Untying Gordian Knot: Projects to Reform the UN Security Council

ABSTRACT

The article focuses on the very topical, and hotly debated in the last three decades, issue of the United Nations Security Council reform. The author briefly describes the historical roots of the Security Council, its establishment in 1945 and the enlargement that took place in 1965. The second part of the paper outlines the systemic flaws of the current composition of the Council and presents the existing projects of its reform proposed by the UN bodies or groups of states. The final part provides the ranking of current members of, and aspiring candidates to, the Security Council. The author describes the methodology used for this ranking and its utility for better understanding of the complexity of the problem.

KEYWORDS

United Nations, Security Council, veto right, state, permanent members

Introduction

The United Nations is a global international organization established in 1945 after the World War II. It replaced the largely ineffective League of Nations and has had similar goals – to maintain international peace and security, increase international cooperation, and, simply speaking, avoid the next global war. The UN’s structure is to some extent based on that of the League of Nations. It has five principal organs, and the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, according to art. 24 of the UN Charter,\(^1\) is conferred on one of those organs – the UN Security Council.

\(^1\) Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
The UN Security Council has been created in a way that requires a consensus among its permanent members in order to effectively perform its duties. Such institutional arrangements may have been seen necessary in 1945 and may have helped to avoid a global military conflict between the permanent members during the Cold War era, in which the League of Nations had failed. On the other hand, it has become evident that the UN Security Council has fundamental flaws, and often cannot adequately react to modern conflicts and challenges, and cannot effectively maintain international peace and security. Thus, the ideas to reform the UN Security Council have been actively discussed for years now.

1. Historical Overview

The ideas to establish a “world government” can be traced far back to the late 17th century. William Penn had proposed an idea of the world parliament, which would settle arising conflicts by a three-quarters vote and would have the authority to enforce peace by the use of force; Immanuel Kant had also argued in his “Perpetual Peace” for the establishment of the league of peace.

During the Napoleonic wars, the four powers, Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, came to an agreement to overthrow Napoleon and to remain in alliance for the following twenty years after Napoleon’s defeat. This arrangement was signed as the Treaty of Chaumont in March 1814. In the next year, after Waterloo, another treaty was signed which confirmed and renewed previous arrangements. Article 6 of that treaty provided that the four powers “have agreed to renew their meeting at fixed periods for the purpose of consulting upon their common interests, and for the consideration of measures most salutary for the repose and prosperity of Nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe.” This article “formed the basis for the Concert of Europe and contained the germ of international government.”

Between 1814 and 1914 there were numerous meetings in order to

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2 The most recent examples of the UN Security Council’s inability to react to a threat and accept any decision are the civil war in Syria, war against ISIS and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.


5 Ibidem.
resolve disputes peacefully, and maintain peace in Europe. At least 8 congresses (meetings of heads of governments or foreign ministers) and 18 conferences (meetings of ambassadors) took place during that period.6

The World War I and its horrible experiences became a decisive argument for the establishment of international organization and, thus, strengthening and enhancing the international cooperation. Several ideas had been developed in this regard, including the preparatory reports of British and French committees, chaired by Lord Phillimore and Leon Bourgeois respectively, the famous Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson, as well as the pamphlet The League of Nations: A Practical Suggestion by the South African General Jan Smuts.7 The League of Nations was established by the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919 and the Covenant of The League of Nations was signed on the same day.

The League of Nations comprised of three main organs: the Assembly, the Council, and the permanent Secretariat (art. 2 of the Covenant).8 The Council of the League of Nations is the direct predecessor and prototype of the United Nations Security Council. It consisted, according to art. 4 of the Covenant, of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (permanent members – T. L.), together with Representatives of four other Members of the League (non-permanent members). The Covenant also provided a possibility to increase the number of permanent members of the Council (“with the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name additional Members of the League whose Representatives shall always be members of the Council” – art. 4 (2)), which is, in a way, a more progressive solution than that provided by the UN Charter. But on the other hand, the decision-making process required a unanimous agreement of the Council (and of the Assembly as well), except the matters of procedure (art. 5). Such an order made the decision-making process in the League of Nations extremely complicated and cumbersome; unfortunately, a similar, to some extent, design was established for the UN Security Council (so-called “veto right” by the permanent members), which is the reason of its inability to adopt many necessary decisions.

Despite its systemic problems and inability to prevent another great war, the achievements of the League of Nations should not be belittled. As Christian Tams puts it, “in the immediate aftermath of the Great War, the

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7 Ch. J. Tams, op. cit.
League idea generated an unprecedented level of hope and faith in international progress. The League itself became the first international organization with general competence and, for at least 15 years, functioned as a permanent forum of international co-operation." Francis Paul Walters also describes the founding of the League of Nations as "a forward leap of unprecedented extent and speed, accompanied by extraordinary changes in the conduct of international relations."

The United Nations was established on 24 October 1945 after World War II and was largely designed upon the structure of the League of Nations. The General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice, and the Secretariat have been established as its principal organs (art. 7 of the UN Charter). The Security Council originally consisted of eleven members, five of them permanent (US, UK, France, the Republic of China, and the USSR) and six nonpermanent members elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term (art. 23).

In 1965 the UN Charter has been amended in response to the growing number of new states becoming the members of the UN. Article 23 was amended to enlarge the Security Council from 11 to 15 members (of which 5 are still permanent, and 10 are non-permanent), and article 27 was amended to increase the required number of votes from seven to nine (to reflect the enlarged number of the Security Council members). Besides these, rather formal amendments, some structural changes have also appeared without the amendments of the Charter. In 1971, the People's Republic of China was recognized by the Resolution 2758 as the lawful member of the UN and assumed the permanent seat at the Security Council (the Taiwan-based Republic of China was expelled from the UN); and in 1991, the Russian Federation assumed the permanent seat in the Security Council after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Practically since the establishment of the UN, there have been many proposals to reform the organization, including the proposals and debates around

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9 Ch. J. Tams, op. cit.
the Security Council reforms. Even inside the UN itself, some bodies have been established specifically for that purpose, such as the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (established in 1975), or the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council (established in 1993). There are also many projects and proposals designed by states or group of states, as well as non-governmental international organizations. The following part of the paper will explore these projects in more details.

2. Projects to Reform the UN Security Council

2.1. The Idea to Reform the Council

The UN Security Council has been heavily criticized for its imperfect composition and lack of transparency of working methods and decision-making process. Due to the limits of this paper, the focus of the research will be put on the analysis of the composition of the Council and projects to reform it. The main arguments against the current composition are as follows:

- the Council is too limited, it consists of 15 members out of 193 member states (comparing to 15 members out of 117 member states in 1965 when the last and only enlargement of the Council has taken place);
- European countries are overrepresented having two permanent seats (the UK and France), two non-permanent seats for the Western European and Others Group, one non-permanent seat for the Eastern European states, comprising in total to 5 seats out of 15 (plus, the permanent seat of the Russian Federation may also be viewed as a European seat);
- Africa and Asia, in contrast, are underrepresented having only 3 seats (one of which is permanent) for Asian countries (while they represent more than a half of world’s population) and 3 seats for African countries (representing 54 member states);
- the concept of permanent seats is criticized from two opposite points: on the one hand, it is criticized as a non-democratic and anachronistic principle, on the other hand, there is a number of states that aspire to receive the permanent seat in the Council and criticize it for inadequate representation of the modern geopolitical situation.\footnote{See more: P. Teixeira, \textit{The Security Council at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century. To What Extent Is It Willing and Able to Maintain International Peace and Security?}, Geneva 2003, pp. 11–12.}
The ideas to reform the Security Council have been developed for a long time by the UN itself (including the UN University), numerous NGOs (the Center for UN Reform Education, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, the International Coalition for Responsibility to Protect, Global Policy Forum, Security Council Report, the United Nations Reform Study Group of the International Law Association etc.), and academics.\textsuperscript{14} Since most of the projects and ideas developed before 2000\textsuperscript{15} are either outdated or have not been discussed anymore, the article will analyze only the newest proposals from the twenty-first century and the last decade of the twentieth century.


After the Cold War era, Germany and Japan started to increasingly push their candidacies as new permanent members of the UN Security Council; they were later joined by India and Brazil. These countries formed an informal group called G4 and they explained their aspirations by their growing role in international politics, by their territory and population, involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, and contributions to the UN budget. At the same time, their regional rivals (Italy, South Korea, Pakistan, Mexico, Argentina, and others) tried to block these aspirations and pushed the idea of increasing the number of non-permanent seats instead (these countries formed so-called “Coffee Club,” later changed to “United for Consensus.”)\textsuperscript{16}

In 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected a Secretary-General of the UN and shortly thereafter published \textit{An Agenda for Peace} where he argued for restructuring the Security Council and reforming it.\textsuperscript{17} As more and more countries raised this issue, the 1992 Security Council Summit included it on its agenda and, in 1993, the Open-ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters related to the Security Council (hereinafter-


\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem, pp. 2–3.

ter – the Working Group) was established by the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{18} In the following years several proposals were developed, including the proposals to increase the number of permanent and non-permanent seats, as well as limit the veto right of permanent members.

Bardo Fassbender provides the statement of the Vice-Chairman of the Working Group in which he summarized the state of the debate as of September 1995:

Discussions showed that there was an agreement in the Working Group on the need to strengthen the effectiveness of the Security Council by an increase in its membership in order to reflect more accurately the important international changes that have taken place, including the substantial increase in the membership of the United Nations, especially of developing countries. Discussions further showed that there was an agreement on the need to review the Council’s composition, its working methods, and other matters related to its functioning.\textsuperscript{19}

In 1997, the General Assembly President and, at the same time, the Working Group chairman, Ismael Razali, proposed an ambitious three-stage reform plan, which provided for the enlargement of the Security Council from 15 to 24 members, including the addition of five new permanent members. To counteract the Razali-proposal the Non-Aligned Movement and Italy successfully lobbied the adoption by the General Assembly of the resolution A/RES/53/30 on 23 November 1998. This resolution stipulated that any future resolutions on enlarging the Security Council would require a two-thirds majority vote. This requirement is applicable to even minor adjustments and has made decisions on Council enlargement extremely difficult ever since.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{2.3. Latest Proposals of the Reform (since 2003)}

In 2003, the then Secretary-General Kofi Annan established the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which delivered a report \textit{A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility}\textsuperscript{21} in December 2004. In the report, the authors proposed two models of the Security Council reform.

\textsuperscript{18} UN Doc. A/Res/48/26, 3 December 1993.
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Governing and Managing Change…}, op. cit., p. 5.
**Model A** provides for six new permanent seats, with no veto being created, and three new two-year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:\(^{22}\)

Table 1: Model A of the Security Council reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional area</th>
<th>Number of states</th>
<th>Permanent seats (continuing)</th>
<th>Proposed new permanent seats</th>
<th>Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Model B** provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category of eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (and non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:\(^{23}\)

Table 2: Model B of the Security Council reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional area</th>
<th>Number of states</th>
<th>Permanent seats (continuing)</th>
<th>Proposed four-year renewable seats</th>
<th>Proposed two-year seats (non-renewable)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia and Pacific</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{22}\) The data is valid as of 2 December 2004.
\(^{23}\) The data is valid as of 2 December 2004.
Additionally, the authors proposed for the General Assembly to elect Security Council members by giving preference for permanent or longer-term seats to those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions.24

In 2005, the African states formed an “Ezulwini Consensus” and called for two permanent seats. They argue that, even although the main focus of the Security Council activities is directed towards the African states, the continent has no permanent representative. The two permanent members should be chosen by the African Union member states themselves, and the main contenders for the positions are Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria, with strong claims also from Ethiopia, Senegal, Algeria, and Tanzania.25

Another prominent proposal of the Security Council reform is the one delivered in 2015 by the Elders,26 “A UN Fit for Purpose” which, among others, proposed a new category of members of the Security Council and called upon

[...] the states which aspire to permanent membership accept instead, at least for the time being, election to a new category of membership, which would give them a much longer term than the two years served by the non-permanent members, and to which they could be immediately re-elected when that term expires. This would enable them to become de facto permanent members, but in a more democratic way, since it would depend on them continuing to enjoy the confidence of other member states.27

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25 *Governing and Managing Change...*, op. cit., p. 4.
26 Informal and independent group of global leaders which was founded by Nelson Mandela and has included Kofi Annan, Jimmy Carter, Desmond Tutu, Fernando H. Cardoso and others.
The biggest rivalry, concerning the Security Council reform, is currently present among the already mentioned groups of states that have interests in taking new seats in the enlarged Security Council. Those main groups are: the **Group of Four (G4)** – Japan, Germany, India and Brazil; **United for Consensus (UfC)** – Italy, Spain, South Korea, Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Turkey, Pakistan, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, and San Marino; the **Ezulwini Consensus** – representing the positions of the African Union. The plans of these groups may be described as follows:

Table 3: Plans of the Group of Four (G4), United for Consensus (UfC), and the Ezulwini Consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Plans</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>G4</strong></td>
<td>The G4 plans envisage a Council with a total membership of 25, including six new permanent members (Brazil, Japan, Germany, India and two African countries) and an additional three elected seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UfC</strong></td>
<td>UfC called for a 25-member Council, which would be achieved by adding “no permanent members to the Council, but would rather create new permanent seats in each region, leaving it to the members of each regional group to decide which Member States should sit in those seats, and for how long”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ezulwini Consensus</strong></td>
<td>The Ezulwini Consensus proposes two permanent seats and two additional elected seats for Africa. Under the proposal, the permanent members would be granted “all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right to veto”.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


To further illustrate how complicated is the process of reforming the UN Security Council and how many opposite interests different states and groups of states have, it would be useful to describe other, not yet mentioned in the text, less active groups of states\(^{28}\) that have proposed various projects of the Council reform:

1) **The African Group / C10.** Although the African Group represents a common position during the inter-governmental negotiations, it has serious internal divisions and competing candidacies. Despite the fact that they have formed the “Ezulwini Consensus” in 2005, South Africa and Nigeria tried to converge with the G4 group. In response to this, the Committee of 10 (C10) was established to act as a focal point on the Security Council reform and alliances with other regional groups. The C10 consists of Algeria, Congo Brazzaville/Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia;

2) **ACT (Accountability, Coherence, and Transparency)** consists of 25 members including Austria, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Ghana, Hungary, Ireland, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Maldives, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Portugal, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and Uruguay. They do not participate in inter-governmental negotiations as a group but instead had worked together to develop a Code of Conduct by which its endorsers pledge not to vote against credible resolutions of the Security Council aimed at preventing or ending genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. By November, it had gained support from 106 countries, including France and the United Kingdom, but not the other three permanent members. Besides this group, Belize, the Netherlands, Spain, and Ukraine also participated in the development of the above-mentioned Code of Conduct;

3) **L69.** The group of about 40 developing countries: G4 members Brazil and India, 11 African countries, small island states, Caribbean Community States and several states from Latin America;

4) **The Arab group** advocates for its own permanent seat;

5) **Eastern European states** propose a second non-permanent seat for themselves;

6) Some states have proposed a joint permanent seat for the **European Union,** instead of two permanent seats of UK and France (a proposal rather not actual anymore, having in mind the recent Brexit developments);

7) **Small island developing states** are in favor of special cross-regional rotating non-permanent seat in exchange for their support of new permanent seats.

Such a variety of opposing interests illustrates the complexity of the Security Council reform. And it is only one aspect of the reform – enlargement of the Council. As Lydia Swarf puts it:
A successful vote for new permanent members – with or without veto rights – may not be easy to bring about, however. There is a complex and large variety of options on the table. There are likely to be last-minute changes in national positions resulting from external pressure or new understandings. And most of all, there seems to be lack of genuine political will among the wider membership for a solution that will mostly benefit just a handful of countries whose relative power may change over time. Longer-term and renewable seats seems the most feasible and flexible option, but a vote for such a solution would likely fail too at this time. Neither a text without real negotiations or untimely votes will bring results. Only compromise can.\textsuperscript{29}

3. Who Should Receive the Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council?

Given the political complexity of the issue, it may be useful to provide some quantitative data that may clarify the problem and provide some objective information on which countries should actually receive the permanent seat in the Security Council (or long-term renewable seat) in case of eventual enlargement. To answer this question, a few indicators will be taken into account: firstly, the population of a state, and its GDP; next, budget contributions to the UN and the number of peacekeepers from a given state; and, additionally, the nuclear arsenal of a state.

Statistics on the following countries will be analyzed: current permanent members of the Security Council (USA, UK, France, the Russian Federation, and the People’s Republic of China) and countries that either aspire to receive the seat or are regional leaders (Germany, Italy, Japan, India, South Korea, Pakistan, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Canada, South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia). The countries will be ranked by every indicator and will be awarded points depending on their place in the rank (1\textsuperscript{st} place = 1 point, 2\textsuperscript{nd} place = 2 points and so on). In the end, all the points from the ranks by different indicators will be summed up and the states with the least numbers of points will be those who most deserve a seat in the Security Council. Those countries that possess nuclear arsenal will be awarded 1 point irrespectively of the number of warheads, those that do not possess it – 2 points.

The methodology may be also used for a bigger number of states (including Canada, Spain, Australia, Iran, Ethiopia etc.), as well as with additional indicators (territory, defense budget, index of democracy and/or human rights protection etc.) but for the purpose of this research only the above-mentioned ones will be taken into account.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibidem.
The main goal of such quantitative approach is to provide the audience with some objective quantitative information on different states that are or aspire to become the members of the Security Council. As may be seen in the Table 4 below, if the Security Council would have been established nowadays based on the objective criteria (in this case: population, GDP, and nuclear arsenal, as well as involvement in the UN activities, such as contributions to the UN budget and number of peacekeepers from each country) the permanent five members of it would be China, USA, India, Brazil, and Japan. The next five countries in the ranking are, respectively, Germany, France, UK, Indonesia, and Italy. The use of this methodology provides us with the clear understanding that the claim of G4 countries (India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany) for the seat in the Security Council is the most reasonable and well-grounded. Among the African states, the highest position in the ranking belongs to Nigeria (13), which would make it the primary candidate for the “African” seat.

Unfortunately, the reform and alleged enlargement of the Security Council will, most likely, be based not upon the objective criteria but on political reasons and self-interests of states and groups of states.

Table 4: Ranking of the permanent members of and potential candidates to the UN Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>GDP (billions $)</th>
<th>Budget contribution to the UN (%</th>
<th>Number of peacekeepers</th>
<th>Nuclear arsenal</th>
<th>Points</th>
<th>Overall position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>326,474 (3)</td>
<td>18,036 (1)</td>
<td>22 (1)</td>
<td>73 (18)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>65,511 (14)</td>
<td>2,861 (5)</td>
<td>4,463 (6)</td>
<td>528 (13)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>8-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>64,938 (15)</td>
<td>2,418 (6)</td>
<td>4,859 (5)</td>
<td>846 (10)</td>
<td>+1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Russia 143,375 (8)  1,365 (11)  3,088 (9)  95 (17)  +1  46  11
5. China 1,388,232 (1)  11,064 (2)  7,921 (3)  2,509 (5)  +1  12  1
6. Germany 80,636 (12)  3,363 (4)  6,389 (4)  728 (11)  +2  33  6
7. Italy 59,797 (16)  1,821 (8)  3,748 (8)  1,272 (9)  +2  43  10
8. Japan 126,045 (10)  4,383 (3)  9,68 (2)  123 (15)  +2  32  5
9. India 1,342,512 (2)  2,088 (7)  0,737 (15)  7,648 (1)  +1  26  3
10. S. Korea 50,704 (18)  1,377 (10)  2,039 (10)  625 (12)  +2  52  14
11. Pakistan 196,744 (6)  271,049 (20)  0,093 (20)  7,111 (2)  +1  49  12
12. Indonesia 263,510 (4)  861,933 (13)  0,504 (16)  2,722 (4)  +2  39  8-9
13. Brazil 211,243 (5)  1,803 (9)  3,823 (7)  1,284 (8)  +2  31  4
14. Argentina 44,272 (19)  584,711 (16)  0,892 (14)  464 (14)  +2  65  19
15. Mexico 130,222 (9)  1,143 (12)  1,435 (11)  32 (19)  +2  53  15-16
16. S. Africa 55,436 (17)  314,571 (19)  0,364 (17)  1,395 (7)  +2  62  18
17. Nigeria 191,835 (7)  486,792 (17)  0,209 (18)  1,686 (6)  +2  50  13
18. Egypt 95,215 (11)  330,778 (18)  0,152 (19)  2,895 (3)  +2  53  15-16
19. Turkey 80,417 (13)  717,879 (14)  1,018 (13)  117 (16)  +2  58  17
20. Saudi Arabia 32,742 (20)  646,001 (15)  1,146 (12)  - (20)  +2  69  20


Conclusion

There is a general understanding for the need to reform the UN Security Council which includes the improvement of the working methods and decision-making process, increasing transparency of the Council, restraining veto powers, and reconfiguration of the Council according to the current political configuration in the world. The reality has changed fundamentally since the World War II and the UN Security Council does not adequately
represent the world anymore. Most active in claiming their right to receive the seat in the Council are the so-called G4 countries: India, Brazil, Japan, and Germany. But their claim is strongly resisted by their regional competitors who formed the United for Consensus group (Italy, South Korea, Pakistan, Argentina, and others). There is also a group of African states who argue that their continent is the most underrepresented in the Council.

Besides the competition among the aspiring states, there is also discussion on the type of enlargement with two main approaches. The first approach proposes to increase the number of permanent seats in the Council (with or without the veto right), while, according to the other approach, the “quasi-permanent” long-term renewable seats should be added. The second approach becomes more and more popular since many states are reluctant to increase the number of permanent members of the Council. They claim that in a few decades some permanent members may lose some of their influence (as has happened with some current members of the Council, notably Russia, France, and, to some extent, UK) while the other states may arise as global or regional leaders (as has happened with G4 countries). Therefore, the establishment of “quasi-permanent” seats is more reasonable and more democratic.

Another major obstacle to the UN Security Council reform is the repugnance and unwillingness of the current permanent members to revoke or even restrain the veto right. The veto is usually used to protect the self-interests of states, although very often to the detriment of international peace and security or human rights. But since the veto right in the Security Council is a major advantage in international relations, it is highly doubtful it may be restrained in the near future.

Opposing interests of states and groups of states and unresolved issue with the veto right make the attempts to reform the UN Security Council a truly “Sisyphean work.” The intensive work on this problem has started in the UN after the Cold War but there has not been a major progress since then. While many interested groups proposed numerous projects of reforms, there is not a single one that has gained the support of the majority of states. It is a “Gordian knot” the international community has so far not been able to either untie or cut.

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