., *Vnutri myslâših mirov*, Moskva 1996.
22. Lovrenović I., *Ivo Andrić: Paradoks o šutnji*, „Ćasopis za kulturu, knjiŹevnost i društvena pitanja” 2008, br. 13 (1–2).
23. Lovrenović I., *Kulturni identitet Bosne i Hercegovine?*, [online] <http://ivanlovrenovic.com/2014/03/kulturni-identitet-bosne-i-hercegovine> [accessed: 4.01.2019].
24. Luketić K., *Balkan: od geografije do fantazije*, Zagreb 2013.
25. Morkoć S., *A Study of Ottoman Narratives on Architecture: Text, Context and Hermeneutics*, Bethesda 2010.
26. Peirce Ch. S., *What is a Sign?*, [in:] *The Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical Writings*, vol. 2, Bloomington 1998.
27. Prokopljević J., *Do Not Throw Concrete Blocks! Social and Public Housing in New Belgrade and Their Representations in Popular Culture*, “Fusion Journal” 2015, No. 6.
28. *Rećnik srpskoga jezika*, ur. M. Vujanić, D. Gortan-Premk, M. Dešić, R. Dragićević, M. Nikolić, Lj. Nogo, V. Pavković, N. Ramić, R. Stijović, M. Radović-Tešić, E. Fekete, Novi Sad 2011.
29. Riegl A., *Der moderne Denkmalkultus. Sein Wesen und seine Entstehung*, Wien 1903.
30. Rizvić M., *Bosanski Muslimani u Andrićevu svijetu*, Sarajevo 1995.
31. Sang Hun K., *Andrić as an Object of Hate: Reception of Ivo Andrić’s Works in the Post-Yugoslav Context*, „Slavistićna revija” 2011, no. 59 (1).
32. Sinan M., *Sinan’s Autobiographies. Five Sixteenth-Century Texts*, ed. G. Necipoĝlu, trans. H. Crane, E. Akin, Leiden 2006.

33. *Słownik stereotypów i symboli ludowych*, t. 1: *Kosmos. Ziemia, woda, podziemie*, red. J. Bartmiński, Lublin 1999.
34. Stanišić S., *Wie der Soldat das Grammofon repariert*, München 2008.
35. Todorova M., *Imagining the Balkans*, Oxford 2009.
36. Лотман Ю., *Внутри мыслящих миров*, Москва 1996.
37. *Мифы народов мира. Энциклопедия*, ред. С. А. Токарев, Т. 2: К–Я, Москва 1982.

ZESZYTY NAUKOWE TOWARZYSTWA DOKTORANTÓW UJ
NAUKI SPOŁECZNE, NR 24 (1/2019), s. 181–198
E-ISSN 2082-9213 | P-ISSN 2299-2383
WWW.DOKTORANCI.UJ.EDU.PL/ZESZYTY/NAUKI-SPOLECZNE
DOI: 10.26361/ZNTDsp.10.2019.24.10
HTTPS://ORCID.ORG/0000-0003-1483-6573

ANGELIKA KOSIERADZKA

UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW
INSTITUTE OF WESTERN AND SOUTHERN SLAVIC STUDIES
E-MAIL: ANGELIKA.KOSIERADZKA@UW.EDU.PL

SUBMISSION: 21.01.2019
ACCEPTANCE: 20.08.2019

The Memory of Architecture, the Architecture of Contentious Memory. Post-Ottoman Edifices of Worship and the Contemporary Spaces of Bulgarian Cities—the Case of Dzhumaya Mosque and the Tomb of Bali Efendi

ABSTRACT

The Ottoman rule in Bulgaria brought a visible change in the way of organizing urban spaces expressed by i.a. architectural elements and public facilities making up new infrastructure which provided for the needs of Muslim culture. A vital element of this infrastructure is objects related to religious worship which the author of the text considers palimpsest-places. In a diachronic view, one can observe for example practice of transforming sacred buildings—churches into mosques and, after regaining independence, mosques into churches, as a result of transitioning of the same territories between Islamic and Eastern Christian cultural spheres. Other Bulgarian locations related to the Islamic culture became multilayer spaces utilized by representatives of various cultural and religious universes at the same time. The author's considerations of the problematic status of these places are illustrated by the cases of Dzhumaya Mosque in Plovdiv and the Tomb of Bali Efendi in Sofia. The study of the meanings inscribed into city iconospheres by the discussed objects shows a huge role of the visual sphere in the creation of appropriated, regained or shared spaces. Therefore the purpose of this article is to consider the status of the post-Ottoman cultural objects in modern Bulgaria and their position on the mental maps of Bulgarian cities. It allows us to compare often extreme social reactions to their presence in the public space which exposes the multilayered ontology of these buildings. The inclusion of the issue of the collective memory of traumatic past into the analysis justifies regarding the discussed locations as transmitters of contentious memories which provoke a discussion on tolerance, nationalism and creation of historical narrative.

KEYWORDS

Dzhumaya Mosque, Tomb of Bali Efendi, Sofia, Plovdiv, the Ottoman Heritage, Post-Ottoman Edifices of Worship, Public Space, Bulgarian Cities, Memory

Introduction—The Usurped Urban Space

Maria Todorova, a scholar of Bulgarian descent and author of the famous work *Imagining the Balkans*, stated that “it is absurd to search for the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans, the Balkans are the Ottoman heritage.”¹ The long period of the Ottoman rule in the Balkans, which started in 1389 with the Turkish (probably) victory in the Battle of Kosovo, permanently changed local realities (political, economic, demographic, religious) and visible traces of these influences persist in the Balkan space to this day. During the analysis of the stage in the Bulgarian history, which was the Ottoman rule, Ivo Strahilov and Slavka Karakusheva posed a question, whether “it is at all possible to speak of the Ottoman heritage in the Balkans (especially in Bulgaria), if we assume that the purpose of heritage is ‘to be inherited,’ i.e. to be identified and viewed as a part of the nation’s historic past?”² Such a question is justified in the context of numerous national narratives which portray the period between the 16th and 19th centuries exclusively as a time of denationalization, forced conversion, discrimination and violence, because it shows that the problematic past and its remnants are either marginalized, or they constitute, as Nikolay Aretov puts it, “rejected heritage.”³

It is also worth mentioning that the establishment of Turkish influences in the Balkans negatively affected the perception of the cultures there in Western Europe and gave rise to a number of oversimplifying stereotypes. Many of them were based on a belief about the Oriental character of the Balkan Peninsula, that in turn caused its pejoration and marginalization as an imagined Other.⁴

¹ М. Тодорова, *Османското наследство на Балканите*, [online] <http://www.librev.com/index.php/discussion-bulgaria-publisher/2027-2013-04-19-10-36-54> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

² И. Страхилев, С. Каракушева, *Османското минало – между наследеното и наследството*, [online] https://www.seminar-bg.eu/spisanie-seminar-bg/broy12/item/444-osmanskoto_minalo.html [accessed: 13.08.2019].

³ Н. Аретов, *Балканските народи и Османската империя: Едно отхвърлено наследство*, “Литературна мисъл” 2008, бр. 1, p. 55.

⁴ Larry Wolff writes more extensively about the intellectual process of dividing Europe into mystic East and rational West, whereas Božidar Jezernik shows the impact, that travel diaries about the Balkans written by Westerners had on the mechanisms of stereotypization of this space, in his book *Wild Europe: the Balkans in the gaze of Western travelers*—an exten-

The focal point of the interests of the author of this text is contemporary Bulgarian public space, which contains edifices of worship built during the Ottoman reign. The space of other countries of the Balkan Peninsula was also heavily marked by many years of Ottoman influence through the urban solutions which were used, as well as public facilities and places of worship. It should be noted that often ambivalent social reception of Muslim objects of worship is not exclusive to Bulgaria, but it is a pan-Balkan tendency proven by the fact that

[...] regardless of historical facts, the current conflicts in the Balkans are also caused by the contemporary Balkan Orthodox understanding of a Muslim as a human being of lesser value, a parasite on "our" soil, trash whose fate is not important and who is usually scorned regardless of the official views we declare as European citizens. We only take an interest in them, when they are in our way.⁵

In 1393, forces of the Ottoman Empire led by Bayezid I captured Tarnovo, the then capital of the Tsardom of Tarnovo. Three years later, the fortified city of Vidin, the main center of the Tsardom of Vidin ruled by Ivan Stratsimir, also fell. This defeat marks the beginning of the 500-year Ottoman rule in Bulgaria, situated at the core of territories occupied by the sultan's forces. This problematic position influenced the way of exercising power (both political and cultural) over the conquered Bulgarian lands. The dominant ideology of the Turkish state was based on Islamic rules, while the close relationship of religion and state administration shaped the institutional organization of the Empire itself, as well as that of the occupied territories. It also affected the differentiation of the social structure, mainly through discrimination (economic or in access to civic rights) of the non-Muslim population. As a result of emigration, displacement and conversion, the number of people in Bulgaria officially following various forms of Islam gradually increased. It is worth noting, however, that with the corroboration of the Turkish rule, religious divisions blurred and clear sep-

sive summary of the views on the Balkans collated from numerous travel reports. The relationship between the categories of orientalism and balkanism, which come up in the discourse about the Balkans, was studied by such scholars as Maria Todorova and Milica Bakić-Hayden. See: L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 1994; B. Jezernik, *Dzika Europa. Bałkany w oczach zachodnich podróżników*, tłum. P. Oczko, Kraków 2013; M. Todorova, *Bałkany wyobrażone*, tłum. P. Szymor, M. Budzińska, Wołowiec 2008; M. Bakić-Hayden, *Reprodukcja orientalizma: primer bivše Jugoslavije*, „Filozofija i društvo” 1998, t. XIV, pp. 101–118.

⁵ I. Sawicka, J. Sujecka, *Wprowadzenie do bałkanologii. Etnosy – Języki – Areeły – Konceptualizacje*, Warszawa 2015, pp. 10–11.

aration gradually transformed into religious syncretism, resulting chiefly from many years of coexistence of Turks and Bulgarians in the same spaces.⁶

The change of power also brought a visual modification of Bulgarian space, which was at the time a Slavo-Byzantine amalgam. Virtually every dimension of urban areas was transformed—fortifications, defensive infrastructure, tsars' palaces and boyars' residences were demolished. Places of worship were also erased from the landscape—many monasteries and churches were burnt, while some of the latter were transformed into mosques, belfries standing out from the city panorama replaced with slender minarets. As a result of these actions, new elements were inscribed into the landscapes of Bulgarian cities, including objects providing for the needs of the Muslim population. Therefore drinking water fountains (*чешми*), clock towers and multifunctional T-shaped buildings appeared, constituting Muslim culture complexes, along with other public facilities, such as religious education centers, public baths or soup kitchens for the poor and travelers (*imarets*).⁷

Just a quick overview of the above-mentioned examples shows a visible transformation of architectural silhouettes of Bulgarian cities. A lot of objects built in the 14th century and later are to this day present in many urban areas there.

Architecture as a way of space planning consists of numerous artifacts which, although not permanently inscribed into city landscape, often take root in it for a long time. When interpreting a city as a cultural institution composed, in the most basic view, of public and private spaces, one must take into account the elements that construct the ontology of each of the components. Moreover, this complex division is superimposed by issues of individual and collective reception of given spaces which is largely a result of mnemonic or associative processes.

The subject of this paper will be two examples of Ottoman sacred architecture, that is Dzhumaya Mosque in Plovdiv and the Tomb of Bali Efendi in Sofia. The core of the author of this text considerations is the social reception of these objects exposing an inseparable bond between memories and locations. The author interprets both cities as palimpsest spaces that are characterized, in addition to their complex structure, by a high degree of memorability.

⁶ Д. Трънкова, А. Георгиев, Х. Матанов, *Пътеводител за османска България*, София 2011, р. 12.

⁷ More information on city planning and architecture of the cities conquered by the Ottoman Empire provided, among others, by Grigor Boykov. See: Г. Бойков, „Османизацията“ на Пловдив (Филибе) през XV в. – население, градоустройство и архитектура, „Годишник на Регионален Исторически Музей – Пловдив“ 2012, pp. 39–67.

An attempt to define a concept such difficult to perceive as the Ottoman heritage must be approached with a number of simplifications. According to Maria Todorova “the danger [of these simplifications] lies not in over-emphasizing ‘the influence of the West’ and belittling the continuity and local institutions, but in an artificial separation of institutions and influences into «local» and ‘Ottoman.’”⁸ Peculiar religious syncretism, whose two variants are exposed by an analysis of the status of two post-Ottoman religious objects, confirms the argument that such divisions are groundless, particularly when one considers the play of meanings between dynamic spaces and heterogeneous communities that are a part of the Bulgarian society.

Spatialized Memories and *Modi Memorandi* of Identity

The aforementioned examples of the Ottoman architecture are still integral parts of Bulgarian cities, inherently grown into their structure. As such they are an important, though often an unnoticeable component of urban space. At the same time, they are not neutral semantically, but they generate certain meanings. The meaning of these objects comes from their functional purpose—they are important places of worship from the point of view of Muslim minorities inhabiting Bulgaria, many of them are also officially categorized as parts of Bulgarian cultural heritage. Dzhumaya Mosque is one of the oldest and largest Muslim sacred buildings in the Balkans and the most important place of worship in the Plovdiv Province. On the other hand, the Tomb of Bali Efendi, situated in the periphery and unremarkable in appearance, is neither a tourist attraction nor a destination of pilgrimages. Over time, the worship of the Tomb of Bali Efendi started to fade. Svetlozar Kirilov, a Bulgarian sociologist and journalist concerned i.a. with the problems of integration of the Roma minority, described it even as “dying.”⁹ Sacred buildings erected in Bulgaria during the Ottoman rule are oftentimes so deeply rooted into the city structure, that they are automatically recognized as its fixed component. Their daily beholders grew accustomed to their presence. Renewed acknowledgment of this kind of objects is often linked to an earlier controversy (e.g. arisen from nationalist or discriminatory narratives) related not to the building itself, but to the meanings or memories it diffuses, because—in the words of Pierre Nora—memory is “susceptible to manipulation and appropriation, it can slumber and reawaken

⁸ М. Тодорова, *Османското наследство...*, op. cit.

⁹ С. Кирилов, *Бали Ефенди – един умиращ култ в полите на Витоша*, [online] <http://www.librev.com/prospects-bulgaria-publisher/2289-2014-01-21-10-39-06> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

every once in a while.”¹⁰ Deyan Sudjic notes that “architecture is about power and rulers build because rulers have always been building. [...] Architecture is, first of all, a means to tell about those who enabled its creation.”¹¹ Ottoman material heritage frequently induces negative emotions or associations to violent domination. It is after all visible evidence of Bulgaria’s former subjugation to the Ottoman Empire. Almost five hundred years of Turkish rule over these lands is still described as a time when Bulgaria was under the yoke¹² and provides a source for martyrological myths. The authors of the book *Пътеводител за османска България*, a guide to Ottoman architectural heritage, ironically state that “the Ottoman Empire is a populist’s favorite excuse to everything wrong in Bulgaria—from bad work ethics to ineffective bureaucracy, from lack of good roads to eating sunflower seeds.”¹³

Dimana Trankova, Antoni Georgiev and Hristo Matanov notice also that Turkish influences present in many aspects of contemporary Bulgarian culture are often marginalized, and the narrative regarding this historical period, propagated i.a. in student’s textbooks, literature and visual arts, oftentimes comes to a conclusion that “the 500 year Ottoman domination in Bulgaria is nothing more than a long streak of decapitation, impalement and rivers of blood.”¹⁴ Such a way of creating a story about a problematic and often traumatic stage of history (the authors of the mentioned work call this narrative practically propagandist) constitutes an expression of constructing a memory of this period. Aforementioned Pierre Nora described such a mechanism of thought as mediated memory, reformulated by history, “conscious and thought through, experienced as a duty, no longer spontaneous.”¹⁵ A visible heritage of a once officially dominant culture is therefore oftentimes interpreted in Bulgaria as a sign of post-dependence—a result of the intensifying process of domination of history over memory observed by Nora. With this in mind, many secular objects built during the Ottoman reign are defined by the category of

¹⁰ P. Nora, *Między pamięcią i historią: Les lieux de Mémoire*, tłum. P. Mościcki, „Tytuł roboczy: archiwum” 2009, nr 2, p. 5.

¹¹ D. Sudjic, *Kompleks gmachu. Architektura władzy*, tłum. A. Rasmus-Zgorzelska, Warszawa 2015, p. 14.

¹² This phrase is a reference to Ivan Vazov’s novel *Under the Yoke (Под узомо)*, published in 1894, which tells a story of preparations for the anti-Ottoman uprising which took place in April of 1876. See: I. Wazow, *Pod jarzmem*, tłum. Z. Wolnik-Czajkowska, Warszawa 1974.

¹³ Д. Трънкова, А. Георгиев, Х. Матанов, op. cit., p. 12. Eating sunflower seeds is often viewed as a harmful habit. Doing so during a conversation used to be regarded as bad manners by Muslims.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 9.

¹⁵ P. Nora, op. cit., p. 7.

Bulgarian renaissance architecture.¹⁶ Architecture, being an art of shaping and modeling space, has a relatively wide range of iconic power, because it permanently changes not only the visual form of certain areas, but also their symbolic overtone, so, as Sudjic notes, “it has the power to insert the world into a frame.”¹⁷

The objects discussed in this paper are a materialization of memory which is inseparable from social perception. As Jan Assmann notes, “memory needs places and is a subject to spatialization.”¹⁸ During the analysis of the problematic status of the objects the author of this text discusses, the category of memory figures defined by the German researcher of memorizing mechanisms comes in useful. According to this concept memory is embedded in the concrete, not in the abstract, and “ideas need to acquire a material symbol to become an object of memory.”¹⁹ Memory in this sense has a time and space frame and is shaped by things or architecture, because “a tendency to localization is typical to all kinds of communities. Every group that aspires to consolidate as such, tries to create and secure places that would serve as [...] symbols of identity and an attachment point for memory.”²⁰ This issue was similarly phrased by aforementioned Pierre Nora, who stated (stressing out even more strongly the inseparable connection between tangible things or objects and evasive and abstract memory) that “modern memory is primarily archival memory. It is entirely based on the materiality of traces, the directness of data, the visibility of the image.”²¹ Therefore the concept of sites of memory in the broadest sense refers to all kinds of its visual representations, including architecture.²² While

¹⁶ An example of this is a Facebook fanpage *Architecture of Renaissance Plovdiv* which posts archival pictures of buildings from the time and historical curiosities about them. The authors also take up the issue of preservation of the city’s architectural heritage. In January 2019 the fanpage had 1617 followers.

¹⁷ D. Sudjic, op. cit., p. 276.

¹⁸ J. Assmann, *Kultura pamięci*, [in:] *Pamięć zbiorowa i kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka*, red. M. Saryusz-Wolska, Kraków 2009, p. 70.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 69.

²⁰ Ibidem, p. 70.

²¹ P. Nora, op. cit., p. 7

²² The issue of sites of memory is so intensively explored that today we can speak of this term’s “international career,” in the words of Andrzej Szpociński. See: A. Szpociński, *Miejsca pamięci (Lieux de Mémoire)*, „Teksty Drugie” 2008, nr 4, p. 11. Andrzej Szpociński was the first who introduced this term in Polish humanities. See: idem, *Kanon historyczny*, „Studia Socjologiczne” 1983, nr 4 (91), pp. 129–146. In Poland, they used it, interpreting and reconfiguring Norra’s original approach, e.g. Roma Sendyka, Jolanta Sujecka, Marcin Kula and Marian Golka. See: R. Sendyka, *Miejsca, które straszą (afekty i nie-miejsca pamięci)*, „Teksty Drugie” 2014, nr 1, pp. 84–102; J. Sujecka, *Балкански места на паметта. Терминът Македония и об-*

considering ontological statuses of the sacred edifices built during the Ottoman reign, not only in Bulgaria but in the whole Balkan Peninsula, special emphasis should be placed on the significance associated with these spaces, as well as on the issue of consolidating the group around the values communicated by these places. They are strongly entangled in the past through the memory passed on by them. This issue is further complicated by the fact that many communities inhabiting contemporary Bulgaria see the discussed locations as areas where the social interests of the representatives of each group are concentrated. This requires to take into consideration the issue of collective memory as well. Its nature is reconstructive, so it stores only what the society is able to recreate from its past. The ideas coming from it have to take a form which is possible to memorize, therefore visual, materialized representations of abstract values play an important role in this process—values such as national martyrdom or the myth of “the Turkish yoke.” The visual culture created by given communities can, therefore, connote certain emotions and diffuse meanings in the same measure as a written or oral tradition.

The analysis of the individuals’ and communities’ microenvironment is in a way forced by the culture of memory since it’s related to searching for an answer to the question about elements which mandatorily deserve memory. It is also one of the constitutional factors of every social community’s identity.²³ The entanglement of architecture in the issues of identity makes the way the society perceives it significantly more complex. According to Sudjic “we know how to classify buildings by the shape of their windows or the decorative detail of their capitals. We see buildings as a result of access to certain materials or skills. We lose confidence when we start to consider a wider, political meaning of buildings—why, and not how, they exist.”²⁴ In a semiological approach, represented e.g. by Umberto Eco, the network of meanings diffused by matter is complex. The Italian philosopher and medievalist noticed that architectural objects may denote their own functions and connote ideology associated with them. With these observations in mind we can assume (although considering the variable social reception of both discussed objects, it is just one of a few possible interpretations) that the sacred buildings mentioned in this paper denote a religious, or in a wider sense, ritual function, and connote experiencing the past, specifically the time of the Ottoman rule and various meanings

разът на Никола Вапцаров в българския и македонския времепространствен континуум, “Литературна мисъл” 2005, бр. 2, pp. 138–154; M. Kula, *Nośniki pamięci historycznej*, Warszawa 2002; M. Golka, *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Warszawa 2009.

²³ J. Assmann, op. cit., p. 60.

²⁴ D. Sudjic, op. cit., p. 24.

related to this period. Each of the discussed locations refers to different values—in the case of Dzhumaya Mosque it can be the meanings associated with the memory of foreign domination, cultural subjugation, symbolic appropriation of public space by an intruder from another culture, while the Tomb of Bali Efendi may connote ideas referring to religious tolerance or coexistence and mutual diffusion of different religious universes. Eco argues that symbolical connotations are no less important to a community than their functional denotations. This statement emphasizes the importance of architecture in the process of shaping a space's atmosphere in the understanding of Gernot Böhme—as all-encompassing emotional forces appropriate to the environment, spread by people, things or objects.²⁵

Dzhumaya Mosque and the Tomb of Bali Efendi. Cultural Stratification of Ottoman Edifices of Worship

The Ottoman Empire in the occupied territories pursued a policy of domination of the invader's culture over the one created and propagated by the conquered people. One of the pillars upon which identity of individuals and communities is founded is religion and the ceremonial related to it, and hence—architecture. The attempts at reinforcing Islamic traditions cultivated by the Ottoman Turks in Bulgaria were visually commemorated in urban spaces and inscribed into cities' images, transforming them forever. The increase of Muslim population exacted providing the cities with new places of worship, especially mosques. During the Ottoman rule in Bulgaria, there was a frequent practice to transform existing churches into mosques, which implied the destruction of Bulgarian sacred art, such as mosaics, frescos and icons, due to the Islamic resistance to figure representation of saints.²⁶ After Bulgaria regained independence, intensive works on undoing the effects of these actions have begun. The restoration of their original function to churches transformed into mosques constitutes a visual exclamation of installing a new order, in this case—the regaining of independence and cultural autonomy and moreover, as Maria Todorova also stresses, in the context of fight for liberation it is not only an act of breaking with the past but one of denying it as well.²⁷ Many Muslim sacred objects were erased from city landscapes through demolition, desertion and abandonment

²⁵ G. Böhme, *Filozofia i estetyka przyrody w dobie kryzysu środowiska naturalnego*, tłum. J. Merecki, Warszawa 2002, p. 7.

²⁶ Orthodox churches were converted into mosques, destroyed or left to decay. See: И. Страхилев, С. Каракушева, op. cit.; П. Петров, *Пет века под ятагана и Корана (1396–1878)*, [online] <http://koreanstudies.bg/node/110> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

²⁷ М. Тодорова, *Османското наследство...*, op. cit.

to the forces of nature or transformation into public facilities. Such actions aimed at restoration of the former spatial order evidence that religion plays a role of a medium of social memory, though the mnemonic elements inscribed into it are harder to perceive than those that mark objects or pictures located in the urban area.

In Plovdiv, Bulgarian city second to Sofia in terms of population, the change in dominant ideology was visualized in the organization of the urban space, which is confirmed for example by the division of the city into quarters based on the religion of their residents—Christians occupied the fortified part of the city situated upon three hills, while Muslims lived North-West from them. Plovdiv's Dzhumaya Mosque (also known as Muradie) is one of the oldest and biggest examples of Ottoman sacred architecture in the Balkans. Historians still argue about the exact date it was built. According to one theory the mosque, funded by sultan Murad I, was built shortly after the Ottoman army captured Plovdiv around 1364 and the Slavic name of the city was changed to Turkish Filibe.²⁸ According to many sources, the building was erected in a place formerly occupied by the main city church—the Church of Saint Petka, it is, therefore, an example of overwriting multicultural architectural orders within one space. The practice of transforming churches into mosques frequently had a sense-making overtone, as—in addition to its purely functional aspects—it served the legitimization of new rule and it propagated the new culture (including religion and social worldview) as the dominant ideology.

During the reign of Sultan Murad II the building is said to be demolished and a new object of the same function was founded in its place and it stands in Plovdiv to this day. Grigor Boykov notices, however, that during the works on reinforcing the edifice's foundation conducted from 2006 to 2008, no older architectural layers were uncovered, which allows us to rule out theories about an older church or mosque existing in this place.²⁹ The researcher, quoting sources such as travel diaries, architectural solutions used during the construction of the building and tax registers (specifically records regarding *waqf*—an estate or chattel which according to the Islamic law was given for religious purposes or charity), concludes that the mosque could not have been built earlier than in 1433. The monumental object was erected in the main part of the city, an important fragment of Plovdiv's public space, and it set a new zone in the city—a center of commerce to be used primarily by the Muslim population. Boykov notes that “the founding of Muradie Mosque in Plovdiv marked the core of a Muslim city, where all the economic activity and the social life of

²⁸ Г. Бойков, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 48.

the city was focused.”³⁰ As a result of these actions, Christian settlements were pushed to the periphery, which drastically changed the balance of social powers functioning in Plovdiv’s space.

Dzhumaya Mosque is eclectic in its nature not only because of the meanings attributed to the part of the city it occupies. The outer walls were constructed with a particular building technique called *kletachen gradezh* (клетъчен градеж), where a hewn block of stone is enclosed in a rectangular brick frame. This sort of façade decoration is typical for buildings constructed in the Balkans before the Ottoman invasion and said to originate from Byzantium. This technique had been used before while building i.a. churches, so the builders of the mosque could have been local Christians. Therefore while creating a symbol of foreign cultural domination, familiar aesthetics were used, which in addition to the urban legend claiming that a church existed in this place before, reinforces the overtone of the discussed space as a system of intersecting vectors marking different cultural orientations.³¹ Spreading of this rumor bears signs of pejoration of the symbolic overtone of Dzhumaya Mosque which is attributed with a function of a foreign aggressor, a monumental reminder of the dark ages of Bulgarian culture which the period of the Ottoman rule is considered to be. This kind of narrative is based on a catastrophic view of this period.

The fact that the very nature of Plovdiv’s mosque is polarizing the social moods is evidenced by the protests whose contestational energy focuses around its shell and the space it occupies. On May 2, 2019, around one hundred residents of Plovdiv protested against so-called “gypsyfication” of the country. Among romaphobic demands of the protesters were, for example, ensuring police protection for residents of rural areas who are harassed by the Roma and a ban for the unemployed members of this minority on having more than one child. The protest was of nationwide nature, the participants gathered outside city halls. What is interesting in terms of these considerations is the fact that as information portal trafficnews.bg informs, “police and gendarmerie presence increased in the area of Dzhumaya Mosque as the authorities are concerned that the tension may escalate when the protesters pass the mosque.”³² One year before, another notorious protest took place that

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 52.

³¹ According to Bulgarian media, this interpretation was spread by a 19th century writer, Luben Karavelov. See: Д. Лещева, *Какво остана в Пловдив от Османската епоха?*, [online] <https://trafficnews.bg/istoriya/kakvo-ostana-plovdiv-osmanskata-epoha-112365/> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

³² П. Иванова, *Протест срещу циганизацията на площада, жандармерия пред Джумая джамия*, [online] <https://trafficnews.bg/plovdiv/protest-sreshtu-tsiganzatsiata-plosh-tada-zhandarmeriia-17969/> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

had such a direct connection to this problematic space that it caused a physical interference into the shell of the building. Over five thousand protesters, including residents of Plovdiv, Stara Zagora and Karlovo, as well as football fans, gathered outside the courthouse in Plovdiv after the verdict that gave the institution officially representing Muslims in Bulgaria (Главното мюфтийство на мюсюлманското изповедание в Република България) the right to Kurshum Djamia Mosque in Karlovo as a *waqf* estate. The protesters, holding banners with nationalistic slogans and icons, demanded that the Muslim minority give up all claims to spaces of this kind. The radicalization of moods resulted in them attacking Dzhumaya Mosque with stones, cobbles, bottles and fire-crackers. Both situations show radical reactions to the object's material presence in Plovdiv's public space and its problematic social reception. During the mentioned protests the mosque became a materialization of the Other, alien and harmful to the indigenous culture. Therefore it was treated as a lens converging negative values associated by the nationalistic discourse with minorities inhabiting Bulgaria. This course of action exposes a mechanism of interpreting the urban space in the categories of possession and acquisition, it downright becomes an area of manifestation of symbolic power—the protesting residents of Plovdiv usurped the right to the *waqf* estates as their own, Bulgarian and belonging to the Bulgarians. At the same time, they interpreted the transfer of the locations in question to the institutions uniting Bulgarian Muslims, as a physical and symbolic appropriation of urban areas.

It is worth mentioning, however, that Dzhumaya Mosque, as well as the terrain around it, was used as a space of events which were a part of Plovdiv's Cultural Calendar. In 2019 the city acts as the European Capital of Culture and some of the events planned for this occasion directly involved the discussed object. For example, on May 17–19th, 2019, the area near Dzhumaya Mosque hosted the third edition of the fair “Ethno Kitchen on Wheels” (*Етно кухня на колела*) organized by the foundation “Together” (“Заедно”). The main theme of the event, which included workshops and tasting, was various culinary traditions (not only Turkish but also Russian, Jewish, Armenian and Italian). Representatives of various religions from all the minorities inhabiting the city and its surroundings were invited. The location was not chosen randomly—the organizers stated: “this year, when Plovdiv is the European Capital of Culture, everyone has a common message of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and tolerance between all religions and nations.”³³ The mentioned event is an ex-

³³ *Различни етноси от Пловдив откриват заедно на Джумаята. „Етно кухня на колела“*, [online] <http://www.visitplovdiv.com/bg/eventsplovdiv/6621> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

ample of a different interpretation of Plovdiv's mosque overtone, namely its recognition as a symbol of interculturality and a visible testimony to many years of coexistence of various religions, which corresponds with Plovdiv's watchword as the European Capital of Culture, which is "Together" ("Заедно").

Another post-Ottoman object closely related to religious worship and example of a palimpsest space is the tomb³⁴ where Bali Efendi lies. He was a 16th-century Muslim thinker and teacher, a follower of Sufism, author of religious treatises and a prominent figure of Sofia's religious life at the time. According to numerous legends, he was a philanthropist and a tolerant person respecting both Muslims and then discriminated Christians. After his death a religious complex was built in a place which is today Sofia's Kniazhevo Quarter at the foot of Vitosha, comprising a mosque, baths and the tomb where Bali Efendi was buried. At the time of Bulgarian national revival, the mosque was demolished and upon its ruins, the Church of Saint Elias was founded, the construction of which started in 1888. The tomb was destroyed too. It is worth mentioning that this object (as well as the votive stone with a carved cross, almost illegible today, dedicated to Saint George) was built on *waqf* land. The act of constructing an Orthodox church on land reserved for Muslim sacred edifices adds to the ambiguity of this space and the impression of its entanglement into various, often disputable, as the afore-mentioned protests in Plovdiv prove, cultural universes.

The tomb, which has been reconstructed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, is a small rectangular building comprising the sarcophagus of the saint. For centuries this tomb has been the destination of Turkish, Bulgarian and Romani pilgrims. The latter has preserved the saint's cult in their traditions to the greatest extent and they know him by the name of Ali Baba. Svetlozar Kirilov describes specific rituals related to this cult, conducted by the members of Sofia's Roma minority: "first they passed through the church, they took candles, some of them even bowed before the icons, and then they lit the candles in the tomb."³⁵ This practice implies a peculiar religious syncretism which clearly shows in mixing of religious orders and rituals or artifacts related to them. It is noteworthy that the largest number of religious followers had been coming to the thinker's tomb on Saint Elias' Day which is celebrated in Bulgaria on July 20th. Therefore traditionally this day had been dedicated to the patron saint of the church located in the discussed space. And so, *Ilinden*, as this holiday is called in the Bulgarian Orthodox tradition, is an Orthodox, not a Muslim holiday.

³⁴ In Bulgarian this type of object is referred to with a Turkish loanword *турбе*.

³⁵ С. Кирилов, *op. cit.*

The considerations of this object are complemented by the fact that another such object is located in the archaeological reserve of Sbornyanovo near the town of Ispereh in North-Eastern Bulgaria—the Tomb of Demir Baba, the main saint in the tradition of the Alians, a Muslim minority inhabiting, among others, villages in the Rhodopes and Dobruja. They follow a relatively liberal branch of Shi'a Islam, moreover the Alians advocate for the equality of all religions. As such, they are willing to include various external elements into their beliefs, so their religious traditions can be characterized as syncretic. The authors of the afore-mentioned work *Пътеводител за османска България* point out, as they describe in short the Alian rituals, that many of them oppose the official Islamic doctrine, which prohibits, for example, the cult of tombs. As evidence that many of the Alian religious traditions are borrowed from other religions, the authors cite i.a. the practice of lighting candles on graves.³⁶ This reference confirms the cultural entanglement of locations such as the Tomb of Bali Efendi, the ambiguity of their overtone and the complexity of meanings they connote.

Currently, the cult of the Tomb of Bali Efendi considerably decreased in popularity and it is visited by less and less followers for religious purposes. Some of the tomb's furnishings also evidence the heterogeneity of the rites related to it. Kirilov, for example, mentions a piece of cloth laid on a coffin, a kind of small kilim, with an embroidered representation of Saint Nicholas pictured as more commercialized Santa Claus associated with Christmas advertisements.³⁷ All of the above-mentioned elements form an eclectic overtone of this space in Sofia, which becomes a palimpsest not only through the overwriting of architectural layers, such as building a church in place of a mosque but also through adding to it meanings from various religious and cultural universes. The coexistence of an Orthodox church and a Muslim mosque in one relatively small part of the city makes this location ambiguous, its social reception, however, exemplifies a quite different interpretation of power over space than the afore-mentioned example of Dzhumaya Mosque.³⁸

To complement the considerations above one should mention a special kind of reception of post-Ottoman buildings, specifically those that are currently utilized in a way unrelated to Muslim culture in the narrow sense. An example

³⁶ Д. Трънкова, А. Георгиев, Х. Матанов, op. cit., pp. 33–35.

³⁷ С. Кирилов, op. cit.

³⁸ For more information about the cultural phenomenon of good Muslim and Christian neighborliness (which was the source i.a. of some elements of religious syncretism) see Magdalena Lubańska's article: M. Lubańska, *Pogranicze jako przestrzeń strategicznej koegzystencji grup mieszanych religijnie. O a(nta)gonistycznej tolerancji komşuluku w muzutańsko-chrześcijańskich społecznościach bałkańskich*, „Etnografia Polska” 2017, nr 1–2 (LXI), pp. 21–41.

of this type of object is the Chifte Hamam baths in Plovdiv, constructed in the 16th century and officially referred to as “Starinna,” which can be translated as old/antique/ancient, that has served as the seat of the Center for Contemporary Art since 1922. The authors of the album *Пътеводител за османска България* point out that the object’s name has been changed as to obscure direct associations with the Ottoman heritage. The adjective *старинна* suggests antiquity of the object while its transformation into the seat of a Bulgarian cultural institution is an act of giving it a new function, unrelated to its original purpose. This exposes the problematic overtone of this space which municipal institutions try to neutralize by eliminating its connections to a foreign culture, what is a de facto indication of bulgarianization of the building. It is also manipulation in the memory concentrated around this fragment of the city landscape.

Ending

Marian Golka dedicates a chapter of his book “Social memory and its implants” (“Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty”) to media of memory. The author assumes, like Andrzej Szpociński, that almost any work of culture can act as such, though “a medium becomes active when people notice and use it.”³⁹ Moreover, he points out certain paradox considering memory-inscribed artifacts: “the memory of the past resides [...] in surviving works of culture as if in spite of their obvious fate—despite the fact that they are doomed to physical annihilation. The memory depends on the outcome of the fight between annihilation and salvation.”⁴⁰ Therefore it is justified to interpret the objects related to religious worship discussed in this article as transmitters of narratives about the past, even though they often do not have a sanctioned (for example by a memorial plaque) commemorative function. Such an understanding of memory carried by objects is also a view which puts in the center of attention specific individuals and communities equipped with an active power to create their own mnemonic techniques and form narratives about history inscribed into urban space of everyday use. In this sense, the memory may be placed in architecture and built with the use of architectural instruments.

Such an understanding entitles us to interpret cities as multidimensional spaces that individuals shape perceptually according to their subjective liking and personal conditionalities. The palimpsesticity of the discussed locations and the ambiguity of social reactions to them is largely a result of the variety of ways of remembering the meanings generated by both objects. After the Con-

³⁹ M. Golka, op. cit., p. 68.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 69.

gress of Berlin, which officially ended the Turkish reign in the Balkans in 1887, the mainstream narrative about the historical Ottoman heritage in Bulgaria was directed against the Turks and underwent periodic radicalization. One of the most blatant examples of discrimination against the Turkish minority in Bulgaria was slogans proclaimed by Todor Zhivkov, who in 1971 became the Chairman of the State Council. One of the opinions propagated by him was the belief about particular backwardness of Muslim population due to conservative Islam they followed. It was widely preached that Turks never lived in Bulgaria, therefore local Muslims are in fact Bulgarians who gave in to the process of Islamization. In order to assimilate them to the rest of the society, an action was conducted, incidentally officially named “The Process of Rebirth,” which presented Muslims with an opportunity to choose a new, Slavic name and surname. If they refused, the names were assigned from the top down. The process of compulsory change started in the second half of 1984. The number of Muslims who left Bulgaria after the boarder with Turkey had been reopened, given by Tadeusz Czekalski, uncovers the immensity of repression—370 thousand people of Turkish descent fled over the course of three months.⁴¹ The issue of the Ottoman reign today still polarizes social moods and provides a source for numerous political scandals and vehement discussions.⁴² On the other hand, the memory of the myth about Bali Efendi’s tolerance and good neighborliness of Muslims and Christians influenced the social reception of the space where the tomb of the Muslim cleric is located—during the evaluation of the place devoted to him, the traits which he represented (kindness, generosity, openness to others) proved more important than his origins and religion. The above considerations show that the Ottoman architectural heritage in the broad sense participates in the process of creating places which enable the coexistence of different cultural spheres, even though it often contributes to controversial spaces of clashing contentious memories. Symbolic meanings inscribed into areas of coexistence of all members of the Bulgarian society are reconfigured, but not erased, because the past determines the way of perceiving the present and the future, therefore “one should not contrast ‘the principle of memory’ with «the principle of hope.»”⁴³

Translation from Polish: Janusz Szablewski

⁴¹ T. Czekalski, *Bułgaria*, Warszawa 2010, p. 241.

⁴² Some of them are described by Mila Mineva, who also considers in her article the status of an emotionally charged phrase, commonly used in Bulgaria for the discussed historical period—Turkish Enslavement (*турско робство*). М. Минева, *Колко е важно да бъдеш поробен*, [online] <https://www.seminar-bg.eu/spisanie-seminar-bg/broy7-kiberfolk/item/349-kolko-e-vajno-da-badesh-poroben.html> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

⁴³ J. Assmann, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Assmann J., *Kultura pamięci*, [in:] *Pamięć zbiorowa i kulturowa. Współczesna perspektywa niemiecka*, red. M. Saryusz-Wolska, Kraków 2009.
2. Bakić-Hayden M., *Reprodukcija orijentalizma: primer bivše Jugoslavije*, „Filozofija i društvo” 1998, t. XIV.
3. Böhme G., *Filozofia i estetyka przyrody w dobie kryzysu środowiska naturalnego*, tłum. J. Merecki, Warszawa 2002.
4. Czekalski T., *Bułgaria*, Warszawa 2010.
5. Golka M., *Pamięć społeczna i jej implanty*, Warszawa 2009.
6. Jezernik B., *Dzika Europa. Bałkany w oczach zachodnich podróżników*, tłum. P. Oczko, Kraków 2013.
7. Kula M., *Nośniki pamięci historycznej*, Warszawa 2002.
8. Lubańska M., *Pogranicze jako przestrzeń strategicznej koegzystencji grup mieszanych religijnie. O a(nta)gonistycznej tolerancji komśuluku w muzułańsko-chrześcijańskich społecznościach bałkańskich*, „Etnografia Polska” 2017, nr 1–2 (LXI).
9. Nora P., *Między pamięcią i historią: Les lieux de Mémoire*, tłum. P. Mościcki, „Tytuł roboczy: archiwum” 2009, nr 2.
10. Sawicka I., Sujęcka J., *Wprowadzenie do bałkanologii. Etnosy – Języki – Areaty – Konceptualizacje*, Warszawa 2015.
11. Sendyka R., *Miejsca, które straszą (afekty i nie-miejsca pamięci)*, „Teksty Drugie” 2014, nr 1.
12. Sudjic D., *Kompleks gmachu. Architektura władzy*, tłum. A. Rasmus-Zgorzelska, Warszawa 2015.
13. Sujęcka J., *Балкански места на паметта. Терминът Македония и образът на Никола Вапцаров в българския и македонския времепространствен континуум*, „Литературна мисъл” 2005, бр. 2.
14. Szpociński A., *Kanon historyczny*, „Studia Socjologiczne” 1983, nr 4 (91).
15. Szpociński A., *Miejsca pamięci (Lieux de Mémoire)*, „Teksty Drugie” 2008, nr 4.
16. Todorova M., *Bałkany wyobrażone*, tłum. P. Szymor, M. Budzińska, Wołowiec 2008.
17. Wazow I., *Pod jarzmem*, tłum. Z. Wolnik-Czajkowska, Warszawa 1974.
18. Wolff L., *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment*, Stanford 1994.
19. Аретов Н., *Балканските народи и Османската империя: Едно отхвърлено наследство*, „Литературна мисъл” 2008, бр. 1.
20. Бойков Г., *„Османизацията“ на Пловдив (Филибе) през XV в. – население, градоустройство и архитектура*, „Годишник на Регионален Исторически Музей – Пловдив” 2012.
21. Иванова П., *Протест срещу циганизацията на площада, жандармерия пред Джумая джамия*, [online] <https://trafficnews.bg/plovdiv/protest-sreshtu-tsiganiza-tsiata-ploshtada-zhandarmeriia-17969/> [accessed: 13.08.2019].
22. Кирилов С., *Бали Ефенди – един умиращ култ в полте на Витоша*, [online] <http://www.librev.com/prospects-bulgaria-publisher/2289-2014-01-21-10-39-06> [accessed: 13.08.2019].
23. Лещева Д., *Какво остана в Пловдив от Османската епоха?*, [online] <https://trafficnews.bg/istoriya/kakvo-ostana-plovdiv-osmanskata-epoha-112365/> [accessed: 13.08.2019].
24. Минева М., *Колко е важно да бъдеш поробен*, [online] <https://www.seminar-bg.eu/spisanie-seminar-bg/broy7-kiberfolk/item/349-kolko-e-vajno-da-badesh-poroben.html> [accessed: 13.08.2019].

25. Петров П., *Пет века под ятагана и Корана (1396–1878)*, [online] <http://koreanstudies.bg/node/110> [accessed: 13.08.2019].
26. *Различни етноси от Пловдив откриват заедно на Джумаята. „Етно кухня на колела“*, [online] <http://www.visitplovdiv.com/bg/eventsplovdiv/6621> [accessed: 13.08.2019].
27. Страхилев И., Каракушева С., *Османското минало – между наследеното и наследството*, [online] https://www.seminar-bg.eu/spisanie-seminar-bg/broy12/item/444-osmanskoto_minalo.html [accessed: 13.08.2019].
28. Тодорова М., *Османското наследство на Балканите*, [online] <http://www.librev.com/index.php/discussion-bulgaria-publisher/2027-2013-04-19-10-36-54> [accessed: 13.08.2019].
29. Трънкова Д., Георгиев А., Матанов Х., *Пътеводител за османска България*, София 2011.

About the Contributors

Krzysztof Dobosz—Ph.D. candidate in the Faculty of History of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. His research interests focus on the Early Ottoman Empire.

Angelika Kosieradzka—Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Western and Southern Slavic Studies, University of Warsaw. In 2016 she received an MA degree from the Faculty of Polish Studies at the University of Warsaw. The subject of her thesis was *Obrazy społeczeństw bałkańskich w „Roztrwonionym darze Boga” Jana Herolda, „Bałkańskich upiorach” Roberta Kaplana oraz „Bukareszcie” Małgorzaty Rejmer* (*Images of Balkan societies in „Roztrwoniony dar Boga” by Jan Herold, „Bałkańskie upiory” by Robert Kaplan and „Bukareszt” by Małgorzata Rejmer*). She is a „Zwiększenie mobilności doktorantów UW” program scholarship holder. The program is financed from the European Social Fund in the frames of the Operational Program Knowledge Education Development, 3.5. In her Ph.D. project, she is analyzing artistic practices which are related to post-communist architectural elements in contemporary Bulgarian city spaces.

Paweł Michalak Ph.D.—graduate of the Faculty of History of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, in 2017 he defended his doctoral dissertation entitled: *The ideology of the monarchy of the Aleksandar Karađorđević King of Yugoslavia, in the newspaper “Politika” during the period 1921–1934*. Member of the Commission of the Balkan Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences and The Polish Commission of Balkan Culture and History. Author’s area of interest focuses primarily on the history of the Balkan nations from the mid-nineteenth century until the outbreak of World War II, with particular emphasis on the history of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, and the activities of the so-called Polish Great Emigration in the Balkan region.

Piotr Mirocha—Ph.D. candidate in the Institute of Slavonic Studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Among his academic interests is an analysis of political discourses in the Western Balkan countries (including the use of quantitative and corpus-driven approaches), as well as different aspects of spatial semiotics of Southeastern Europe. He is an author of several articles, i.a. *Dwa modele titoizmu* (2017, „Socjolingwistyka” 31) and *Terytorium symboliczne w «Načertaniju» Ilii Garašanina* (2015, „Socjolingwistyka” 29).

Nevyan Mitev—Ph.D. candidate in the University of Veliko Tarnovo, Bulgaria, which is preparing the thesis *The Crusades of Vladislav Varnenchik 1443–1444 (according to written and archaeological data)*. His research interests focus on Medieval history, archaeology, numismatics and Early Ottoman period.

Agata Pawlina—in 2014 she graduated *cum laude* from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków, in the field of Oriental Studies—Turkish Studies, with the master thesis entitled *Musial Terminology in Modern Turkish Classical Music*. In 2015 she graduated from the Karol Lipiński Academy of Music in Wrocław, in the field of Vocal Studies. Currently, she is a Ph.D. Candidate in the field of Linguistics at the Faculty of Philology of the Jagiellonian University. Her research interests lie in the area of Ottoman-Turkish and Modern Turkish musical terminology, the musical culture of the Ottoman Empire, westernization process of Turkish music in the 19th and 20th century and life and works of Wojciech Bobowski (vel Ali Ufkî).

Krzysztof Popek—graduated in history and Slavic studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków (Poland), currently a Ph.D. candidate at the Faculty of History of the Jagiellonian University. Author of the monograph *„Turecka opończa, belgijska peleryna”. Obraz państwa bułgarskiego w twórczości satyrycznej przełomu XIX i XX wieku* (Kraków 2016) [“Turkish Cloak, Belgian Mantle.” Image of Bulgarian State in Satires of the turn of 19th and 20th Century]. Laureate of the grants Preludium 13, POWER 3.1, Scholarship of the Lanckoroński Foundation, and Scholarship of the Polish Minister of Higher Education. He specializes in the political and social history of the Balkan Peninsula in the 19th century.

Mateusz Seroka, Ph.D. —graduate of the MA studies at the Faculty of Historical and Social Sciences of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in the field of political science, speciality International Relations and Geopolitics (2006) and MA studies at the Institute of Western and Southern Slavic Studies at the Faculty of Polish Studies at the University of Warsaw, specialty in Croatian (2008). In 2017, he defended, at the Faculty of Polish Studies of the University of Warsaw, his doctoral dissertation on the subject of Croatian relations from travels to Bosnia and Herzegovina in the 19th century, in the context of the Croatian national idea. Since 2016, he is an analyst at the Mark's Karp Center for Eastern Studies in the Central European Team, where he deals with the foreign and domestic policy of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bulgaria.

Monika Skrzyszewska—graduate of the MA studies at the Centre for East European Studies and the Institute of Western and Southern Slavic Studies at the University of Warsaw, a Ph.D. candidate at the Institute of Slavic Studies at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. In 2016, a participant in the grant titled “Community-Based Policing and Post-Conflict Police Reform” (the part concerning the Republic of Serbia) financed by the EU Research and Innovation program Horizon 2020. Since 2017, she is a co-worker of the Institute of Western and Southern Slavic Studies and a teacher of Serbian as a foreign language. Currently, her scientific interest concerns the ideology of “Serbian confessors of Islam” in Serbian political and journalistic discourse until the outbreaks of World War I.

Aleksandar Zlatanov—Ph.D. candidate in the Saint Kliment of Ohrid University in Sofia, Bulgaria. His research interests focus on the Bulgarian-Polish Contacts in the 19th century, especially the figure of Michał Czajkowski—Sadık Paşa.

