Living with Lawrence’s silent ghosts: a Lacanian reading of “Glad Ghosts”

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ABSTRACT
Living with Lawrence’s silent ghosts: a Lacanian reading of “Glad Ghosts” seeks to contribute to the growing scholarly field of Gothic modernisms by reading D.H. Lawrence’s long and underappreciated ghost story “Glad Ghosts” (written 1925) through a distinctively theoretical lens. This theoretical framework will call upon Jacques Derrida’s notion of the “specter”, as put forward in his Specters of Marx, Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s psychoanalytical “phantom”, and Jacques Lacan’s theory of the barred subject (S) and their relationship to jouissance. The haunting figured in “Glad Ghosts” cannot be properly elucidated by exploring how it dramatizes the tensions between Derridean spectrality and Abraham and Torok’s “phantom”, which has become a standard theoretical approach in the wider field of haunting studies. Indeed, these positions must be supplemented by an understanding of how they work for and against some of the fundamental concepts of Lacanian psychoanalysis in order to fully gauge what is at stake in Lawrence’s distinctive appropriation of the ghostly. The article’s main contention is that Lawrence’s staging of haunting, which emphasises the role of the silent ghost, is symptomatic of the Lacanian barred subject’s attempt to experience different registers of jouissance.

KEYWORDS: D.H. Lawrence, haunting, Lacan, jouissance, Gothic
ABSTRAKT
Poniższy artykuł: Living with Lawrence’s silent ghosts: a Lacanian reading of “Glad Ghosts” ma na celu wzbogać prężną dziedziny naukowej modernizmu gotyckiego poprzez analizę długiego i niedocenionego opowiadania D. H. Lawrence’a pt. “Glad Ghosts” (napisanym w 1925 r.) poprzez pryzmat czysto teoretyczny. Ów szkic teoretyczny poparty jest pojęciem “specter” (widmo) przywołanym przez Jacquesa Derridę w Specters of Marx, psychoanalitycznym pojęciem Nicolasa Abraham and Marii Torok „phantom” (fantom), a także teorią zabronionego podmiotu (the barred subject $S$) Jacquea Laca- na i ich związkom z konceptem jouissance. Nawiedzenie ukazane w “Glad Ghosts” nie może być dostatecznie wyjaśnione poprzez wskazywanie napięć pomiędzy ‘spectrality’ Derridy a ‘phantom’ Abrahama i Torok, co stało się standardowym podejściem teoretycznym w dziedzinie studiów gotyckich. Podobne stanowiska muszą być uzupełnione wyjaśnieniem w jaki sposób działają zarówno przeciw jak i w oparciu o fundamentalne założenia psychoanalizy Lacana, aby móc w pełni ocenić co jest na rzeczy w szczególnym zastosowaniu fantomatyczności przez Lawrence’a. Artykuł ma na celu twierdzenie, iż przedstawianie straszenia u Lawrence’a, które uwydatnia rolę cichego ducha, jest charakterystyczne próby doświadczenia różnych rejestrów jouissance lacanowskiego zabronionego podmiotu.


In The Routledge Companion to the Gothic Catherine Spooner notes that the curious intersections between the literary modes of the Gothic and modernism have been gathering more and more scholarly attention (38). The essay collections Gothic Modernisms (Smith & Wallace) and Gothic and Modernism (Riquelme) remain the key academic texts covering the area; however, the field suggests such a wide scope for consideration that many avenues remain to be explored. This article seeks to contribute to this widening scholarly area by reading one of D.H. Lawrence’s later ghost stories – “Glad Ghosts” – through a distinctly theoretical lens. This theoretical framework will rely upon a tripartite approach by calling upon Derrida’s notion of the ‘specter’, Abraham and Torok’s psychoanalytical ‘phantom’, and the relationship between Lacan’s barred subject ($S$) and their experience of jouissance, in order to elucidate Lawrence’s distinctive appropriation of the ghostly. Recent studies of literary haunting have considered how the tensions be-
tween a Derridean speaking to the ghost and Abraham and Torok’s psychoanalytical project to exorcise the transgenerational ‘phantom’ can explain the persistence of the ghostly in a range of literary works, from neo-Victorian meta-fiction (Arias and Pulham) to the Gothic (Berthin). However, in order to understand what is at stake in Lawrence’s appropriation of the master trope of haunting, the two seemingly opposed theoretical standpoints of Derrida and Abraham and Torok need to be further supplemented by a consideration of how they work with and against some of the fundamental categories of Lacanian psychoanalysis. The argument that emerges is that Lawrence’s staging of the ghostly in these stories, with its emphasis on a silent haunting that resists symbolisation, is symptomatic of the Lacanian barred subject’s attempt to experience different registers of jouissance.

In Lacan’s (“The Four Fundamental”) work the term ‘jouissance’ has connotations of pleasure, sexual enjoyment (in French ‘jouir’ is slang for ‘to come’) and pain (281). The final connotation of pain relates to an experience of jouissance as being enjoyable only up to a point, after which there is too much: a traumatic overload of jouissance occurs in which the subject experiences an excruciating dissonance (in his reading of Lacan, Slavoj Zizek emphasises this traumatic character, 79). The barred subject ($) cannot therefore be exposed to pure jouissance as he or she is separated, in the very act of joining the symbolic order, by a bar that separates them qua barred subjects from this overwhelming exposure to the Real. What is crucial, is that in his later work, most notably in Seminar XX, Lacan begins to suggest that there is jouissance of being, an innate enjoyment that the body of the barred subject experiences that is essentially asexual (“On Feminine Sexuality” 6-7) and is an enjoyment of being itself. This possible enjoyment is one type of jouissance that will be considered here. Also, in terms of a more emphatically sexual enjoyment, Lawrence’s text emphasises another form of Lacanian jouissance. This is a darker, more erotic jouissance that the subject knows nothing about, that comes upon the subject from the field of the Other, and is supplementary to phallic jouissance (for Lacan this is Woman’s jouissance, see On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge 1972-1973, 73-77). The ghostly emerges in ‘Glad Ghosts’ when the barred subject pushes the limits of bearable jouissance by an encounter with a spectral Other and where, as in the case of Lucy Hale’s return as a poltergeist, the dead come to collect a debt of jouissance and to reclaim an enjoyment that was kept from them when they were living. These are the terms of the reading that will ultimately follow but first some background work is necessary to shed light on both the origin of “Glad Ghosts” and the current theoretical climate in haunting studies.
Lawrence composed “Glad Ghosts” in late 1925 in response to a request from his long time correspondent and friend Lady Cynthia Asquith who was seeking contributions for her first collection of tales of terror *The Ghost Book* (1926). Lawrence penned ‘Glad Ghosts’ as an initial submission for the collection only for it to be rejected by Asquith on the grounds of it being too lengthy, although some critics suggest that Asquith was put off the story by the uncanny resemblance she bears to the female lead, Carlotta Fell (for a fuller discussion see Ellis 274-77). Lawrence was, in turn, compelled to write another story – “The Rocking Horse Winner” – as an alternative submission for *The Ghost Book* and it was duly accepted by Asquith. This shorter, more psychologically intense story has become the better known of the two works (partly due to a 1949 film adaptation by Anthony Pelissier) though Lawrence, in a letter to his agent Nancy Pearn, describes it only as “spectral enough” (Boulton and Vasey 400) and it is clearly not a ghost story in the traditional sense. While “Glad Ghost” works through several familiar registers of haunting (such as incomplete mourning, spiritualism, and the return of the dead to collect a debt), “The Rocking Horse Winner” suggests a more deeply psychological range with its young protagonist Paul demonstrating symptoms of child psychosis. However, it is “Glad Ghosts” emphasis on a silent haunting, and its handling of different registers of jouissance, that will be of interest here.

As mentioned above, theoretical work in recent scholarly studies of haunting has been dominated by readings that predominantly call upon either Derrida’s formulation of the ‘specter’ or Abraham and Torok’s identification of the ‘phantom’. Considering the former first, Derrida is consistently concerned with the ‘specter’ as an agent of ethics. In*Specters of Marx*, he posits that it is necessary to speak of the ghost, and indeed to the ghost and with it, from the moment that no ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and thinkable and just that does not recognize in its principles the respect for those others who are no longer or for those other who are not yet there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. (xix)

This emphasis on speaking to the ghost at a time of ontological crisis as a prerequisite to justice is a foundational tenet of Derrida’s larger theoretical project, put forward in his later work, which promotes a continual mourning in the form of a melancholia that is both life-affirming and ethical. In his final interview, as the last survivor of his generation of French post-structuralist theorists, Derrida stresses that his discourse of survival “is
life beyond life, life more than life and... not a discourse of death.... Survival is not simply that which remains but the most intense life possible. I am never more haunted by the necessity of dying than in moments of happiness and joy” (“Learning” 52). Haunting for Derrida is therefore not the horror ridden and clichéd affair that is played upon in popular culture but, instead, is the necessary zero point of building a hauntological ethics of living. In particular, in *Specters of Marx*, there is a consideration of the ghost as an ethical harbinger, as a messiah without a messianism, one that can provide a powerful injunction to “make new” ontology and form a larger Derridean “hauntology” that resists relying upon some of the traditional notions of a metaphysics of presence but also encompasses them (“Specters” 10). It is the spectre's role as a distorting force upon linear temporality, along with how it destabilises the supposed binary oppositions of presence and absence, dead and alive, being and non-being (“Specters” 11) that is also conceptually cognate with Derrida’s wider deconstructive project. Crucially, the ghost for Derrida is armed with a spectral voice capable of providing an injunction that any subject following the programme of hauntology is actively obliged to work for or with. The radical Otherness of the spectre gives its spoken injunction the status of a formidable imperative.

In the psychoanalytical work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, however, a very different ghost is reckoned with and their mission as analysts is to exorcise it from the analysand’s unconscious. Their ‘phantom’ is essentially a liar, a transgenerational form of haunting that protects family secrets and that occurs in the analysand’s unconscious, not because of failed mourning, but due to an uncanny knowledge gap in a love object, usually a parent. This ‘secret’ has been concealed by the parent, or even by generations of a family, due to an original shame, and yet it has been transmitted, unconsciously, to subsequent generations. The phantom “works like a ventriloquist, like a stranger within the subject’s own mental topography” (173). Colin Davis has argued that in Abraham and Torok’s account, “the ghost imposes a command of ignorance, which is an injunction not to know, not to seek to reveal, and to hide from others, the secret of the encrypted other.... [While], in Derrida’s version the secret precedes any distinction between ignorance and knowledge, and the injunction requires unconditional belief and obedience. By turning the ghost into a figure of the absolute Other, Derrida effectively sidesteps the issue of the truth or falsehood of what it has to say” (83-84).

Thus, what Derrida puts forward is a spectre of ethics whose address is also somehow pre-ethical: an injunction that demands obedience by its nature as radically Other. Whereas, contrary to this unconditional welcoming of the ghost, Abraham and Torok’s psychoanalytical programme aims to exorcise the ghost and expose the secret
it withholds. However, “Glad Ghosts”’ double emphasis on a haunting of silence and registers of jouissance renders Lawrence’s appropriation of the ghostly in a way that, while recalling some of their tenets, is ultimately distinct from either of these theoretical lenses. These theories should not be disregarded, as they will be referred to throughout, particularly Derrida, but ultimately it is necessary here to read “Glad Ghosts” through a predominantly Lacanian theoretical lens in order to understand properly the role of the ghostly in the text.

The story is narrated from the perspective of Morier, an isolated, wandering ex-art student who recounts his close friendship with Carlotta Fell who he first met at art school before the outbreak of World War One. Carlotta not only impressed at art school but “she was also a beauty too. Her family was not rich, yet she had come into five hundred a year of her own, when she was just eighteen” (“Glad Ghosts” 615). Her family, if not rich, is aristocratic, of the old guard, and fulfilling her wish to “marry into her own surroundings” (ibid 616), she weds an officer in the Guards’ regiment called Lord Lathkill. Morier does not dislike Lathkill but feels him “already a ghost” (ibid 618), while Lathkill himself fears that his family is cursed by infamous bad luck. This is proved to be horrifically accurate as Carlotta and Lathkill lose all three of their children – their young twin boys in a tragic car accident and their even younger daughter to a sudden illness. After these tragic events, and following a hiatus in their communication, Morier decides to meet Carlotta and visit her and Lathkill at Lathkill’s mother’s family home in Derbyshire. Lady Lathkill is an imposing figure and a spiritualist engaged in a frustrating communication with a spirit named Lucy who is the deceased wife of an ageing Colonel staying in the home. Colonel Hale has remarried but he laments, “I daren’t offend Lucy’s spirit. If I do, I suffer tortures till I’ve made my peace again, till she folds me in her arms. Then I can live. But she won’t let me go near the present Mrs. Hale. I – I – I daren’t go near her” (ibid 632). Thus, initially, Lucy’s haunting is read as a barrier inhibiting the Colonel’s enjoyment.

The narrative climax of ‘Glad Ghosts’ soon follows when the younger generation in the house overcome their previous morbidity, begin to dance, and crucially include the Colonel. Lucy’s spirit quickly presents itself in an attempt to counter Hale’s newly found enjoyment as “from somewhere came two slow thuds, and a sound of drapery moving” (ibid 637). In spite of Lady Lathkill’s interpretation of this movement and noises as the imperative “we must leave this room” (ibid) a sensational shift takes place in terms of narrative control in which her son Lathkill wrestles charge of the party and directly disputes his mother’s orders. He urges the Colonel to keep dancing but the Colonel, awe-
struck with terror, following another ominous crash from the poltergeist, is driven from the room by the ghostly presence. In turn, it seems as if not listening to the injunction of the ghost, in other words disrupting the Derridean insistence upon speaking to and with the ghost, results in an unbearable haunting of terror. However, in spite of this momentary fall out, Lathkill constructs a new reading of Lucy’s poltergeist activity and persuades the Colonel into a realisation that he is being haunted by Lucy because together they were, like Lathkill is now, “the ghost of disembodiment” (ibid 645). This explanation allows the Colonel to make peace with Lucy’s spirit. Subsequently, as if to affirm the rights of the body, he gestures the act of taking her into his breast, in a way that rereads psychoanalytical introjection as a corporeal act.

In order to understand Lawrence’s insistence upon the body as this vehicle of love it is necessary to turn to his theory of psychology. In *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious* Lawrence dramatically rereads psychoanalysis so as to furnish the term “unconscious” with his own idiosyncratic significations. He maps out a radical physio-psychology by positing that the seat of the unconscious is not situated in a foreclosed region of the mind but in the human chest.

There are now two planes of primary consciousness – the first, the lower, the subjective unconscious, active beneath the diaphragm, and the second upper, object plane, active above the diaphragm, in the breast. Let us realize that the subjective and the objective of the unconscious are not the same as the subjective and the objective of the mind. Here we have no concepts to deal with, no static objects in the shape of ideas... We are on straightforward solid ground, there is not abstraction (27).

Lawrence’s “philosophy” of psychology is idiosyncratic to say the least and it is beyond the scope of this article to interrogate its main tenets fully. However, what is crucial for current considerations is that “the subjective and the objective of the unconscious are not the same as the subjective and the objective of the mind.” In turn, there is an emphasis on the body as having its own instinctual plains of experiencing, particularly “the diaphragm” and “the breast”, which contain elements of what Lawrence calls “primary consciousness”. The action of Hale taking the spirit of Lucy into his chest in “Glad Ghosts”, read from this perspective, is therefore a reworking of psychoanalytical introjection to fit the tenets of Lawrence’s own theory. Instead of the ego using language as a means to introject and consume loss and exorcise the ghosts of mourning, as is the case in classic psychoanalytical modes of mourning, the ghost is exorcised in this case by a signifying
practice grounded in the body that resists “abstraction”. Hale comes to grips, to put it in Lacanian terms, with his own jouissance of being and the act of pulling Lucy into his body constitutes an end to the mourning process through a shift in register from the symbolic to the Real.

In some senses this recalls Lacan’s later works in which he posits that the ideal position for the analysand to be in on completion of analysis is for his jouissance to accompany and supplement the symbolic. As Veronique Veroz puts it, “Truth is to be half-spoken, *mi-dite*, a combination of being *qua* jouissance – a letter – and being *qua* meaning – a signifier: the symptom as semantic part of the Real, or as real part of the Symbolic…” (131). Veroz’s emphasis on the “letter” here recalls Lacan’s theory of the letter as the closest representative of the Real; his most prominent example of this being the *objet a*. However, Lawrence’s staging of this coming to terms with the ghost, while conceptually cognate with late Lacanian psychoanalysis, does not suggest a complete exorcism of Lucy in the traditional sense of Freud’s normative mourning or Abraham and Torok’s work on the phantom. Instead there is a living with ghosts that recalls the Derridean position on the spectre and yet this does not fulfil the programme Derrida puts forward in *Specters of Marx* fully either. Hale indeed speaks to the ghost of Lucy, through Lathkill as a kind of analytical interpreter, but this speaking to the ghost is not sustainable and reaches a limit at which point there is a shift in register from the symbolic, which has been feeding an imaginary fantasy, to the Real. Hale learns to carry Lucy in his breast and live with the ghost *qua* jouissance of being rather than engaging in the continual, symbolic and hauntological speaking to the ghost.

Therefore, while on one hand Lawrence’s coming to terms with jouissance works to realign failed mourning, there is also the inverted sense that *only* speaking to the ghost, in a misguided way that forecloses the body, leads to the deadlock of a disembodied melancholia. This recalls Lacan’s essential formulation that “what [does] not come to light in the symbolic, appears in the real” (“Écrits” 324) and the Real “expects nothing from speech” (ibid). In particular, speaking to the ghost *qua* spiritualism is figured in the story as a dangerously symbolic practice that feeds an imaginary fantasy at odds with an objective critique or reading of the ghost’s desire. As a spiritualist, Lady Lathkill works to enforce her own totalitarian desire over the household while prolonging the failed mourning of others. However, there is a pivotal moment that occurs to promote a movement beyond this melancholic deadlock to the rediscovery of jouissance: Lathkill usurping of his mother’s power that restricts and stifles the desire of others. Lathkill insists upon the rights of the flesh over a spiritualist mode that restricts and stagnates
desire. After seizing control of the party he rejoices that “the Colonel is happy now the forlorn ghost of Lucy is comforted in his heart”. Lathkill now reads that Lucy haunts because, in life, it was the Colonel’s “body which had not been good to her” (ibid 647). It is Lathkill’s reading of the ghost as collecting a debt of jouissance that promotes an end to the haunting and allows Colonel Hale to live on with Lucy introjected into his body. In turn, Mrs Lathkill qua spiritualist in “Glad Ghosts” performs a role that embodies Paul de Man’s understanding of prosopopoeia – attributing a fictive voice to the dead that is really a manifestation of the desire of the conduit for this voice, the person who is listening to this supposed voice (for a discussion of reading prosopopoeia in this way see Davis, 112-114). Lathkill, on the other hand, builds a dialogue with Lucy that reads her supposed symbolic debt, her raison d’être for haunting, in a more sophisticated manner that in fact reinterprets the debt not as symbolic but as a debt of jouissance.

Lathkill’s working through of Hale’s mourning is not a completely selfless one. He is compelled to help Hale as he identifies with his predicament: both Lathkill and his wife Carlotta have been caught in a melancholic deadlock, reminiscent of Hale’s, since the deaths of their children. They too have been haunted in recent years by a silent ghost of the quotidian: not the ghost of Lucy but another spectral figure that resists naming. However, their failed mourning is also realigned by Lathkill’s newly found, manic impetus as he tries to constitute himself once more as a desiring subject. He begins to realign his own mourning with a moment of symbolic suicide. This moment of symbolic suicide qua erasure of subjectivity is interlinked with a return to the mother. Lathkill therefore not only rediscovers his desire but in this movement he returns to the mother seemingly flaunting the incest taboo. In a frenzy he suggests to his mother that

...a man has to be in love in his things, the way you ride a horse. Why don’t we stay in love that way all our lives? Why do we turn into corpses with consciousness? Oh, mother of my body, thank you for my body, you strange woman with white hair! I don't know much about you, but my body came from you, so thank you, my dear. I shall think of you tonight! (ibid 648).

Here the mother is constituted as a conscious sexual object and yet her primary function remains maternal with Lathkill’s assertion first that “my body came from you” and this recalls Lacan’s situating of Woman as primarily maternal but also as the object cause of Man’s desire (“On Feminine Sexuality” 7). The mother is returned only to then be abjected but this reciprocal motion seems to transform Lathkill from a “corpse with
consciousness” into a vital, desiring subject. The final, strange promise of the passage, where Lathkill cries that he will think of his mother tonight, places the remainder of the story in the thematic realm of the sexual and the prohibited. It is in this space that the Lathkills’ ghost of the quotidian haunts. Indeed, in spite of the cessation of Lucy’s haunting, this other ghost remains to haunt the Lathkill’s home and Carlotta and Lathkill consistently suggest that it will be drawn to Morier: It is implied that the ghost will visit Morier one late evening with sexual purpose.

Lathkill urges Morier to welcome this ghost of the quotidian if it should visit his room during the night, after the fire in his room has been extinguished, suggesting that the ghost can somehow replace the warmth of the fire by satiating sexual desire. However, what is crucial is the emphasis upon the ghost as silent:

There, your fire has died down. But it’s a nice room! I hope our ghost will come to you. I think she will. Don’t speak to her. It makes her go away. She, too, is a ghost of silence. We talk far too much. But now I am going to be silent too, and a ghost of silence (ibid 648-49).

This is an invitation to relate to the ghost as neither a psychoanalytical ‘phantom’ nor a Derridean spectre: there is neither an exorcism of the ghost as symptom nor a speaking to the ghost. However, by reading it through the lens of Lacanian psychoanalysis, what is at stake can be understood more clearly. By having the ghost remain silent Lawrence suggests a primal communication with the spectral through the flesh, something that perhaps pre-dates language, and is furthermore suggestive of a primacy of communication that is neither ethical nor fully accessible to the barred subject. We are perhaps here dealing with a communication from the objective and subjective consciousnesses that Lawrence outlines in *Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious*. Once more, this ghost is interlinked with the barred subject’s experience of jouissance, specifically where the “bar” that prohibits the subject from experiencing the impossible pain of jouissance is subject to slippage.

This sense of the encounter with the ghost as a return to a state before the constitution of the barred subject is highlighted in Morier’s account of the ghostly encounter itself. There is at work an intermingling of fantasy and maternal womb imagery:

I must have gone far, far down the intricate galleries of sleep, to the very heart of the world. For I now know I passed on beyond the strata of images and words, beyond the
iron veins of memory, and even the jewel of rest, to sink in the final dark like a fish, dumb, soundless, and imageless, yet alive and swimming.

And at the very core of the deep night the ghost came to me, at the heart of the ocean of oblivion, which is also the heart of life. Beyond hearing, or even knowledge of contact, I met her and knew her. How I know it I don’t know. Yet I know it with eyeless, wingless knowledge. (ibid.649)

In reading this descent into a womb-like space of consciousness which is “beyond the strata of images and words” and which signifies “a final dark” and yet allows Morier to feel “alive and swimming” there is something unfathomable here – clear even in his later uncertainty of whether the presence is a ghost, a vision, or a woman – and Morier has the feeling of knowing but not knowing – what Nicolas Abraham calls a “nescience” (“The Intermission” 188). One explanation for this dark experience of jouissance is that Morier’s object of desire is foreclosed in the symbolic order as taboo. The ghost is the distorted figure of the illegitimate desire for the mother, something foregrounded in Lathkill’s earlier strange speech of rebellion to his mother which culminates in the perverse, “I shall think of you tonight!” So, this privileging of the body and the instinc
tual over phantasmatic love carries with it a prohibited and veiled return to the original maternal object of desire; this can only be recalled as a spectre, as something not fully there, and so not engendering a lethal threat to the adult subject. It allows the subject to flirt with what separates it from impossible and painful jouissance and, in turn, leads to a sexual experience that is both intense and unknowable. In Lacanian terms, this the jouissance of the Other S(A).

“Glad Ghosts” therefore follows a tripartite approach to dealing with haunting so as to realign failed mourning. Firstly, Mrs. Lathkill is the channeller who “speaks to the ghost” on the pretence of having the privileged power of the spiritualist. Such a power is conceived of as being a supernatural ability to communicate with the dead but in a private discourse that the living cannot hear. In turn, Lady Lathkill is conversing with a personal other and misreads Lucy’s proclamations, qua poltergeist activity, that are articulations of the debt of jouissance that she has come to collect. Mrs. Lathkill employs, albeit with Hale’s initial complicity, an impersonal Derridean speaking to the ghost in what should be a personal haunting for Colonel Hale. Her son, however, when he seizes the role of interpreter, and here we move onto psychoanalytical ground, interprets the symptom in a more complex way and constructs a case history, albeit a brief one, that is primarily focused upon experiences of jouissance. The second stage in Lawrence’s “living with the
ghost” therefore presents itself in Lathkill’s more complex reading of the ghost’s desires and how this relates to unfulfilled demands that were known but unknowns, nesciences of sorts, in the Hales’ marriage. Lucy does not actively mislead, as Abraham and Torok’s ‘phantom’ may do, and she even retains the Derridean status of the ghost to be lived with in a haunting that affirms life in the present, although speaking to the ghost in the symbolic does reach a limit for Lawrence. In turn, a living with a ‘silent’ ghost is put forward in the third stage of haunting figured in the story – the living with the Lathkills’ persistent ghost of the quotidian. This is the ghost of jouissance par excellence: it extends the bearable jouissance of the barred subject by veiling and yet representing the prohibited maternal object of desire. This experience of jouissance is so radical that it cannot be properly recalled, the barred subject knows nothing about its origin, and it is the ghost’s status as a being radically outside of any traditional ontological understanding that allows it to stand in for this tabooed return of prohibited desire. Thus, “Glad Ghosts” illustrates that the ghostly manifests itself, either darkly from the field of the Other or due to unsuccessful mourning, as a symptom of the barred subject’s experience of different registers of Lacanian jouissance.

Works Cited