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DANGEROUS VOTE. DOUBLE-EDGED IMPLICATIONS
OF FERVENTLY PUSHING TOWARDS ELECTIONS
IN THE POST-REVOLUTION ARAB COUNTRIES

Among the many devices that modern democracies present their citizens with, voting seems to be one of the more weighty and, in a way, attractive. Without going too deeply into the theory of voting, I would like to focus on the idea that voting conveys. The term *elections* usually wants to imply *free elections*, meaning that any of those considered citizen can take part in the political process, even if it is only at a very basic level.

This is important especially since more and more countries embark on the road towards democratization and older democracies have already had the time to evolve. Since the enthusiastic praise of liberal democracy by Francis Fukuyama that heralded *the end of history* in 1989, when some thought that it could become the universal form of government, the number of democracies went up; but what also needed to increase was the awareness of democratic processes and their impact. This impact did not prove to be universal since it can bear different fruit depending on the ground it finds itself seeded in.

In the aftermath of the *Arab Spring* events we have seen so far, citizens from countries that have recently abolished dictatorship are now at the threshold of rearranging their political scene. What is stressed and demanded is democratization in its different aspects. Here, I wish to concentrate on democratic elections in the Arab countries that lately went through some revolutionary changes. I will relate to the works of political philosophers, press releases and other studies to talk about the advantages and downturns of calling on the voters to the polling stations in the immediate and short-term perspective after a drastic change in the political structure. The issues addressed encompass the institutional background, stability and general problems of voter irrationality

and misconceptions, as well as the idea that pushing for elections to occur as soon as possible may cause some serious negative consequences. All this may lead to further destabilization if conducted in the wrong moment and without proper preparation and understanding of the situation.

If the peacebuilding process is successfully conducted, the country may embark on the road towards developing its own type of a democratic system. However, there is also a chance for a slide back into another form of autocracy, especially in the countries that have had a historical inclination towards it.¹

SUSTAINING POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORDER

It is often the case that when a dictatorship is overthrown, institutions need to be reorganized and new standards of political conduct introduced. As a *protector* and *guardian* of a country no longer determines its politics, the responsibility must be somehow redistributed. This transition may occur in a number of ways and depends on many factors. If the conflict was decisively won by one particular faction, it should have enough potential for a fairly quick reestablishment of basic infrastructure and state agencies. What can greatly aid in the process is the absence or weakness of opposition.

One of the reasons that led the USSR to dissolve in the late 1980's was the loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens.² State institutions lost most of their power and influence. The system could not remain accepted nor revered, so eventually it collapsed. Former state agencies served the system and many citizens would not like them to be a part of the new political order. Such agencies do not make the citizens feel secure and willing to cooperate. What is needed in such situations is stabilization, if we do not wish for the return of transitional turbulences.

If we look for similarities in the Arab world today, Libya is in a quite fragile position. We can find people claiming that since Libya is "still in the hands of armed regional and tribal factions – each challenging the other's pretensions to political authority – it seems wishful to believe that the country will enjoy a smooth and quick transition to stable democracy."³ Fukuyama once stated

¹ M. Ercan Yilmaz, *Peacebuilding in Libya*, "International Journal on World Peace" 2012, No. 29.

² F. Fukuyama, *Budowanie państwa. Władza i ład międzynarodowy w XXI wieku*, trans. J. Serwański, Poznań 2005, p. 42.

³ D. Brancati, J. L. Snyder (2011). *The Libyan Rebels and Electoral Democracy*. "Foreign Affairs" 2011. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68241/dawn-brancati-and-jack-l-snyder/the-libyan-rebels-and-electoral-democracy> [2012, April 18].

(2005) that democracy is the only considerable source of legitimization for political systems. Within such political and social environment, democratic institutions should follow certain rules of transparency which can help them to appear credible to the citizens. As democratization progresses, people become less and less tolerant towards organizations that do not respect their rights and views, and eventually stop seeing them as working in their interest. If a country is set to undergo a turn towards democracy, it is solid and respected institutions that should form its backbone as their legitimacy is based on the law and people's choice. There were, however, some instances where it was not the democratic thinking that led to the emergence of such institutions: China, with its well-settled and well-established agencies, may serve as an example here. The Arab countries did not follow either of these routes and are in a position where institutions must prove themselves before receiving more trust from the post-dictatorial society. It is very likely that initially these institutions will still need police and military support; in other words – the means that have been forming the regional political scene for centuries.

We should keep in mind that Libya is just emerging from four decades of authoritarian rule during which there was little possibility for any development of civil society⁴. The former system was able to reach some visible results in case of economic growth and stabilization, which enabled it to be enumerated among the more developed countries in Africa. However, it also proved to be unsustainable, mostly because of the widespread poverty, even though prospects for change seemed extremely slim just a couple of years back. As it was already mentioned, what violent revolutions often have in common is forcing the reestablishment of the society in terms of most of its substructures, and in case of the political system in Libya, the newly established order is also facing a significant lack in electoral infrastructure, voter education and media professionalism.

PUBLIC DEMAND FOR INSTITUTIONS

In Libya, the NTC⁵ proposed to hold elections as soon as 2012, but there is no one prominent source of influence in Libya and the distribution of power is still in the state of flux. It may be hard for democracy to take hold in a country that

⁴ Oxford Analytica Ltd., *Civil Society Development is key to Libya transition*. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB175526> [2012, September 27].

⁵ NTC stands for National Transitional Council. It is a temporary parliament of Libya established by anti-Qaddafi forces. Its formation was announced in Benghazi on 27 February 2011.

is so deeply divided and lacking well-established political parties and civic organizations. It would be best if this framework was in place before people go to the polls. The problem with Libya is that the years of dictatorship prevented civil society from forming and it is impossible to create one right away.⁶

The citizens are not adequately prepared for political participation nor integrated within a solid institutional framework, which might also be the reason for their low demand for such institutions.⁷ Some UN documents describe a two-stage transition to democracy in Libya, stating that what needs to be established first is public security and people's trust towards it. The police must be considered just and impartial. This would help to settle the situation and minimize the possibility of a relapse into civil war. Secondly, what needs to be established is a new and valid electoral machinery. This stage should also be prepared with great care if the citizens are to accept the outcome of its work during elections.

Let us not forget that it was not any strong urge for democracy that sparked and fueled the revolution, but longing for better economic life on one hand, and an open socioeconomic system on the other. Democracy is only a means to an end here. The economic discourse is, however, very limited and gives way to the language of freedom and neo-democracy, which can suggest that the driving force of reforms may have an external element that did not originate within any of the local parties.⁸

Mobilizing a new electorate is also a challenge for Libya. Such concepts like elections, political parties and voting to elect leaders are new for the citizens there and they do not even have a good sense of the role and responsibilities of political parties.⁹ In turn, those parties are having a hard time getting through to people for lack of means and media support. This situation also discourages young people from participating in the process and is responsible for their minimal representation in government bodies. Despite such complications, 80% of eligible voters have registered¹⁰ to choose between 4000 independent and party candidates as well as 370 registered factions.

According to research conducted on the outcome of elections that immediately followed civil wars, the quicker the voting, the greater the danger of

⁶ D. Brancati, J. L. Snyder, op. cit.

⁷ F. Fukuyama, *Budowanie państwa*, op. cit., s. 48.

⁸ O. Groupson-Paul, *Oil Politics and War in Libya: Arming of Rebels and the New Phase of Neo-Democracy Evaluated*, "Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences" 2012, Vol. 3, No. 4.

⁹ Oxford Analytica Ltd., *Civil Society Development is key to Libya*, op. cit.

¹⁰ Oxford Analytica Ltd., *New Libyan Congress cannot match high expectations*. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.oxan.com/display.aspx?ItemID=DB176742> [2012, September 27].

a renewed armed conflict. "On average, waiting five years before holding the first election reduced the chance of war by one-third."¹¹ Even in case of Libya, which has the support of international community, encouraging the creation of stable institutions is not an easy thing to do. There are numerous problems connected with creating such institutional framework even with the help of other, more democratically experienced countries. Their actions may, and often do, have the opposite effect of further destabilizing the already frail position a country may be in.¹²

Although the elections went on relatively well, the situation is not stable and even now we can observe fighting (e.g. Beni Walid) and protests still going on in Libya. This further undermines the position of the new Prime Minister, Ali Zidan, that is trying to form a cabinet and convince the international community, as well as his own citizens, that he can provide security and stabilize the country.¹³

Another problem would be that those reaching for power are often yesterday's fighters. They look for support in certain groups and factions, and since institutions and law are of little importance, demagoguery prevails. If elections are held in a country divided among such groups trying to amass power and not having much esteem for the law, factions may go to war once more over the unfavorable election's outcome. In Libya, where disarmament has not yet been conducted, such shift may result in deadly violence. Fortunately, we do not observe any grave relapse in Libya, but the process of peacebuilding in this country will still need time. If a good strategy is implemented, a successful democratic transformation is possible.¹⁴ Such "good strategy" should involve transitional justice, forming a representative government (which is currently being established), strengthening security, producing a constitution, revitalizing the economy and conducting national reconciliation – all conducted in that order.

It would be advisable to give the factions some time to settle down and encourage them to enter into a dialogue. If any agreements are made, the risk of turning back to violence can be significantly reduced. No such debate can presently be observed in Libya.

It all comes back to institutions – a weak state cannot back its resolutions. It is unable to formulate and execute policies both at the national and interna-

¹¹ D. Brancati, J. L. Snyder, op. cit.

¹² F. Fukuyama, *Budowanie państwa*, op. cit., s. 55.

¹³ C. Stephen, *Bani Walid protesters storm Libyan parliament grounds*. "The Guardian" 2012. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/oct/21/protesters-libya-parliament-bani-walid-conflict> [2012, October 21].

¹⁴ M. Ercan Yilmaz, op. cit.

tional level.¹⁵ Possibly one of the more peculiar and surprising events during the anti-Gaddafi war was the establishment of the new Central Bank of Libya by the rebel forces in the midst of the civil war (one would think that such actions usually come after the war is over). Whatever the actual reasons and background, if a country wants to reach stability, one of the most important issues would definitely be economic stability.

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCING

The parts of human life that play a role in the formation and sustaining of a stable democracy are economic growth and political development.¹⁶ The latter “involves changes in three types of institutions: the state itself, which concentrates and deploys power to enforce rules across a territory; the rule of law, which limits the governments’ ability to make arbitrary decisions; and mechanisms of democratic accountability, which ensure the governments reflect the will and interests of the people.”¹⁷

Economy and politics are interconnected. The rule of law is good for entrepreneurs who become more active and produce economic growth. The economic growth in turn can help to promote democracy. There is a strong correlation between a percapita income level and the stability of a democracy. Democracies also tend to develop notions that impede economic growth, such as populist redistribution theories or various forms of rent-seeking by interest groups.

In case of countries that struggle to form stable state agencies and facilitate economic growth, the weaker the institutions and the rule of law, the more difficult the task. Destabilization also works against the formation of civil society, as people have a hard time believing that their efforts may have any meaning at all.

The above remarks may be related to the situation in Libya and other Arab countries that recently underwent some revolutionary changes. Leaving the voters and their approach out for the time being – How can such newly formed states go on to become stable democracies? One idea would be that of Samuel Huntington, who proposed sequencing the development. In the 1960s, he came up with the idea of *authoritarian modernization*. The concept describes the role of establishing political order and stabilizing the economic situation. This process should come before democracy is introduced.¹⁸

¹⁵ F. Fukuyama, *Budowanie państwa*, op. cit., s. 113.

¹⁶ Idem, *Is There a Proper Sequence in Democratic Transitions?*, [in:] Taylor & Francis Inc., “Democracy and Security”, Vol. 8, Philadelphia 2012, s. 308.

¹⁷ Ibidem, s. 308–310.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

The approach gives the citizens a chance to learn about new possibilities of becoming politically and socially active, gives them time to learn about their economic opportunities, and helps individuals to find their place in the new reality. This enables the reestablishment of different social groups. An important aspect is that such sequencing creates the environment for middle class formation. If the future democratic governance is to be stable, it needs both the institutional support and a strong middle class. The connection between political development and economic growth is not easy to present in a short and straightforward way, but giving priority to economic development has proven effective in some cases, e.g. in South Korea and Taiwan. Those countries went through a phase of economic growth before their transition to democracy in the late 1980s.

The obvious problem with this idea would be that good dictators are hard to find and many countries did not have the luck to have benevolent and enlightened ones. Quite often it is the opposite. Another concern is connected with those placing more faith in the rule of law. Even if the ground for democracy is prepared by some decisions made by an authoritarian government, the rule of law may be essential in keeping the political elite in check. This particular sequence may be traced back in many European countries, like 18th century Prussia with its authoritarian *Rechtsstaat*, which was still governed by law. This system guaranteed some personal freedom. The facts are that Germany in the 19th century was undergoing industrialization at a remarkable pace.¹⁹

Whether any of these approaches (placing economic growth and/or rule of law before actual democratization) would be possible in case of Arab countries such as Libya or Egypt is not certain. The situation is not yet set to develop in any particular direction. Libya, as was previously stated, is still heavily divided on the inside and is yet to establish a dialogue among its different factions. In Egypt, for some time there was a shuffle of presidential candidates, as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, serving as the interim government, seemed to be getting used to the power and appeared unwilling to loosen its grip over things. It was rumored that the election might be postponed if the work on Egypt's new charter isn't finished in time,²⁰ as well as some other twists that constantly rocked the boat.²¹

From a practical point of view, it would be hard to expect that a nation, especially one that was under dictatorship for over 40 years, would understand

¹⁹ Ibidem.

²⁰ This information has later been called off.

²¹ J. Martini (2012). *Cairo's Candidate Shuffle*. "Foreign Affairs" 2012. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137513/jeff-martini/cairos-candidate-shuffle> [2012, April 27].

and agree to adopt a plan for steady, step-by-step plan for development. The goal of the fight was to win and relish in the new reality, so policymakers should think hard on implementing right reforms in a way that would also win public acceptance. We should also understand the background of the whole issue - the dynamics of the political situation in Libya are dominated by the interplay of religion, tribalism, and other ideologies. Moreover, the country lacks effective political authority and experience. Ideology, tribes and oil drilling are the primary factors that shaped both social relations and the political-economic dynamics in Libya and will most probably continue to do so. Religion is the central part of culture and Libyan identity that forms the background for the amorphous nature and fluidity of tribal alliances.

During Gaddafi's rule numerous institutions and policies were repeatedly abolished, and as a result the prestige of administrative institutions was undermined. That in turn led to the deepening of the crisis of the state and allowed for the tribal alliances to emerge stronger. This fact shows the possibility of Libya heading towards federalism, which existed before 1963. The tribes do not usually emerge into modern state institutions with all their agencies and central bureaucracy, so if such a scenario happens, the chances for building a strong civil society²² would be very low. In any case, tribalism will surely have a strong influence on the future socio-political interaction and will be able to impede modernization.

The most important signals coming from the citizens themselves are those associated with religion and its expected political role in the new Libya. The local Islamist movements are committed to creating an Islamic state, but at the same time none of the political groups have rejected democracy, with only the salafists pointing to some contradictions. Democracy is therefore seen as an instrument that can be adopted and no objections are voiced against a civil state, provided that it does not go against the primacy of the Shari'ah.

Liberal, nationalist and leftist groups are poorly organized and their leaders have not yet paid enough attention to assess the situation and seem to be waging on the traditional moderation of the Libyans. They are all against religion being used to control people.²³

There are also other aspects that are of importance to the debate on the Libyan politics, the transitional phase, and both democratic and revolutionary ways of administering it. Regarding the Constitutional Proclamation from August 3, 2011, the signposts towards establishing a new political system have

²² S. M. Lipset, *The Democratic Century*, University of Oklahoma Press 2004, p. 92–138.

²³ Y. Mohammad Sawani, *Post-Qadhafi Libya: interactive dynamics and the political future*, "Contemporary Arab Affairs" 2012, 5:1, p. 1–26.

been defined. The document contained 37 articles grouped in five sections relating to the principles of political process, the public rights and liberties, the system of governance, judicial and legal guarantees, and transitional regulations. The Constitution is aimed at addressing the hopes and aspirations of the people and facilitating the movement towards a society of citizenship, justice, equality and progress.

As we can learn from Article 1 of the Constitutional Proclamation: “Libya is an independent democratic state; its people are the source of authority; its capital is Tripoli; its religion is Islam; Islamic Shari’ah is the primary source of legislation; the state guarantees non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religious observances.”²⁴

The way towards stabilization in Libya should probably lead through working out an agreement between the unstable and insecure authorities and the better organized movements and associations of multiple political orientations. What makes the transition more difficult is not exclusively limited to the brutalities of the past, but is also connected with altering the value system of society and upsetting the components of its political culture. It will take more than one willing generation to overcome this heritage, and a lot of patience will be needed before the country can fully embrace new concepts.

VOTERS’ MISCONCEPTIONS

Another piece of the puzzle are the citizens themselves. Voting can serve as a powerful incentive towards a more rational and active involvement. It builds the sense of responsibility. Even if such involvement would initially produce poor results (explain shortly), it will make people aware that their collective choices actually affect their lives, which may give them a more tangible reason for participation.

But this does not mean that they are out of the woods yet. One of the most important facts to acknowledge here is that we can never be fully aware of the issues connected with the political reality we live in. This dimension is simply enormous and tends to be extremely complicated. But since it is impossible and, frankly, unnecessary for each voter to know everything, we should focus on the more realistic approach. Of course, politicians are not able to have total awareness of politics and economy as well.

“The people ultimately in charge – the voters – are doing brain surgery while unable to pass basic anatomy.”²⁵ As many different studies show, people

²⁴ Ibidem, s. 10.

²⁵ B. Caplan, *The Myth of Rational Voter. Why Democracies choose bad Policies*,

are often quite ignorant about political and economic processes. Yet, they hold some ideas they consider valid and act upon that premise. That is true also in well-settled democracies.

The formation of a civic society that can fairly well act in its own interest through a dialogue with the government takes time to develop. This process may be hampered by factors such as demagoguery, or by misconceptions about politics and economy held by the voters themselves. Therefore, apart from all the problems listed so far (political instability, poor economy, lack of strong institutional support, disregard of law, interior conflicts), it is also the people that may play against their own interests. Politicians often cater to the preferences of their citizens to win their votes. This can play into the hand of voters if they are smart enough to know what is best for them, but can turn against them if they cling to their ideas about the world against all odds. In the latter case, voters indirectly push politicians to take actions that are bad for the citizens. According to Caplan, the rule of demagogues is not an aberration, but a natural condition of democracy. And what is the result? – “democracies fall short because voters get the foolish policies they ask for.”²⁶

It does not seem possible to make all citizens conscious enough about economy and politics to enable them to make only the correct decisions, especially in the countries that have a history of being ideology-driven. As we may observe, the political scene in Libya is a mosaic of mostly revolutionary forces and militias. Tribalism and religion are strong and the voters are unprepared, unsure and practically taking chances with different candidates and options often based on emotional grounds as neither had the chance to significantly influence the Libyan politics during the Gaddafi era.²⁷ The thing that can be done is devising means for building a civil society that can, in the future, partake in creating the political and economic landscape of a country.

Civil society has a potential to convey ideas to other citizens and to those in charge through many channels. This establishes good grounds for a continuous dialogue. To illustrate with an actual example - there was an interesting project done in Tunisia called *The Return of Ben Ali Campaign* developed at Memac Ogilvy Label Tunisia by its creative director, Nicolas Courant. A huge poster of the former President Ben Ali was displayed on the wall in La Goulette. As the angry civilians tore down the poster, they saw another one underneath saying “Wake up, dictatorship can return. Vote on October 23rd.”²⁸

Princeton University Press 2006, s. 6.

²⁶ Ibidem, s. 22.

²⁷ R. Bruce St John, *Libyan Election Breaks Arab Spring Pattern*, “The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs” 2012, 47:3, p. 13–19.

²⁸ M. Ben Ghazi (2012). *La Goulette Awakens to the Return of Ben Ali*. “tunisialive”

CONCLUSION

Free elections are one of the trademarks of democracy, with voting being one of the most important and direct means of citizen participation in politics. This notion is well acknowledged in the Arab countries in the wake of revolution as they are shifting towards actual democracy. However, there are factors that should not be disregarded, even if it means making the newly gained freedom less sweet. Voting, as it is established in modern democracies, cannot do without adequate social background, otherwise it may backfire.

As voting may help in forming a sense of responsibility among citizens, the thing that must be kept in mind is that democratic devices cannot simply be put in place in each and every situation. An example may be the 1993 premature elections in Burundi, that led to an armed conflict between Hutu and Tutsi, the assassination of a Hutu president and a death toll of 200,000 people.²⁹

There are certain steps that should be taken before the introduction of democratic devices such as voting. Those would be strong institutions, rule of law and economic growth. Development sequencing also has the potential to produce good results, but it seems extremely unlikely that it can be artificially moderated. In case of countries involved in the Arab Spring - if the elections are implemented too quickly, they may lead to the return of the system people fought to change or the continuation of armed conflicts.

Without a proper set of institutions and a civil society, the people may stay ill-informed about their rights and privileges, as well as remain ignorant policy consumers. The bottom line is – it is not that hard to get people to vote and conduct an election, but the challenge should be making sure that it is a solid democratic election. Reaching that goal will need time, perhaps even a generation or two, and the result will most assuredly differ from the achievements of European tradition; still, it is hard to think of taking any marvelous shortcuts here.

2012. [Online]. Available at: <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/10/19/ben-ali-is-back/> [2012, November 29].

²⁹ D. Brancati, J. L. Snyder (2011). *The Libyan Rebels and Electoral Democracy*. "Foreign Affairs" 2011 [Online]. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68241/dawn-brancati-and-jack-l-snyder/the-libyan-rebels-and-electoral-democracy> [2012, April 18].

NIEBEZPIECZNY GŁOS.
MOŻLIWE KONSEKWENCJE PRZYSPIESZONYCH WYBORÓW
W KRAJACH ARABSKICH PO REWOLUCJI

Celem niniejszego artykułu jest przyjrzenie się politycznym i społecznym zmianom zachodzącym obecnie w krajach arabskich. Nacisk położony jest na zasadność przeprowadzania wolnych wyborów w krajach, które nie osiągnęły jeszcze stabilizacji ani zdolności skutecznego realizowania praktyk demokratycznych. Kraje te stoją na progu wielkich przemian politycznych, jednak do ich demokratyzacji należy podchodzić z rozwagą. Istnieją konkretne niebezpieczeństwa, które należy rozpoznać i uwzględnić. Wynika to z faktu, że aby demokracja mogła działać poprawnie, spełnionych musi być szereg warunków dotyczących środowiska jej funkcjonowania.

Francis Fukuyama pisze o znaczeniu tła instytucjonalnego oraz aktywnym społeczeństwie obywatelskim dla podtrzymania praktyk demokratycznych. Jeśli demokracja ma się zadomowić w krajach arabskich, sektory te muszą zostać wzmocnione. Artykuł przywołuje ponadto kilka faktów związanych z sytuacją społeczną panującą w krajach arabskich, mogących przemawiać za przesunięciem wyborów w czasie; przynajmniej do momentu, w którym państwa wzmocnią swoją demokratyczną orientację i uspokoją wewnętrzne konflikty. W określeniu korzystnego kształtu ewolucji politycznej pomocna może okazać się również idea stopniowego rozwoju. Uwagi wymaga tu polityka, ekonomia, organizacja społeczeństwa obywatelskiego i organów państwa. Kolejnym czynnikiem jest irracjonalność i błędne mniemania wyborców hołdujących częściej własnym wizjom rzeczywistości nawet wbrew obiektywnym przesłankom. Fakt ten może tym bardziej działać na niekorzyść obywateli, jeśli nie są oni w jakimkolwiek stopniu przygotowani do wyborów, jak w sytuacji braku chociażby załączków społeczeństwa obywatelskiego. Niezwykle istotne jest zatem dążenie do powstania i rozwoju stabilnego społeczeństwa obywatelskiego mającego potencjał do dyskusowania z rządem oraz pogłębiania własnej świadomości politycznej. Wspomniane przejścia nie powinny być realizowane w pośpiechu czy też częściowo.

Należy pamiętać o tym, że próby szybkiego wprowadzenia procesów mających sprawić, że państwo będzie wyglądać na demokratyczne, nie zawsze stanowią dobry wybór, który niejednokrotnie może przynieść efekt wręcz odwrotny. Jeśli celem wolnych wyborów jest wzmocnienie procesu demokratycznego, muszą one odbywać się w ramach uprzednio przygotowanego podłoża, jakim są obywatele, oraz z pomocą powszechnie uznanych instytucji. Wtedy demokracja ma szansę być stabilną i sprawiedliwą.

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