

The Impact of Terrorism on Border Security in the EU: The Case of the Islamic State

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Abstract: The Islamic State (IS) has been around since the 1990's under different leadership and commonly referred to as ISIS. It was not until 2013 when the group changed their name to the Islamic State. Since the 2000's, the expansion of the Islamic State has grown significantly. IS has been in battle to overtake many regions within Syria and Iraq to acquire control of lands and assets. US-led invasions with joint forces from Belgium, Denmark, France, Jordan, the Netherlands, and the UK have taken part of the coalition to deter and expel the rise of the Islamic State from gaining complete power in the Middle East. The economic advantages that IS receives from conquering different regions in Syria and Iraq comes with benefits such as oil, taxes, smuggling artifacts/art, and prospering from business deals with human trafficking dealers, which has given the terrorist organization the fundamental means to procure, govern, recruit, pay, and distribute their beliefs across the globe. The network of the terrorist organization has enlarged to a degree where there are individuals all over the world who pose a threat. Countries in the South/Southeast Asia (i.e. the Philippines) and in the EU (i.e. France, UK, Belgium, and Germany), have seen an increase in terrorist plots or attempted attacks within the past five years due to many Muslim citizens and non-Muslims citizens (i.e. young vulnerable males and criminals) being persuaded to convert into foreign fighters due to the progression of radicalization and digital recruiting methods used by IS. In response, the EU has enacted strict mandates formed for restrictions and more effect guidelines for border security, to deter any terrorist threat in the present and future times. Effective policies and border agencies such as FRONTEX and European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) to challenge and mitigate any threat possible from entering into the EU. This paper analyzes the impact of terrorism organized and/or inspired by IS to EU security with a focus on border security.

Keywords: terrorism, IS, Islamic State

Introduction

“[T]errorism” Wardlaw argues, “may be aimed at causing/hastening a general breakdown in social order, demoralizing the citizens and causing them to lose faith in the ability of the incumbent government to maintain order, stability and safety.”⁹⁵¹.

The Islamic State (IS) has been around since the 1990’s under different leadership and commonly referred to as ISIS, “Islamic State of Iraq, as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), as Majlis Shura al Mujahidin, and as Jamaat al Tawhid wa-l-Jihad.”⁹⁵². This paper examines the IS and analyses the problems it has been causing the EU border security. In particular, this paper looks at how IS has been able to control many regions within Iraq and Syria, recruit new followers abroad called foreign fighters, obtain financial gains from oil, taxes, smuggling art/artifacts in the black-market, and affect the migration flow from certain countries.

As this paper highlights, IS has impacted individuals seeking refuge in European countries and discusses the EU response of increasing border security and agencies to control and counter any form of a terrorist threat/plot from affecting the security of its nations and its citizens. From 2014 to 2019, there have been numerous terrorist plots in the EU, with increases from 2015 to 2017 and a slight decrease from 2018 to 2019⁹⁵³. Examples of the types of terrorist plots include bombings such as (i.e. the bombing in Spain in 2004, terror attack in Strasbourg in 2018, the bombing in Brussels in 2016, and the Manchester Arena bombing in England in 2017”⁹⁵⁴). Due

⁹⁵¹ Grant Wardlaw, “Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures”, Cambridge University Press, (1982): 39.

⁹⁵² Matthew Levitt, “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 13, 2014. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony20141113.pdf>.

⁹⁵³ News – European Parliament, “Terrorism in the EU: terror attacks, deaths, and arrests in 2019”, July 14, 2020. Accessed date September 19, 2020, <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/security/20180703STO07125/terrorism-in-the-eu-terror-attacks-deaths-and-arrests-in-2019>.

⁹⁵⁴ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf>

to the IS attacks in several European cities such as in Paris and Brussels, the terrorist organization has received world recognition for being an extremist Islamic group within a short time frame. Its ideologies have “made it a rival not only to western countries, but also to neighboring ones”⁹⁵⁵.

The Islamic State and Europe could be compared to a wildfire; that keeps burning, expanding, and reaching into more fields. The tensions between the two parties is one that may be lasting for a long time. The amount of water that is poured into the situation has not and will not dissipate until a solution is found and/ or the problem can be eliminated in all its entirety. EU and its allies versus IS are on a metaphorical battlefield of “tactical and strategic”⁹⁵⁶ elements. With IS on the rise, US-led coalitions along with countries such as France, UK, Belgium, and Germany have formed a team to fight against the insurgency of the Islamic State in “several African...and Middle Eastern countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya.”⁹⁵⁷ In order to stop the rise of the terrorist organization, the coalition to fight IS strikes where the organization gained the most support. The Islamic State has developed into a globally well-known terrorist organization and to some extent their own ‘state’. After taking control over several cities in Syria and Iraq, IS has acquired the “Administrative buildings, courts and street signs....military recruitment and financial means, social media outreach, and illegal operations”⁹⁵⁸, giving them the foundation to further build their caliphate.

Following IS overthrow of many cities in Iraq and Syria, the flow of migration has spiked in recent years. Over the course of the Syrian war, there has been an estimated 5.6 million Syrian refugees and another 6.2 million displaced within the country⁹⁵⁹. In 2015, Europe began to feel the pres-

⁹⁵⁵ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State” Listopad, (2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf.

⁹⁵⁶ Grant Wardlaw, “Political Terrorism: Theory, tactics, and counter-measures”, Cambridge University Press, (1982).

⁹⁵⁷ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State” Listopad, (2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf.

⁹⁵⁸ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State” Listopad, (2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf.

⁹⁵⁹ World Vision, “Syrian refugee crisis: facts, FAQ’s, and how to help”, March 15, 2020. Accessed August 7, 2020, <https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts>.

sure of the influx of refugees and migrants when an estimated 1 million arrived looking for a better life and to flee from violence and war⁹⁶⁰. With the significant number of migrants and refugees coming into Europe, the EU has implemented various security measures in place for refugees and migrants in order to deter any potential threats that may come into European countries. In response to several violent conflicts and civil wars in the Middle East, joint coalitions between many countries in the EU and the US have developed to address the rise of radicalism and concerns of foreign fighters creating security obstacles within the EU borders.

In the years 2014 and 2015, the rise of the Islamic State and groups of similar ideologies have caused a prominent increase of 30,000 foreign fighters from over 100 UN Member States⁹⁶¹. How will this affect the EU? How will the security of the borders look since there is tension within the borders of people trying to cause/do harm and mayhem? Would a joint effective border security outline be promising? Are there future plans in place for an effective EU security strategy? This paper outlines the major threats IS is posing to EU security and measures the EU has taken to counter them, especially in the field of border security.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: Organization and Activity

Recruitment

Part of the Islamic State's strategy is to recruit and mobilize new members in the EU by means of entrepreneurs making contact and providing information about the terrorist organization. Entrepreneurs are in charge of "reaching out to misfits such as criminals and people who are socially distant and offer them a place of purpose and connection....and mold

⁹⁶⁰ World Vision, "Syrian refugee crisis: facts, FAQ's, and how to help", March 15, 2020. Accessed August 7, 2020, <https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts>.

⁹⁶¹ Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee of the United Nations, "Foreign terrorist fighters", 2014. Accessed September 19, 2020, <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/focus-areas/foreign-terrorist-fighters/>.

them into terrorist.”⁹⁶² As Nesser discusses, these methods are effective and provide a sense of belonging to those normally deemed “misfits”⁹⁶³. Gates and Podder write how IS seeks to become global, with “Recruitment from parts of the world such as the Middle East, North Africa, and from Europe”⁹⁶⁴. IS also seeks to polarize “grayzones” – religiously mixed communities that might otherwise coexist peacefully. This is done by triggering hatred and retribution against Muslims in western countries. In 2015 for example, the Islamic State proclaimed that Muslims in the West have two choices – apostatize or emigrate to the Islamic State⁹⁶⁵. This proclamation came just prior to the massacre that IS incited in Paris of a satirical magazine named *Charlie Hebdo* promoting fear and heightening tensions between French Muslims and other French citizens.

GLOBSEC characterizes potential European Jihadis recruited as “male, young adults, homegrown and naturalized, unemployed, criminal, sometimes uneducated, slow to mature to radicalization, and traveling to and from a foreign conflict.”⁹⁶⁶ Foreign fighters with a criminal background typically have had “a serious run-in with the law....they had committed crimes including: violent robberies, burglaries, and thefts; illicit trafficking of drugs, trafficking of goods and fraud, and terrorism-related crimes.”⁹⁶⁷.

Propaganda is also used as part of the new recruitment strategy. Social media has been used as a media outlet for advertising and displaying what the Islamic State is about. The recruitment is not limited to any particular

⁹⁶² Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf>.

⁹⁶³ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019.

⁹⁶⁴ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” Perspective on Terrorism, (2015): 107–113.

⁹⁶⁵ Murtaza Hussain, “Islamic State’s Goal: Eliminate the Grayzone”, The Intercept, November 15, 2015. Accessed August 5, 2020, <https://theintercept.com/2015/11/17/islamic-states-goal-eliminating-the-grayzone-of-coexistence-between-muslims-and-the-west/>.

⁹⁶⁶ GLOBSEC, “Who are the European Jihadis?” November 9, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/who-are-european-jihadis-from-criminals-to-terrorists-and-back/>.

⁹⁶⁷ GLOBSEC, “Who are the European Jihadis?” November 9, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/who-are-european-jihadis-from-criminals-to-terrorists-and-back/>.

person or set of skills⁹⁶⁸. With the advancement of the use of social media and any other forms of virtual propaganda, IS increases its chances of enlisting recruits with knowledge of “technical and machinery capabilities to help with the promotion and further spread the word. The virtual entrepreneurs are used to direct and recruit terrorist attacks in Europe and other places in the world via encrypted apps such as Telegram”⁹⁶⁹. This is how planned attacks are coordinated and planned through encrypted technology. Through such advanced forms of recruitment, IS has the ability to draw attention and attract new recruits to join.

To incite and motivate prospective new members, recruiters may include “the prospect of adventure, a search for identity, feeling of revenge, the desire to make history, the idea to die as a martyr and go to heaven in the end.”⁹⁷⁰. Common IS recruiter targets include Muslims, criminals, uneducated citizens, males, homegrown or naturalized citizens, and young adults⁹⁷¹. GLOBSEC reported that in 2015, “54% of incarcerated criminals later turned terrorist by co-radicalized behind bars in prison due to the contact of other radicalized prisoners”⁹⁷² who were caught doing terror-related crimes. Motivations to change their current lifestyle is an effective tool to further persuade someone to join the fight. This means traveling to another country to join the mission of such terrorist groups for training to be assimilated into the terrorist organization.

⁹⁶⁸ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” (Perspective on Terrorism, 2015) 107–113.

⁹⁶⁹ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf>.

⁹⁷⁰ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” Perspective on Terrorism, (2015): 107–113.

⁹⁷¹ GLOBSEC, “Who are the European Jihadis?” November 9, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/who-are-european-jihadis-from-criminals-to-terrorists-and-back/>.

⁹⁷² GLOBSEC, “Who are the European Jihadis?” November 9, 2018. Accessed August 3, 2020. <https://www.globsec.org/publications/who-are-european-jihadis-from-criminals-to-terrorists-and-back/>.

Foreign Fighters

The mobilization of foreign fighters is influenced by the victimization or injustice done to civilians in a certain region from wars. Foreign fighters have mobilized and fought in past wars including the wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq. In the case of the recent war in Syria, IS has succeeded in attracting and recruiting a much larger pool of international foreign fighters in part because of the extensive international coverage it has received. The Islamic State has heavily relied upon the use of foreign fighters that have provided the terrorist organization with a diverse skills set that it would not have otherwise. Foreign fighters are defined as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts.”⁹⁷³. With pressure at an all-time high between Europe and the Islamic State, there is no surprise that the recruitment of foreign fighters is heavy within countries with the highest rate of Muslim citizens and migration of Muslim refugees. Over the past 4 years between 2014–2018 there have been more terrorist plots in Europe. Nesser argues, “More people have died from terrorism in Europe between 2014 and 2018 at least 345 deaths than in the previous 20 years at 267 deaths.”⁹⁷⁴. As of March 2017, an estimated “40,000 individuals from 110 countries had traveled to Syria and/or Iraq to engage in combat as members for various armed groups since 2012”, many of which came from Europe⁹⁷⁵. The Islamic State seeks foreign fighters from the West to target countries with terrorist plots and attacks against countries who were part of the joint coalition against them. This strategy has succeeded in making IS one of the EU’s largest security threats, particularly in France and the UK, who have been the target of terrorist plots within the past years. Despite the UK and France’s promo-

⁹⁷³ David Malet, “Foreign fighters: Transnational identity in civil conflicts”. Oxford University Press, (2013).

⁹⁷⁴ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf> page?

⁹⁷⁵ Christopher Blanchard and Carla Humud, “The Islamic State and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, September 25, 2018. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43612.pdf>.

tion of multiculturalism⁹⁷⁶ or assimilation⁹⁷⁷ to integrate different religions, these two countries have faced the highest terrorist threats due to “their policies of intervening in armed conflicts in the Muslim world.”⁹⁷⁸

IS was able to exploit the migration crisis in 2015 by smuggling in terrorist plotters posing as refugees and by recruiting members among the refugees for attacks⁹⁷⁹. Also, they used routes via Istanbul to bring foreign fighters to Syria – they would “travel into northern Syria via Turkey by flying into Istanbul and transferring to commercial flight or buses to the border where they would either cross legally or smuggler routes.”⁹⁸⁰

The bridge between the Islamic State and Europe are the foreign fighters. Gates and Podder estimate “around 20 percent of foreign fighters who have traveled from western countries”⁹⁸¹ have joined conflicts in the Muslim world. Although many of the recruits from the West are inexperienced, Gates and Podder argue that they along with the other foreign fighters “can be trained to be excellent combatants, but most likely be given tasks unique to their skills.”⁹⁸²

In addition to European recruits, Gates and Podder reported that in 2015, “over 20,000 foreign fighters had joined militant organization in the Iraq/Syria conflict with most of them being Arabs coming from neighboring

⁹⁷⁶ Multiculturalism: the acknowledgement of a variety of cultures, races, and ethnicities of minority group differences within a dominant political culture. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/multiculturalism>.

⁹⁷⁷ Assimilation: the process difference of individuals or groups ethnic heritage are absorbed into the dominant culture of a society. <https://www.britannica.com/search?query=assimilation>.

⁹⁷⁸ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf>.

⁹⁷⁹ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf>.

⁹⁸⁰ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” (Perspective on Terrorism, 2015) 107–113.

⁹⁸¹ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” (Perspective on Terrorism, 2015) 107–113.

⁹⁸² Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” (Perspective on Terrorism, 2015) 107–113.

countries in the Maghreb.”^{983, 984}. Whether foreign fighters are from the EU, Middle East, Gulf, or South/Southeast Asia, they all pose a threat to the country they get to in terms of security, because of the extremist ideology and views of the world compared to their views of how the world should see them and fear them.

Financing

The Islamic State is one of the biggest and richest terrorist organizations in the world. The net worth comes to about \$2 billion dollars⁹⁸⁵. This stems from natural resources, taxation, smuggling artifacts/art, human trafficking and extortion methods. There is a hierarchical design to the way the Islamic State operates that includes “separating revenue collection activities from disbursement and management.”⁹⁸⁶. One of the key aspects to limiting the Islamic State from gaining power is to expel their financial connections.

Counter-terrorist organizations have developed methods to shed light on how terrorist organizations such as IS are able to maximize their financial stability. As an example, al-Qaeda depended on reverse money laundering or channeling funds through Islamic charities and legitimate business to fund its military council. Due to the recognition of increased counter-terrorism measures, more than 165 countries had multiple assets frozen of individuals and organizations that were potentially connected to terrorism groups⁹⁸⁷. Limiting their finances will result in a blow to their resources and economic funding. The Islamic State is set up in a way which is formed

⁹⁸³ Maghreb includes Northwest Africa and the western part of the Arab world which is predominantly Muslim. The countries included: Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Nigeria, Chad, Morocco, and Tunisia.

⁹⁸⁴ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” *Perspective on Terrorism*, (2015): 107–113.

⁹⁸⁵ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State”, (November 2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf website accessed + date.

⁹⁸⁶ Luigi Achilli and Alessandro Tinti, “Debunking the smuggler-terrorist nexus: human smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, *European University Institute*, October 28, 2019. Accessed July 28, 2020, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678884?journalCode=uter20>.

⁹⁸⁷ Peng Wang, “The Crime-Terror Nexus: Transformation, Alliance, Convergence”, *Asian Social Science*, (2010): 11–18.

much like a cabinet. IS has assembled a “financial committee consisting of a finance minister who oversees its financial affairs and exerts authority over local finance councils for the provinces... The primary purpose of the finance minister is to ensure tax collection is met.”⁹⁸⁸. Dissolving their financial system is a key strategy used to limit the power of the Islamic State. For instance, the US led coalition in Syria caused IS to lose a lot of its land power. This resulted in the depleted income of the terrorist organization. Formerly in 2017, the Islamic State controlled around “23,300 square miles of territory between Iraq and Syria.”⁹⁸⁹. However, a 2019 report stated “IS has lost control of almost all of its territory due to joint military campaigns”⁹⁹⁰, with control only over discrete amounts of “land in eastern Syria near the Iraqi border”⁹⁹¹. This estimates to about “9,300 square miles of land resulting in a 96%”⁹⁹² reduction of land and valuable means of financial stability. From the shrinkage of land power, the methods used to retain their financial stability is still at large.

Oil

IS controls many areas within Iraq and Syria with a wide range of industrial opportunities such as natural resources and raw materials indigenous to the land. One of these resources is oil. In 2014, around 350 oil wells in Iraq and 60% of Syria’s oil fields were overtaken by the Islamic State⁹⁹³. One

⁹⁸⁸ Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

⁹⁸⁹ Aljazeera, “After the almost 100 percent defeat of ISIS, what about its ideology?” May 8, 2018. Accessed August 11, 2020, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/05/100-percent-defeat-isis-ideology-180508042421376.html>.

⁹⁹⁰ Ari Shapiro, “The Current State of ISIS as Its END Draws Near” February 19, 2019. Accessed September 19, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2019/02/19/696075305/the-current-state-of-isis-as-its-end-draws-near>.

⁹⁹¹ Ari Shapiro, “The Current State of ISIS as Its END Draws Near” February 19, 2019. Accessed September 19, 2020, <https://www.npr.org/2019/02/19/696075305/the-current-state-of-isis-as-its-end-draws-near>.

⁹⁹² Aljazeera, “After the almost 100 percent defeat of ISIS, what about its ideology?” May 8, 2018. Accessed August 11, 2020, <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2018/05/100-percent-defeat-isis-ideology-180508042421376.html>.

⁹⁹³ Matthew Levitt, “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 13, 2014. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony20141113.pdf>.

report suggests, “The exploitation of the natural reserves of oil refineries constitutes of one of several primary sources of funding.”⁹⁹⁴ This has enabled IS to be one of the most powerful and richest terrorist organizations in the world⁹⁹⁵. The Islamic State makes an earning approximately worth “\$500 million a year”⁹⁹⁶ from the oil refineries alone. Through black-market sales and local truck drivers in the region, they are able to then smuggle, export and transport oil through backhanded deals to sell the oil and deliver it to its final destination to countries such as Jordan, Turkey, Iran, and Kurdistan⁹⁹⁷. The war in Syria in 2015, significantly reduced the amount earned from the oil refineries from key territories. In 2014, the earnings from oil equated to “\$1 billion compared to in 2015 which the income earned was estimated about \$600 million dollars.”⁹⁹⁸ However, due to the recent loss of territory, IS’s revenues have become strained as the value of oil barrels being sold has decreased, as well as the yearly income gained. By limiting the finances of the Islamic State, it will effectively hurt the operations of the organization.

Taxation

Tax earnings by the IS are worth approximately over \$250 million a year⁹⁹⁹. The taxes are imposed on the civilians living in the cities under IS control. IS imposes an additional tax on non-Muslims – *Jizyah*¹⁰⁰⁰. IS has been able to tax almost everything which includes, but is not limited to, agricultural

⁹⁹⁴ Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

⁹⁹⁵ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State”, (2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf.

⁹⁹⁶ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State”, (2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf.

⁹⁹⁷ Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, “Islamic State: the economy-based terrorist funding”, October 2014. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Islamic-State.pdf>.

⁹⁹⁸ Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

⁹⁹⁹ Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰⁰ *Jizyah*: a yearly additional tax imposed on those who are non-Muslims who are not willing or wanting to convert.

goods, telecommunication companies, cash withdrawals from bank accounts, road tax, custom per truck entering Jordan and Syria border checks, looting archeological sites, and protection tax¹⁰⁰¹. In 2015 this resulted in a \$250 million earning¹⁰⁰². The money earned from all the taxes have been put towards expansion into new territories within the region IS has claimed in Syria and Iraq and an “extensive civil system”, especially to “fund garbage collectors and motor vehicle authority.”¹⁰⁰³. There are fees placed upon each household per month for the essential items (i.e. water and electricity). The fees for each household made about \$60 million in 2015¹⁰⁰⁴. In terms of human trafficking, IS also taxes the “greedy bogeymen”¹⁰⁰⁵ who facilitate in criminal cartels with smuggling route passage fees “to move goods across the area under the Caliphate’s de-facto jurisdiction”¹⁰⁰⁶. This was done so IS could gain income as well as new potential recruits.

Smuggling Arts/Artifacts

Iraq and Syria have important (incl. UNESCO Word Heritage) archeological sites that consist of cultural artifacts dating back 9,000 BCE. IS has taken these ancient historical artifacts and produced revenue from selling them. The Site of Palmyra for example, located in the Syrian desert, north-east of Damascus, represents an archeological heritage site of the ancient world,

¹⁰⁰¹ Jean-Charles Brisard and Damien Martinez, “Islamic State: the economy-based terrorist funding”, October 2014. Accessed August 4, 2020. <http://www.gdr-elsj.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Islamic-State.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰² Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰³ Rosie Perper, “ISIS made millions from taxes that it then used to run garbage collections and even a DMV” Business Insider, April 6, 2018. Accessed August 9, 2020, <https://www.businessinsider.com/islamic-state-used-taxes-to-grow-power-and-offer-services-2018-4>.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Luigi Achilli and Alessandro Tinti, “Debunking the smuggler-terrorist nexus: human smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, European University Institute, October 28, 2019. Accessed July 28, 2020, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678884?journalCode=uter20>.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Luigi Achilli and Alessandro Tinti, “Debunking the smuggler-terrorist nexus: human smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, European University Institute, October 28, 2019. Accessed July 28, 2020. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678884?journalCode=uter20>.

with Graeco- Roman and Persian influences¹⁰⁰⁷. IS has made an estimated \$30 million to \$50 million dollars a year from selling artifacts from these cultural heritage sites¹⁰⁰⁸. Smuggling artifacts and/or art items, as well as “taxing looted antiquities”¹⁰⁰⁹ is one of the economic sources that finances the Islamic State by a large income worth. Any items found are subjected to taxes ranging from 20% to 50%¹⁰¹⁰. To make money from these artifacts, IS “smuggle[s] them into Europe via Turkey, Jordan, Iran, and Syria”¹⁰¹¹ sales and/or auctions them internationally. IS has created a systematic structure to obtain the financials of the looted and smuggled artifacts by creating an antique department within the ministry of natural resources, and legalizing the looting of the archeological sites of these artifacts¹⁰¹². Documents supporting this ministry highlights the cultural antiques preparation for professional sale internationally. Since 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) monitoring team enacted sanction and recommendations to Member States in order to hopefully disrupt the financing of IS and the sale of cultural artifacts¹⁰¹³. It remains unknown how much they are earn-

¹⁰⁰⁷ UNESCO, “Site of Palmyra”, 2020. Accessed September 19, 2020, <https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/23/>.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Rafat Kurdi, “Islamic State” Listopad, (2016) https://www.amo.cz/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO_isis_final.pdf.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Hans-Jakob Schindler & Frederique Gautier, “Looting and smuggling of artifacts as a strategy to finance terrorism global sanction as a disruptive and preventive tool”, *International Journal of Cultural Property*, September 2, 2019. Date Accessed July 31, 2020, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-cultural-property/article/looting-and-smuggling-of-artifacts-as-a-strategy-to-finance-terrorism-global-sanctions-as-a-disruptive-and-preventive-tool/3485D8F8BF5EC709D85ECACBDA4E6972>.

¹⁰¹⁰ Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, “ISIS Financing”, May 2016. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://cat-int.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/ISIS-Financing-2015-Report.pdf>.

¹⁰¹¹ Matthew Levitt, “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, November 13, 2014. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/testimony/LevittTestimony20141113.pdf>.

¹⁰¹² Hans-Jakob Schindler & Frederique Gautier, “Looting and smuggling of artifacts as a strategy to finance terrorism global sanction as a disruptive and preventive tool”, *International Journal of Cultural Property*, September 2, 2019. Accessed July 31, 2020, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-cultural-property/article/looting-and-smuggling-of-artifacts-as-a-strategy-to-finance-terrorism-global-sanctions-as-a-disruptive-and-preventive-tool/3485D8F8BF5EC709D85ECACBDA4E6972>.

¹⁰¹³ Hans-Jakob Schindler & Frederique Gautier, “Looting and smuggling of artifacts as a strategy to financeterroismglobalsanctionasadisruptiveandpreventivetool”, *International Journal of Cultural Property*, September 2, 2019. Accessed July 31, 2020, <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-journal-of-cultural-property/article/looting-and-smuggling-of-artifacts-as-a-strategy-to-finance-terrorism-global-sanctions-as-a-disruptive-and-preventive-tool/3485D8F8BF5EC709D85ECACBDA4E6972>.

ing in recent years from the sale of historical artifacts/antiques sold on the black-market to make from outside sources.

Human Trafficking

The American Intelligence Journal reports, “human trafficking is one of the fastest growing illicit activities in the world, and is second most profitable crime along with weapons and drugs”¹⁰¹⁴. Human trafficking is one aspect of illicit activities that usually accompanies other criminal activities (i.e. drug trafficking). The act of human trafficking is usually smuggling persons who were into the process. Some of the prominent elements of human trafficking include: 1) the act (i.e harboring, recruiting, and transporting), 2) the means (i.e. “forced, deceived, coerced or exploited”)¹⁰¹⁵, and 3) the purpose (i.e. exploitation and gain).

With the uprise in the irregular migration flow, human trafficking became a lucrative business for smugglers, terrorist organizations, and illegal organizations. The logistics of human trafficking requires investment for networking, warehousing of the victims, inspection, modes of transportation, and partnerships with other organizations for the purchase of the victims.

The Islamic State takes part in the trafficking of humans, especially women and children. Acts of sexual and gender-based violence has been a strategic objective of terrorist groups¹⁰¹⁶. For example, Yazidi were targeted by IS, whereby Yazidi women and young girls were sold for sexual abuse and/or family housekeepers, and male children used as new recruits for combat and support roles (e.g. human shields, informants, bombmakers, executioners, and suicide bombers) by IS inserting its ideology from a young age. In 2017, IS abducted 400 Yazidi children for combat training roles. IS has enacted

¹⁰¹⁴ Daniels Sheinis, “The Links Between Human Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism”. American Intelligence Journal 30, no. 1 (2012): 68–77. Accessed August 11, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/26201986.

¹⁰¹⁵ Daniels Sheinis, “The Links Between Human Trafficking, Organized Crime, and Terrorism”. American Intelligence Journal 30, no. 1 (2012): 68–77. Accessed August 11, 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/26201986.

¹⁰¹⁶ United Nations Security Council, “Identifying and Exploring the Nexus between Human Trafficking, Terrorism, and Terrorism Financing”, November 15, 2018. Accessed September 23, 2020. <https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HT-terrorism-nexus-CTED-report.pdf>.

heinous crimes towards the persons of other religious cultures committing mass crime, “ethnic cleansing campaigns”¹⁰¹⁷, and enslaving them. Human trafficking may not be as profitable as other parts of the Islamic State finances, but the selling of humans as “commodities”¹⁰¹⁸ has proven to be beneficial by exploiting financial gain of ransom money towards families. The demanded prices of ransom has ranged between \$10,000-\$40,000. In 2014 IS made between \$35 to \$45 million¹⁰¹⁹. As Achilli and Tinti stated, this has become a “dirty entanglement”¹⁰²⁰ for a more lucrative economic and social opportunity to expand their resources.

The methods IS uses, combined with efforts of migrant smugglers, has generated income from the business through taxes, selling of women and children, and slave labor. IS has benefited from the partnership from an economic standpoint, as well as learning the routes which the smugglers use to try to gain access to Europe. If they were to get involved in the business, “EUROPOL estimated that the flow of irregular migration would have amounted to an income between EUR 3 to 6 billion.”¹⁰²¹.

Border Security in the European Union in the Context of Terrorist Threats

Migration

Within the EU, migration has accelerated between 2015–2017. The numbers of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants rose quickly. Between 2014–2017 more than 919,000 Syrians applied for asylum within the EU

¹⁰¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰¹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁰ Luigi Achilli and Alessandro Tinti, “Debunking the smuggler-terrorist nexus: human smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, European University Institute, October 28, 2019. Accessed July 28, 2020. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678884?journalCode=uter20>.

¹⁰²¹ Luigi Achilli and Alessandro Tinti, “Debunking the smuggler-terrorist nexus: human smuggling and the Islamic State in the Middle East”, European University Institute, October 28, 2019. Accessed July 28, 2020. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678884?journalCode=uter20>.

alone¹⁰²². With the increase in geopolitical turmoil overseas in the Middle East and North African regions, the demand has increased for immigrants wanting to come to the EU. The number of refugees surpassed the number of migrants travelling to the EU within the past 5 years. Since 2015, the migration and refugee crisis has amounted to 2.4 million refugees and 860 thousand asylum seekers as cases are pending at the end of 2018¹⁰²³. Demands to accommodate and manage the essential information needed from the migrants and refugees resulted in the development of a database system created to inform policy makers and the public. With the help of these databases, countries are now able to analyze, assess threat levels, provide socio-economic indicators, and provide regulations for the migration public and asylum seekers.

In regard to security measures, migration will always be deemed as a risk. Many people wanting to enter the EU may be flagged for connections with terrorist organizations, affiliated in criminal activity, smuggling illegal or illicit goods, or may be wanted by other countries¹⁰²⁴. During the conflict in Syria in 2015, IS took this “opportunity to try and smuggle in operatives among the migrants or refugees to mobilize connections overseas and recruit members.”¹⁰²⁵. This also provided the opportunity for foreign fighters to travel abroad to fight in conflicts for certain terrorist organizations. This has created concerns regarding foreign fighters returning home. Due to the increased risk of terrorist attacks, the EU has put in place strategies, security agencies such as ECTC, FRONTEX, and enhanced capabilities to use more advanced technological equipment for identification, centers for terrorism and radicalization awareness to warn and inform the public.

¹⁰²² BBC News, “Migration to Europe in Charts”, September 18, 2018. Accessed September 26, 2020. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44660699>.

¹⁰²³ Migration Data Portal, “Migration data in Europe,” August 3, 2020. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://migrationdataportal.org/regional-data-overview/europe>.

¹⁰²⁴ FRONTEX, “Risk Analysis 2020”, March 2020. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2020.pdf.

¹⁰²⁵ Petter Nesser, “Military Interventions, Jihadi Networks, and Terrorist Entrepreneurs” CTC Sentinel, May 2019. Accessed August 4, 2020. <https://ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CTC-SENTINEL-032019.pdf>.

EU Counter Terrorism Strategy

Security measures rose after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, which enhanced the protocols that are in place today in Europe and the US. However, a turning point for more assertive collaboration within the EU to prevent terrorist attacks came following the terrorist attack bombing in Madrid in 2004. Effective immediately, the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy was created to boost the security measures of the EU. The basis of the strategy are based upon “four pillars of prevent, protect, pursue, and respond”¹⁰²⁶, and “5 main objectives regarding the counter-terrorism border strategies: strengthening external border controls, enhancing capacities for identifying terrorist at border, improving identity document security, strengthening the exchange of information relating to border controls, and coordinating the reintroduction of internal border controls.”¹⁰²⁷. In recent times the threat may no longer be physical, but more of a mix of physical and electronic (i.e. hybrid). Potential terrorist threats are becoming complex, this allows for organized crime or terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State to make connections based upon both platforms to exploit anyone for their own gain. These threats may “happen outside of the EU borders, but can still affect what may have critical impact on the security inside the EU.”¹⁰²⁸. Europol reports, “Recently IS has transitioned to a covert insurgent group operating in Iraq and Syria and maintained its global network connections.”¹⁰²⁹. An example of this mixture would be the entrepreneurs of the Islamic State which use electronic methods to communicate with other radicals, foreign fighters, or new recruits to supply them information or any type of plans to make a threat a reality within a country. Coopera-

¹⁰²⁶ Sarah Léonard, “Border Controls as a dimension of the European Union’s counter-terrorism policy: a critical assessment,” January 13, 2015, *Intelligence and National Security* 30, no. 2–3 (2015): 306–332.

¹⁰²⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰²⁸ European Commission, “Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the European council, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions” July 24, 2020. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-security-union-strategy.pdf>.

¹⁰²⁹ Europol, “Terrorism”, 2020. Accessed August 12, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/terrorism>.

tion between all Member States¹⁰³⁰ is a key aspect to the security of the EU to fight the increase in terrorism within the regions. The fight against terrorism will start with the “cooperation with third countries and at global level to address common challenges in the EU.”¹⁰³¹

European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX)

FRONTEX and the European Counter Terrorism Centre at Europol work towards “safeguarding the area of freedom, justice, and security.”¹⁰³² The purpose of FRONTEX is to safeguard the borders of the EU. Frontex states, “Member States reported an increase in the detection of clandestine or secondary movement entries on both inland and sea routes in 2019, but a decrease in illegal border crossing along the external borders in 2019 compared to 2013.”¹⁰³³ In 2019, FRONTEX reported the top 3 nationalities for migration and refugees: Afghanistan with 34,154, Syria with 24,390, and Morocco with 8,020¹⁰³⁴. There are several routes used by different nationalities depending on the region they are coming from. For instance, the Western Balkan Route consist of migrants or refugees coming from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, whereas the Central Mediterranean route accompany migrants and refugees from Tunisia, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire. The migration flow is monitored and recorded by FRONTEX, to safeguard border security, entry, documentation, and cross border crime from different migration routes. The reason why there is sizable amount of security when it comes to the border of the EU is due to the fact that sometimes in the mix of migrants or refugees there are persons who are red listed for criminal and dangerous activities they have been involved in. FRONTEX

¹⁰³⁰ Member States: countries that originally started out to working economically in 1951 were Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg, Italy, and the Netherlands. Now there are 27 countries that are part of the Member States in the EU, excluding the UK who withdrew in January 2020.

¹⁰³¹ European Commission, “Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the European council, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions” July 24, 2020. Accessed August 11, 2020. <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/communication-eu-security-union-strategy.pdf>.

¹⁰³² FRONTEX, “Risk Analysis 2020”, March 2020. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2020.pdf.

¹⁰³³ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁴ Ibid.

is there to protect the citizens of the EU from any potential threats from entering. They do this by checking for illegal items which most often come in the form of illegal firearms, drug trafficking, stolen vehicles and parts, and false documentation. FRONTEX admits, “Borders provide challenges, but also opportunities in countering-terrorism as they offer a geographical spread where Member States can take executive actions to deter, disrupt, and detect terrorist-related movements and detain those involved in terrorist-related activities.”¹⁰³⁵.

Advanced technological programs such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), Entry-Exit System (EES), and the Electronic Travel Information and Authorization (ETIAS) are technical identification informational systems that help with the fight against terrorism or terror-related activities/persons¹⁰³⁶. The support system of FRONTEX has four guidelines towards their mission: a) adapting to the threat and facilitating access, b) outreaching and spreading knowledge, c) engaging and supporting, and d) informing/influencing EU policy¹⁰³⁷. All these efforts to support in countering-terrorism are to make the process for the entire EU work as a team for the same goal of protection and safety of each nation.

European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) at Europol

One of the priorities for ECTC is to counter the advancement of terrorism as well as foreign fighters. Despite threatening plots and attacks in the EU in recent years, the EU Situation and Trend Report (TESAT) states, “a total of 199 completed, failed, and foiled terrorist attacks in 2019 were reported by 13 EU countries”¹⁰³⁸. The capability of the Islamic State to create contact networks of extremist within the EU and the Middle East causes ad-

¹⁰³⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰³⁶ Sarah Léonard, “Border Controls as a dimension of the European Union’s counter-terrorism policy: a critical assessment,” January 13, 2015, *Intelligence and National Security* 30, no. 2–3 (2015): 306–332.

¹⁰³⁷ FRONTEX, “Risk Analysis 2020”, March 2020. Accessed July 20, 2020. https://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2020.pdf.

¹⁰³⁸ Europol, “European Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT)”, 2020. Accessed August 13, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/terrorism>.

ditional threats of terrorism. Europol shares, “The European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECTC) evolved in 2016 to enhance cross border cooperation between relevant counter-terrorism authorities.”¹⁰³⁹. The Report goes on to argue, “Terrorist attacks tend to be directed by IS or inspired by IS ideology and rhetoric that include a range of weapons that include bladed weapons, automatic rifles, explosives, and vehicles.”¹⁰⁴⁰. While the threat of terrorism has subsided in 2019 because of the effective law enforcement and security authorities, there is still a high demand for safe security measures. While FRONTEX focuses on the border security aspect, ECTC works on countering terrorism within the EU countries. This includes migrants who may have been turned by persuasion of an IS affiliate, the radicalism in prisons that can lead to recruitment, and sole actors who are persuaded by e.g. martyr and heroic ideologies. These threats remain high within the EU¹⁰⁴¹. Terrorism Situation and Trends report states that in 2019 there were 1,004 individuals arrested on suspicion of terror-related activities in 19 Member States¹⁰⁴². That number has decreased from 2017, which reported 1,219¹⁰⁴³ arrests on suspicion of terrorist-related activities. Security measures are placed by ECTC to keep the public safe from any potential harm and Europol works towards that goal to subside violent tactics by extremist whether they are sole actors or from an organization.

The Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN)

As part of the EU Internal Security Strategy (EU ISS) in 2010, its main objective is to target radicalization and recruitment. By 2017 the pressure to reform the prison system to combat criminalization of terrorism increased with the newly adopted EU Directive on combatting terrorism¹⁰⁴⁴. Radicali-

¹⁰³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴¹ Scott Gates and Sukanya Podder, “Social Media, Recruitment, Allegiance and the Islamic State” *Perspective on Terrorism*, (2015): 107–113.

¹⁰⁴² Europol, “European Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TESAT)”, 2020. Accessed August 13, 2020. <https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-trends/crime-areas/terrorism>.

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁴ ICF, “How to prevent dangerous radicalization in prisons”, March 4, 2019. Accessed September 22, 2020. <https://www.icf.com/insights/public-policy/preventing-radicalization-in-prisons>.

zation of criminals occurring in prisons has become a focus point for the RAN organization¹⁰⁴⁵. This is where terrorist-related activities, return of foreign fighters, and criminals tend to congregate and end up sharing some of the same ideologies and/or looking for new life once out of prison, all of which the Islamic State tapped into as part of its newer recruiting methods. An ICF report suggests, “The prison environment helped European terrorist groups support and further develop propaganda, as well as extremist groups from the conditions of the prisons”¹⁰⁴⁶.

In response to these findings, Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) was created, as a network of practitioners and experts working towards preventing and countering violent extremism. With the support of the European Organization of Prison and Correctional Services (EUOPRIS), they work towards the de-radicalization and prevention of radicalization in prisons¹⁰⁴⁷. In 2015, the key focal point of RAN was to “develop work with third countries with a priority on Turkey, and countries in the Middle East, Western Balkans, and North Africa.”¹⁰⁴⁸. Working towards de-radicalization in prisons is a top priority as a fight against terrorism from within the Member States.

Conclusion

Terrorist organizations and terrorist threats are security issues for all countries. When the terrorist attacks happened in the US on September 11,

¹⁰⁴⁵ European Commission, “Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the European council, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions”, April 24, 2015. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/european-agenda-security.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁶ ICF, “How to prevent dangerous radicalization in prisons”, March 4, 2019. Accessed September 22, 2020. <https://www.icf.com/insights/public-policy/preventing-radicalization-in-prisons>.

¹⁰⁴⁷ European Commission, “Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the European council, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions”, April 24, 2015. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/european-agenda-security.pdf>.

¹⁰⁴⁸ European Commission, “Communication from the commission to the European parliament, the European council, the council, the European economic and social committee and the committee of the regions”, April 24, 2015. Accessed July 31, 2020. <https://www.cepol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/european-agenda-security.pdf>.

2001, it set a standard for increased security measures. When the attack happened in the EU in Madrid in 2004, that set the tone for the EU to take counter measures towards the fight against terrorism. The terror, fear, and uncertainty of the Islamic State's future plans has pushed the EU to increase security measures to prevent terrorist attacks. By 2006, the EU formed FRONTEX to protect its borders and control the internal and external border management of migration from land and sea, refugees, and the stoppage of illegal firearms, drug trafficking, and illicit goods. With the migration and refugee crisis that took place in 2015, IS took advantage of this opportunity to smuggle in operatives as well an increase in foreign fighters. This also stems from the motivation and propaganda used to bring more persons for foreign land to be recruited into the Islamic State. Over the past couple of years many foreign fighters returning from their combat tour have "avowedly reject[ed] the Islamic State and its violent ways/tactics."¹⁰⁴⁹ The downward trend in 2019 from terrorist attacks and plots foiled, a decrease in foreign fighters traveling to and from countries with known conflicts, as well as a decrease in terror-related activities, and radicalism has shown that the fight against terrorism is effective. The depletion of the Islamic State finances from land lost due to the formation of joint coalitions to deter IS over in Syria and Iraq have effectively minimized their resources. Although their main sources of oil and taxes are less, they are still able to network through telecommunications with recruiters and other foreign fighters all over the world. With the downward trend of plots and/or attacks by terrorist, the goal within the security challenges for the EU for the next five years should focus on three main areas:

1. fighting organized crime,
2. countering terrorism and radicalization,
3. fighting crimes in the digital age"¹⁰⁵⁰.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Souad Mekhennet and Joby Warrick, "The appeal of ISIS fades among Europeans who return home from Syria", Washington Post, June 14, 2020. Accessed August 10, 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/the-appeal-of-isis-fades-among-europeans-who-returned-home-from-syria/2020/06/14/754b3e0e-acb9-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html.

¹⁰⁵⁰ European Commission, "Security Union Strategy", Migration and Home Affairs, July 2020. Accessed August 12, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/security-union-strategy_en.

Although it is hard to determine for how long this downward trend of terrorist attacks will continue, the continuous progression towards the security of the EU, the fight against radicalism, and the help provided to third countries from the influence of terrorist organizations can keep the amount of threats and progression minimized.