VI

Boredom and Melancholy in Utopias and Dystopias

Mariusz Finkielsztein

Introduction

In many ways, utopia was the humanists' replacement for Paradise—Christian utopia of eternal life (Manuel, Manuel 1979). Arthur Schopenhauer was among the first in a long line of Western thinkers to suggest the powerful agency of the experience or the state of boredom in jeopardising the sustainability of utopian states of being: "after man had transferred all pain and torments to hell, there then remained nothing over for heaven but ennui" (Schopenhauer 2011: 401).

Schopenhauer's statement could be interpreted as rhetorical or humorous. However, its central thesis that an "ideal" world might eventuate in an unbearably stressful state of boredom has been corroborated by many other writers and observers of human condition. In the twenty-first century a body of research findings and conceptualizations of boredom suggest that Schopenhauer's "hell" might be conceived as stressfully "boring" as well.

Casual observation of twentieth-century events has provided convincing support for the idea that even in the worst and most horrifying situations the experience/state of boredom wields enormous power over human life—myriad diaries and testimonials have noted excruciating boredom in wartime trenches, in Jewish ghettos, and in war-torn occupied countries. Alberto Moravia (2010) posited that boredom compromised the efforts of people who were fighting for utopias, thus actually creating dystopias. Many writers suggest that capitalism, which according to some

thinkers had its origins in attempts to mitigate boredom (make trade more "interesting"), over time resulted in a sufficient level of individual and societal boredom that led to the Russian Revolution. Boredom experience which was engendered by the Great Depression led to totalitarianisms and their pervasive visions of an ideal social order. Boredom together with melancholy have accompanied the emergence of utopias and dystopias in most of the late expressions of human history.

This chapter aims to explore the following issues: (1) why utopias and dystopias almost invariably come to be experienced as boring or unsatisfying for their inhabitants; (2) why admitting the experience of boredom and melancholy is proscribed in utopias and dystopias; (3) the array of methods employed by the utopian and dystopian authors to prevent admission of the experience of boredom and melancholy among their adherents.

The absence of a currently singularly-accepted definition of "boredom" is problematic for the proposed exposition. However, a relatively high level of agreement exists for a received phenomenology of boredom. Boredom is generally associated with physical and/or mental idleness and with situations in which individuals have nothing to do in particular or have no interest in doing what they should do at a given moment. Boredom defined as a state of disconnection/indifference associated with a sense of meaninglessness is also an antithesis for engagement (Toohey 2012). On the other hand, melancholy, which is generally considered to be closely phenomenologically associated with boredom (especially with boredom's existential variant), is a reflexive experiential and behavioural state related to the experience of pessimism, sadness, sense of futility, lack of agency, and a generalized "inhibition of action" (Lepenies 1992).

Both boredom and melancholy have much in common: their variants manifest similar expressions (a glazed look, apathy, lack of action) and effects (a sense of meaninglessness, pessimism). However, empirical work *vis-à-vis* intraindividual correlations of scores on validated boredom proneness and depression scales (Farmer, Sundberg 1986; Vodanovich 2003) points out that the two terms cannot validly be employed interchangeably. Melancholy entails a larger component of sadness, sense of futility, inhibition of action, and indifference, while boredom, especially its situational and less severe variant, entails a larger component of action, behavioural arousal, and need for change (Mann, Robinson 2009; Russell 1932). Melancholy more often leads to behavioural resignation, whereas mild, transient boredom is often noted

to be associated with high degrees of behavioural activation, restlessness, and physi-
ological arousal often accompanied by the experience of frustration and/or anxiety.

In the following chapter I define utopia and dystopia mainly as a literary genre
which aims to present life of ideal or apparently ideal society along with a description
of its social settings (Kamińska 2012). The selection of utopias and dystopias analysed
in the chapter embraces the following Western literary works: Thomas More's *De
optimo reipublicæ*, Thomasso Campanella's *The City of the Sun,* Francis Bacon's *New
Atlantis,* Plato's *State,* Bellamy's *Looking Backward 2000-1887,* and Charles Fourier's
idea of Phalanstery. The dystopias are represented by Aldous Huxley's *Brave New
World*, George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four,* and Kurt Vonnegut's *Player Piano*. The
main criterion employed in my exposition was whether the terms boredom or mel-
ancholy were mentioned in a particular work by name or subjectively suggested "be-
tween the lines". While a small number of literary works featuring boredom or mel-
ancholy as a central theme comprise my datum, this limited selection of literary
works is sufficient to proffer and explore a number of tentative questions and theses
on the role of boredom and melancholy in modulating the emergence of utopias and
dystopias, their subsequent evolution, and their eventual unsustainability.

Why Do Utopias/dystopias Frequently Come to Be Experienced as "Boring" or "Unsatisfying" for their Inhabitants?

Returning to Schopenhauer's perspective of Paradise as being an inevitably "boring
place," a fundamental question is why life in a paradisiacal society might be experi-
enced as "boring". First of all, "the ideal" is "boring" by its very definition, as it is
inherently predictable and unchanging. Knowing that the ideal has no capability to
provide additional surprise/interest through further development, the "ideal" is
complete in and of itself. Since a utopian social system is perfect in every way, "any
change must be for the worse, must be a return to pre-utopian chaos" (Szacki 2000:
178). Thus, it is not surprising that utopian republics were meant to be unchangea-
ble—namely, Plato's *State*, More's *Utopia*, Campanella's *The City of the Sun*, or Bacon's
New Atlantis.

The aforementioned works are only descriptions of "mental experiments" (Jerzy
Szacki's terminology), but all of them envisage an invariant state of separation—both
geographical (islands, high mountains) and social (the politics of isolationism). Ad-
mittedly, Bacon's *New Atlantis* sends scientific, spying missions to other countries but

nowhere does it mention of any influence of the missions on everyday social praxis. Other social systems have little or no influence on utopian social settings along any dimensions. As articulated by one of Huxley's characters: "We have our stability to think of. We don't want to change. Every change is a menace to stability" (Huxley 2007: 198)—and stability means boredom. Thus, each utopian and dystopian social system is an adequate place for boredom to escalate, as predictability, sameness, routine, and repetitiveness are its primary attributes.

Utopia is a paradise primarily in regard to material needs. A utopia does not lack for materialistic entities and it does not require supplementation of any biological necessities (food, water, oxygen, shelter, etc.) In a utopia, all regulations and social institutions aim to establish and implement a socioeconomic system that provides their adherents with all the materials essential for the experience of "basic" happiness (in Abraham Maslow's sense of the term). Boredom might even be construed as normative in developed Western countries in which large numbers of denizens live lives that are close in character to materialistic utopias/quasi-utopias. However, utopias and contemporary materialistically affluent societies create a situation in which "the guarantee that we shall not die of starvation entails the risk of dying of boredom" (Vaneigem 2001: 18).

Many utopian authors have assumed that if food, health care, peace, and rules that secured its continuance were guaranteed, their adherents would be eternally happy. The second fallacious supposition of the authors is that such happiness is inexhaustible (Walsh 1962): people cannot be bored or depressed in materialistic utopias. Utopian authors have proposed various recipes to achieve an affluent utopian society, e.g., the abolishment of private property (More, Bellamy), development of science (Bacon), and mechanization of routine boring tasks (Bellamy). However, the world of mechanization, automation, and standardization virtually guarantees psychologically debilitating sameness—"boredom"—under the guise of diversity. This variety of "affluent boredom" is salient in Bellamy's *Looking Backwards*, a literary work in which a reader dreads thinking about what the characters in the novel would do if they were not required to describe their social and economic system to a time traveller, Julian West.

A perceived lack of agency on the part of adherents is a major posited cause of normative boredom experience and/or associated behaviours afflicting utopias and dystopias. In *Notes From the Underground,* Fyodor Dostoyevsky has his main character opine:

Of course there is no guaranteeing […] that it will not be, for instance, frightfully dull then (for what will one have to do when everything will be calculated and tabulated), but on the other hand everything will be extraordinarily rational" (Dostoyevsky 2005: 29).

Rational, or one may say "ideal" order in utopias, implies overregulation of social life. Boredom would be normative for adherents because there would be nothing left to do that depends on the adherent's idiosyncratic "freedom to choose". This situation is exemplified in Vonnegut's *Player Piano*, where dystopian adherents must deal with a highly mechanised world in which individuals are supplementary to machines and mechanisation being the central characteristic of their daily lives. For instance, computers measure an individual's intelligence and decide whether the individual can partake in a university education or not, what a great significance, because without a university education the individual becomes a slave-worker instead of an engineer operating the machines. People no longer have a sense of agency and usefulness. However, because it is a dystopia—at the end it turns out, like in Huxley's *Brave New World*, that the majority do not want to decide on their own account and choose not to decide for themselves. Dostoyevsky strongly disagrees with this concept, claiming that everything that individuals do is to be independent, to "want independently" in spite of the consequences of such behaviour. According to Dostoyevsky, humans may even prefer suffering, chaos, and self-destruction—just to show their agency.

It is said that boredom and melancholy are defined as anomie at the individual level. Anomie is a sociological concept developed by Emile Durkheim. It is etymologically derived from the Greek word *nomos* (law, order) where the prefix *a-* denotes "without" or "absence of". Thus, anomie is a state of lawlessness and insufficiency of law and order. Societies that provide too little control often evoke a correlative sense of insecurity and anxiety. Anomie can also result in melancholy, a tendency to interpersonal isolation and solitude as well as to the state of boredom characterized by withdrawal of engagement in one's social system. Therefore, the great exemplars of it are "romantic boredom", the melancholy of artists, aristocrats and bourgeoisie in nineteenth century Germany, aptly described by Wolf Lepienies (1992). A lack of political power and agency, coupled with an excess of social and political control, are frequently prodromal of melancholy and boredom. The same situation and outcome obtain for utopian adherents.

The aforementioned argument states that freedom and control are central issues in most people's lives. Boredom is commonly linked to a paucity of control, an

excess of freedom (anomie, leisure time), or to an excess of control/lack of freedom—which one can observe in utopias and dystopias as well in the form of over-regulated societies.

Why Do Utopias/Dystopias Proscribe Experiences and/or Displays of Behaviour that Suggest the Existence of Boredom and/or Melancholy States among their Inhabitants?

Explicit expression of boredom or melancholy on the part of utopian adherents have the potential of being perceived as denoting ingratitude by founders or proponents of a given utopian society. Such admission of boredom or melancholy might be construed by proponents of the utopian society as a public accusation of a particular order, as a symptom of strong dissatisfaction, and thereby instantiating that "the ideal" is not in fact "perfect". "The ideal" implies that everyone would invariably perceive it as such, lest the conclusion arise of the conceptual bankruptcy of "the ideal" or that the notion itself is highly relative.

In the Christian Heaven, melancholy or boredom are seen by believers as impossibilities owing to the assumed nature of Heaven itself. For Christians, Heaven is a gift while boredom and sadness are construed as visible signs of ingratitude on the part of Christians for Heaven's existence. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the issue of acedia (spiritual boredom) which expressed by medieval monks strongly contradicted the Christian view of creation, in the Christian context—in which acedia entailed a lack of joy with God's order/creation and as a result was perceived as a cardinal sin. The sin of passive undermining the concept of the ideal Christian utopia.

Each utopia is a projection of some ideal (or apparently ideal) order (see Mumford 1922; Manuel, Manuel 1979). The experience or display of melancholy or boredom ruins this order. For Wolf Lepenies, utopias "ban the melancholy" (1992: 25). The members of utopian communities are no longer in a position to allow themselves to be sad—to openly display their emotions which could suggest or reveal the failure of the utopian endeavour. Ultimately, a utopia is a conceptualization of how to guarantee the experience of happiness among its members. Any actions that potentially signify melancholic mood (for example, the poetry in Plato's *The Republic*)

or a display of behaviour which would suggest that one is not satisfied with her life are prohibited.

For inhabitants of utopian ideals, expression of boredom or melancholy is not merely a symptom of the invalidity of "ideal" ideologies. Expression of such emotions calls into question the stability of the utopian social system. Sadness, implied by melancholy, "allows us to slow down so that we can reflect on disappointment or failure. It lets us know that there is a problem or trouble" (Macklem 2015: 7). The awareness of inconsistency in utopia's order is the first step to enable challenges of the conceptual or organizational system and through this awareness the utopian system's stability which is a *sine qua non* for its sustainability. The expression of melancholy or boredom can lead to the experience of alienation, thus starting to undermine the community and threaten the official conceptualization of the ideal/utopian system. This phenomenon can clearly be seen in twentieth century totalitarianisms, for instance, Communism. Citizens of communists states were not allowed to be sad, to be bored by their social reality, and were expected to experience and manifest gratitude to the party leadership for construction and implementation of the best possible social system. The experience or expression of melancholy (or its medicalised version, depression; Földényi 2011) or boredom had the potential to be interpreted by party proponents as a form of "soft resistance" to party ideology.

Boredom and melancholy also had a potential to foster advanced reflection, criticism, or even subversive thoughts. This point is developed by Mostafa Mond, one of the World Controllers in Huxley's *Brave New World*, who claims that the society of Alphas would slit leadership's throat: they would revolt owing to being forced/expected to endure unfulfilling and mediocre occupations far beneath their skills and aspirations (in *Brave New World*, the fate of the lower social castes). Severe frustration and boredom could lead to violence and slaughter of the subjugators.

Subversive, revolutionary thoughts in bored, dissatisfied individuals in fact pose serious threats to any social order: real, utopian, or dystopian. A common assumption is that boredom is associated with social deviation. One has too much time, nothing to do, and becomes "bored" with it—the state of boredom often fosters "threatening" or "anti-systemic" ideas, and worse, drives the sufferer to implement these ideas almost immediately. A "boredom-as-a-problem-literature" exists (Calhoun 2011: 269), especially in pedagogy. A major pedagogical issue is "adolescent boredom", in the main propelled by a revolt against adult social rules. In this manner, boredom can be not only an individual disposition but also a serious threat to a

macro-social system. Being accompanied by feelings of constraint or being cogs in a huge uncaring social machine without a correlative construction of a sense of meaning are just the case of utopias and dystopias.

The revolutionary potential of boredom is, therefore, not surprisingly often proscribed in utopias and dystopias. For Guy Debord, however, "boredom is always counter-revolutionary". Debord's apparently contradictory view of boredom's role in revolutionary activity and thought stems from defining boredom as a synonym to apathy or total lack of engagement. Many scholars emphasize that boredom and apathy do not refer to the same phenomenology and set of behaviours (Svendsen 2005; Mann, Robinson 2009). In contrast to apathy, boredom can be its own cure and a strong motivator to act and change one's situation. Boredom is a state of dissatisfaction or even frustration that leads to actions that are meant to alleviate that feeling in a positive (creativity; Mann, Cadman 2014) or negative (deviation, revolt; Russell 1932) way. Apathy is a lack of any emotion, a state of total indifference and experiential anaesthesia: as a state of apathy is counter-revolutionary in that the word denotes the inhibition/absence of any emotional response to one's environment/existential situation.

What Methods Do the Utopian/Dystopian Authors Employ to Prevent the Emergence of Boredom and/or Melancholy among Utopias/Dystopian Inhabitants?

Work is the most often prescribed remedy for boredom or melancholy by almost all utopian and dystopian authors. Human beings should be occupied with work and other productive activities all the time. In More's *Utopia*, there were even special officials, Syphogrants, whose main duty was to see "that no one sits around in idleness" (More 2003: 49). In *Utopia* and in Campanella's *The City of the Sun,* idleness or laziness is strictly prohibited. More's "laziness" includes every kind of non-productive or non-useful activity like playing dice, drinking alcohol, or being involved in sexual activity. Campanella, echoing More, considers idleness and sloth as harmful for health, describing the consequences of idleness among women of the upper classes who due to idleness:

> […] lose their colour and have pale complexions, and become feeble and small. For this reason they are
> without proper complexions, use high sandals, and become beautiful not from strength, but from

slothful tenderness. And thus they ruin their own tempers and natures, and consequently those of their offspring (Campanella 2009: 32-33).

Both visions, More's and Campanella's, entails short working hours, i.e. four or six hours per day, respectively. The rest of the time, nevertheless, must be fully occupied. A similar prescription can be noticed in Charles Fourier's day schedule for people within the Phalanstery structure, i.e. a well-organized time from 3 a.m. to 10:30 p.m. (Fourier 1971: 276-77). Unremitting activity is treated as an unquestioning prescription for the sustainability of their utopian communities. In the same time, utopian authors proffer optimistic views of human nature. They assume that people can be easily persuaded to obey "good" and "proper" rules. The inhabitants of More's and Campanella's utopias spend their free time only on estimable occupations like self-education, discussion, reading, and writing. Moreover, they do all these praiseworthy tasks willingly out of a "natural" disposition. Utopian adherents are unable to be idle, and even if they are rewarded with dispensation of work (for example, being prize for the best warrior in *The City of the Sun*) they cannot bear idleness and willingly return to their work.

Behind the optimistic assumption that all societal problems are caused by "bad" rules (not by human nature) and that people can easily be persuaded to follow "good" rules stands another unquestioned assumption. Namely if individuals are momentarily left alone/idle, they start to think and experience boredom or display its associated dysfunctional behaviour. Therefore, social systems should be established to fill up every minute of the day with some useful activity. This fact may draw us to the conclusion that utopias and dystopias can be perceived as totalitarianisms of time: they enforce spending all available time on things that are controllable, by political or physical/military power, or, more subtly, by social control. Both forms of control can be seen in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. After many hours of work the main character Winston is obliged to attend Community Centre, where "his soul writhed with boredom" (Orwell 1961: 74) owing to the experience of emptiness, futility, and meaninglessness engendered by all of the Centre activities.

Human beings obviously "naturally" require some occupation, challenge, and aim. However, in many cases, "activity/busyness" appears to be only an escape from boredom or melancholy, from being exposed to one's own thoughts, from reflection concerning human existence and the meaning of life. The creators of utopias appear to fear "empty" time, frightened by their view that in the absence of distracting activity, boredom or melancholy trumps the experience of interest and happiness.

Scholars refer to this variant of boredom as busy boredom, employing the term in the context of the continuously distracting entertainment culture (Winter 2002). The phenomenon of busy boredom is central in Huxley's *Brave New World*, where in order to avoid sense of futile, time is tightly organized by the production and experience of "entertainment" which after "busyness/unremitting activity" is the next important treatment of boredom and melancholy. All members of Huxley's society are conditioned to like sports and other leisure activities, for example, photograph films (special kinds of movies in Huxley's world). If "entertainment treatments" do not sufficiently mitigate boredom and melancholy, the drug named Soma, which has the effect of being "happy" and precluding the "aberrational" states of boredom and melancholy, is distributed to all after their work. Happiness is the new god; but sadness, melancholy, and boredom are treated as dangerous criminal misdemeanours.

In Plato's *The Republic,* everyone works in a position according to individual disposition and talents. In Campanella's *The City of the Sun* officials are chosen by abilities and assigned their social status in childhood. The dystopian authors were not so optimistic. They hold to the assumption that in order to make people do boring, unchallenging, and sometimes even stultifying jobs, people have to be properly conditioned. In Huxley's *Brave New World*, manipulation of embryonic incubation and conditioning individuals to like what they will have to do for their whole lives is the basic method of achieving sustainability of social system. Boredom and melancholy is nipped in the bud as "all conditioning aims at that: making people like their inescapable social destiny" (Huxley 2007: 12).

Community participation is another prescribed method of alleviating boredom and melancholy. In almost every utopia (and in some dystopias as well), participation in "community" is an essential imperative. No one should be alone, no one should be outside society, no one should be alienated and disconnected from the assigned community. In fact, many authors ascribe a sense of belongingness as essential for avoiding boredom or unhappiness (e.g. Toohey 2012; Spacks 1995). However, involvement and belongingness in community must be voluntary and desired, which constitutes a serious problem for utopias and dystopias wherein social engagement is obligatory and enforced.

Several prominent boredom theorists (Spacks 1995; Goodstein 2005; Svendsen 2005) construe boredom to be intimately tied to modernity and correlative changes in socio-cultural mores embracing individualism over collectivism as well as secu-

larisation over religiosity. A closer analysis of these phenomena suggests epistemo-
logical interdependence ("both/and") rather than polarization ("either/or") of the re-
spective changes in social mores in modernity. While there is no doubt that religious
practice strengthened community, and community empowered religion, the indi-
vidualism of capitalism and its associated weakening of community strengthened the
need for community and associated transpersonal "spiritual" experience and wor-
ship of gods other than money.

Apparently steadily increasing rates and testimonials of boredom and melan-
choly in the developed West are ascribed to be exacerbated by the decline of com-
munity and religion in modernity. It is not surprising that utopian and dystopian
authors emphasized attention to boredom and melancholy in their prescriptions for
sustained viability. In More's and Campanella's utopias, one's localised "community"
is to be established and maintained by the cooperative/helping attitude fostered by
religious beliefs. In Bacon's utopia, the state religion is science, and a scientists its
priests. In dystopias we can see some influential surrogates of religion, for example,
a charismatic effective leader, a ruling party (in Orwell's work), or science in its de-
humanized form (Huxley's work).

Existential Boredom and Melancholy as Human Attributes

This chapter has provided an overview of interrelations between boredom/melan-
choly and the development of utopias/dystopias; explained why utopias and dysto-
pias are such a favourable environment for the experience of boredom and melan-
choly; why the two states are so vigorously combated; and what remedies for bore-
dom and melancholy originators of utopias and dystopias prescribe. Here, the last
important issue to the current reflection. A curious aspect of utopias is that their
members appear to be content but not ecstatic: they often present a visage of being
happy, albeit in a fettered, controlled, and emotionless manner. Negative emotions
and states, including melancholy and boredom, are assumed to be excisable. Apart
from a passive contentment (apparently real in utopias and a facade in dystopias), all
others emotions are neglected or openly prohibited and a general quasi-inhibition
of emotions is the normative acceptable attitude. Some authors have ascribed the
presence and expression of emotions as a *sine qua non* attribute of being human (Ma-
cklem 2015)—a perspective seemingly corroborated by descriptions of many utopias

and some dystopias describing adherents as relatively unfeeling, minimally expressive living entities who are more like unfeeling robots than sentient human beings.

A Polish philosopher, Leszek Kołakowski, opined that "boredom is an indispensable part of our society, or: the fact that we are capable of feeling boredom makes us humans" (2008: 99). The status of melancholy is assumed to be similar as human beings are self-conscious and generally painfully and fearfully aware of their own finitude. The human capacity for boredom and melancholy (as well as man's correlative capacity for language-abetted abstract rational thought) is considered to be an important correlate of being human or even human right. When Huxley's Savage insists on having the right to be unhappy, and within it, to experience boredom and melancholy, in fact he is insisting on having the right to be human. Utopian social systems that pretend to guarantee happiness and to eliminate all negative effects are dehumanizing. Such social systems enhance their adherent's sense of incompleteness, alienation, and lack of agency by overregulation exacerbate boredom and melancholy. Utopias also prohibit some means of alleviating these states. For example, according to Denis Diderot, to overcome boredom and melancholy[1] we need "neither solitude, nor community, but this, what stitches them: desire. Or at least friendship" (Diderot 1984: 116). The world of utopias and dystopias is bereft of these human qualities, which upon emergence threaten the "idealized" worldviews of their utopian or dystopian originators—as did the love between Winston and Julia in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* or the friendship of Bernard Marks, Helmholtz Watson and the Savage in Huxley's *Brave New World*. The experience and overt expression of emotions (including boredom and melancholy or sadness), most central aspect of humanity, is prohibited. Thus, in utopias and dystopias the object of prohibition is the humanity itself.

---

[1] Diderot speaks about French term *ennui*, which was actually the mixture of boredom and melancholy.

Works Cited

Bacon, Francis (2009), *The New Atlanti*s, Auckland, New Zealand: The Floating Press.

Bellamy, Edward (2005), *Looking backward, 2000-1887*, San Diego: ICON.

Calhoun, Cheshire (2011), 'Living with boredom', *Sophia*: 50 (2), 269-279.

Campanella, Thomasso (2009) *The City of the Sun*, Waiheke Island: The Floating Press.

Diderot, Denis (1984), *Lettres a Sophie Volland*, Gallimard: Paris.

Dostoyevsky, Fyodor (2005) *Notes from the Underground*, San Diego: ICON Classics.

Farmer, Richard, Sundberg Norman (1986), 'Boredom proneness—the development and correlates of a new scale', *Journal of Personality Assessment*: 50 (1), pp. 4-17.

Fourier, Charles (1971), *The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier. Selected Texts on Work, Love, and Passionate Attraction*, transl. Honathan Beecher, Richard Bienvenu, Boston: Beacon Press.

Földényi, László (2011), *Melancholia*, transl. by Robert Reszke, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo KR.

Goodstein, Elizabeth (2005), *Experience Without Qualities: Boredom and Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Huxley, Aldous (2007) *Brave New World*, London: Vintage Books.

Kamińska, Joanna (2012), *Nowe wspaniałe światy: współczesne projekty doskonałego społeczeństwa*, Kraków: Nomos.

Kołakowski, Leszek (2008), *Mini wykłady o maxi sprawach*, Kraków: Znak, pp. 94-101.

Lepenies, Wolf (1992), *Melancholy and Society*, transl. by Jeremy Gaines and Doris Jones, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mann, Sandi, Rebekah Cadman (2014), 'Does Being Bored Make Us More Creative?', *Creativity Research Journal*: 26 (2), pp. 165-173.

Mann, Sandi, Andrew Robinson (2009), 'Boredom in the lecture theatre: an investigation into the contributors, moderators and outcomes of boredom amongst university students', *British Educational Research Journal*: 35 (2), pp. 243-258.

Manuel, Frank, Manuel Fritzie (1979), *Utopian Thought in the Western World*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Moravia, Alberto (1965), *Empty Canvas*, transl. by Angus Davidson, London: Penguin Books.

More, Thomas (2003), *Utopia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Mumford, Lewis (1922), *The Story of Utopias*, New York: Boni and Liveright Publishers.

Orwell, George (1961) *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, New York: The New American Library of World Literature.

Russell, Bertrand (1932), *The Conquest of Happiness*, London: George Allen & Unwin LTD, pp. 57-67.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1969), *The World as Will and Representation,* vol. 1*,* New York: Dover Publications, Inc.

Spacks, Patricia (1995), *Boredom: The Literary History of a State of Mind*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Svendsen, Lars (2005), *A Philosophy of Boredom*, transl. by John Irons, London: Reaktion Books.

Szacki, Jerzy (2000), *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa: Sic!.

Toohey, Peter (2011), *Boredom. A Lively History*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Walsh, Chad (1962), *From Utopia to Nightmare*, London: Harper.

Vaneigem, Raoul (2001), *The Revolution of Everyday Life*. London: Rebel Press.

Vodanovich, Stephen (2003), 'Psychometric Measures of Boredom: A Review of the Literature', *The Journal of Psychology*: 137 (6), pp. 569-595.

Vonnegut, Kurt (2000), *Player Piano*, New York, Rosetta Books.