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‘THE LONG WAR’: WHO IS WINNING THE BATTLE FOR IDEAS?

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From the outset this has been a very confusing conflict. For over seven years western leaders have never tired of telling the world that the War against Terrorism is principally an ‘ideological struggle’ or a ‘battle of ideas’. But the concept of a ‘battle of idea’ is rarely elaborated. In official proceedings the term has a uniquely shallow and rhetorical character. Official statements self-consciously avoid spelling out the ideology that they are tackling. Recycled historical allusions to Nazism, totalitarianism and Stalinist Russia serve as a substitute for clarity about the ideological character of the contemporary threat. Other than denouncing it as ‘extremist’, ‘totalitarian’ or ‘fanatical’ there is a studied silence about the content of the ideological threat facing Western democratic societies. This remarkable reluctance to spell out the issues at stake betrays a sense of defensiveness and hesitancy toward the conduct of the battle of ideas.

The most striking symptom of this defensiveness is the linguistic confusion shown in official communications. Policy makers appear to lack a language through which they can give meaning to contemporary realities. Indeed they appear to devote more energy toward lecturing people what words not to use than to offer a clear explanation of their objectives. Jonathan Evans in his first public speech in November 2007 as head of MI5 pleaded with newspaper editors to avoid words that help the enemy. He insisted that we must ‘pay close attention to our use of language’ and avoid words that encourages the association of terrorism with Islam since that would undermine the Government’s ability to win the hearts and minds of Britain’s Muslim communities (Evans, 2007). Soon after this statement reports were circulated indicating that officials were ‘rethinking’ their approach and ‘abandoning what they admit has been offensive and inappropriate language’. The acknowledgement that UK officials expressed themselves in a language that was offensive and inappropriate betrays a palpable sense of disorientation in Whitehall. According to reports the term ‘war on terror’ will no longer be heard from ministers and the threat will not be described as a ‘Muslim Problem’ (Norton-Taylor, 2007). It is as if the ‘Careless Talk Costs Lives’ campaign of 2nd World

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1 This point is developed in ‘Introduction’ to Frank Furedi, Invitation To Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unknown, London: Continuum Press, 2007.
War has been rehabilitated – only this time there is confusion about who the enemy is and what to call it.

Unlike their opponents Western officials are continually correcting the language they use to describe what is now euphemistically called the Long War. ‘We strongly urge the government to abandon talk of a “War on Terror”’ demands a report on the issue of home-grown terrorism in the UK (Blick, Chouduri and Weir, 2007:11). The British Broadcasting Corporation appears to be at a loss to know when the usage of the word ‘terrorist’ or ‘terrorism’ is appropriate. ‘The value judgements frequently implicit in the use of the words “terrorist” or “terrorist groups” can create inconsistency in their use or, to audiences, raise doubts about our impartiality’, states the BBC’s editorial guidelines (‘Editorial Guidelines’, 2007). The EU is obsessed with not using words that could give the slightest hint of implicating Islam with terrorism. Take the guidelines issued by EU officials in April 2006 on the difficult question of what to call the enemy. The guidelines counselled avoiding the term ‘Islamic terrorism’ in favour of the Orwellian-sounding phrase ‘terrorists who abusively invoke Islam’. The invention of this term was part of the project of constructing a ‘non-emotive lexicon for discussing radicalisation’ (‘Islamic terrorism is too emotive a phrase, says EU’, 2006).

Linguistic uncertainty afflicts proceedings on both sides of the Atlantic. Even supporters of the war on terror have reservations about using this term. Former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum has remarked that to say ‘we are fighting a War on Terror’ is ‘like saying World War II was a war on blitzkrieg’. He added that terror like blitzkrieg is a tactic used by our enemy, not the enemy itself’ (Santorum, 2006). Occasionally even the architects of the war on terror concede that they got their lines mixed up. ‘We actually misnamed the war on terror’ conceded President Bush in August 2004. Without a hint of irony he added that ‘it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world’ (‘Campaign snapshots’, 2004). In the very attempt to rectify the ‘misnaming’ of a war, Bush exposes the poverty of the intellectual resources with which the battle against terror is fought. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the confusion lies not just with the occasional word but the entire script.

President Bush’s acknowledgment that ‘we actually misnamed the war on terror’ should not be seen as proof of the White House’s lack of rhetorical skills. Confusion about terminology expresses a wider mood of disorientation about the very meaning of the war. One of the clearest manifestations of this problem is the constant display of verbal acrobatics shown by officials in London and Washington in their attempt to explain the significance of this conflict. Sometimes they struggle to find the right words. At times they even attempt to distance themselves from the term ‘war on terror’ and give the impression that they are uncomfortable with the rhetorical idioms that they invented. In December 2006 it was reported that the Foreign Office had advised Government ministers, ambassadors and officials to stop using the term ‘war on terror’ and similar provocative terms as ‘they risk angering British Muslims and generating tensions in the wider Islamic world’ (‘Christmas Terror’, 2006). A year later official sources indicated that the term war on terror would no longer be heard from ministers. Apparently they will use a ‘less emotive language’ that would focus on the criminal character of terrorist plots (Norton-Taylor, 2007). That the name designated to define this glob-
al conflict could be perceived as too ‘emotive’ and a liability and so easily dispensed with is symptomatic of a mood of unease about progress in the war.

But of course the problems are not so much linguistic as ideological and political.

As one report on the state of British public diplomacy noted ‘effective policies for dealing with these new security challenges are quite different from those of the Cold War, and publics require much more active persuasion’. It added that ‘responses to the threat of nuclear war or Russian invasion had much broader and less questioning support than do responses to the threat of terrorist attack, which are coloured by deep popular scepticism about pre-emptive wars and about the principle of regime change for “terrorism-sponsoring” states’ (Leonard, Small and Rose, 2005: 11). The relatively ambiguous public support for the war against terrorism suggests that for a variety of reasons this conflict has not encouraged national solidarity. The inability of the Western elites, particularly in the EU to give meaning to their global policies means that it is not winning the battle of ideas with its own public. This development is most evident in relation to its estrangement from the Muslim population that inhabit western societies.

Surveys continually highlight the feeble influence of secular and liberal values on significant sections of Europe’s Muslim population. Despite the numerous initiatives at ‘dialogue’ and ‘multiculturalism’, a global survey indicates that Muslims in Britain are the most anti-western in Europe. Back in June 2007 Gordon Brown pledged to wage a cultural war on terrorism similar to that used against communism during the cold war. ‘We must work across society to isolate the extremists from society to protect and advance the British way of life’ argued Brown (Laville, 2007). A month later he developed this theme and told his American hosts that in the fight against terrorism what was at stake is a ‘struggle for the soul of the 21st Century’ (‘Brown Talks of Terror Struggle’, 2007). His sentiments are widely shared throughout the EU. As one well known analyst observed ‘the larger part of this struggle, and the more important in the long term, is the battle for the hearts and minds of young European Muslims—usually men—who are not yet fanatically violent jihadists, but could become so’ (Ash, 2007).

A NEW TYPE OF IDEOLOGICAL THREAT

Official anxiety about the growing threat of home-grown extremism represents a radical departure from the way that terrorism was conceptualised in the past. Today terrorism is understood as not merely a physical threat. It is not simply the capacity of the terrorist to wreak mass destruction that worries society. Terrorism is also endowed with moral and ideological power that it is able to exercise over significant sections of the domestic population. The influence that the cause of the terrorist is able to exercise over the minds of sections of the public endows this threat with unparalleled danger. Sir David Omand, the former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator goes as far as to state that ‘the most effective weapon of the terrorist at present is their ideology’ (Omand, 2005:109). The model of a terrorist as an effective purveyor of ideas represents a significant departure from the way this threat was perceived in the past. Indeed the idea that a terrorist can appeal to people’s heart and minds and not just merely scare the public is fundamentally inconsistent with traditional definitions of this threat. Until
recent times the danger of terrorism was interpreted through its capacity to inflict fear on its target population. It is only in recent times that terrorism is conceptualised as an effective ideological competitor.

Increasingly an important dimension of the war against terrorism is the battle for moral authority. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the political and cultural elites of Western societies feel less than confident about conducting a successful campaign on the battlefield of ideas. Their apprehension about the powerful attraction of radical ideas on sections of the domestic population in the West often betrays the belief that they can not convince others of the superiority of their own way of life.

Western analysts are intensely apprehensive about the likely outcome of the battle of ideas with terrorism. They appear at a loss to explain what they refer to as the ‘radicalization process’. One U.S. intelligence survey published in April 2006 observed that ‘the radicalization process is occurring more widely, and more anonymously in the Internet age, raising the likelihood of surprise attacks by unknown groups whose members and supporters may be difficult to pinpoint’. But blaming communication technology for promoting radicalisation can not entirely distract attention from a far more fundamental problem—which is that the US is not winning the battle for ideas. As this report concedes the Jihadists have increased their influence and numbers (‘Declassified Key Judgments’, 2006).

British intelligence analysts are if anything more anxious about the appeal of radicalism than their American counterparts. Ian Blair, Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, has drawn attention to the fact that young British Muslims are ‘willing to die for an idea’ and ‘this is a phenomenon we have not seen en masse, since the Spanish Civil War and the battle against fascism’. Idealism seems to be monopolised by the wrong side of this conflict. Of particular concern for Ian Blair is the fact that the appeal of their ‘coherent narrative of oppressions, war and jihad’ seems ‘very potent’.

One of the truly shocking things — in addition to their intent — about the recent alleged plot to blow up airliners is the apparent speed with which young, reasonably affluent, some reasonably well-educated, British born people were converted from what appeared to be ordinary lives — in a matter of some weeks and months, not years — to a position where some were allegedly prepared to commit suicide and murder thousands of people at the same time. (Blair, 2006)

It is likely that Blair’s shock at the speed of radicalisation expresses a belated recognition of a problem that the British Government failed to recognise for a very long time. The response towards the problem of home grown terrorism has been confused to say the least. Until the 7/7 J London bombings the Government tended to act as if this problem did not exist. It has yet to take on board the possibility that as matters stand—it may lack the intellectual and political resources to project an attractive credible alternative

Insofar as there is a hint of strategy about tackling radicalisation it has a fantasy like character. Often the official discourse on radicalisation projects an infantilized version of child protection attitudes. It warns that ‘vulnerable’ and ‘impressionable’ young people may be targeted on internet sites, campuses and social venues and ‘groomed’ by cynical operators. Back in November 2007 it was reported that the UK Government’s Research, Information and Communication Unit would draw up “counter-nar-
natives” to the anti-Western messages on websites ‘designed to influence vulnerable and impressionable audiences here’ (Norton-Taylor, 2007). The same point was reiterated a year previously. In November 2006 Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, the former head of MI5 observed that ‘it is the youth who are being actively targeted, groomed, radicalised and set on a path that frighteningly quickly could end in their involvement in mass murder of their fellow UK citizens’ (ctd in Norton-Taylor, 2006).

Unfortunately the dramatic framing of the threat — ‘sudden radicalisation’—allows extremism to be seen as a kind of psychological virus that suddenly afflicts the vulnerable and those suffering psychological deficits. Yet the depiction of radicalisation as a symptom of vulnerability overlooks the fact that frequently it expresses confidence and self belief. Indeed as Ian Blair pointed out above what is striking is the activism and idealism of these so-called brainwashed. Moreover the people who embrace radicalism are rarely brainwashed by manipulative operatives –often they have sought out jihadist web-sites and on-line networks. In other words they may have made a self-conscious and active choice.²

WHAT IF THEY ARE US?

Apprehensions about the problem of the home-grown threat endows the question ‘why do they hate us’ with a new meaning. The very posing of the question by Bush and others conveys a sense of genuine surprise and bewilderment. The question also expresses frustration and distress about the discovery that not everyone loves us. It resembles the kind of gesture that children make when they discover that they are not the centre of everyone’s undivided attention. Even in its slightly less infantilised form this query hints at a sense of disappointment about being betrayed by someone close. The implicit premise of this question is that they ought to be really like us. This is not a sentiment that one directs at clearly acknowledged enemies. Neither President Roosevelt nor Churchill needed to ask why the Nazis hate us. Nor was this the type of question that western leaders directed at the Kremlin. So the anxiety expressed by this question semi-consciously refers to the concern that they might be uncomfortably close to us. Worse still since the apparent emergence of ‘home grown terrorism’ there is great concern that ‘they’ might be one of ‘us’.

When this question was originally formulated by President Bush it was based on the premise that the enemy came from somewhere far way. The problem and sources of terrorism was conceptualised as one that is external to Western societies. Many of the theories about Muslim rage or clash of civilisations have as their focus distant and exotic places such as Afghanistan or Iran. Ironically many of the critics of American and European foreign policy also offer an externalist perspective and argue that what provokes terrorism is the oppression of Palestine and Western domination of the Middle East. Radical critics of the West also locate the problem of terrorism as the consequence of developments in the Middle East (see Gary Younge, 2007).³ In Britain the

² This point is confirmed by research into the motivation and character of suicide bombers. See for example Scott Atran, ‘The Moral Logic of Suicide Terrorism’, The Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2006.
³ See for example Gary Younge ‘We must be honest about our past to be truly hopeful about our future’, The Guardian: 16 April 2007.
Oxford Research Group regularly publishes reports that condemn the war in Iraq for encouraging global terrorism (See ‘Iraq Policy’, 2007).

Since September 11 it has become increasingly difficult to ignore the fact that the threat of terrorism is not just an external but a domestic problem. The difficulties that political leaders have in spelling out ‘our’ way of life acquire momentous significance in relation to the flourishing of anti-western movements in the domestic front. With the rise of so-called home grown terrorism the question of why do they hate us is linked to queries about why are they repelled by us and why don’t they want to be like us. British officials and analysts have been shocked by the discovery that a significant section of its Muslim youth has become sympathetic to a radical Islamic outlook. Press reports frequently draw attention to the way in which young people who apparently lived a life of English born westernised teenagers can become suddenly radicalised and turn into bitter enemies of their country. Take the following account of the life Hasib Hussain, one of the suicide bombers responsible for the carnage of the 7 July bombings in London:

He liked playing cricket and hockey, then one day he came into school and had undergone a complete transformation almost overnight... He started wearing a topi hat from the mosque, grew a beard and wore robes. Before that he was always in jeans (‘Suicide Bomber Profile: The Teenager’, 2006).

Here is a young man who is apparently just like us but who incomprehensibly has a sudden character transformation and turns against his neighbours and country! Like the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings, he lived and worked amongst the people he chose to target.

The realisation that they are not like us, do not want to be like us and hate us render this threat an all too intimate status. It is not just in Britain that people have discovered that their neighbours were not who they thought they were. Holland Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, Canada, the U.S.A. are some of the countries who have discovered that some their young people have developed extreme hatred for the western way of life.

The discovery of home-grown radicalisation implicitly calls into question the conventional portrayal of the war on terror. Not only has the distinction between them and us become more confused the conflict increasingly points to tension within the western society itself. It is recognised that in recent years ‘the majority of terrorist activities inside the West come from independent, homogeneous networks’ (Vidino, 2006:119). It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that that at least for some people living in the West, their society’s way of life appears repulsive. This development poses the question of ‘who is next’? The problem posed by the ascendancy of the homogenous radical is that it can be anybody. In Europe security analyst concede that it is proving impossible to make a profile of the terrorist.

From time to time analysts compare today’s home grown terrorists with those of the past. ‘From the Ku Klux Klan to the Weather Underground, American society has reaped its share of violent dissident groups’ notes one reporter (Jonsson, 2006). However the threat of today’s home-grown Islamic radical is not experienced as that posed by a small isolated fringe group. On the contrary they are perceived as part of a global revolt against the Western way of life. That anti-western sentiment can serve as a focus
for the radicalisation of young people living in Europe and America exposes the problem that these societies have in inspiring enthusiasm and loyalty. On the contrary. The emergence of home-grown anti-western radicalism indicates that at least for some, rather than possessing any positive meaning, ‘our way of life’ provokes hatred and disgust.

In a different world terrorism could be dismissed as an episodic threat posed by a handful of malcontents whose heinous deeds repelled the vast majority of ordinary citizens. When Governments sought to crack down on terrorists they could invariably count on public support. This was a threat that could be swiftly criminalised and isolated as an illegitimate threat. Acts of terror directed at members of the political elites were successfully presented by governments as threats to anyone. The battle lines were clear with a small group of extremists on one side and the rest of society on the other.

At a time when home grown and external threats appear so confusing the elevation of terrorism as the enemy provides little obvious meaning. Increasingly it is recognised that this conflict is not so much about weapons of mass destruction as they are about ideas. At present the predominant tendency is to interpret the problem as that of disgruntled people becoming radicalised and drawn to a movement with mass appeal. One important analyst of this process writes how Jihad has ‘become a millenarian movement with mass appeal’ and about the need to counter the ‘terrorist narrative—and draw potential recruits away from the lure of jihad’ (Stern, 2006). However it is unclear just what constitutes the lure of jihad. Young people who are attracted by jihadist videos rarely adopt a new world view. Their response is not all that different to the numerous non-Muslim Westerners who visit nihilistic web sites and become fascinated by destructive themes and image. Those who visit jihadist sites opt for a fad rather than a coherent worldview. It is worth noting that some radicals who have been arrested for terrorist activities in Europe do not fit the image of the religious zealot. According to one report on members of the Mujahedon network—a Swedish internet forum, their knowledge of Islam was ‘virtually non-extent’ and their ‘fascination with jihad seems to be dictated by their rebellious nature rather than a deep ideological conviction’ (Vidino, 2006:6). In other words the dominant influence appears to be estrangement from society rather than the pull of a vibrant and dynamic alternative.

What’s often overlooked is that it is not so much the lure of radicalism but the unravelling of meaning that is predominantly responsible for the emergence of a home-grown threat in the West. It appears that at least since the end of the Cold War, western political ideals have become exhausted and their capacity to endow experience with meaning has become significantly diminished. As Laidi noted ‘to define oneself by contrast with communism no longer has any meaning’ (Laidi, 1998: 172). At the same time the West has become uncomfortable about its own tradition and its intellectual, scientific and moral inheritance rarely succeeds in providing a positive sense of meaning. Bin Laden himself attempts to incorporate into his statements many of the

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*This problem is discussed in Frank Furedi, The Politics Of Fear; Beyond Left and Right, London; Continuum Press, 2005.*
doubts that Westerners have about their legacy. In his October 2002 message to the Americans he wrote:

You are a nation that exploits women like consumer products or advertising tools, calling upon customers to purchase them. You use women to serve passengers, visitors, and strangers to increase your profit margins. You then rant that you support the liberation of women…

You have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases, more than any other nation in history. Despite this, you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your greedy companies and industries (ctd in Lawrence, 2005: 168).

The ease with which conventional anti-consumerist, environmentalist themes merge with radical jihadist ones is testimony to the confluence of internally driven anti-modernism with externally inspired anti-western ones. In such circumstances it is not surprising that western governments find it difficult to give a name to the enemy.

Within the West there are formidable cultural influences that disparage its historical achievements and belief in progress and enlightenment. Some commentators take the view that the West faces a moral crisis and finds it difficult to believe in itself. The authors of *Suicide of the West* believe that ‘most Westerners no longer believe in the ideas that have made the West so successful’ (Koch and Smith, 2006:2). Others argue that even the police force and intelligence gathering agencies are influenced by a mood of ‘Western self-loathing’ which undermines their operational judgment (Newman and Smith, 2005:100). Those who look and find a home on a jihadist website may well represent but a variant of such a response to the crisis of belief afflicting the West.

One reason why the war on terror has failed to consolidate a sense of solidarity against the enemy is because of the crisis of meaning afflicting the West. Uncontained by a robust system of meaning the threats have been far more effective in producing fears than in encouraging the emergence of new solidarities. Sadly shared meaning for most people is confined to fearing being a target rather being inspired to stand up for a way of life.

A crisis of meaning

It is evident that the reconceptualisation of terrorism as an ideological competitor is linked to the apparent decline in the self-belief of the West. Even before 9/11 there was more than a hint of defensiveness about the capacity of western values to prevail over those of hostile opponents. One conservative American contributor gave voice to this sentiment and concluded that ‘protecting Western culture from foreign assault requires domestic revival’. A decade before 9/11 he warned that ‘the twenty-first century could once again find Islam at the gates of Vienna, as immigrants or terrorists if not armies’ (Lind, 1991:45). Today there is little evidence of a domestic revival. Indeed Western governments are sensitive about their very limited capacity for inspiring their own public. The problem of engaging the public and gaining its support is strikingly evident in relation to the post 9/11 political landscape.

Almost imperceptibly the threat of terrorism has been reinterpreted as predominantly an ideological one. Joseph Nye a leading American foreign relations expert places an emphasis on what he calls the *soft power* of terrorist organisation. Soft pow-
er, which Nye describes as ‘the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments’ seems to directly contradict the conventional representation of terrorism with its focus on realising objectives through inflicting fear (Nye, 2004: 34). Official concern about the influence of jihadist web sites, videos and other forms of communications indicates the seriousness with which the soft power is taken. ‘Terrorism depends crucially on soft power for its ultimate victory’ states Nye who also believes that ‘it depends on its ability to attract support from the crowd at least as much as its ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight’ (Nye, 2004:51).

Nye’s shift in focus from mass casualty and weapons of mass destruction terrorism to the danger of soft power parallels an important shift in official thinking. In effect concern about ideas rather than just physical force shapes elite perceptions of the problems. Terrorism is feared as an ideological competitor for the allegiance of the very same publics that western governments are attempting to influence. Anxiety about the capacity of terrorists’ organisations to succeed in the battle of ideas exposes a crisis of confidence that haunts western political elites. This is why the war on terror is frequently described in extravagant terms as a battle to defend a way of life.

The very fact that governments perceive relatively incoherent jihadist opponents as representing a serious ideological challenge to the western way of life draws attention to their feeble sense of self-belief. Paradoxically while they continually inflate the physical threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorism governments are reluctant to fully acknowledge their concern about winning the hearts and minds of sections of its own public. The deliberations about the problem of home-grown terrorism tend to focus on the problem of ‘radicalisation’. This challenge is interpreted as a consequence of the external influence of global jihadist forces rather than what it may well be—a rejection of the western way of life. So one American intelligence report indicates that home-grown terrorism in the U.S. and Europe is likely to become a growing problem without posing the question of why young people growing up in these places come to hate their countries way of life (see ‘Declassified Key Judgments’, 2006).

The tendency to associate the problem of radicalisation with the influence of external global forces peddling anti-western sentiments serves to distract attention from the crisis of elite authority on the home front. It is important to note that the growth of ‘anti-US and anti-globalization sentiment’ recorded by U.S. intelligence sources is often fuelled by cultural forces closer to home (‘Declassified Key Judgments’, 2006). Anti-Americanism and contempt for aspects of the so-called western way of life exercise widespread influence in many European countries. These sentiments are most systematically expressed through cultural critiques of consumerism, capitalist selfishness, greed and ambition—ideas that also resonate with sections of America’s cultural elite. Ideas that denounce Western arrogance and its belief in science and progress are actually generated from within the societies of Europe and America. The crisis of the West ‘is internally generated’ and it ‘lies in Western heads’ (Koch and Smith, 2006:1). Often this internally generated critique of the West overlaps on many points with those mounted by jihadist movements.

Instead of focusing on the external influences driving radicalisation, the UK based analyst Bill Durodie believes that it is more profitable to explore developments closer at home: ‘It may prove more productive to ask why it is that a small element of Asian
youth, and quite a few others as well, fail to find any sense of solidarity or purpose within Western society’ (Durodie, 2005:2). Numerous observers have drawn to the fact that a significant proportion of the individuals linked to terrorist outrages have grown up in the societies that they have learned to hate and want to destroy. Scott Atran that ‘arguably the greatest potential threat in the world today lies with uprooted and egalitarian Muslim young adults in European cities, who provided the manpower for both the 9/11 and Madrid train-bombing attacks’ (Atran, 2006: 269). Yet there is little attempt to discuss why it is that a significant minority of young people have developed such intense hostility towards their own society. The same commentators who exaggerate the threat of WMD terrorism appear to ignore or pay only a fleeting attention to a threat which is far too close to home. This response is entirely understandable for it is through this threat that the political elites are painfully reminded of the crisis of their authority. The widely observed rule of silence on this subject stands in sharp contrast to the shrill rhetoric surrounding the perils posed by jihadist websites. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what we need is not rhetoric about a struggle for idea but a more scrupulous attention to the content of what constitutes a way of life worth defending.

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